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SUMMARY 
The still on-going negotiations on the future of the international regime on climate 
change for the period post-2012 have compelled negotiators to consider climate change 
effects in today’s multiple and (now undeniably) real manifestations. In this context, the 
´sinking island paradigm’ has emerged as one of the latest and perhaps most paradigmatic 
images of today´s post-modern global environmental crisis. International legal scholars have 
thus gradually come to embrace the looming threat of State extinction due to climate change 
impacts as an unprecedented and challenging issue deserving close examination. Yet, most 
studies have in common 1/ the use scientific data on sea-level rise projection as the 
benchmark legitimizing the study of this issue; and 2/ the use of a disaggregated approach on 
the effects of climate change by authors who generally focus on the consequences of climate 
change in only one of the tree dimensions of the State at a time (effects of sea level rise on 
island States’ maritime rights, decrease of habitability conditions prompting population 
displacement or the prospect of government relocation). As a result, the question of State 
extinction is generally by-passed or conceived as a marginal question merely connected with 
the effects of climate change in only one of these dimensions.  
This thesis engages with these two characteristics of current studies on State extinction for 
climate change impacts and proposes to approach the issue through a new methodological 
and structural blueprint.  The purpose of the thesis is not to predict or resolve the question of 
whether the international legal personality of low-lying island States will get extinct as the 
material substratum of the State (namely, its territory, population and government) gradually 
crumbles.  Considering whether a ‘metaphysical State’ could one day see the day of light 
seems, at this point, a premature endeavour.  Rather, this thesis seeks to point out at the 
relevant factors that one day may - and should- be used to resolve such question, and also 
demonstrate the extent to which some of such factors are already available in the 
international political sphere.   
Part I of the thesis departs from one main argument, namely, that State extinction for 
climate change impacts is a matter that ought to be (re)anchored in the realm of international 
politics regardless of the scientifically measurable nature of the phenomenon, for the State is, 
fundamentally, a political construct - with sovereignty as its distinctive legal attribute. Indeed, 
since the creation of States operates in the political realm, the same can be presumed for the 
question of extinction of States; and thus, taking stock of the view that the international 
community already has on the matter may prove to be a determinant factor of its resolution. 
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The interpretation, understanding and consequent construction of interests that States have 
made about this issue is analysed and explained in detail, in Chapters 1 to 3, through the 
reconstruction of what is referred to as the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse. This Discourse, developed in parallel to the mainstream climate change 
negotiations, is a ten-year-old political move, involving a great majority of State actors, and 
which has been institutionalized and circulated through a wide range of regional and global 
international organizations.  
Chapter 1 begins by showing how the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse can be conceived as a ‘revival’ of a political process started in the 1980s by the 
Soviet Union, which sought to link the spheres of ‘environment’ and ‘security’ as an alternative 
strategy to the arms race, and introduced the concepts of ‘international ecological security’ 
into the agenda of the United Nations. It then considers how the concept of environmental 
security, which evolved after the end of the Cold War outside the United Nations framework, 
developed in the ‘security studies’ doctrinal circles. Important theoretical and empirical studies 
emerged in the 1990s (including opposing voices), reinforcing the link between environment 
and security and providing a basis for the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
which was yet to come.  
Chapter 2 thus marks the point of departure of the ‘second wave’ of the environment 
and security link within the specific context of climate change. It maps the birth, circulation 
and limits of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse within and among 
regional organizations, showing how it emerged from hegemonic regions (the Euro-Atlantic 
Axis) and was then disseminated to the regional organizations of the most vulnerable regions – 
notably the Pacific Islands Forum and the African Union – while remaining unabsorbed by 
emerging regions less likely to suffer extreme climate change impacts, who oppose the 
movement and fight to maintain the climate change global discourse within the mainstream 
UNFCCC–KP framework. 
 Then, Chapter 3 moves on from the regional level of analysis to the universal level, 
reconstructing the introduction of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
into the policy agenda, and the operation, of the two core organs of the United Nations: the 
Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA). Most importantly, Chapter 3 shows 
that the latest understanding of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, as 
widely approved by a majority of States, can be reduced to one fundamental issue: the threat 
of climate change to the survival of low-lying island States.  
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Part II thus operates a shift from the political or ‘pre-normative’ level of analysis to the 
formulation of a legal question and analyses how the elements of statehood are challenged by 
climate change effects through the study of Pacific Island States, major co-promoters of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse and region where three out of the four 
low-lying island States – all with a maximum altitude of less than 5 metres – are located 
(Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands). The analysis of the effects of climate change on 
Pacific Island States is thus carried out through a division of three main dimensions of 
statehood.  
Firstly, Chapter 4 deals with the effects of climate change on Pacific islands’ territory – 
referred to as the ‘de-territorialization challenge’ – including how climate change may affect 
the maritime entitlements of these often called ‘Ocean States’. A genealogical study of the 
meaning of territory in international law first indicates that, just as the nature of the State – a 
privileged habitat of the territory – goes beyond the realm of law, the place of territory in 
international law is equally unsettled and its nature doubtful from a legal perspective. In the 
case of post-colonial Pacific Island States, the territory was a vehicle for expressing or 
manifesting the right of Pacific island peoples to self-determination and political independence 
from former colonial domination. This particular meaning explains why they were granted 
statehood in spite of their very limited land area (as opposed to very big maritime spaces), and 
shows how the existence of a solid normative ground may balance and even supersede the 
viability requirement.  This Chapter also introduces the question of whether completely de-
territorialized nations may still survive as independent sovereign entities, through the analysis 
of two precedents: the Holy See and the Order of Malta, whose current atypical status shows 
that there is room and flexibility in international life allowing a typology of subjects of the 
international legal system - as long as strong historical and political reasons support this 
special treatment. It is also a reminder that, sovereignty and statehood may come together, or 
be set apart, if necessary, to acknowledge the existence of a special political entity that plays a 
positive role in the international community.  
The continuation of Pacific island sovereignty and/or statehood, even in extreme cases of 
total territorial loss, may be justified by the role played by the second dimension of the State, 
namely, the population, since a sovereign political entity with international legal personality 
may result first from its total or acute de-population, before total submergence ensues. 
Chapter 5 thus considers the implications of climate change impacts on Pacific islanders. After 
a comparative analysis of the climate-induced relocations already accomplished in the region 
and a critique of how climate-induced displacement has so far been dealt with in international 
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legal scholarship, it proposes an alternative approach to the legal-protection tools which have 
so far been developed. The proposal consists on conceptualizing the legal protection of Pacific 
islanders within a multilayered legal protection scheme, which axis and main structural variable 
is the question of the continuation of the State; the idea that fate of Pacific islanders and the 
eventual legal protection they may have cannot be detached from the fate of their State of 
origin is thus highlighted.  
Although this fundamental and structuring question – whether and when Pacific island 
statehood may become extinct – remains outstanding, it is clear that in all stages and scenarios 
covered by the multilayered legal protection scheme, the action and presence of the political 
dimension of the State is fundamental. Chapter 6 is finally devoted to a study of the effects of 
climate change on Pacific islands’ governmental capacities, both nationally and internationally. 
Considering the literature on ‘failed States’ and governments in exile, it first deals with the 
scenario in which governments of Pacific Island States may be obliged to evacuate State 
territory (referred to as ex situ governments). Ultimately, as the three dimensions of Pacific 
islands’ statehood may be challenged at any time, this closing Chapter explores the role to be 
played by different normative and political avenues which will determine their continuation as 
States. From a politico-legal perspective, these include, most notably, the claims to the 
continuation of statehood made by the affected States– and revealed by the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse-, the corresponding reactions of other States through 
international recognition, and possibly the outcome of Pacific islanders´ right to self-
determination on the future organization of their communities. Yet, may these factors come 
up in the real political scenario, when a more pressing time crystallizes, and influence the 
contingencies of the moment, two ethical constraints should also play a determining role: the 
ethical compromise of the international community vis-à-vis future generations, and the need 
not to disregard the fact that today’s present vulnerable condition of Pacific Island States is 
bound to the history of their colonial occupation by certain industrialized countries.  
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RESUMEN 
Las negociaciones sobre el futuro de régimen internacional sobre cambio climático 
para el periodo post-2012 han forzado a los negociadores a considerar los efectos del cambio 
climático en sus múltiples – y ahora innegablemente reales – manifestaciones. En este 
contexto, el surgimiento del ‘paradigma del hundimiento de los Estados insulares’ 
(denominado en inglés ‘the sinking island paradigm’) se ha constituido como una  imagen 
particularmente paradigmática y representativa de la actual crisis medioambiental global. Así, 
internacionalistas del mundo académico han ido por tanto gradualmente abordando la 
cuestión de la amenaza de extinción del Estado como resultado de los impactos del cambio 
climático como un desafío sin precedentes y merecedor de escrutinio doctrinal.  
No obstante, la mayoría de los estudios hasta ahora desarrollados tienen dos 
características en común: 1/ el uso de datos científicos sobre la proyección del aumento del 
nivel del mar como punto de partida sobre el que legitimar el estudio de esta cuestión; y 2/ el 
uso de una aproximación desagregada sobre los efectos del cambio climático, que centra el 
estudio de estos impactos en tan solo una de las tres dimensiones del Estado (efectos del 
aumento del nivel del mar en los derechos sobre los espacios marinos de los Estados insulares, 
por un lado; descenso de las condiciones de habitabilidad, dando lugar a desplazamientos de la 
población, por otro lado; o bien la posibilidad de relocalización del gobierno en el extranjero). 
Como resultado, la cuestión de la extinción del Estado es generalmente eludida o concebida 
como una cuestión marginal, si acaso, meramente conectada con los efectos del cambio 
climático en tanto solo una de las tres dimensiones del Estado.  
  Esta tesis aborda estas dos características de los estudios actuales sobre extinción del 
Estado producida por los impactos del cambio climático y propone una aproximación 
metodológica y estructural innovadora. El propósito de esta tesis no es predecir o resolver si la 
personalidad jurídica internacional de los Estados insulares de baja altitud se extinguirá en la 
medida en que el sustrato material del Estado (es decir, su territorio, población y gobierno) 
acaben desintegrándose gradualmente. Proyectar y establecer la posibilidad de que un ‘Estado 
metafísico’ pueda, algún día,  hacerse realidad en la esfera internacional parece, en este 
momento, un objetivo prematuro. Por tanto, esta tesis propone únicamente indicar los 
factores relevantes que pudieran – y debieran- un día ser utilizados para resolver dicha 
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incógnita. También se propone demostrar en qué medida algunos de estos factores se 
encuentran ya disponibles en la esfera política internacional.  
  La primera parte de esta tesis parte de un argumento principal – a saber, que la 
extinción del Estado por los efectos del cambio climático es un problema que debe ser (re) 
asignado o (re)ubicado en el ámbito de la política internacional, con independencia de la 
naturaleza científicamente calibrable del fenómeno, puesto que el Estado es, 
fundamentalmente, fruto de una construcción política – siendo la soberanía su atributo 
jurídico distintivo. En efecto, dado que el proceso de creación de los Estados opera en el 
ámbito político, esta misma característica puede igualmente presumirse en materia de 
extinción de los Estados; así,  hacer balance de la visión que la comunidad internacional tiene 
en este momento sobre este problema puede resultar ser un elemento determinante para su 
resolución. La interpretación, comprensión y consecuente construcción de los intereses que 
los Estados han llevado a cabo sobre esta materia es analizada y explicada detalladamente, en 
los capítulos 1 a 3, a través de la reconstrucción del llamado Discurso del Cambio Climático y la 
Seguridad Internacional. Este Discurso, desarrollado en paralelo a las negociaciones del clima, 
es un movimiento político que data de hace diez años, incorpora a una gran mayoría de 
actores estatales, y ha sido institucionalizado y circulado a través de un gran elenco de 
organizaciones internacionales, tanto de corte regional como global.  
El Capítulo 1 abre la tesis mostrando cómo el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad 
Internacional puede ser concebido como el resurgimiento de un proceso político iniciado en 
los años 80 por la Unión Soviética, cuyo objetivo entonces fuera vincular las esferas del 
medioambiente y la seguridad como alternativa a la estrategia de seguridad basada en la 
carrera armamentística entonces dominante, y que dio como fruto conceptual la introducción 
de la noción de ‘seguridad ecológica internacional’ o seguridad ambiental en la agenda de 
Naciones Unidas. Prosigue considerando cómo el concepto de seguridad ambiental, cuya 
evolución tras el final de la Guerra Fría tuvo lugar fuera del marco de Naciones Unidas, 
continuó su desarrollo en el seno de los círculos doctrinales y escuela dedicadas a los estudios 
sobre seguridad (siendo esta nueva disciplina conocida en inglés como ‘international security 
studies’).  Importantes estudios teóricos y empíricos emergieron así en los años 90 (voces 
discordantes incluidas), que reforzaron el vínculo entre el medioambiente y la seguridad y 
establecieron las bases para el futuro surgimiento del Discurso del Cambio Climático y la 
Seguridad Internacional.  
El Capítulo 2 establece el punto de partida de esta segunda etapa en la asociación de las 
esferas del medioambiente y la seguridad internacional, ubicándolo en el contexto específico 
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del cambio climático. Delinea la historia del surgimiento, la circulación y los límites del Discurso 
del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional dentro y entre organizaciones regionales. 
Muestra cómo este Discurso es un producto narrativo que emergió de las regiones 
hegemónicas (o ‘Eje Euro-Atlántico’), para ser posteriormente diseminado hacia las 
organizaciones regionales de las regiones más vulnerables a los impactos del clima– en 
particular, al Foro de las Islas del Pacífico y la Unión Africana-; quedando al margen de la 
regiones emergentes con menor probabilidad de sufrir los impactos del cambio climático en su 
versión más extrema, que se oponen a este movimiento y luchan para mantener el  discurso 
global del cambio climático dentro del la vía principal del Convenio Marco de Naciones Unidas 
para el Cambio Climático y el Protocolo de Kioto.  
El Capítulo 3 pasa del nivel regional de análisis al nivel universal, reconstruyendo la 
introducción del Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional en la agenda 
política de los dos órganos principales de las Naciones Unidas: el Consejo de Seguridad (CSNU) 
y la Asamblea General (AGNU). El aspecto  más relevante de este capítulo es que muestra que, 
cómo resultado del proceso de absorción, discusión y progresiva re-significación del Discurso 
del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional en estos órganos, aprobada y adoptada por 
la mayoridad de los Estados, este Discurso a llegado finalmente a cristalizar una cuestión 
fundamental: la amenaza que el cambio climático supone para la supervivencia de los Estados 
insulares de baja altitud.  
La segunda parte de la tesis opera por tanto un cambio de nivel de análisis político o ‘pre-
normativo’, a la formulación de una cuestión jurídica, y se propone analizar los efectos del 
cambio climático en las tres dimensiones del Estado (la dimensión espacial –el territorio; la 
dimensión humana – la población; y la dimensión política – el gobierno) a través del estudio 
concreto del caso de los Estados insulares del Pacífico. La elección de esta región de muestra 
se debe a que,  por un lado, estos Estados son los principales co-promotores del Discurso del 
Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional en los órganos de Naciones Unidas, y, por otro 
lado, sólo en esta región se encuentran ubicados tres de los cuatro Estados insulares del 
mundo únicamente compuestos por atolones de altitud inferior o igual a 5 metros, para 
quienes la amenaza de extinción es más acuciante. Estos Estados son Kiribati, Tuvalu y las Islas 
Marshall, siendo las islas Maldivas el cuarto Estado amenazado, y situado en el Océano Índico. 
El análisis de los efectos del cambio climático en los Estados insulares del Pacífico y la amenaza 
de extinción que estos suponen es llevado a cado en los capítulos 6 a 8, cada uno 
correspondiente a una de las tres dimensiones del Estado.  
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En primer lugar, el Capítulo 4 aborda los efectos del cambio climático en el territorio de las 
islas del Pacífico – referido como ‘el desafío de la des-territorialización’, incluyendo  en el 
estudio de la dimensión espacial cómo el aumento del nivel del mar puede afectar a los 
derechos sobre los espacios marinos de estos Estados, a menudos llamados ‘Estados 
oceánicos’. Un estudio genealógico del significado del territorio en Derecho internacional 
indica en primer lugar que, así como la naturaleza  del Estado – hábitat privilegiado del 
territorio- traspasa el ámbito del Derecho,  el papel del territorio en Derecho internacional es 
igualmente indefinido y su naturaleza dudosa desde una perspectiva jurídica. En el caso de los 
Estados insulares post-coloniales del Pacífico, el territorio fue un vehículo  para expresar o 
manifestar el Derecho de los pueblos insulares del Pacífico a la auto-determinación e 
independencia política de la dominación colonial. Este significado particular explicar por qué 
les fue otorgada la condición de Estado a pesar de su limitada área terrestre (que contrasta 
con sus amplios espacios marítimo), y muestra cómo la existencia de una base normativa 
sólida puede equilibrar e incluso superar la condición ‘practica’ de la viabilidad. Este capítulo  
plantea igualmente la cuestión de si naciones completamente des-territorializadas podrían, no 
obstante, sobrevivir como entidades soberanas independientes. Para ello, realiza un análisis de 
dos precedentes: la Santa Sede y la Orden de  Malta, cuyo actual estatuto atípico revela cómo 
la esfera internacional es capaz de tolerar con flexibilidad la existencia de una tipología si 
acaso, heterogénea, de los sujetos del sistema jurídico internacional; ello   siempre y cuando 
razones de peso histórico y/o político justifiquen y avalen dicho tratamiento especial. El caso 
de estos dos precedentes es también un recordatorio de que soberanía y estatalidad pueden 
venir de la mano, o existir con independencia la una de la otra, si dado el caso fuera necesario 
para reconocer la existencia de una entidad política especial que juega un papel positivo en la 
comunidad internacional.  
La continuación de la soberanía y/o estatalidad de las islas del Pacífico, incluso en casos 
extremos de pérdida territorial, puede encontrar justificación en el papel que juega la segunda 
dimensión del Estado, es decir, la población, dado que la extinción de una entidad política 
soberana con personalidad jurídica internacional puede resultar, en primer lugar, de su total o 
marcadamente acentuado despoblación, antes incluso de que quedar totalmente sumergida. 
El capítulo 5 considera por tanto las implicaciones de los impactos del cambio climático en los 
habitantes de las islas del Pacífico. Tras realizar un análisis comparativo de las relocalizaciones 
inducidas por el cambio climático ya acaecidas en la región, y criticar cómo los 
desplazamientos inducidos por el fenómeno han sido hasta ahora tratados en la doctrina 
internacionalista, este capítulo propone una aproximación alternativa a los instrumentos de 
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protección jurídica hasta el momento desarrollados. La propuesta consiste en conceptualizar la 
protección jurídica de los habitantes de las islas del Pacífico dentro de un esquema de 
protección jurídica multi-nivel, cuyo eje y variable estructural sea la cuestión de la 
continuación del Estado. La idea de que el destino de los habitantes de las islas del Pacífico y su 
eventual protección jurídica no puede desvincularse del destino de su Estado de origen  es por 
tanto particularmente señalada.  
A pesar de que esta cuestión fundamental y estructural – si los Estados insulares del 
Pacífico llegarán a extinguirse y, en caso afirmativo, en qué momento podrá considerarse que 
este fenómeno tuvo lugar – permanece sin resolver, queda claro que en todas las etapas y 
escenario cubiertos por el esquema de protección jurídica multi-nivel, la acción y presencia de 
la dimensión política del Estado  es fundamental. El capítulo 6 está finalmente dedicado al 
estudio de los efectos del cambio climático en las capacidades gubernativas de los Estados 
insulares del Pacífico, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. Considerando la literatura 
sobre ‘Estados fallidos’ y gobiernos en el exilio, comienza por adentrarse en el escenario en el 
que los gobiernos de las islas del Pacífico puedan verse obligados a evacuar el territorio del 
Estado (denominados en este capítulo ‘gobiernos ex situ’). En última instancia, cuando  las tres 
dimensiones de las estatalidad de las islas del Pacífico son desafiadas al mismo tiempo, este 
capítulo de cierre explora el papel que juegan las distintas salidas normativas y políticas que 
determinarán su continuación como Estados. Desde una perspectiva político-jurídica, estas 
posibilidades incluyen, en particular, la reivindicación de continuación de la estatalidad 
realizadas por los Estados afectados – y revelados por el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la 
Seguridad Internacional -; las reacciones correspondientes de otros Estados a través del 
reconocimiento internacional; y, posiblemente, el resultado del derecho de auto-
determinación de los habitantes isleños del Pacífico sobre la futura organización de sus 
respectivas comunidades. Por ende, si estos factores llegaran a surgir en el escenario político 
real, cuando la presión material se cristalice, e influencien las contingencias del momento, dos 
constricciones éticas debieran igualmente jugar un papel determinante. Por un lado, el 
compromiso ético suscrito por la comunidad internacional  con relación a las futuras 
generaciones; y, por otro, la necesidad de no menospreciar el hecho de que la actual condición 
de vulnerabilidad  de los Estados insulares del Pacífico está íntimamente vinculada – e incluso 
es en parte resultado -   del pasado de dominación colonial ejercida por países industrializados.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘All Science should be scholarly, but not all scholarship should 
be rigorously scientific. [T]he terrae incognitae of the 
periphery contain fertile ground awaiting cultivation with the 
tools and in the spirit of the humanities.’  
John Kirtland Wright, Terrae Incognitae: The Place 
of Imagination in Geography, 1947. 
 
 
1. Climate Change, International Security and the State at a Crossroads  
Both the State and international security are topical in international law and have been 
thoroughly studied by international legal scholars for at least the past four centuries. Climate 
change, in contrast, has only been identified as a distinguishable scientific phenomenon for the 
past four decades.1 How has the oldest and perhaps most paradigmatic figure of the post-
Westphalia international legal system as the State and its security come across a fairly recent 
and still contested phenomenon such as climate change? At the heart of this puzzle lies the 
original impetus of this thesis.  
The eruption of climate change as an issue deserving international political attention 
and eventually demanding international action has gone through progressive stages of 
development.2 At the onset of the history of climate change in international relations lies the 
birth of ecological political movements in western countries, which arguably served as the 
cradle of the concern about the excesses of industrialization.3 Such initial preoccupation 
became more solidly grounded as scientific knowledge about global warming and climate 
change began to develop. Far from being a merely opportunistic political construct serving 
other, wider, related causes (such as peace), the existence of climate change began to be 
acknowledged on the international scene as a scientifically proven disruption of the natural 
climate cycle resulting – at least to some extent – from human action.4 Certainly, since the 
                                                          
1
 See S. R. WEART, The Discovery of Global Warming, 2003, (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University 
Press).  
2
 See D. DOBANSKY, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, 2010, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press), pp. 18-37; more specifically on the three stages of the climate-change regime. 
J. VIÑUALES, ‘Balancing Fairness and Effectiveness in the Redesign of the Climate Change Regime’, 
(2011) Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 24, issue 1, pp. 223-252. 
3
 See J. DRYZEK, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses, 1997, (New York: Oxford University 
Press) at 51.  
4
 While the first studies on climate change science date back to the late-19
th
 century, it was not until the 
1990s that broad (though still contested) consensus within the scientific community was reached 
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early stages of development of climate change science, ‘cornucopian’ voices were raised 
denying both the link between the cause – industrial growth – and the effect – disruption in 
the natural climate cycle – on the one hand, and the very existence of environmental limits to 
industrial growth altogether, on the other hand.5 Yet, these voices lacked the strength to stop 
the international community from beginning to develop collective concerted action to halt 
climate change and react against its impacts. In this context, the creation in 1988 of the UNEP–
WMO Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change played a crucial role in neutralizing the 
potential effects of climate change sceptics, as it legitimized the development of international 
co-operation on this matter and served as the source of scientific knowledge officially 
recognized by a great number of States.6 A few years later, concerted action materialized with 
the adoption at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1992) of the multilateral environmental agreement specifically designed to deal with 
the issue, namely, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).7  
Since the adoption of this instrument, the international regime on climate change has 
developed exponentially, complemented by a large number of decisions adopted by the 
successive Conferences of the States Parties to the UNFCCC, including the adoption, in 1997, of 
the Kyoto Protocol, which established specific emission-reduction targets for industrialized 
countries. The three main characteristics of international co-operation on climate change in 
the past two decades should therefore be highlighted. First of all, climate change has been 
conceptualized as a double-edged issue, constituting as much an environmental problem as a 
challenge to developmental needs, as reflected in the underlying principles grounding the 
                                                                                                                                      
acknowledging the influence of man-made greenhouse gas emissions in the Earth’s climate system. The 
reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, created in 1988, provided a solid 
institutional grounding for scientific studies on these lines to develop further. Besides, scientific studies 
have exponentially developed in parallel to the work undertaken by the IPCC in a framework more 
distant to the political context in which the studies of the IPCC necessarily operate. Such studies, 
conducted for instance by physics and geologists, give broader accounts of the evolution of the Earth’s 
climate system by covering successive geological eras. In this sense, see for instance the works of J. 
ZALASIEWICZ, The Earth After Us, 2009, (Oxford: Oxford University Press); as well as J. ZALASIEWICZ and 
M. WILLIAMS, The Goldilocks Planet: the 4 Billion Year Story of Earth’s Climate, 2012, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).  
5
 See, for instance, B. LOMBERG, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World, 
2001, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). 
6
 On the creation of the IPCC as a scientific body working in a political context, see for instance F. 
SOLTAU, Fairness in International Climate Change Law and Policy, 2011, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 21-48.  
7
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted on 9 May 1992, entered into force 
on 16 February 2005, 1771 UNTS 164.  
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regime and structuring it.8 Secondly, until very recent years, international efforts have been 
largely focused on the development of concerted mitigation, relegating adaptation to a 
secondary role.9 Thirdly, and consistent with the generally inseparable conceptual bond 
between the environmental and developmental rationales, the timid pace of development of 
adaptation has been directly linked to the analytical framework of development. 
Today’s still on-going negotiations on the future of the international regime on climate 
change for the period post-2012 have compelled negotiators to take into account the reality of 
climate change effects in its multiple manifestations, to consider the new state of the 
international political arena, and correlatively to evaluate whether it might be necessary to 
revisit some of the conceptual foundations of the regime.10 Paradoxically, now that the 
                                                          
8
 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, firstly stipulated in Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development and also enshrined in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC, is 
perhaps the most illustrative structuring principle of the double-edged nature of the international 
regime on climate change. According to it, while all States share the common responsibility to protect 
the global environment, industrial countries bear the primary responsibility due to: 1/ their historical 
responsibility in creating climate change; and 2/ the differing capacities of developing States to take 
remedial measures. As explained by Lavanya Rajamani, based on this principle, the UNFCCC contains a 
‘balance of commitments’ whereby developing (non Annex I) countries are required to develop in a 
sustainable manner and address the negative impacts of climate change through adaptation, while 
industrial (Annex I) countries are required to address climate change through mitigation commitments 
and for some industrial (Annex II) countries to also share the burden of financing developing countries’ 
adaptation measures. See L. RAJAMANI, ‘The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and 
the Balance of Commitments under the Climate Change Regime’, (2000) Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law, vol. 9, pp. 120-131, at 125. 
9
 Ten years after the adoption of the UNFCCC and five years after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, 
Roda Verheyen still considered that ‘the law on adaptation is still in its infancy’, in R. VERHEYEN, 
‘Adaptation to the Impacts of Anthropogenic Climate Change – The International Framework’, (2002) 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, vol. 2, pp. 129-143, at 129. Since 
then, however, climate-change adaptation has received two major boosts. The first one stemmed from 
the adoption in 2006 of the Nairobi Work Programme, which tasked the Subsidiary Body for Scientific, 
Technological and Technical Advice to address the impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate 
change during a five year project. This has been recently complemented by the adoption in 2010 of the 
Cancun Adaptation Framework, opening a process that will enable Least Developed Countries to 
formulate and implement national adaptation plans, develop work programmes to address loss and 
damage derived from climate change impacts and even establish an Adaptation Committee.  
10
 Amongst the most blatant attacks against the consideration of fairness issues in the international 
regime on climate change for the period post-2012 lies the attack from the law and economics 
movement of the Chicago Law School, as notably developed in E. POSNER and D. WEISBACH, Climate 
Change Justice, 2010 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). Specifically arguing against three core 
arguments displayed in Posner and Weisbach’s book, see M. PROST and A. TORRES CAMPRUBI, ‘Against 
Fairness? International Environmental Law, Disciplinary Bias and Pareto Justice’, (2012) Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol. 25, issue 2, pp. 379-396. Broader scholarly accounts from the Third World 
Approaches to International Law movement, specifically focusing on the environmental field, complete 
the alternative view to that of the Chicago Law School. In this sense, see for instance, A. NAJAM, ‘Why 
Environmental Politics Looks Different from the South’, in P. DAUVERGNE (ed.), Handbook of Global 
Environmental Politics, 2005, (Northampton, UK: Edward Elgar Pub.), pp. 111-117; V. ARGYROU, The 
Logic of Environmentalism: Anthropology, Ecology and Postcoloniality, 2005, (New York: Bergham 
Books); U. NATARAJAN, ‘TWAIL and the Environment: The State of Nature, the Nature of the State and 
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existence of adverse effects of climate change is no longer subject to uncertain and unscientific 
predictions, but constitutes a present reality, the prospective image of international co-
operation on climate change has become more blurred. The limits of the last twenty years of 
international efforts to combat the impacts of climate change are indeed surfacing and the 
international regime on climate change, traditionally considered as an illustration of the 
inherently progressive agenda of international environmental law, is gradually being marked 
and referred to by, its failures rather than by the accomplishments it once achieved.11 Most 
importantly, despite the fact that, since the turn of the new millennium, the focus of the 
international regime on climate change may be said to be shifting towards the development of 
concerted action on adaptation rather than mitigation, the present on-going climate change 
negotiations are revealing the unsuitability of the UNFCCC legal framework on adaptation to 
tackle the adverse impacts of climate change effectively.  
 And yet, in contrast, the looming crisis in mainstream international co-operation on 
climate change is serving as the benchmark for a bloom of innovative approaches to the issue 
of climate change. On the one hand, a new highly controversial and rather dangerous look on 
mitigation has fostered investment in geo-engineering research programmes which propose to 
counter certain impacts by physically interfering with the climate system.12 On the other hand, 
alternative approaches on how to deal with the adverse impacts of climate change have been 
                                                                                                                                      
the Arab Spring’, (2012) Oregon Review of International Law, vol.14, pp. 177-202; and K. MICKELSON, 
‘Leading Towards a Level Playing Field, Repaying Ecological Debt, or Making Environmental Space: Three 
Stories About International Environmental Cooperation’, (2005) Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 43, issue 
1, pp.137- 170.  
11
 Literature on the failure of the UNFCCC COP.15/MOP.5 is very dense. For a particularly sharp 
illustration, see D. BODANSKY, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: a Post-Mortem’, (2010) 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 104, issue 2, pp. 230-240.  
12
 The first incursions into the field of geo-engineering have particularly arisen in the United Kingdom 
since the publication in 2009 of the Oxford Principles on Geo-engineering Research, authored by Steve 
Rayner, Tim Kruger and Julian Savulescu from the Oxford Geo-engineering Programme, along with 
Catherine Redgwell (University College London) and Nick Pidgeon (University of Cardiff). According to 
the presentation of the principles laid down in the Oxford Geo-engineering Programme’s official 
website, available at: <http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/oxford-principles/history/>, the five 
overarching principles suggested by the authors are intended to ‘guide the development of 
geoengineering techniques from early research to the point where they may be available for eventual 
deployment’, and also insist on the fact that ‘any decision with respect to deployment may only be taken 
with robust governance structures already in place in order to ensure social legitimacy’. The five 
principles stipulate that: 1/ geoengineering should be regulated as a public good; 2/ public participation 
should conduct decision-making on geoengineering; 3/ there should be complete disclosure and open 
publication of geoengineering results; 4/ a body independent of those undertaking the research should 
conduct an assessment of the impacts of geoengineering techniques; and 5/ any decisions regarding the 
deployment of geoengineering techniques should be taken with robust governance structures already in 
place. These principles were then submitted to the UK House of Commons Science and Technology 
Select Committee. After being endorsed by the Committee, they were also adopted by the UK 
Government as the first UK official policy statement on the matter.  
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put forward in parallel to the climate change negotiations (though invariably connected to 
them). These new developments essentially focus on the management of climate change 
impacts, which are already beginning to reframe the parameters of future concerted action in 
this area and can be divided into two main groups: the disaster risk-reduction stream (more 
ancient, short-term– regulated by the Hyogo Framework for Action);13 and the launch of what 
constitutes the starting point of this thesis, which will be referred to as the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse (innovative, mid-/long-term). 
While acknowledging the controversial nature of directing climate change (as any other 
issue) to the sphere of security – traditionally characterized by the lack of legitimacy and 
transparency in the decision-making process, as well as by the discretionary use of power – 
this thesis considers that studying the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is 
not only justified, but also necessary.14 The thesis seeks to prove how the security approach to 
climate change is the result of a ten-year-old political move involving a great majority of State 
actors which has been institutionalized and circulated through a wide range of regional and 
global international organizations.15 Far from merely constituting an interim ‘rhetorical’ 
exercise exclusively seeking to create more pressure on the climate change negotiations, this 
                                                          
13
 As legal and institutional responses to natural disasters are mainly dominated by humanitarian 
considerations rather than a fully fledged rights-based approach to the people affected; they are 
temporary in nature and highly dependent upon the discretionary will of foreign governments to assist 
the government and population of the State hit by the natural disaster. Nonetheless, governance 
structures for preventive and reactive responses to disasters have developed a lot during the last 
decade, particularly since the adoption in December 2009 by the UN General Assembly of the 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the creation of the United Nations Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNISDR). In 2001, the mandate of the UNISDR expanded to serve the institution tasked 
with the co-ordination of activities for disaster reduction and help mainstream disaster risk reduction 
within the areas of work of the UN dedicated to economic and social development. See UNGA Res. 
56/195, ‘International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’, document reference: A/RES/56/195, adopted on 
21 December 2001, 90
th
 plenary meeting. This expansion was complemented in January 2005 with the 
adoption of the Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the 
Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’, adopted by the World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction, in Kobe, Hyogo (Japan).   
14
 Some charges against the security approach to climate have highlighted the dangers of leaving room 
for the Security Council to expand further its scope of action; others have deplored the possible counter-
productive effect of these so-called ‘alarmist’ pledges for the appropriate understanding and resolution 
of these issues. See for instance, J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, 
2012, (New York: Oxford University Press), at 4. 
15
 For a long time, the security approach to climate change was largely disregarded in international legal 
scholarship. Some very recent new accounts seeking to map the birth and evolution of this approach 
include S. SCOTT, ‘The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close Have We Come and 
Would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?’ (2013) Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law, vol. 21, issue 3, pp. 230-240; and A. OELS, 
‘From “Securitization” of Climate Change to the “Climatization” of the Security Field: Three Theoretical 
Approaches’, in J. SCHEFFRAN, M. BRZOSKA, H.G. BRAUCH, P.M. LINK, and J. SCHILLING (eds.), Climate 
Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict, 2012, (New York: Springer), pp. 185-205.    
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political process is gradually permeating the agenda of several fora of inter-State co-operation. 
The relevance of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is therefore not 
merely based on a theoretical lucubration nurtured in the solitude of academic doctoral 
research. Nor is it a ‘futuristic’ exercise intended to make up the long-term future landscape of 
international co-operation on climate change against the background of a devastated Earth. 
Rather, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse results from a solidly 
grounded political process, undeniably operating in present international organizations and 
currently giving rise to fervent discussions by a great majority of States. Yet, this thesis not only 
seeks to demonstrate the existence of the security approach to climate change and explain its 
characteristics from a political perspective, but also to reflect on the legal implications of 
climate change impacts, as revealed by the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse. And therefore, at the core of this thesis lies one all-embracing fundamental 
question: What are the international legal implications of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse, as construed by State actors working through international 
organizations?  
The term ‘discourse’ implies that a new common and distinct understanding of a 
previously existing issue has been developed and follows Alan Gare’s point that ‘the notion of a 
global environmental crisis is a social construct’.16 Referring to this alternative approach to 
climate change as the Climate Change and International Security Discourse thus implies that 
the application of regime theory to this matter has been discarded.17 Indeed, the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse does not study the interaction between two ‘legal 
regimes’ – the climate change regime and the laws governing the use of force and the 
collective system of international security; rather, it refers to the construction, in the political 
arena, of a new interpretation and understanding of the impacts of climate change. Such new 
understanding of climate change leads directly to the emergence of a fundamental legal issue. 
This thesis seeks to show how, in its latest evolution in international organizations, the Climate 
                                                          
16
 A. E. GARE, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, 1996, (London: Routledge). Following similar 
lines, see P. BLAIKIE, ‘Postmodernism and Global Environmental Change’, (1996) Global Environmental 
Change, vol. 6, issue 2, pp. 81-85; on how to address ‘the idea of the global’, see M. HUME, ‘Problems 
with Making and Governing Global Kinds of Knowledge’, (2010) Global Environmental Change, vol. 20, 
pp. 558-564. 
17
 S. KRASNER defined a regime as a set of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. Accordingly, regime 
theory is an international relations theory derived from the liberal tradition and holding that co-
operation among States is possible in an anarchic system, for international regimes affect State behavior 
in specific political contexts or ‘issue areas’. See S. KRASNER, International Regimes, 1983, (Ithaca, N.Y.; 
Cornell University Press); and V. RITTBERGER and P. MAYER, Regime Theory and International Relations, 
1993, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press).  
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Change and International Security Discourse has come to embody one single issue commonly 
recognized and accepted by the majority of UN Member States, namely, how is the 
continuation of small islands’ statehood jeopardized by climate-change impacts. Given the 
inherent bias of international law towards stability and order, it does not come as a surprise 
that State extinction is a matter quite poorly dealt with in international legal scholarship – 
particularly when compared with the vast array of studies on the creation of States in 
international law. If anything, the issue of State extinction diverted the attention of 
international scholars in the context of State succession, that is, in cases when the 
international legal personality – rather than the material elements of the States – risked 
disappearing as a result of a political process.18 These cases, however, are a matter of 
appropriation of the governing power over a specific portion of territory and the population, 
rather than the extinction of such power due to the disappearance of the material substratum 
of sovereignty over which the governing power is displayed. In rare cases in which this case 
scenario was considered, international legal scholars simply concluded that the State 
disappears. For instance, in 1987, Ulrich Fastenrath wrote that ‘according to international law 
a State becomes extinct with the disappearance of one of the criteria of statehood (territory, 
people and government), either because it has physically ceased to exist or has merged into a 
larger unit or split up into smaller units, thereby removing the social foundation of the former 
State’.19 Following the same line, Matthew Craven more recently stated that ‘while the 
territory of a State becomes submerged by the sea, or where the population of a State 
evacuates en masse to other territories [...] it should be possible to conclude that the State has 
ceased to exist’.20 However, as the voices of small island States’ rise and warn about the threat 
that climate change constitutes for their continuation as States, new studies in international 
legal scholarship on this specific case scenario have begun to mushroom at an impressive pace. 
An emerging stream of scholars is thus beginning to put forward the idea that that 
international legal personality is not necessarily extinguished by the loss of the material 
                                                          
18
 For a recent and all-encompassing account on State extinction in international law, see M. AZNAR-
GÓMEZ, ‘The Extinction of States’, in  Eva Rieter and Henri de Waele (eds.), 2012, Evolving Principles of 
International Law : Studies in Honour of Karel C. Wellens, pp. 25-51. 
19
 U. FASTENRATH, ‘States, Extinction’, (1987) Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 10, pp. 465-
467, at 465.  
20
 M. CRAVEN, ‘The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law’, 
(1998) European Journal of International Law, vol. 9, pp. 142-162, at 159.  
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elements of the State (territory, population and government)21 for – and Jane McAdam notes – 
in matters of State extinction, ‘the law is not so clear-cut’.22  
The appeal of this issue generally begins – at least among western scholars – with the 
reminiscence of the Atlantis legend, as so beautifully narrated by Plato in his Dialogue to 
Critias: 
‘So it was that Poseidon received as one of his domains the island of Atlantis and he 
established dwelling places for the children he had fathered of a mortal woman in a certain 
place of the island that I shall describe. 
  Now, seaward, but running along the middle of the entire island, was a plain which is 
said to have been the loveliest of all plains and quite fertile. Near this plain in the middle of the 
island and at about fifty stats distance was a uniformly low and flat hill. [T]o make the hill on 
which she lived a strong enclosure he broke it to form a circle and he created alternating rings of 
sea and land around it. Some he made wider and some he made more narrow. He made two 
rings of land and three of sea as round as if he had laid them out with compass and lathe. They 
were perfectly equidistant from one another. And so the hill became inaccessible to humans’. 
 
Nonetheless, while the parallel between low-lying island States and the legendary 
island trapped in the hands of the God of the Seas is attracting the interest of an increasing 
number of international scholars, most studies undertaken so far have been mainly devoted to 
some concrete consequences of climate change for either their territory, their population or 
their governmental capacity, hence considering only one of the dimensions of the State at a 
time. For instance, studies have been dedicated to the impacts of climate change on, inter alia, 
the outer maritime boundaries of low-lying island States, or to the legal implications of 
national and transnational displacements from refugee law and international human rights law 
perspectives. However, they rarely, if ever, approach these issues all together, conceptualizing 
them as pieces of a wider and rather puzzling problem – the continuation of statehood – and 
pertaining to one of the three different dimensions of the State: the geographical dimension 
(territory); the human dimension (population); and the political dimension (government). 
Climate change impacts affect all three dimensions at a time, and thus their study in isolation 
from the broader context may result in inappropriate or unrealistic legal conclusions or policy 
recommendations. It is only recently that the idea of dealing jointly with the challenges of 
                                                          
21
 See, for instance, M. BURKETT, ‘The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized Nationhood 
and the Post-Climate Era’, (2011) Climate Law, vol. 2, issue 1, pp. 345-374; R. RAYFUSE, ‘International 
Law and Disappearing States: Utilizing Maritime Entitlements to Overcome the Statehood Dilemma’, 
(2010) University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, paper nº 52, pp. 1-13. See also, M. 
AZNAR-GÓMEZ, ‘El Estado sin Territorio: la Desaparición del Estado Debido al Cambio Climático’, (2013) 
Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, vol. 26, pp.  1-23.  
22
 J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, supra, at 127.  
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climate change to the three dimensions of the State has begun to emerge.23 Increased detailed 
and comprehensive institutional and scholarly attention is expected in the years to come, 
particularly since the creation at the International Law Association (ILA) of the new Committee 
on International Law and Sea Level Rise, chaired by Professor Davor Vidas with Professors 
David Freestone and Jane McAdam as co-rapporteurs, which will become operative in 
November 2013.24  
All in all, conceptualizing climate change as a phenomenon challenging the central and 
structural institution of international law – namely, the State – in a form never experienced 
since the emergence of the modern State in the 17th century may well substantiate Leigh 
Glover’s statement that ‘climate change defines modernity’s end in ecological terms’. Curiously 
enough, it is when the existing international regime on climate change – a paradigm of the ‘law 
of co-operation’ – fails to respond effectively to the issue at stake, that the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse emerges, virtually effecting an approximation to the issue 
                                                          
23
 See, for instance, the very recent collective publication M. B. GERRARD and G. E. WANNIER, 
Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas in a Changing Climate, 2013, (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press), as well as the book by L. YAMAMOTO and M. ESTEBAN, Atoll Island 
States and International Law: Climate Change Displacement and Sovereignty, 2013, (Berlin: Springer). 
Articles dealing with the consequences of climate change on statehood include, E. CRAWFORD and R. 
RAYFUSE, ‘Climate Change and Statehood’, in R. RAYFUSE and S.V. SCOTT (eds.), International Law in the 
Era of Climate Change, 2012, (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar), pp. 243-253; 
and one chapter in J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, supra, 
Chapter 4 on ‘Disappearing States, Statelessness and Relocation’, pp. 119-158.  
24
 See the final report of the ILA International Committee on Baselines under the International Law of 
the Sea, adopted at the 75th General Conference of the ILA, held in Sofia (Bulgaria), 26–30 August 2012. 
The report states that: ‘All coastal States face the threat of territorial loss as a result of predicted sea 
level rise. When coastal territory submerges below the selected low-water datum, the normal baseline 
would retreat, and in extreme cases would be lost. As indicated in the proposal establishing this 
Committee, low-lying, small-island developing states are likely to be the most severely affected by this 
phenomenon. If current predictions of sea level rise are realized, some States will become completely 
submerged. The resulting deterritorialization will likely mean, among other things, a total loss of 
baselines and of the maritime zones generated by coastal territory and measured from those baselines. 
Should the issue of deterritorialization fail to be considered by the international community at least in 
part as a baseline issue, the existing law of the normal baseline does not offer an adequate solution [… ] 
but the loss of a State’s territory to rising sea levels is not primarily a baseline or law of the sea issue . 
Substantial territorial loss is a much broader issue encompassing concerns of statehood, national 
identity, refugee status, state responsibility, access to resources, and international peace and security. 
This issue requires consideration by a committee established for the specific purpose of addressing this 
range of concerns’.
24
 Following the adoption of its final report, the Committee on Baselines under 
International Law of the Sea recommended the creation of another Committee specifically tasked with 
the consideration of the wide range of issues arising from the impacts of sea-level rise described above. 
The acknowledgement of both the existence of specific concerns arising out of the impacts of sea-level 
rise, and the suitability of establishing another Committee for the specific purpose of addressing them, 
were endorsed by the ILA Conference in Resolution nº1/2012. The establishment of the ILA Committee 
on International Law and Sea Level Rise was finally approved by the ILA Executive Committee in 
November 2012. Official website of the Committee available at:  
<http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1043>.  
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of climate change viewed through the prism of the earlier ‘international law of coexistence’, or 
even, in this case, of mere ‘existence’.25 All in all, the security approach to climate change not 
only contributes to the formation of a holistic view of the evolving forms that international co-
operation on climate change is acquiring in the light of the new factual and political realities, it 
also invites rediscovery, or perhaps even redefinition, of what the central institution of the 
international legal system –the State – is.  
  
2. Normative Discoveries and Methodological Choices 
This thesis takes a normative stand which results from a series of three discoveries 
driven by the object of study itself – the discovery of contextuality, the discovery of relativity 
and the discovery of otherness. Each of these discoveries correlatively prompted the adoption 
of three defining methodological choices: the preference of political discourse over science as 
the founding stone of the legal analysis; the choice of approaching such a legal issue through a 
case study rather than abstract thinking; and the acknowledgement – imposed by the nature 
of the object of study itself – of the need for interdisciplinary incursions to be allowed and 
even preferred over a strict legal formalist approach. 
The discovery of contextuality stems from the reconstructive task of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse undertaken in Part I of the thesis. Fundamentally, 
it implies that the question of the continuation or extinction of Pacific Island States threatened 
by climate change impacts stems from the interpretation that States have made of the 
phenomenon and the consequent construction of their interest in this matter. Rather than 
using scientific knowledge of climate change as the unique source legitimizing the approach to 
the legal question of the thesis, namely, the continuation of small islands’ statehood, this 
thesis extracts such legal question from the study of the evolution, in international life, of the 
understanding of the phenomenon. This is consistent with my personal conception of law l as a 
social product that varies together with social evolution to respond to the new needs and 
challenges of the realm in which it is called upon to operate. This choice seemed all the more 
necessary that, while climate change as a phenomenon needs natural scientific knowledge to 
provide an explanation, the State is, in contrast, a fundamentally political construct (with 
sovereignty as its correlative and distinctive legal attribute). In addition, since the creation of 
States operates in the political realm, the same can be presumed for the question of extinction 
                                                          
25
 See P. M. DUPUY, ‘International Law Torn between Coexistence, Cooperation and Globalization: 
General Conclusions, (1998) European Journal of International Law, vol. 9, pp. 278-286.  
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of States; and thus, taking into account the view that the international community already has 
on the matter (through the reconstruction of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse), may prove to be a determinant element of its resolution. To be sure, the choice of 
political discourse over science as the benchmark from which legitimizing the study on the 
effects of climate change on Pacific islands’ statehood steps apart from the vast majority of 
studies generally dealing with climate change impacts. Yet, rather than perceiving political and 
scientific approximations to the legal issue at stake as mutually exclusive, I view them as 
potentially complementary. 
Closely related to the discovery of contextuality and the choice of discourse over 
science, lies the discovery of ‘relativity’. ‘Relativity’ in this context is simply understood as a 
synonym for ‘non-dogmatic’, and essentially implies that the results of this thesis are defended 
with conviction while acknowledging that objective knowledge is unattainable in the realm of 
social sciences and that the social institutions – including juridical institutions – under study 
exist in a changing context. Indeed, paradigm shifts at each historical moment in turn affect 
our view of international law. Andreas Paulus thus acknowledged the need ‘to open up “legal 
science” for debate and contestation, without neglect to the constraints of the rules and 
principles agreed to by the international society may be the challenge of this method. Thus, a 
certain ”middle-of-the-road” approach steering a course between normativity and 
contextuality seems unavoidable, event at the price of indeterminacy […] International lawyers 
should both use the potentiality and accept the limits of their task.’26 The acceptance of this 
view has nurtured the tendency of the thesis to approach some issues from a genealogical 
perspective (for instance, to analyse the evolving role of territory in international law, in 
Chapter 4). It also explains the clear preference for interdisciplinary tools; as the area covered 
by this thesis is set on the boundary between international law and international life 
constantly oscillating from one realm to the other, legal formalism was clearly unsuited to 
address this theme.  
Finally, the discovery of ‘otherness’ emerged when the reconstruction of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse revealed that Pacific Island States, as vulnerable 
and weak players in international affairs as they might be, are, nevertheless, not voiceless. 
Their claims were thus what led to the choice of a bottom-up approach based on the case 
study of Pacific Island States over the commonly used top-down abstract thinking. First, as 
Jane McAdam has consistently remarked, for international, regional and national responses 
                                                          
26
 See A. PAULUS, ‘International Law after Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International 
Law?’, (2001) Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 14, pp. 727-755, at 755. 
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proposed to be effective, they must be informed by a bottom-up approach that takes into 
account the desires, needs and concerns of the affected States and populations.27 And yet, in 
this thesis, the bottom-up and case-study approach has not only been chosen for practical 
constraints, but relies on a complementary and a more deeply rooted normative view on both 
the contextual characteristics of the States concerned (historical and present), and the position 
from which I am invited to engage with them, through research and writing, and in spite of 
being a complete alien to the cultural reality and identity of the region. The discovery of 
‘otherness’ stems, firstly, from the realization that Pacific Island States threatened by climate 
change impacts lie very much on the edge of both the family of States and the rationalist 
secular conception of State sovereignty predominant in western thought in which I am 
embedded. It then turns into what Anne Orford describes as the anxiety and sense of 
responsibility coming from the understanding, in Jacques Derrida’s words, that ‘to take 
decision in the name of the other in no way at all lightens my responsibility, on the contrary, my 
responsibility is accused by the fact that it is the other in the name of which I decide’.28 The 
reconstructive move of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in Part I and 
the case study and bottom-up approach informing Part II are thus the methodological vehicle 
through which this thesis has sought to fulfil this sense of ‘accused responsibility’. To be sure, 
this endeavour is still limited by the fact that the reconstruction of the Discourse and the 
interpretation of most data are necessarily conditioned by my own subjectivity; that, as Liliana 
Obregón put it, ‘there is no identity, there is only identification and self-identification of a 
process’.29 Yet, the open acknowledgement of this limit seemed a much more acceptable 
burden to endorse than pursuing the alternative trend in which the voices of the States 
concerned, while filling regional and international fora, remained largely ignored and silenced 
in academic literature.  
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 See J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, supra, at 5. McAdam has 
consistently maintained and defended this position all along in her work on climate-induced 
displacement. Her defense of a bottom-up approach to this matter has also been accompanied by a 
preference for a multidisciplinary approach enabling the scholar to better grasp the real desires, needs 
and concerns of the population affected. This was particularly noticeable in the joint publication J. 
McADAM (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 2012, (Oxford, 
Portland Ore.: Hart Publishing).  
28
 See A. ORFORD (ed.), International Law and its Others, 2006, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press), at 22.  
29
 Ibid., at 52.   
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3. Structure of the Thesis 
 The incursion into some of the unexplored territories of international law or the terra 
incognitae of the peripheries, on which this thesis embarks, is dealt with in two main Parts 
each comprising three chapters. This tripartite structure is then reproduced within each 
Chapter, which is divided into three main Sections, and with its respective introduction and 
conclusion. Sustaining such a tripartite structure throughout the thesis served to respond to 
the necessity of providing a wide encompassing theme with clear bearings; it was thus an 
actively sought structure, intended to: establish a clear-cut framework of reference for a 
theme that has not yet been dealt with comprehensively; maintain the overall balance of the 
thesis; and convey the sense of continuation between Parts I and II and of the interrelatedness 
among the chapters within each Part.  
PART I is fully dedicated to the reconstruction of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse which has been introduced into the agendas of regional and global 
international organizations. It is thus highly focused on the realm of international politics. 
Chapter 1 begins by showing how the Climate Change and International Security Discourse can 
be conceived as a ‘revival’ of a political process started in the 1980s by the Soviet Union, which 
sought to link the spheres of ‘environment’ and ‘security’ as an alternative strategy to the 
arms race, and introduced the concepts of ‘international ecological security’ into the agenda of 
the United Nations. It then considers how the concept of environmental security, which 
evolved after the end of the Cold War outside the United Nations framework, developed in the 
‘security studies’ doctrinal circles.30 Important theoretical and empirical studies emerged in the 
1990s (including opposing voices), reinforcing the link between environment and security and 
providing a basis for the Climate Change and International Security Discourse which was yet to 
come. Chapter 2 thus marks the point of departure of the ‘second wave’ of the environment 
and security link within the specific context of climate change. It maps the birth, circulation 
and limits of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse within and among 
                                                          
30
 It is worth noting that some international legal scholars took account of the emergence of the concept 
in its double-faced dimension. See, most prominently, J. BRUNÉE, ‘Environmental Security in the 
Twenty-First Century: New Development of International Environmental Law’, (1995) Fordham 
International Law Journal, vol. 18, pp. 1742-1747, who explains at 1742: ‘Arguably, such a broader 
conception is inherent in the notion of "environmental security”, a term that has been gaining currency. 
The term should be understood to have two dimensions. On the one hand, in placing emphasis upon the 
environmental dimension, security means maintaining an ecological balance, at least to the extent 
necessary to sustain resource supplies and life-support systems. On the other hand, in emphasizing the 
dimension of security in the traditional sense, the term refers to the prevention and management of 
conflicts precipitated by environmental decline’.  
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regional organizations, showing how it emerged from hegemonic regions (the Euro-Atlantic 
Axis) and was then disseminated to the regional organizations of the most vulnerable regions – 
notably the Pacific Islands Forum and the African Union – while remaining unabsorbed by 
emerging regions less likely to suffer extreme climate change impacts and opposing the 
movement and the fight to maintain the climate change global discourse within the 
mainstream UNFCCC–KP framework. Chapter 3 moves on from the regional level of analysis to 
the universal level, reconstructing the introduction of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse into the policy agenda, and the operation, of the two core organs of the 
United Nations: the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA). The focus is 
thus placed both on the origins of the three different moments, in which these UN organs 
were called upon to discuss climate change from a security perspective (UNSC-2007, UNGA-
2009 and UNSC-2011) and the content of the positions on this approach of the UN Member 
States who participated in them. Most importantly, Chapter 3 shows that the latest 
understanding of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, as widely approved 
by a majority of States, can be reduced to one fundamental issue: the threat of climate change 
to the survival of low-lying island States.  
PART II thus operates a shift from the political or ‘pre-normative’ level of analysis to the 
formulation of a legal question, namely, how do climate change impacts jeopardize the 
continuation of Pacific islands’ statehood. To do so, it analyses how the elements of statehood 
are challenged by climate change effects through the study of Pacific Island States, which are 
the major co-promoters of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, and this in 
a region where three out of the four low-lying island States – all with a maximum altitude of 
less than 5 metres – are located (Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands). The analysis of the 
effects of climate change on Pacific Island States is thus carried out through a division of three 
main dimensions of statehood. Chapter 4 deals with the effects of climate change on Pacific 
islands’ territory – referred to as the ‘de-territorialization challenge’ – including how climate 
change may affect the maritime entitlements of these often called ‘Ocean States’. It also 
introduces the question of whether completely de-territorialized nations may still survive as 
independent sovereign entities, through the analysis of two precedents: the Holy See and the 
Order of Malta. Chapter 5 considers the implications of climate change impacts on Pacific 
islanders themselves. After a comparative analysis of the climate-induced relocations already 
accomplished in the region, it focuses on the controversial legal status of ‘climate-induced 
displaced people, often called ‘climate refugees’, and proposes an alternative approach to the 
legal-protection tools which have so far been developed. Finally, Chapter 6 is devoted to a 
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study of the effects of climate change on Pacific islands’ governmental capacities, both 
nationally and internationally. Taking stock of the literature on ‘failed States’ and governments 
in exile, it first deals with the scenario in which governments of Pacific Island States may be 
obliged to evacuate State territory (referred to as ‘ex situ governments’). Ultimately, as the 
three dimensions of Pacific islands’ statehood may be challenged at any time, this Chapter 
explores the role to be played by different normative and political avenues which will 
determine their continuation as States, including, most notably, their own claims to statehood, 
the corresponding international recognition and, ultimately, the outcome of Pacific islanders’ 
exercise of their right to self-determination. 
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‘Could the time be coming when as much lasting security 
can be purchased through trees as through tanks?’   
     Michael Myers, 1995.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Dealing with the notion of security appears as the necessary and inescapable point of 
departure of any attempt to study the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
and its ‘international environmental security’ precedent.  
The birth of the notion of security can be traced back to the aftermath of the First World 
War; it constituted the crystallization of the intellectual and political participation by civilians 
in war and defence issues in the Western world. As reported by E. H. Carr, the psychological 
effects of the First World War generated a widespread ‘popular demand’ for integrating the 
conduct of international relations – especially the decision to go to war – into the realm of 
national politics.31 As the heart of the decision power over foreign-policy issues shifted from 
the military to political parties, public scrutiny was ensured.32 The first uses of the concept of 
security are thus the result of a sociological process initiated in Anglo-American intellectual 
circles of the 20th century inter-war period and were closely intertwined with the parallel birth 
of international politics as a science.33 Then, the traditional configuration of the notion of 
security was consolidated in American literature by the Realism, the international relations 
movement that developed in the aftermath of World War II. Realism gave to the notion of 
security a solidly grounded theoretical and institutional habitat. Fitting perfectly the Realist 
explanation of the conduct of international relations – governed by the power factor-34  it 
became the central notion of newly established schools of international security studies.35 Yet, 
                                                          
31
 E. H. CARR, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939 An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, 1946, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd.), Part I, Chapter 1, at 4.  
32
 Carr contends that the sacred trust in both the power and the rightness of public opinion professed by 
the American political class of the inter-war period is a mark of the influence of the eighteenth century 
English rationalism of Jeremy Bentham. Ibid. 
33
 International politics was the previous name given to political science or to international relations 
which was used up to World War II. Ibid. 
34
 H. MORGENTHAU, K. THOMSON, D. CLINTON, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, 1948, (New York: McGraw Hill), at 50. Morgenthau defines political power as ‘the mutual 
relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at 
large’. Similarly, G. KENNAN condemned the moralistic-legalistic approach to international problems of 
the Wilsonian model in American Diplomacy 1900-1950, 1951, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
35
 Two seminal articles inaugurated the golden age of the notion of security: J. HERZ, ‘Idealist 
Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, (1950) World Politics, vol. 2, issue 2, pp. 157-180, at 157; 
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soon after such a habitat was found, the bipolarization of the world between the eastern-
Soviet and the Western-American blocs and the threatening shadow of the nuclear weapon 
eclipsed any further theoretical developments of the concept.36 
Nonetheless, after three decades of conceptual encapsulation in the Realist (also 
referred thereafter as ‘traditional’) understanding of security, events in the international 
sphere called for a revision of the material scope of security so as to include non-military 
issues. Firstly, the 1973 Oil Crisis recalled the inextricable connection between a State’s level of 
military war-making capacity and its secured access to natural resources.37 This promoted a 
scholarly debate in American and western European intellectual circles, whereby 
environmental considerations were for the first time approached from a security standpoint 
and the first formulations of the term ‘environmental security’ were raised. The notion of 
security was accordingly reshaped and redefined – though only in so far as it had a direct 
impact on the military capacities of the western bloc.38 The second event concerned the 
                                                                                                                                      
and A. WOLFERS, ‘“National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol’, (1952) Political Science Quarterly, vol. 
67, issue 4, pp. 481-502. Herz formulated the ‘security dilemma’, requiring the existence of both an 
anarchical society and members with competing interests – materialized by their individual quest for 
absolute or relative power. Two years later, Wolfers’ article defined security as an ‘ambiguous symbol’
35
 
which ‘[I]n an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, 
the absence of fear that such values will be attacked’. WOLFERS, supra, at 485. An analytical and 
historical institutional genealogy of ‘International Security Studies’ can be found in B. BUZAN and L. 
LARSEN, The Evolution of International Security Studies, 2009, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press).  
36 The freezing of the conceptual analysis of the notion of security explains why it was absorbed by the 
‘practical’ and concrete adjacent notion of ‘strategy’, defined by Charles-Philippe David as ‘the planning 
and the conduct of military operations’, in C.-P. DAVID, La Guerra y la Paz: Enfoque Contemporáneo 
sobre la Seguridad y la Estrategia, 2008, (Barcelona: Icaria Antrazyt), at 61. It also results from the 
natural inclination of Realists to privilege practice of and approach to politics fundamentally from an 
empirical perspective. See CARR, supra, at 13-18.   
37
 The 1973 Oil Crisis put into the scenario of international politics the fear of ‘resource wars’. See for 
instance J. NYE, ‘Collective economic security’, (1974) International Affairs, vol. 50, issue 4, pp. 584-598. 
Contra, L. BROCK, ‘Security through Defending the Environment: an Illusion?’, in E.BOULDING (ed.), New 
Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamined, 1992, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers), at 108, who considers that ‘scarcity as such does not exist, it only exists in specific political, 
socioeconomic and cultural contexts’; R. LIPSCHUTZ and J. HOLDREN, ‘Crossing Borders: Resources Flow, 
the Global Environment, and International Security’, (1990) Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 21, pp. 121–
133, who in turn consider that the need for specific resources more often serves as a rationalization of 
military state behaviour that is actually the cause of war; see finally H. E. GOELLER and A. WEINBERG, 
‘The Age of Substitutability’, (1978) American Economic Review, vol. 68, issue 6, pp. 1-11, whose theory 
contends that the possibility to recreate earth materials artificially through technological development 
reduces geostrategic dependence on natural resources.  
38
 See J. TUCHMANN MATHEWS, ‘Redefining security’, (spring 1989) Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, issue 2, pp. 
162-177. Since interdependence is a condition shared not only for financial flows, but also for 
environmental factors, Tuchmann Mathews, a leading proponent of an expansion of the scope of 
security, explains that: ‘Environmental strains that transcend national borders are already beginning to 
break down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty, previously rendered porous by the 
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eastern bloc, for which internal transformation in the mid-1980s stemming from Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s new political blueprint – perestroika – the restructuring of the Soviet political and 
economic system, which will be referred to hereafter as ‘Soviet New Thinking’, proved to be 
capital for the integration of the notion of ‘international environmental security’ into the 
debate within the United Nations system. Although the Soviet attempt was curtailed by the 
break-up of the eastern bloc, it set the basis of what can today be understood as a precedent: 
the application of the environmental approach to security within the United Nations system. 
This chapter argues that the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
developed in the late 1990s can be conceived as the ‘second wave’ of environmental 
approaches to security. Its ‘international environmental security’ precedent can be said to be 
based on two pillars: the approach initiated before the ending of the Cold War and promoted 
within the United Nations system by the eastern bloc, on the one hand; and the theoretical 
and empirical studies that developed in western doctrine after the ending of the Cold War, on 
the other. The principal aim of this chapter is therefore to place these ‘pioneering accounts’ in 
the historical political framework in which they were launched.  
Thus, Section 2 begins with an elucidation of how the notion of ‘international 
ecological security’ emerged within the Soviet Union as a combined product of the 
development of national environmentalism, on the one hand, and a reification of the role of 
international law for the development of international co-operation, on the other. Section 3 
focuses on the introduction of the environment and security link into the agenda of the United 
Nations, as pushed for by the Soviet Union and supported by most of its closely allied 
communist States. This attempt reached its most prominent manifestation in 1987 with the 
draft proposal of a General Assembly resolution on ‘International Ecological Security’, which 
was presented as one aspect of a much more far-reaching and controversial proposal from the 
Soviet Union calling for the institution of a ‘Comprehensive System of International Peace and 
Security’. Finally, in Section 4, how the concept of environmental security pushed for by the 
Soviet Union evolved after the end of the Cold War as a result of the transformation of the 
historical and political context is considered. Although it did not find further development 
within United Nations institutions after 1991, the notion of ‘environmental security’ remained 
very much alive in western doctrinal circles of some disciplines, in particular in the field of 
security studies. Important theoretical and empirical studies emerged in the 1990s (including 
opposing voices), which reinforced the link between environment and security in social science 
                                                                                                                                      
information and communication revolutions and the instantaneous global movement of financial 
capital’, at 162. 
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and provided a wider basis for the Climate Change and International Security Discourse that 
was yet to emerge. 
 
2. THE BIRTH OF ‘INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL SECURITY’: A PRODUCT OF SOVIET ‘NEW 
THINKING’ (PERESTROIKA)  
The notion of ‘international environmental security’ (also referred to as ‘international 
ecological security’) emerged from the Soviet bloc in the mid-1980s, as a result of the double-
edged effects – national and international – of the ‘new thinking’ enacted by President 
Gorbachev. In order to identify the founding rationale of the concept and determine its role 
within the new political design, first, the meaning and effects of perestroika on the Soviet 
approach to international law are put in context; then the environmental dimension of this 
new thinking is considered. Both elements lead to the formulation of the notion that would be 
circulated to the United Nations system.  
2.1. Perestroika and International Law in Context 
2.1.1. Soviet ‘Traditional’ Thinking and International Law: From the 1917 Russian Revolution to 
Détente  
The evolution of Soviet thinking with respect to international law can be divided into 
three main stages, each corresponding to a change of direction in the conduct of Soviet foreign 
affairs (political decision), followed or accompanied by a new understanding of the nature and 
formation of international rules as well as their adequacy to the tenets of Marxist-Leninist 
socialism (theoretical formulation).39  
The first stage, beginning by the end of World War I, was marked by the denunciation 
of international law as a form of ‘bourgeois’ law pre-existing the birth of the Soviet State. As it 
had not participated in the law-making process, the Soviet State did not consider itself bound 
by international law. This political position was materialized through Lenin’s decision to refuse 
the payment of the debts contracted by the Tsarist Russian Empire during the Napoleonic 
                                                          
39
 For a thorough explanation of the different phases of the Soviet thinking with respect to international 
law, until the establishment of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, see J. QUIGLEY, ‘The New Soviet 
Approach to International Law’, (1965-1966) Harvard International Law Club Journal, vol. 7, issue 1, pp. 
1-32. Jean-Christophe Romer explained how the evolution of the Soviet military thinking and doctrines 
between 1945 and 1985 were essentially marked by the dominant Marxist-Leninist social ideological 
‘présupposés’, for the relationship between the Army and the Party were extremely close. J.-C. ROMER, 
‘Evolution de la Pensée Militaire Soviétique (1945-1985)’, (1986) Relations Internationales, vol. 5, pp. 51-
66.  
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Wars.40 Philosophically, it was fully consistent with the Marxist view of law as a 
‘superstructure’ serving the perpetuation of capitalist States, whereas, from a legal 
perspective, it translated the refusal of the Soviet State to consider itself as the successor of 
the Tsarist Russian Empire. Yet, as the ideological rejection of international law impeded the 
full realization of Soviet foreign-policy goals – particularly those concerned with international 
trade41 – some degree of involvement with the existing legal system was needed, such as 
accepting the conclusion of bilateral commercial treaties. The inter-war period therefore saw 
the first important doctrinal attempt to reconcile these two opposing forces. Led by E. Korovin, 
E. Pashukanis and, later on, followed by A. Vyshinskii,42 international law was depicted as a 
transitional compromise across classes that would last until the spread of the socialist 
revolution throughout the world had been achieved. Since the eastern and western blocs 
could not be ideologically reconciled, these authors conceived the existence of two normative 
orders coexisting at the international level. Each order would constitute a superstructure built 
up on opposed ideological foundations: one Marxist-Leninist/socialist and one Liberal-
bourgeois/capitalist. Henceforth, the rules of international law accepted by the Soviet State 
were those emerging from the concurrence of similar norms existing in both superstructures.43 
This first approach to international law remained predominant until after World War II and the 
beginning of the Cold War.  
The second stage began with an important scholarly debate which seemingly took 
place from 1952 to 1956. It was launched by G. Tunkin’s publication of an article in which he 
objected to Korovin’s transitional inter-class compromise constituted by two international 
legal superstructures.44 In contrast, Tunkin’s view held that the existence of two ideological 
                                                          
40
 J. HAZARD, Lecture: ‘New Thinking’ in Soviet Approaches to International Politics and Law’ (1990) Pace 
Yearbook of International Law, vol. 1, pp.1-20, at 5: ‘[W]hy should a government emerging from a 
revolutionary change be required to support the international law norm on payment of debts by a 
successor government? He (Lenin) believed that a social revolution broke the chain. To Lenin, power 
passing from one group of a class to another group within the same class was not a coup’.  
41
  Commercial activity was capital for the achievement of Soviet economic prosperity and the 
correlative success of its communist project. 
42
 E.A. KOROVIN, International Law of the Transition Period [Me dunarodnye dogovory i akty novogo 
vremeni], 1924, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo); E.A. KOROVIN, Contemporary International 
Public Law [Sovremennoe me dunarodnoe publi noe pravo], 1926, (Moscow : Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatel'stvo) ; E.B. PASHUKANIS, Outlines for International Law [Ocherki po mezhdunarodnomu pravu], 
1935, (Moscow : Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo), at 18; A. VISHINSKYI, The Law of the Soviet State, 1939, 
(Moscow : Sovietskaja Justicija). 
43
 Note that the concurrence would only arise out of ‘similar’ norms, given that ideologically 
insurmountable differences made it theoretically impossible to produce ‘identical’ rules.  
44
 For a detailed account of the exchange of articles and letters during that period, and the impact it had 
on both the Soviet approach to international law and on the international law’s scholarly circles, see 
J.QUIGLEY, ‘The New Soviet Approach to International Law’, (1965-1966) Harvard International Law Club 
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blocs did not imply that a superstructure would emerge out of each of them, and argued that 
international law was one single superstructure within which international legal rules resulted 
from the formulation of agreements between States belonging to opposing blocs. Therefore, 
he claimed the unity of the international legal system, as well as the non-transitional nature of 
the agreements.45 As J. Quigley points out, this new approach ‘showed the formation of 
international law as the result of a give-and-take process in which both camps participated’.46  
Tunkin’s theory of agreements provided the platform for the third stage of Soviet 
thinking on international law on which a new Soviet foreign policy based on the doctrine of 
peaceful coexistence could be elaborated,47 and marked the first gradual evolution in the 
perception that international law was also a Soviet phenomenon. In 1952, he gave the legal 
grounds for what became the political enunciation of the first stage of the Cold War, since, 
four years later, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party officially adopted the Yugoslav 
proposal of ‘peaceful coexistence’ as the new foreign policy of the Soviet Union.48 In doing so, 
an official willingness to depart from the class-conflict analysis of international law was 
established. However, notwithstanding the shift towards a vision of international law as 
forming a single superstructure, Tunkin conceived a way of maintaining the ‘differential 
nature’ of the law emanating from the two ideological blocs. The original idea that different 
rules emanated from the two blocs was thus reconciled with the assumption that the 
international legal order was one single superstructure, through the notion of ‘concentric 
circles’. The wider legal circle consisted of general international law, containing rules and 
norms of co-operation applicable among States of the two opposing blocs. However, the 
                                                                                                                                      
Journal, vol. 7, issue 1, pp. 1-32; J. HAZARD, ‘Cleansing Soviet International Law of Anti-Marxist 
Theories’, (1938) American Journal of International Law, vol. 32, pp. 244-252 ; and W. E. BUTLER, 
‘Socialist International Law or Socialist Principles of International Relations’, (1971) American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 65, pp. 796-800. 
45
 Tunkin’s theory of agreements was thus fundamental to the construction of the theory of peaceful 
coexistence. See W. E. BUTLER, ‘Perestroika and International Law, 1991, (Leiden and Boston: Brill), 
introduction, at 3. 
46
 QUIGLEY, supra, at 12. 
47
 See S. KRYLOV, ‘Les notion principales du droit des gens (la doctrine soviétique du droit 
international)’, (1947) Recueil de cours de l’Académie de la Haye, vol. 70, issue 1, pp. 407-476; and then 
G. TUNKIN, ‘Coexistence and International Law’, (1958) Recueil de cours de l’Académie de la Haye, vol. 
95, issue 1, pp. 1-82. As a result of the political materialization of his influential legal theory, Tunkin was 
appointed Chief of the Soviet Legal Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For a western account of 
the time, see for instance E. McWHINNEY, ‘Peaceful Co-existence and Soviet-Western International Law, 
(1962) American Journal of International Law, vol.56,, pp. 951-970. 
48
 Later on, some voices, such as Serge Krylov – first Soviet Judge at the International Court of Justice – 
claimed that the original idea of peaceful coexistence came from Lenin, not from the Yugoslav proposal, 
in K. GRYBOWSKY, ‘Soviet Theory of International Law for the Seventies’, (1983) American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 77, pp. 862-872.  
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existence of general international law would not rule out the possibility of developing specific 
(regional and local) rules and norms based on the principle of socialist internationalism and 
exclusively applicable among States of the Soviet bloc. Within this narrower circle, the validity 
of rules and norms of socialist internationalism depended only on their consistency with 
general international law.49 Moreover, Tunkin’s theory of agreements offered the political 
flexibility that the Soviet State needed to maintain a certain internal degree of ideological 
coherence (i.e. leaving it free to choose certain international rules while rejecting others), 
while ensuring its presence and participation as a major actor in the international arena 
beyond commercial and trade areas. As a result of the doctrinal shift proposed by Tunkin and 
the entry into a new phase of recognition of the unity of the international legal system, the 
Soviet State made extensive use of treaty law, which it enthroned as the primary source of 
international law.50 This marked the shift from bilateralism to the conclusion of multilateral 
treaties, particularly activated by the support of codification of international law that took 
place between the 1960s and the 1980s. Since the active participation of the Soviet Union in 
the formation of international law, the initial rejection of it, for being exclusively ‘bourgeois 
law’, was successfully overcome by the view that international law was partly bourgeois and 
partly socialist.51 
                                                          
49
 The relationship of the concentric circles and their origins is explained in C. OSAKWE, ‘Socialist 
International Law Revisited’, (1972) American Journal of International Law, volume 66, issue 3. In 
response to J. HAZARD, ‘Renewed Emphasis upon a Socialist International Law’, (1971) American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 65, issue 1, pp. 142-148. For an explanation on how the role of Socialist 
internationalism evolved from being the basis of the international workers’ movements (proletarian 
internationalism) to regulate relations between the Soviet Commonwealth of Nations of an interstate 
nature, see OSAKWE (citing G. Tunkin), supra, at 598. See also, S. SCHWEBEL, ‘The Brezhnev Doctrine 
Repealed and Peaceful Coexistence Enacted’, (1972) American Journal of International Law, vol. 66, 
issue 5, p. 817: ‘In earlier days of Khrushchev’s preaching of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union had 
made it plain that the mere peaceful co-existence did not suffice for relations among the socialist group, 
which were governed by the principles of “socialist internationalism”.’  
50
 As explained by Quigley, ‘the Soviets could hardly be expected to find this to their liking, since all 
customary norms had been formulated by hostile bourgeois States.’ It was thus natural that ‘they 
consider the treaty as the principal means of creation of legal norms between the Soviet Union and the 
West’. Henceforth, Soviet international legal scholars quickly declared that the treaty constituted ‘the 
principal source of international law’ and that international custom was relegated, for the Soviets, ‘to 
the role of subsidiary source of norm-creation’. In QUIGLEY (based on KOROVIN’s 1924 treatise), supra, 
at 12.  
51
 John Quigley also highlights the political utility of Tunkin’s theory within Soviet spheres of influence, 
since the conception of international law as one single unit, which resulted from an agreement among 
States of the two opposing blocs, made it feasible to ‘demonstrate how the Soviet Union had convinced 
bourgeois States to recognize certain (socialist) norms as part of the single superstructure of 
international law’, in QUIGLEY, supra., p. 12. As explained by Quigley, D. B Levin’s words – coming from 
one of the most prolific writers on Soviet international legal expertise – epitomize well the change of 
perspective when he explains that: ‘the Soviet Union accepts all those bourgeois norms and institutions 
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2.1.2. Soviet ‘New Thinking’ and International Law: The Change of Paradigm 
The Soviet thinking with respect to international law based on Tunkin’s theory of 
agreements and the principle of peaceful coexistence remained in the mainstream from 1956 
to 1962, and even after entering the period of détente which followed the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Then, the 1973 Oil Crisis forced the Soviet Union to abandon its position of economic 
isolation, and important changes in the Soviet study of western writings in international law 
ensued.52 That year, oil prices quadrupled.53 As one of the more important oil producers of the 
time, the crisis initially had positive effects on the USSR and brought about an extraordinary 
boost in the Soviet economy between 1970 and 1980.54 Yet, such an unexpected period of 
bonanza also had ambiguous effects, as it seemingly motivated Brezhnev’s decision to engage 
in an arms race and compete against the USA’s superior war-making capacity at the time.55 As 
a result of this change in foreign policy, the Soviet military establishment acquired a 
‘superpower status’ which, by the mid-1980s, would clearly appear economically 
unsustainable.  
Yet, before the long-term non-viability of Brezhnev’s foreign policy became evident, 
the relationship between the two blocs had evolved from isolation to acknowledged economic 
interdependence. The understanding of the new world reality was soon embodied in politico-
legal terms, first by the celebration in 1973 of the first Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the launch that same year of the so-called ‘Helsinki Process’, 
and the resulting adoption in 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act.56 This agreement involved States 
from both blocs and was characterized by the newly coined notion of ‘comprehensive 
security’, a cornerstone formula which gave theoretical coherence to the institutional and 
                                                                                                                                      
which serve the cause of peace, defend the independence of peoples, and serve international 
cooperation’. Ibid., at 9.  
52
 GRZYBOWSKI, supra, at 862.  
53
 E. HOBSBAWM, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1994 (London: M. Joseph), 
Chapter entitled ‘The End of Socialism’, at 475. As Hobsbawm points out, from 1970 to 1980, Soviet 
exports to developed market economies increased 19%, and 32% for total exports. 
54
 Ibid., at 475: ‘The millions simply rolled in without effort, postponing the need for economic reform 
and, incidentally, enabling the USSR to pay for its rapidly growing imports from the West with exported 
energy’. 
55
 Ibid., at 474. Hobsbawm carefully avoids affirming that there is a proven link between the economic 
bonanza of the time and Brezhnev’s decision to embark upon a more aggressive international policy. He 
reports instead that this idea ‘has been suggested’ by some historians such as Maksimenko.   
56
 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, adopted at Helsinki, on 1 August 1975 
by the High Representatives of the Participating States. The adoption of this instrument (generally 
referred to as the ‘Helsinki Final Act’) put an end to a process (generally referred to as the ‘Helsinki 
process’) which began on 3 July 1973 in Helsinki and was pursued in Geneva from to 18 September 1973 
to 21 July 1975.   
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normative framework newly set up. Security in Europe would be ensured through co-operation 
between the two blocs in three main areas, generally referred to as ‘the three baskets’. Basket 
1 logically deals with co-operation in the politico-military field (important to ensure the 
maintenance of the established borders in Europe). More innovative, however, were the two 
other baskets: the acknowledged ‘new dimensions of security’ developed in the Helsinki Final 
Act, namely, co-operation in the economic and the environmental fields (Basket 2); and, 
likewise, in the arena of human security (Basket 3). Although the Helsinki Final Act was not 
given a legally binding effect (Rein Mullerson considers it as being ‘politically and morally 
binding’),57 the notion of ‘comprehensive security’ that emerged epitomized the merger 
between the Soviet conception of general international law based on the principle of peaceful 
coexistence and the recently forged change in economic policy leading to an increased 
openness towards the western bloc in the field of economic and environmental co-operation.58 
In Section 3, such a notion will be ‘rediscovered’ with perestroika in the mid-1980s and 
become the conceptual tool through which the Soviet new thinking was channelled in United 
Nations institutions.59  
By the beginning of the 1980s, the golden period of the Soviet economy had been 
washed away and a new period of profound reform was about to be initiated60.. In 1985, 
exactly one decade after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, Mikhail Gorbachev came to 
power as Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A scent of change had 
already been felt since Yuri Andropov, Chief of Security Section and predecessor of Gorbachev, 
distanced himself from the Brezhnev regime in 1983. The full explanation of the foundational 
reform and the new governmental agenda would finally be explained in detail with the 
                                                          
57
 See R. MULLERSON, ‘Sources of International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking’, (1989) 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 83, pp. 494-512, at 509. 
58
 For instance, on 15 August 1986, the Soviet State applied for permission to participate as observer at 
the eighth and last round of the trade negotiations conducted under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), with, as Kevin Kennedy explains, ‘full membership in GATT following in “due course”’. 
See K. C. KENNEDY, ‘Accession of the Soviet Union to GATT’, (1987) Journal of World Trade Law, vol. 21, 
pp. 23-39. 
59
 As Butler notes, the Central Committee considered that ‘[t]he notion that systems move along parallel 
ways is an illusion’, for ‘[t]he interdependence of the world is such that these parallels inevitably 
intersect, both systems and the countries therein interact closely within the framework of general world 
development, in scientific-technical, economic and social domains, in human relations, and in resolving 
global problems’, in W. E. BUTLER, ‘International Law, Foreign Policy and the Gorbachev Style’, (1989) 
Columbia Journal of international Affairs, vol. XXII, pp. 363-375, at 372.  
60
 Afghanistan, being coupled with eastern Europe in the 1978 war, suffered from an acute energy crisis; 
political events such as the Soviet non-reaction (namely, non-military intervention) in Poland in 1981 
following the movement led by the Polish trade union Solidarnost and supported by the Catholic Church, 
already gave the sense that eastern Europe was and would continue to be, as E. Hobsbawm explains, 
the political ‘Achilles heel’ of the USSR. HOBSBAWM, supra. 
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publication in 1987 of Gorbachev’s book Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the 
World. Perestroika (or ‘new thinking’) was marked, as A. Carty and G. Danilenko explain, by the 
purpose and ‘desire to reshape international society into one interdependent unit’.61 It 
constituted a foundational principle of Soviet political conduct (at both the national and 
international levels) and a major departure from the doctrine of peaceful coexistence which 
had remained steadily dominant for four decades since the end of the Second World War. The 
main task brought about by perestroika was a full-range reassessment of the place of the rule 
of law in the Soviet Union.62 Hence, acknowledgement of the primacy of common human 
values was put at the centre of this new foundational principle, the effects of which were 
materialized both in the national and international realms. The main internal effect was the 
launch of a movement of democratization in all areas and levels of decision-making (from 
reforms of the economic system to legislative developments on environmental protection). As 
a corollary of the increased level of public participation, transparency (glasnost) and access to 
information were also promoted.63 At an international level,64 the reassessment of the rule of 
law brought about a definite turn in Soviet foreign policy, the cardinal tenet of which was the 
establishment of the primacy of international law over State policy.65 This tenet had not only 
practical consequences, such as the repayment of arrears to the United Nations and a host of 
proposals to enhance the role of international institutions, but also affected the Soviet 
approach to international law as such. Henceforth, V. Vereschetin and R. Mullerson – 
‘spokesmen’ for the Soviet approach to international law in this period – called for the 
                                                          
61
 These authors nonetheless remind us that that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence was not 
completely banned, as Soviet New Thinking ‘did not abandon the belief in the inevitability of class 
struggle’. A.CARTY and G. DANILENKO, Perestroika and International Law: Current Anglo-Soviet 
Approaches to International Law, 1990, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), at 1. 
62
 Butler considers that the move towards the consideration of international law as part of the Soviet 
rule of law system can be traced back to the years 1977–1978 when international law received 
constitutional recognition as part of municipal law or the national rule of law system, in W. E. BUTLER, 
International Law, Foreign Policy and the Gorbachev Style’, supra, at 365. 
63
 See HOBSBAWM, supra, at 480-482. Glasnost was in fact not only the corollary of democratization, 
but had a deeper ‘autonomous’ meaning as a way to break with the nomenklatura of the Brezhnev era.  
64
 Ibid. See also W. E. BUTLER, ‘International Law, Foreign Policy and the Gorbachev Style’, supra, at 371-
374; and W. BUTLER, Perestroika and International Law, supra, at 3; and A. CARTY, ‘Changing Model of 
the International System’, in Perestroika and International Law: an Anglo-Soviet Debate, p. 15. 
65
 BUTLER, Perestroika and International Law, supra, Introduction, at 3. See also V. VERESCHETIN and R. 
MULLERSON, ‘Primacy of International Law in World Politics’, in W. BUTLER (ed.), Perestroika and 
International Law, supra, at 6: ‘[i]t is not accidental, therefore, that along with common human values 
and interests, interdependence and integrity of the world, and a free choice of ways of development, the 
concept of primacy of international law in politics has been increasingly fixed in new political thinking.’ 
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development of international rules and principles ‘free from ideology’.66 The principle of 
peaceful coexistence – previously perceived as a form of class struggle in the international 
arena – was, for instance, revisited and adapted by these authors, who presented it as a 
general principle of international law, ‘universal in application and binding in the relations of 
States’ and imposing upon them a duty to co-operate.67 
2.2. The ‘Green Dimensions’ of Perestroika  
2.2.1. ‘Ecological Security’: Launch of the New Soviet Environmental Protection Strategy 
Originally, Marxism-Leninism did not pay specific attention to nor took into account 
environmental protection, but was exclusively concerned with the identification of the sources 
of class struggle in economic structures. Yet, as environmentalism spread in the western bloc 
(particularly in Europe) during the 1960s in association with pacifism,68 so would it eventually 
attain Soviet society.69 
As W. E. Butler points out, Soviet environmental law has been subject to extensive 
modification since the 1950s, and has always figured as part of a wider programme.70 It can be 
said that a first important evolution in Soviet environmental law took place in the 1970s, 
seemingly pushed forward by the recent trend to insert environmental issues into the 
international agenda, such as the celebration of the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm, 1972), and the most important USA–USSR Agreement for 
Cooperation in the Field of Environment adopted in the same year.71 Under the umbrella of 
this bilateral agreement, N. Robinson notes, an important flow of joint working projects in 
                                                          
66
 V. VERESCHETIN and R. MULLERSON, ‘The New Thinking and International Law’, (1988) Soviet State 
and Law, vol. 3, pp.3-5. The authors stated that ‘[t]he earlier formulation of peaceful coexistence as the 
class struggle in the international sphere [i]s a principle of interstate relations that should not be turned 
into an arena for class struggle’. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 See J. RIECHMANN, ‘Los verdes alemanes’, 1994, (Madrid: Editorial Comares).  
69
 See, for instance, A. GARE, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, supra, Chapter 3 ‘Post-
structuralism, Marxism and the Environment’. 
70
 W .E. BUTLER, ‘Law Reform in Soviet Environmental Law’, (1988) Pace Environmental Law Review, vol. 
5, issue 2, pp. 425-438, at 426. 
 
71
 As explained by Robinson, since the USA and the USSR (together with Canada) share common 
borders, they have also similar environmental protection interests, particularly in the Arctic. Both 
superpowers had thus acknowledged the need for international co-operation in this field ever since 
1972. In this context, and following the release, one week earlier, of the report of the 10
th
 meeting of 
the USA–USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, Presidents 
Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva on 13 December 1988 and adopted the USA–USSR Agreement for 
Cooperation in the Field of the Environment. In ROBINSON, supra, at 353. For a more detail account of 
this agreement, see N. ROBINSON and G.WAXMONSKY, ‘The USA–USSR Agreement to Protect the 
Environment: 15 Years of Cooperation’, (1988) Environmental Law, vol. 18, pp. 403  
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various fields of environmental concern (air, water and marine pollution, protection of wildlife, 
climate analysis, etc.) was undertaken, forging a deep and long-lasting co-operation experience 
between the two superpowers.72 Mirroring this move to co-operation, coupled with the 
vigorous Soviet press, which had been writing about environmental issues since the end of the 
1960s, each bloc seemingly developed environmental regulations at a national level.73 In the 
USSR, the 1970s saw the adoption of some environmental regulations. Control over pollution 
advanced at a slower pace than the most developed regulations regarding the protection of 
the natural habitat.  
Yet, by the time perestroika was formulated, the USSR was in a state of acute 
environmental crisis. Soviet concern for the protection of priroda (nature) mainly resulted 
from the high levels of pollution and the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, as 
well as from prominent examples of Soviet environmental catastrophes.74 Virtually 
encompassing all aspects of Soviet public life, perestroika was intended to radically restructure 
the Soviet economy and establish a more decentralized decision-making system. On the one 
hand, as N. Robinson points out, such an endeavour risked being compromised in favour of 
short-term economic reforms or revitalization (referred to as uskorenie).75 On the other hand, 
however, the programme to restructure the national economy provided a good opportunity to 
assess the level of unsustainability of the previous system and push forward the enactment of 
environmental protection rules. Thereby, perestroika became the most fruitful ‘wider 
programme’ in which both environmental legislation and institutional building would emerge 
and the protection of the environment became part of the national rule of law system. 
Essential elements of perestroika, such as decentralization and transparency, undoubtedly 
facilitated the reflection of the growing social concern for environmental issues in economic 
revitalization plans, the implementation of which was sometimes so complicated that the ‘not 
                                                          
72
 ROBINSON, supra, at 353.  
73
 For instance, article 42 of Fundamental Law (health protection by measures to improve the 
environment); article 67 (duty to protect nature and conserve its riches). It is generally acknowledged 
that the Soviet environmental protection evolved more rapidly on issues related to the protection of the 
natural habitat than other questions such as pollution. Protection of the natural habitat was indeed 
historically rooted, since Lenin’s initiation of conservation programmes in 1918 seeking the reforestation 
of areas devastated in the war. ROBINSON, supra, at 368. 
74
See for instance, M. FESHBACK and A. FRIENDLY, Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege, 
1992, (New York: Basic Books); also C.E. ZIEGLER, Environmental Policy in the USSR, 1987, (Amherst, 
Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press); and M. I. GOLDMAN, The Spoils of Progress: Environmental 
Pollution in the Soviet Union,1972, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 
75
 N. ROBINSON, ‘Perestroika and Priroda: Environmental Protection in the USSR’, (spring 1988) Pace 
Environmental Law Review, vol. 5, issue 2, pp. 351-423, at 374. 
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in my backyard’ Soviet movement emerged.76 In December 1986, only eight months after the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, and undoubtedly influenced by the scale, nature and magnitude of 
this damage to human health and the environment, the Statute book (‘Digest’, Svid zakonov 
SSS) consolidated Soviet environmental law.77 
In applying perestroika to the problem of protecting priroda (nature), institutional 
reforms followed.78 The radical reorganization of environmental protection in Soviet territory 
came with the creation in 1988 of the Federal State Committee of Environmental Protection 
(Goskompriroda), along with the creation of Committees for Environmental Protection in 
Republics and Local Regions.79 This major institutional development was expected to increase 
the level of effectiveness and implementation of the previously consolidated environmental 
regulations. The Committee was thus empowered with significant competences, allowing it to 
decide the shutdown of too highly polluting factories. As O. Kolbasov and Butler explain, the 
Soviet methods of environmental protection – mainly based on improving the planning system 
– differed from the American ones – essentially based on damages injunctions.80 All in all, as 
Robinson affirms, by 1988 environmental protection was becoming a substantial field of 
endeavour in the USSR.81 
 
2.2.2. ‘International Ecological Security’: Combined Product of National Environmentalism and 
the Reification of International Law  
                                                          
76
 Ibid., at 399: ‘Not in my backyard’ movement (NIMBY) is a battle cry which is heard nowadays from 
Latvia to Georgia, from the Ukraine to Siberia’. As Robinson explains, this movement emerged at a local 
level as an organized phenomenon of citizen opposition to polluting projects.  
77
 Butler reproduces in English the scheme of the Digest, structured in eight parts which cover legislation 
on the land, minerals, water, forestry sectors, as well as the protection of the atmosphere, wildlife and 
‘natural wealth of the continental shelf’. See W. E. BUTLER, ‘Law Reform in Soviet Environmental Law,’ 
supra, at 427-428. The rationale of this new environmental legislative and institutional process was 
underpinned a year later in Gorbachev’s statement: ‘We spent, in fact we are still spending, far more on 
raw materials, energy and other resources per unit of output than other developed nations. Our 
country’s health in terms of natural and manpower resources has spoiled, one may even say corrupted , 
us’, in M. GORBACHEV, Perestroika: a New Thinking for our Country and the World, 1987 (New York: 
Harper and Row), at 373. 
78
 For a detailed account, see ROBINSON, supra, at 366-387. 
79
 Kolbasov explains that the process of creation started in 1986, when the central committee and 
council of ministers introduced a special decree to establish a state committee on the environment in 
each Union republic, replacing many different bodies, agencies and departments. Same 
recommendation was taken to the all-union council of ministers in 1987, and finally the state committee 
for the protection of environment was established. Hence reform started from the local level to the 
federal level, not the other way around, and the committee displayed virtually the equivalent functions 
undertaken in the United States by the Environmental Protection Agency. See ROBINSON, supra, at 367.  
80
 O. KOLBASOV, ‘Environmental Law Administration and Policy in the USSR’ States’, (spring 1988) Pace 
Environmental Law Review, vol. 5, issue 2, pp. 439-444; and W. E BUTLER, ‘Law Reform in Soviet 
Environmental Law’, supra, at 425.  
81
 ROBINSON, supra, at 1. 
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In parallel to the exponential legislative and institutional developments, the academic 
field also made important contributions to the launch and consolidation of Soviet 
environmental protection. These efforts were displayed in particular through the Institute of 
State and Law, directed at the time by Oleg Kolbasov and closely connected with the USSR 
Academy of Sciences. Following the publication of the Soviet environmental ‘Digest’, these 
institutions organized and hosted in 1987 a major Conference which facilitated intellectual 
exchange between international scholars from both blocs. It also had a political impact, as it 
reinvigorated the USA–USSR Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Environment and was 
an occasion to show, a few months after the Chernobyl disaster, that Soviet national 
awareness and concern for environmental protection was on the rise. Most importantly, the 
Conference offered a scenario for Soviet scholars (closely linked to the political spheres) to 
present the view that national or international environmental protection ought to be properly 
conceived; it ought to be also associated with the objectives of maintaining international 
peace and of eliminating the nuclear threat. In Kolbasov’s words, clearly explaining this 
connection, ‘in the Soviet Union, environmental protection is understood to be a complex 
global, national and historical problem. A major factor necessary to solve this problem is peace 
– the elimination of the threat of thermonuclear war which casts doubt on the continued 
existence of the human race’.82  
The association of both political and normative objectives thereby set the conceptual 
basis for the notion of ‘ecological security’ – born out of Soviet legislative and institutional 
developments – to acquire an international dimension. Soviet doctrinal circles thus began 
using the term ‘international environmental security’,83 which called for the opening of a new 
stage of East–West co-operation governed by international law. As perestroika facilitated the 
opening of the Soviet Union to both international law and international institutions, the next 
stage undergone by the notion would unsurprisingly take place within United Nations organs.  
 
                                                          
82
 O. KOLBASOV, ‘Modern Ecological Policy and the Utilization of a Global Environmental Protection 
Strategy’, (spring 1988) Pace Environmental Law Review, vol. 5, issue 2, pp. 445-454, at 448 
83
 The proliferation of articles on ‘international environmental security’ includes: A. S TIMOSHENKO, 
‘Ecological Security: the International Aspect’, (autumn 1989) Pace Environmental Law Review, vol. 7, 
issue 1, pp. 151-160; A. TIMOSHENKO, ‘The Global Environmental Security: International Legal Aspects’, 
(1989) Soviet State and Law, vol. 1; O. KOLBASOV, ‘Modern Ecological Policy and the Utilization of a 
Global Environmental Protection Strategy’, (spring 1988) Pace Environmental Law Review, vol. 5, issue 2, 
pp. 445-454; O. KOLBASOV, ‘The Concept of Environmental Security’ (Legal Aspects), (1988) Soviet State 
and Law, vol. 12; and S. VINOGRADOV, ‘International Environmental Security: the Concept and its 
Implementation’, in A. CARTY and G. DANILENKO (eds.), Perestroika and International Law, supra, 
pp.196-207. 
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3. ‘INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY’ IN THE LATE PHASE OF THE COLD WAR: 
INCLUSION IN THE AGENDA OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1985–1991) 
The configuration of environmental protection at a Soviet (federal) level was conceived as 
a means of serving the purpose of achieving a higher degree of international security. This 
section provides an explanation of why and how such an idea was introduced into the agenda 
of the United Nations. The debate over the notion that took place in several United Nations 
organs between 1985 and 1989 was subsumed under a wider, highly controversial Soviet 
proposal for a ‘Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security’. Until the project 
was annulled by the break-up of the Soviet Union, international environmental security 
developed two facets: one ‘positive dimension’ – inviting the development of international 
environmental co-operation; and one ‘negative dimension’ – associated with the disarmament 
goal.84 
3.1. The Positive Dimension: ‘International Environmental Security’ as International 
Environmental Co-operation (Phase One: 1985–1987) 
3.1.1. A Controversial Framework: Gorbachev’s Project for a ‘Comprehensive System of 
International Peace and Security’  
The introduction of the notion of international environmental security results from a 
process launched in the mid-1980s, when the general political will in the corridors of the UN 
was pointing to the revision of formerly adopted resolutions and programmes on 
strengthening international peace and security. The history of the debate on a ‘Comprehensive 
System of International Peace and Security’ may thus be traced back to the 40th session of the 
UN General Assembly, in 1985. That year, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected head of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while the United Nations solemnly proclaimed 1986 as 
                                                          
84 The notion of security received important conceptual input from peace researchers from the 1950s to 
the 1970s. Theoretical developments from this trend came with an oppositional concept, which worked 
through security but argued that it should be replaced by that of peace. The first way in which Peace 
research worked through security was by tracing a distinction between ‘positive peace’ and ‘negative 
peace’. Such differentiation, which permitted rearticulation of the understanding of security in Strategic 
Studies, was first formulated in 1964 by Johan Galtung, the founding father of the discipline, in the 
inaugural editorial of the Journal of Peace Research. Galtung’s description of this essential dichotomy 
states: ‘One may now look upon peace research as research into the conditions for moving closer to the 
state we have called GCP [General and Complete Peace], or at least not drifting closer towards GCW 
[General and Complete War]. Thus, there are two aspects of peace as conceived of here: negative 
peace which is the absence of violence – and positive peace which is the integration of human society. 
Correspondingly, there are two branches of peace research’. See J.GALTUNG, ‘An editorial’, (1964) 
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1, issue 1, pp.1-4, at 2. This division in fact reflects Johan Galtung’s 
distinction between ‘positive peace’ and ‘negative peace’, reproduced in the respective division of work 
of the Security Council and the General Assembly.  
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the International Year of Peace, on its fortieth anniversary celebration.85 Preparing for the year 
to come, the Assembly approved, during the same session, two resolutions already indicating 
that previous international peace and security co-operation policies ought to be revisited. 
General Assembly Resolution 40/158 called for a revision of the implementation of the 
Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, while the following Resolution, 
40/159, highlighted the deficiencies and main challenges raised on the international scene for 
the implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter for the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security.86 A scent of revision and possible innovation with respect to 
the core function of the Organization was therefore in the air. 
Updating United Nations action in the field of security to the new realities of the 
international political scene was every day more pressing, not only for the Organization, but 
also and most prominently, for the Soviet government; having abandoned the arms race 
policy, it became correspondingly necessary to build up a new international security strategy.87 
The matter was dealt with in 1986 by the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. Part III of the Programme of the Party – approved by the Congress and devoted to the 
‘Tasks of the CPSU on the International Scene, in the Drive for Peace and Social Progress’ – 
reaffirmed the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and for the first time adopted a 
programme of action for a ‘comprehensive international security system’. Soviet authors 
                                                          
85
 UNGA Res. 41/9, International Year of Peace, adopted on 24 October 1986, 49
th
 plenary meeting, 
document reference: A/RES/41/9. Such pronunciation on what would become the main ‘goal’ of the 
following session was not improvised, but had been decided by the General Assembly, following a 1982 
recommendation of the Economic and Social Council in Resolution 37/16 which invited:  ‘[A]ll States, all 
organizations within the United Nations system and interested non-governmental organizations to exert 
all possible efforts for the preparation and observance of the International Year of Peace, and to respond 
generously with contributions to attain the objectives of the Year.’ See UNGA Res. 40/159, 
‘Implementation of the Collective Security Provisions of the Charter for the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security’, adopted on 16 December 1985. 
86
 UNGA Res. 40/158, ‘Review of the Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of 
International Security’; and UNGA Res. 40/159, ‘Implementation of the Collective Security Provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security’, both 
adopted at the 117
th
plenary meeting of the 40
th
 session of the UN General Assembly, on 16 December 
1985. 
87
 V. PRETROVSKY, ‘A Dialogue on Comprehensive Security’ (November 1989) International Affairs, vol.4 
pp. 1-13, at 3. The author, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR at the time when he wrote this 
article, clearly explains: ‘The idea of comprehensive security is a logical result of the objective course of 
world development. In the early 1980’s, international relations reached a turning point. On the one hand, 
trends towards […] an intercrossing of economic, environmental and socio-humanitarian interests won 
obvious dominance. On the other hand, a confrontational differentiation along ideological, political and 
other subjective lines persisted’. See also the explanation provided by P. VLADIMIRSKY ‘Comprehensive 
Security Equal for All’, (October 1987) USSR Report: International Affairs, pp. 9-19. See also, M. McWIRE, 
Perestroika and Soviet National Security, 1991, (Washington D.C.: the Brookings Institution), chapters 2 
and 3, pp. 14-76. 
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asserted that both notions – peaceful coexistence and a comprehensive international security 
system – are in fact theoretically inseparable from one another, for the latter is in fact the 
foundation of the former.88 The Programme linked the notion of a comprehensive security 
system to the development of a Soviet foreign policy based on disarmament and increased 
international co-operation under the auspices of the United Nations.89  
Following the CPSU Congress, a proposal for the introduction of a comprehensive 
system of international peace and security was launched in the United Nations by a letter from 
the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and a group of socialist countries to the UN 
Secretary-General.90 The proclamation of 1986 as the International Year of Peace provided for 
a particularly favourable climate for innovative proposals on how the international co-
operation should be conducted in the years to come. At the time when the proposal was 
launched, the beginning of a revision phase of the means to strengthen international security, 
particularly focused on the improvement of diplomatic and political dialogue, was formally 
under consideration.91 The proposal was finally approved by General Assembly Resolution 
41/92,92 with a widespread and overwhelming support of 102 votes in favour, 46 abstentions, 
and only 2 votes against, those of the United States of America and France. The voting record 
permits the assertion that a considerable part of the non-aligned movement supported the 
proposal or even actively co-sponsored it. The Resolution implied that the concept was 
                                                          
88
 V. FYODOROV, ‘The UN and a Comprehensive International Security System’, (September 1987) USSR 
Report: International Affairs, pp. 90-95, at 90: ‘[t]he draft program for a comprehensive international 
security system aimed at laying the foundation of peaceful coexistence and ensuring the sovereignty, 
independence and cooperation of all nations’.  
89
 Programme of the 27
th
 session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union available online at: 
<http://www.xs4all.nl/~eurodos/docu/cpsu-texts/cpsu86-0.htm>: ‘The Party will work for the 
development of the process of international detente, regarding it as a natural and essential stage  on the 
road to the establishment of a comprehensive and reliable security system. The experience of 
cooperation shows that there is a real prospect for this. The CPSU stands for the creation and use of 
international mechanisms and institutions that would make it possible to find optimal correlations 
between national, state interests and the common interests of mankind. It stands for enhancing the role 
of the United Nations in strengthening peace and developing international cooperation’ [Emphasis 
added].  
90
 The Governments that launched the proposal were: Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Ukraine and the Soviet Union. 
91
 Indeed, meanwhile, the adoption of UNGA Res. 41/90, on ‘Review of the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security’ and UNGA Res. 41/91, on the ‘Need for 
Result Oriented Political Dialogue to Improve the International Situation’, both adopted on 4 December 
1986, at the 96
th
 plenary meeting, documents reference: A/41/904, indicated that the wider and general 
trend initiated with the previously cited UNGA Res. 40/158 and UNGA Res. 40/159 had been followed 
up.  
92
 UNGA Res. 41/92, ‘Establishment of a Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security’, 
adopted with 102 votes in favor, 2 against and 46 abstentions, on 4 December 1986, 96
th
 plenary 
meeting, document reference: A/41/906.  
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introduced as an agenda item of the General Assembly; discussions bearing on the concrete 
meaning, scope and purpose of the proposal were thus about to follow.  
The ‘Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security’ (CSIPS) proposal 
anticipated the effects that perestroika would nurture in the international community. It was a 
prelude to the conceptual crystallization of the radical change of thinking of the Soviet Union 
on how to conduct international relations and construct international peace and security. 
Thereby, the reification of universal human values, moral grounds of the proposal for a 
comprehensive international security system, unsurprisingly matched those affirmed later on 
in the context of perestroika. Also, the increasing interdependence of the economic, 
environmental and social fields served as a practical foundation for facilitating the launch of 
this new Soviet approach at that specific time of the Cold War history. On 18 September 1987, 
the major conceptual explanation of the meaning, scope and purpose of the CSIPS was set up 
in the famous speech ‘Reality and Safeguards for a Secure World’ delivered by President 
Gorbachev during the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly.93 The statement traced back 
the origins of the proposal to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, whereby the link between security 
and environment had been institutionalized in ‘Basket 2’.94 Indeed, just as the architecture of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the proposal for a 
comprehensive international security principle was conceived as ‘bi-dimensional’: the ‘positive 
pillar’ corresponded to the development of international co-operation – driven by the principle 
of the primacy of international law – in areas such as the environment where interdependence 
was a fact; whereas the ‘negative pillar’ encapsulated the need to improve international co-
operation in the military field, strictly speaking, and would be fostered notably through active 
Soviet policy on the enhancement of international disarmament and nuclear control. 
Gorbachev placed ‘ecological security’ as an autonomous item within the proposal for a 
comprehensive system of international peace and security, and provided for a definition of the 
notion initially centred on the ‘positive’ facet of the concept (namely, environmental co-
operation): 
                                                          
93
 M. GORBACHEV, ‘Reality and Safeguards for a Secure World’, statement dated 18 September 1987 
and attachment of the Letter of the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics to the 42
nd
 session addressed to the Secretary-General, document reference: A/42/574, 18 
September 1987. The speech was the article he had recently written on the occasion of a visit to India, 
which he ordered to be distributed among the delegates of the UN Member States to the Plenary of the 
General Assembly under agenda item 73 (entitled ‘Comprehensive System of International Peace and 
Security’).   
94
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 ‘[T]he events and trends of recent decades have broadened this concept [international peace 
and security] and given it new features and characteristics. [P]roblems of ecological security 
affect us all, rich and poor alike. A global strategy for environmental conservation and the 
rational utilization of resources is required. And we propose that work be started on this, too, 
within the framework of the specialized United Nations Programme’.
95
 
3.1.2. An Innovative Component: The Draft Proposal on ‘International Ecological Security’ at 
the Second Committee of the General Assembly on Economic and Financial Matters 
On this basis, development of the notion followed within the Second Committee of the 
General Assembly on Economic and Financial matters,96 tasked with issues ranging from 
economic growth to development. On 23 October 1987 – barely a month after Gorbachev’s 
speech – the Second Committee held its 21st meeting. Chaired by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, it debated on Agenda Item 82 on Development and International Economic 
Cooperation, embracing the sub-items on ‘environment’ and on ‘desertification and 
drought’.97 Discussions of the future of environmental co-operation had already been initiated, 
as the release of the report of the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development 
was expected. Yet, the debate of the Second Committee brought about a new turn on the 
matter of environmental co-operation which anticipated the future development of the 
‘negative pillar’ of ecological security. Firstly, the opening words of A. Arseenko, Deputy 
Permanent Representative of Ukraine, acting as Chairman of the Committee, highlighted the 
impacts of the arms-race policy on the environment. He therefore called for the inclusion of a 
programme in the mid-term mandate of UNEP akin to the existing special programme on 
‘Peace, the Arms Race and the Environment’.98 This suggestion was then supported by the 
Czechoslovakian delegate, who considered that: 
 ‘The environmental threat was becoming a dangerous destabilizing factor and a source of 
increased tensions in international relations. International environmental security would 
guarantee respect for the right of every country to environmentally sound development […] 
The principles of such a code might include the requirement of a constructive and non-
                                                          
95
 GORBACHEV, supra note 66, pp. 5-8. [Emphasis added]. He further declared that: ‘To recognize the 
need for opening a common front of economic and ecological security to move towards establishing it 
would be to deactivate the time bomb that history and people themselves have planted under everyone’s 
lives […]how do we envisage this system ? […] on confidence-building measures and international 
cooperation in all fields, military, political, economic, ecological, humanitarian, and so forth’, at 8. 
Reference to the ‘negative’ side of the concept of environmental security remained when he made this 
reference to human survival (at the time mostly linked to the possibility of nuclear annihilation). 
96
 Information on the Second Committee (ECOFin) is available at: 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/second/index.shtml>   
97
 Summary Record of the 21
st
 meeting of the Second Committee, 23 October 1987, document 
reference: A/C.2/42/SR.21, Sub-items e) and f). 
98
 Ibid., at 2. A. Arseenko also considered that a similar programme should be included in UNEP’s 
Medium-Term Plan 1990–1995.  
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confrontational approach to the solution of international environmental problems, the 
inadmissibility of environmental accidents being used as a pretext for escalating tension and 
hostility among States.’
99
 
The statements from the Ukrainian and Czechoslovakian delegates thus introduced 
some important innovations into the original definition of ‘ecological security’ provided by 
Gorbachev.100 Two days after the opening of the debate in the Second Committee, the double-
faced dimension of the concept was crystallized in the Draft Resolution entitled ‘International 
Ecological Security’ and presented under item 82(e) of the Second Committee’s agenda by the 
Ukrainian SSR and Czechoslovakian delegations.101 The last three paragraphs of its extensive 
preamble, together with the operative part, summarized well the framework in which 
‘international ecological security’ was conceived by the two proponent Member States, the 
purposes of this initiative and the role to be played by the United Nations in the development 
of the notion: 
‘[R]ecognizing that the unity and interdependence of the world and the interrelationship of all 
spheres of human activity manifest themselves most fully in nature and the environment, the 
preservation of which is perceived as part of common efforts of mankind to create 
comprehensive security, 
Convinced that international ecological security could become an important contribution to 
confidence-building, strengthening stability and removing tension in international relations, 
Taking into consideration the close linkage of environmental problems and the political, 
military, economic and humanitarian spheres of international relations, 
1. Recognizes the necessity of exploring and developing a generally acceptable concept of 
international ecological security, and, in particular, of defining relevant basic guidelines 
and principles of conduct of States; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Executive Director of the United 
Nations Development Programme, to outline elements that could lead to the elaboration 
of a generally acceptable concept of international ecological security, and to report to the 
General Assembly at its 44
th
 Session under the sub-item entitled ‘Environment’.’ 
All in all, by October 1987, the notion of ‘international ecological/environmental 
security’ was already on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly, and its double-
                                                          
99
 Ibid., at 11. 
100
 This side was nonetheless mentioned by the German Democratic Republic delegate, who ‘ agreed 
that nuclear war or military conflict involving weapons of mass destruction constituted the gravest 
threat to the environment and that peace and security had a direct bearing upon the concept of 
sustainable development’. Summary Record A/C.2/42/SR.21, supra, at15. 
101
 Czechoslovakia and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Draft Resolution, ‘International Ecological 
Security’, document reference: A/C.2/42/L.34, 30 October 1987, presented to the Second Committee 
under agenda item 82.e, on Development and International Economic Cooperation (Environment). 
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sided dimensions had been referred to. The positive facet promoted by Gorbachev’s speech,102 
which stressed the need to foster international environmental co-operation as a means to 
build up international peace and security, possibly contributed to the normative development 
of international environmental law, since, two months after Gorbachev made his statement, 
an important set of General Assembly Resolutions reflecting an exponential development of 
international environmental co-operation was adopted.103 In contrast, the negative facet of 
the concept, calling for disarmament as a means to ensure effective environmental protection 
and which had been introduced in the Draft Resolution on ‘International Ecological Security’ 
submitted by the Ukrainian and Czechoslovakian delegations, was not followed up by the 
Second Committee and was never submitted to the General Assembly either. Yet, the 
underlying rationale and purpose of this Draft Resolution would not be abandoned by the 
Soviet Union and its allies.  
3.2. The Negative Dimension: ‘International Environmental Security’ as International 
Disarmament Co-operation (Phase Two: 1988–1991) 
3.2.1. Shifting Locations: Rise of the Soviet ‘Comprehensive Approach to International Peace 
and Security at the First Committee of the General Assembly on Security and Disarmament 
                                                          
102
 See supra, note 69. 
103
 The ‘positive’ pillar of international ecological security saw an immediate exponential progress and 
became the seeds of what would become a few years later the Rio Conference. It is noteworthy that by 
Resolution 42/187 the General Assembly directly noted the Report ‘Our Common Future’ of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (also known as the Brundtland Commission), and put in 
place a series of measures leading to the implementation of the analysis and recommendations 
contained in the report (e.g. its transmission to all governments and the governing bodies of the organs, 
organizations and programmes of the UN). Part 11 of the Report provides an extensive explanation of 
the linkages between ‘Peace, Security, Development and the Environment’ and makes specific mention 
of the possible security implications of climate change, see paragraph 15: ‘Environmental threats to 
security are now beginning to emerge on a global scale. The most worrisome of these stem from the 
possible consequences of global warming caused by the atmospheric build-up of carbon dioxide and 
other gases. Any such climatic change would quite probably be unequal in its effects, disrupting 
agricultural systems in areas that provide a large proportion of the world's cereal harvests and perhaps 
triggering mass population movements in areas where hunger is already endemic. Sea levels may rise 
during the first half of the next century enough to radically change the boundaries between coastal 
nations and to change the shapes and strategic importance of international waterways – effects both 
likely to increase international tensions. The climatic and sea-level changes are also likely to disrupt the 
breeding grounds of economically important fish species. Slowing, or adapting to, global warming is 
becoming an essential task to reduce the risks of conflict’. Moreover, the report of the UNEP on 
‘Environmental Perspectives for the Year 2000 and Beyond’, annexed to UNGA Res. 42/187 which takes 
note of the report, integrated elements and recommendations previously formulated by the Brundtland 
Commission, including a specific section on the issue of ‘Security and the Environment’. See UNGA Res. 
42/184, ‘International Cooperation in the Field of Environment’; UNGA Res. 42/185, ‘Biennial Cycle of 
Sessions of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme’; and UNGA Res. 
42/187, ‘Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development’, resulting from the 
Brundtland Report, were all adopted during the 96
th
 plenary meeting, on 11 December 1987. 
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In July 1988, the Warsaw Pact Declaration already indicated that the idea of linking the 
environment and security spheres was to be maintained by the Soviet bloc.104 Yet, as a change 
of strategy within the UN institutions was required, the debate on the notion of international 
environmental security was transferred from the Second Committee (on Economic and 
Financial Matters) to the First Committee (on Security and Disarmament) of the General 
Assembly. Given the nature of the tasks and the issues falling within the mandate of the First 
Committee, it is not surprising that the notion of international ecological security was not 
discussed as a separate issue, but subsumed under the wider Soviet attempt to advance the 
debate on the ‘Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security’. The initiative was 
favoured by the recent relaxation in international relations, referred to by the Cameroon 
delegate as the celebration of ‘a kind of political Pentecost graced by a refreshing revival of 
faith in the United Nations’.105 The new input finally began in 1988 with the distribution by the 
Soviet Union, at the beginning of the 43rd session, of a memorandum entitled ‘Towards 
Comprehensive Security through the Enhancement of the Role of the United Nations’, in which 
the proposal to ‘launch a broad international dialogue’ on the following lines was laid down:  
“Our comprehensive approach to security is based on the obvious fact that the very 
concept of security is made up of many components […] The example of the economic 
elements and the evolution of its significance clearly demonstrate that the very concept of 
security is not something rigid, and that it is in the process of development, and changes 
along with changes in the life of human society. Consequently, qualitatively new elements in 
what we understand by security may appear. Thus over a few years and quite unexpectedly 
                                                          
104
 The Warsaw Treaty Organization (or Warsaw Pact) was established on 14 May 1955 as a military and 
political alliance between the Soviet Union and several communist European countries that would 
counterbalance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (the original signatories of the Pact were the 
Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the German Democratic 
Republic). On 16 July 1988, Member States of the Organization adopted a Declaration on ‘the 
Consequences of the Arms Race for the Environment and other Aspects of Ecological Security’, in which, 
as its title indicates, reference to international ecological security in the Declaration linked 
environmental protection to the negative impacts of war as well as to the need to foster a disarmament 
policy. Cited in TIMOSHENKO, supra, at 153. 
105
 Verbatim Record of 51
st
 meeting of the First Committee, infra, at 28. Prior to the celebration of this 
meeting, the Secretary-General released a Report on the state of affairs with respect to agenda item 73, 
namely a ‘Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security’, document reference: A/43/732, 
released on 20 October 1988.The Report explained that the Soviet delegation had seen the opportunity 
to ‘[l]aunch a broad international dialogue, above all within the United Nations, on the ways and means 
of ensuring comprehensive security in military, political, economic, ecological, humanitarian, including 
human rights, and other fields, on the basis of the strict compliance with the Charter and an enhanced 
role and effectiveness of the United Nations’; it also added that ‘[I]t was suggested by them [a number of 
international and national non-governmental organizations and political figures responding to 
paragraph 13 of the General Assembly Resolution 42/93] that scholars whose research is relevant to the 
study of a ‘new definition’ of global security should be consulted both by their respective governments 
and by the world Organization’, at 4 [Emphasis added]. 
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the problem of the ecological threat in a number of its aspects has become one of the highest 
concerns of mankind.”
106  
Thereafter, the Committee on Security and Disarmament held eight meetings, chaired 
by Canada, in which the Soviet proposal was heatedly discussed.107 Unsurprisingly, such an all-
embracing and innovative proposal on the understanding of security raised strong opposition 
and suspicions from some non-aligned and western States, primarily concerned that approving 
a resolution entitled ‘Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security’ would be 
interpreted as an alternative to the United Nations collective security system. The Soviet 
delegate defended the proposal against this criticism by stating that the concept of a 
comprehensive approach to international security was inherent in the UN Charter.108 Finally, as 
a result of diplomatic exchanges, the wording of both the title of the agenda item and the 
Draft Resolution was modified. The word ‘system’ was replaced by that of ‘approach to 
strengthening peace and security’, and reinforced by an ending formula ‘in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations’.109 Nonetheless, opposition to the substance of the new 
approach was also raised by France and the USA. France considered the distinction, in the 
Charter, between security and environment, as being two spheres which are subject to special 
treatment under the purview of different specialized agencies, and which should not be 
modified.110 The French delegate also highlighted the view that merging military and non-
military threats, in the debate of the First Committee, risked jeopardizing the institutional 
balance provided for in the Charter.111 France’s all-embracing objections (of both a substantive 
and procedural nature) were followed by the even harder opposition of the United States of 
America. The U.S. delegate stated that the comprehensive security approach suggested by the 
Soviet Union was akin to a Trojan horse, posing a serious threat to the United Nations and the 
security of its Member States. It therefore invited the Committee to transfer the Soviet 
proposal to the Special Committee for Charter Review.112 
Czechoslovakia and Ukraine reacted to these opposition voices and provided grounds 
for the defence of the Soviet Union’s proposal. First of all, the Czechoslovakian delegate 
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 Annex to the Letter of 22 September 1988 from the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the USSR to 
the 43
rd
 session of the UN General Assembly, addressed to the Secretary-General, document reference: 
A/43/629.  
107
 See Verbatim Records of 47
th
 to 51
st
 meetings of the First Committee, 23
rd
 to 30
th
 November 1988, 
document references: A/C.1/43/PV.47 – PV.54. 
108
 PV. 51, supra, at 20. 
109
 For France this remained insufficient to cast away the doubts on how to interpret it.  
110
 Ibid., at 15. 
111
 Ibid., at 13.  
112
 Ibid., at 43. 
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pointed out that ‘in conditions that are not suitable for life any thought of ensuring security by 
military means loses all meaning’113 and therefore, as the Ukrainian delegate rhetorically 
stated, ‘comprehensive security enables us to take a broader view between the quality of the 
international relations and the quality of life’.114 Secondly, Ukraine sought to link the Soviet 
Union’s proposal to the follow-up of the Helsinki Final Act that was already under way, 
reminding the Committee that the notion of comprehensive security had been adopted as a 
cardinal starting point for the configuration of the CSCE architecture. Arguably, what was 
positive to improve the regional (European) security climate could be exported at an 
international level. All in all, the course of the debate benefitted the Soviet proposal, as it 
became co-sponsored by an increased number of States and was finally adopted as a 
Committee resolution, with only two votes against: those of the USA and Japan (France 
abstained).115 
 
3.2.2. Limited Timing: Break-up of the USSR and the Legacy of the ‘Comprehensive Approach to 
International Peace and Security’ Project 
Following the adoption by the First Committee of the Soviet proposal for a 
Comprehensive Approach to Security in accordance with the United Nations Charter, on 8 
December 1988, President Gorbachev again addressed the General Assembly.116 He 
emphasized the potential of perestroika for the promotion of peace and international co-
operation, reaffirmed the primacy of universal values in world politics ‘regardless of ideological 
or other differences’, and highlighted the need to gather efforts to solve global problems 
through a ‘new scope and quality of interaction of states and socio-political currents’.117 Soon 
after his plea, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 43/89, whereby the ‘Comprehensive 
Approach to International Peace and Security’ project was included in the agenda of the 
General Assembly. A landmark moment for the notion of ‘international 
ecological/environmental security’ would follow this success when, on 27 September 1989, 
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated before the General Assembly that 
‘political ecology requires the involvement of the Security Council’.118 Seemingly, the time had 
become favourable for the notion of international environmental security to take a more 
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 PV. 52, supra, at 7. 
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 PV. 54, supra. 
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 Address by President GORBACHEV, Verbatim Record A/43/PV.72, 8 December 1988.  
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prominent place within the United Nations (particularly within the organ primarily responsible 
for the maintenance of international peace and security). Yet, the beginning of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, from 1989 to 1991, put a radical end to the process 
originally initiated under the wider project for a ‘Comprehensive Approach to International 
Peace and Security’. Although the item was never formally taken off the agenda of the General 
Assembly, it never saw the light of day again.  
The three main characteristics of this first stage of linking the environment and 
security spheres within United Nations institutions should be highlighted. First of all, it was a 
double-sided process, in which the notion of ‘international environmental/ecological security’ 
proved to be malleable and open to two different meanings – the ‘positive’ dimension called 
for promoting international peace and security through the development of international 
environmental co-operation, whereas the ‘negative’ dimension stressed the irreversible 
consequences of the arms race and the nuclear threat for a common interdependent ‘asset’ 
such as the environment. Secondly, as a result of this double-sided meaning, the concept of 
‘international environmental/ecological security’ before the United Nations institutions was 
introduced as part of a wider political project and strategy nurtured by the new fundamental 
change of thinking in the Soviet Union about international law, which correspondingly found 
strong opposition within the western bloc. Thirdly, the inception of the concept of 
international environmental/ecological security also reflected the historical momentum when 
the awareness of the high level of interdependence between the two blocs in several fields 
(including environmental) was providing input to the conscious formation of the existence of 
‘global issues’, useful seeds for a new stage of international environmental law to develop.119  
 
4. ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACHES TO SECURITY AT THE INCEPTION OF THE NEW WORLD 
ORDER: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM (1991–2007) 
                                                          
119
 The Soviet Foreign Minister closed the intervention by calling to urgently co-operate in the 
environmental field: (seeds of climate change regulation): ‘the time factor and the planetary nature of 
the ecological threat require that we urgently merge our efforts as States to prepare and implement a 
global strategy for the protection of the environment. [R]elevant in this connection is the introduction by 
the Soviet Union of a proposal to conduct a systematic triple cycle of special meetings on problems of 
coordination of efforts in the field of ecology which could conclude with a second UN Summit conference 
on questions on the environment by 1992 or perhaps even earlier’. Yet, as Dalby points out, ‘despite 
some early suggestions by Gro Harlem Brundtland and others, the term “environmental security” was 
apparently eclipsed by the discussions of other matters at the [1992] Earth Summit’; see S.DALBY, 
‘Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse’, in 
KRAUSE and WILLIAMS (eds.), supra, at 15.   
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The break-up of the Soviet Union put an end to the first process, launched within the 
United Nations, whereby the environment and security spheres were conceived as being in 
direct association and mingled from a policy perspective. Afterwards, a ‘second wave’ would 
be brought about by the Climate Change and International Security Discourse that reached 
United Nations organs during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Yet, between these 
two stages – that is, for the period ranging from 1991 to 2007 – important theoretical 
developments and empirical studies developed outside the United Nations framework. This 
interim process constitutes as much an important part of the precedent to the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse as the Soviet Union’s proposal for an ‘international 
environmental security’, and is the object of study of this section. 
4.1. Changing Theoretical Conceptualizations: The Environmental Component of Security in 
International Security Studies 
As pointed out in the introduction to this Chapter, a debate in western international 
security studies about the practical need for and political suitability of considering non-military 
threats within the notion of security preceded the end of the Cold War; it was a debate which 
did not have any outreach within the United Nations system and therefore had a limited 
impact in the international inter-State arena. In contrast, the beginning of a new era outside 
the bipolar straitjacket  brought about a structural crisis in the field of international security 
studies, as the damage to Cold War ‘traditionalists’ and their understanding of security was 
correlatively superseded by a two-fold movement. Several ‘schools’ saw the opportunity to 
highlight the narrowness of the military–state-centred agenda ‘analytically, politically and 
normatively’;120 while ‘wideners’ called for an expansion in scope of the notion of security – 
considering security-specific non-military sectors ‘as phenomena in their own right’ 
(constructivists and the Copenhagen School [Copenhagen Peace Research Institute]) – 
‘deepeners’ proposed expanding the levels of analysis of the notion and considering the 
referent object of security beyond the State (critical movement). The integration of 
environmental considerations into the notion of security thus got back to the front line of 
debate in western doctrinal circles. 
4.1.1. Constructivism and the Copenhagen School: The ‘Securitization’ of the Environment  
It is frequently mentioned that one of the most surprising facts of the ending of the 
Cold War was that at no point did realist analytical tools serve to predict it. Nor were they 
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useful afterwards to explain or elucidate by a solidly structured theory the reasons why the 
Cold War had occurred. The end of the conflict thus gave rise to some important criticism of 
the realist basic tenets, which in turn affected the traditionalist notion of security conceptually 
from two angles. Firstly, it put at stake the identity of the referent object of security, namely 
the (western) State. As Samuel Huntington famously remarked, the end of the Cold War 
unveiled the ‘enemy syndrome’ of both blocs and produced a paradigm shift that he explains 
as follows: ‘[i]n class and ideological conflicts, the key question was: which side are you on? 
And people could and did choose sides and change ideas. In conflicts between civilizations, the 
question is: what are you?’.121 Forced to face the big gap left by the end of ‘The Other’, the 
attention of western intellectual circles consequently turned towards ‘The Self’. This is perhaps 
the cradle of the basic constructivist thought, whose core tenet states that security is a 
theoretical construction based on an interpretation of external events by ‘The Self’, rather 
than based on an interpretation of a situation which objectively constitutes a threat generated 
by ‘The Other’.122 As pointed out by Daniel Deudney, one result of this shift of focus is that it 
became necessary to rethink the referent object of security (referred to as the ‘subjective 
actor’) so as to be able to understand the connections drawn by such a subjective actor with 
any external fact that may subsequently be categorized under the ‘threat label’.123 
Interestingly, Deudney associated the growing awareness of the effects of environmental 
problems with the general effects of the ‘enemy syndrome’, for ‘environmental problems, at 
its basic level, ask us who we are and who “us” encompasses’.124 Secondly, the ending of the 
Cold War embodied the loss of an analytical superstructure, so that the obsolescence of a 
‘balance of power in a bipolar world’ framework generated the necessity of beginning an 
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 S. HUNTINGTON, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ (summer 1993) Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, at 27. [Emphasis 
added]. Particular attention to the importance of ‘The Other’ can be found for instance in the work of D. 
CAMPBELL, Writing Security: the United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 1992, 
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press). Besides, as Buzan and Hansen recall, the question 
of whether States needed enemies was confronted mainly by post-structuralism, one branch of the 
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 See B. KLEIN, ‘Conclusion: Every Month is “Security Awareness Month”’, in KRAUSE and WILLIAMS 
(eds.) supra, at 363, who explains: ‘The theoretical construction around the notion of security born in 
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hostile environment (...). Security considerations are not objectively gleaned from a neutral road map of 
world politics, they are themselves socially constructed and discursively reproduced in ways that are 
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 See D. DEUDNEY and R. MATHEWS, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New 
Environmental Politics, 1999, (New York: State University of New York Press), at 199. Recalling the 
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entirely new process that would enable the identification of the causes of war and instability. 
Thus, in the absence of what Barry Buzan and Ole Waever referred to as a ‘macrosecuritization 
event’,125 most international relations theories developed under strategic studies underwent a 
thorough re-examination and revision;  united by their ‘challenge to military–State centrism’, a 
multiplicity of branches adhered to what is known as the ‘widening and deepening movement’ 
of international security studies.126  
The main ‘wideners’ that emerged after the end of the Cold War and which had an 
impact on the consideration of environmental issues in the context of security were 
Constructivism and the Copenhagen School (the latter described by Matt McDonald as ‘the 
most concerted attempt to develop a theory or framework for the study of security in the 
constructivist tradition’).127 As Barry Buzan explains, conventional constructivism was born out 
of P. Katzenstein’s landmark work and was the ‘least radical’ widening approach to security, as 
it ‘fails to engage security critically’ and embraced the same rationalist (rather than reflective) 
case-study research methodology as that of the traditionalists.128 More relevant for the 
introduction of environmental considerations into the notion of security was critical 
constructivism, which diverged from conventional constructivism by the mid-1990s, criticized 
the reification of the State as the preferable object of security studied by conventional 
constructivism, and focused on identity issues and their corresponding effects on the 
interpretation/representation of events that generate security policies (that is, security is 
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 B. BUZAN and O. WAEVER, ‘Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitization Theory’ (2009) Review of International Studies, vol. 35, pp. 253-276. Macrosecuritizations 
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 See P. KATZENSTEIN (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
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understood as a context-specific social construct).129 Although neither of these two schools 
dealt directly with how environmental considerations could or should be incorporated into the 
notion of security, they indirectly contributed to produce this effect by influencing the 
inception of the Copenhagen School (Copenhagen Peace Research Institute).  
Created in Europe to broaden the definition of security so as to include concerns 
neglected by the traditionalists, the Copenhagen School produced the most interesting 
conceptual innovations in the concept of security from a constructivist ‘traditional’ standpoint, 
directly giving a place to environmental security, as such, in the security discourse, through the 
creation of two main taxonomies – ‘securitization processes’ and ‘security sectors’. The 
starting point of this trend is the idea that the meanings of security originate from ‘inter-
subjective processes with political effect’. It thus places the study of linguistics at the centre of 
its research and, openly engaging with the notion of security, gives rise to a ‘discursive 
approach to security’.130 From there on, the Copenhagen School first comes up with a 
definition of the notion of ‘societal security’, understood in the words of Waever as ‘the ability 
of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual 
threats’.131 Thereby, the Copenhagen School accepts two possible referent objects of security: 
the State and society, excluding both the individual level and the global level. This 
characteristic places the Copenhagen School in an eclectic trend between traditionalists and 
critical constructivists. Furthermore, while considering that the ‘possible or actual threats’ are 
‘linked to an objective definition’, the Copenhagen School does not neglect how the identity of 
the referent object has an impact on the characterization of an objective situation as a threat. 
Such a relation is encapsulated in the notion of ‘securitization’, according to which, security 
results from a process whereby: (1) a ‘securitizing actor’ (the referent object of security) 
defines a particular issue as an ‘existential threat’; (2) such labelling is accepted by a relevant 
audience which (3) results in the introduction of the threat securitized in the (exceptional) 
realm of security policy.132 Securitization theory is thus dependent upon the notion of ‘speech 
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acts’ found in J. Austin’s language theory, since, during the securitization of a threat, security 
becomes a ‘site of negotiation between speakers and audiences’.133 Thirdly, the Copenhagen 
School puts forward the notion of ‘security sectors’, defined as ‘fields of activity or arenas that 
entail particular forms of security interactions and particular definitions of referent objects’.134 
Five different security sectors have been listed by Buzan: the military sector (entailing 
relationships of forceful coercion); the political sector (entailing relationships of authority, 
governing status and recognition); the economic sector (entailing relationships of trade, 
production and finance); the societal sector (entailing relationships of collective security) and, 
last but not least, the environmental sector (entailing relationships between human activity 
and the planetary biosphere).135 
The ‘widening’ operated by the Copenhagen School can be said to be ambivalent. On 
the one hand, it is considered by its proponents to constitute ‘real widening’, in that each of 
the security sectors is ‘eligible’ for consideration under a security prism irrespective of whether 
or not it affects the ‘military capacities of the State’. Any parts of the security sectors 
mentioned can be subject to securitization if an ‘essential threat’ originating in a sector is 
perceived as such by the relevant audience.136 Henceforth, ‘environmental security’ acquired 
the capacity to become an independent notion with autonomous standing in the security 
discourse.137  
Yet, such autonomous standing is limited by the overall framework of analysis 
underlying the Copenhagen School. First, it does not escape the realist State-centred approach 
to security, as the State remains the primary referent object for security and it is State ‘elites’ 
(the political power) who are the actors in the securitization (that is, the ‘relevant 
                                                                                                                                      
by, we are witnessing a case of securitization’. Correlatively, ‘de-securitization’ is defined as the process 
whereby an issue re-enters the realm of normal politics. 
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audience’).138 Environmental problems with effects at infra-statist (individual) or supra-statist 
(regional or global) levels of analysis would therefore not fall within the ‘environmental 
security sector’ – unless the elites of such States decide to engage in the securitization process 
of one of them, presumably out of circumstantial political interest. Limiting the acceptance of 
possible ‘sites’ for securitization to the State – and eventually also to ‘society’ – disregards the 
most important levels where environmental problems empirically manifest themselves, for, as 
Miriam Lowi and Briand Shaw point out, ‘space is a critical variable of environmental and 
security relationships and the spatial dynamics shift from globally to locally’.139 Secondly, 
following up this last point, environmental security – as security in general – does not exist 
outside ‘discourse’. In other words, under the Copenhagen School perspective, there is no 
objective reality of environmental problems being a security threat outside the linguistic 
construction of a fact as such. Such a limitation is highly controversial and, as Ken Booth 
criticizes, ‘[t]he discourse-centric approach to security misses chunks of reality, and is based on 
the fallacy that threats do not exist outside discourse. They clearly do so, empirically. The 
danger posed by global warming to low-lying island States was a physical process long before 
the discourse on environmental security was invented by its proponents and listened to by their 
audiences’.140 
These two main limits to the broadening goal of the Copenhagen School permit the 
assertion that this ‘branch remained, just as traditionalists, stuck in the main “Cold War 
mindsets”.’ Critical security studies would take on this point and develop further the theory of 
security, which provided a radical new framework for the notion of environmental security to 
expand.  
 
4.1.2. Critical Thinking of Security: Redefining Sovereignty in the Ecological Era 
 
The more radical conceptual innovations of the notion of security were operated by 
critical security studies. This branch of international security studies, essentially conformed to 
by the European Welsh School (also known as the Aberystwyth School), was built up from the 
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quest for a real new paradigm that would transform the existing understandings of the notion 
of security.141 
To begin with, ‘non-critical’ security thinking conceives security as a ‘derivative 
concept’ (i.e. which cannot be self-referential and therefore depends on the existence of a 
‘referent’, an ‘object’ and an ‘agent’ to make it become a realm of study).142 Thus, from a 
traditional perspective, ‘security’ does not exist on its own, without reference to whom is 
protected, how protection is ensured, and against what protection is needed. Despite the fact 
that critical security studies also consider that security is a derivative concept, it differs from 
the traditional perspective in so far as, in Mark Horkheimer’s words, traditional theory leads to 
the ‘reification of ideas into institutions that are represented as immutable facts of life, 
whereas critical theory discards rigid distinctions between subject and object’.143 Critical theory 
is in this sense opposed to realist and neorealist perspectives on security – which fail to take 
into account the historical processes that have produced them – and rejects their alleged 
neutral morality which falls short of proposing alternative feasible transformations of the 
existing world they describe.144 In contrast, at the heart of the Welsh School lies the aim to find 
the new grounds of a political order whereby it will be possible to identify referents and actors 
of security which are operative in today’s globalized world. Bearing this principal purpose in 
mind, and considering that ‘security is what we make of it’, the role of the scholar becomes 
important.145 In order to move beyond the general discussion on the nature of security, the 
Welsh School stressed the need to refocus the debate and find a new analytical framework 
through which the relationship between environment and security could be re-conceived from 
scratch.146 To come up with this new analytical framework, the critical school defies both 
‘Statism’ – understood as ‘the normative position that treats the State as the ultimate referent 
                                                          
141
 For an explanation of the origins and main tenets of the Welsh School (including its relation with the 
Frankfurt School), see P. BILGIN, ‘Critical Theory’, in P. WILLIAMS (ed.), supra, pp. 89-102; and BUZAN 
and HANSEN, supra, pp. 205-208. 
142
 The early explanation of Wolfers of security as an ‘ambiguous concept’ directly derives from this 
inherent conceptual dependence of security. See WOLFERS, supra (introduction to this chapter).  
143
 See M. HORKHEIMER, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, in M. HORKEIMER, Critical Theory: Selected 
Essays, 1972, (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company), pp. 188-243. First published in 1937 – and 
part of the philosophical and sociological movement that came to be known as the ‘Frankfurt School’ – 
this article set up the founding layers and the agenda for critical theory, which developed most 
prominently, after World Word II, from the hands of Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas.  
144
 Indeed, the lack of a prescriptive goal is considered by critical thinkers as being openly conservative 
rather than morally neutral.  
145
 See M. WILLIAMS and K. KRAUSE (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, at xiii (Preface), 
supra, at xiii, who explain that the approach of critical security studies to security ‘is that of a stranger 
but not of an outsider’,  
146
 LOWI and SHAW, supra, at 3.  
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
70 
 
object and agent of security’, and ‘State-centrism’ – or consequent ‘methodological choice of 
taking the State as the central actor and concentrating on its practices when studying the 
international phenomena’.147 
On the one hand, the limits of Statism and State capacities to ensure security are 
particularly stressed; while Simon Dalby explains that ‘discussions of reformulating security 
also coincide with the widespread recognition of the limits of formal sovereignty in the modern 
world’,148 Patricia Mishe considers that the origins of this limitation lie in ‘the transboundary 
and interdependent nature of environmental threats [which] defies existing concepts of state 
sovereignty: the Earth does not recognise sovereignty as we now define it’.149 Henceforth, the 
Critical School considers that security ought to be defined globally – and practised locally.150As 
the central focus of attention shifts away from the State, the Welsh School opened the door to 
proposals to redefine the notion of sovereignty in the new ‘ecological era’. ‘Ecological security’ 
is seen as requiring a ‘new cosmology’ that incorporates a shift from a homo-centric to a bio-
centric approach to security, on the one hand, and the reconstruction of a new identity based 
on ‘loyalty systems for our common survival’, on the other.151 P. Mishe further considers that 
global environmental threats create the need to set up a sort of ‘new social contract’ based on 
new understanding of our relationship with the earth;152 a petition which D. Deudney views as 
the need to reconstruct ‘many of the major institutions of industrial modernity, such as the 
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State and the nation’.153 In other words, the interconnectedness of the global ecology leads to 
new understandings of the political community. This new assumption deeply challenges the 
traditional and the limited widening perspectives on the notion of security and potentially 
constitutes a radical or even revolutionary move for the discipline of international security 
studies given that, as explained by Michael Williams and Keith Krause, State sovereignty 
embodies for security studies scholars ‘a coherent response to many of the central problems of 
political life’.154  
Once the Statist framework of analysis of environmental security is superseded by the 
proposal of a new understanding of the political community, the question that emerges is: 
what would then be the new level of analysis? Considering that ecological problems ‘have 
given rise to a new sense of place and threat’, the ‘bioregion’ – a region defined by ecological 
parameters, such as watersheds or predominant vegetation type – re-emerges as a possibly 
appropriate unit of analysis and invites rethinking identity in ecologically appropriate ways 
(including outside the State or the nation).155 
On the other hand, as a reaction to State-centrism and what may be considered as a 
lack of a prescriptive goal of traditional approaches to security, the critical approach puts at 
the centre of the notion of security a concrete normative objective: the fulfilment of various 
aspects of ‘human liberation’. The core challenge of the Welsh School to traditional and other 
non-critical security studies thus lies in the place of the individual, reified as the sole referent 
of security, and the corresponding understanding of the instrumental function of security 
serving the achievement of the individual’s higher goal: its own ‘emancipation’.156 Critical 
theories thus argue that States are means – rather than ends – of security policy; although 
they are often ‘unreliable providers of security’, if not potential generators of insecurity rather 
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than stability and prosperity.157 The positive obligation of the State with regard to security 
(security provider), and its negative obligation (not creator of insecurity), are both denied, and 
this ‘pessimistic view of global security’ is all the more emphasized that individuals’ insecurity 
is considered to be exacerbated by the existing free-market economic structure.158 After 
putting the individual at the centre of the security analysis, the critical security school 
counterbalances its previous ‘pessimistic’ view on global security by creating the notion of 
emancipation, defined by Booth as ‘the freeing of people – as individuals and groups – from 
those physical human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose 
to do’.159  
Moreover, this critical anthropocentric approach to security is closely related to the 
emergence of the human security branch of international security studies, which emergence 
mirrored the introduction of the notion of human security in United Nations institutions as 
well as in the policy agenda of some countries that eventually formed the ‘Human Security 
Network’. As explained by Barbara Von Tigerstrom, the launch of the notion of human security 
‘is based on the argument that, because of its privileged moral position, individual human 
beings rather than States should be the primary referent objects of security’.160 The relationship 
(not comparison) between human security and environmental security can thus be said to be 
ambivalent. Firstly, both concepts are part of a wider movement of expansion and deepening – 
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sometimes deconstruction or redefinition – of the classical realist understanding of security. 
Their emergence and consolidation came with the emergence of new ‘big questions’, since, as 
Eric Stern states, ‘the trend toward disassociating security and the nation State and attempts 
to enhance security for individuals entails coping with serious tensions among multiple levels of 
social aggregation and identity’.161 Therefore, the relation between both concepts could be 
understood from two different angles: either including in human security an environmental 
component; or, alternatively, introducing a people-centred (as opposed to a State-centred) 
dimension to environmental security’ – which is now exacerbated by the increase in the 
number of displaced people due to climate change. 
 
4.2. Innovative Empirical Research: The Quest for the Environmental Causes of Conflict 
4.2.1. Spread of Empirical Studies: A Euro-Atlantic Movement  
The end of the Cold War not only brought about an institutional break within 
international security studies between ‘cold war traditionalists’ and the new schools of the 
widening-deepening movement; it also generated grant-making reorientation, for, as Mitchel 
Wallerstein explains, ‘many donors at the time chose to turn their attention instead to 
environmental problems, where the prospects for progress looked considerably better’.162 In 
other words, the incorporation of environmental issues into the realm of security policy was in 
part a strategy seeking to control or limit the loss of financial support in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. A good example of this plan can be found in, for instance, the United States of 
America, as the chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, 
proposed that substantial Defense Department and intelligence resources be reoriented to the 
solution of ecological problems through the creation of a Strategic Environmental Research 
Program. Journalist Philip Shabecoff of the International Herald Tribune interpreted this 
proposal as an attempt by Senator Nunn to combine environmental concerns with the interest 
of the defence and military establishment of the United States of America, so that research 
and technological capacity for the military could be maintained ‘at a time when military 
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budgets will be shrinking substantially due to changing international threat perceptions after 
the demise of east-west conflict’.163  
The move proved to be successful and, for the first time, in 1991, the concept of 
‘environmental security’ was integrated into the U.S. National Security Strategy, followed by a 
widely commented speech of Secretary of State Warren Christopher in which he stated that 
‘environmental initiatives can be important, low-cost, high-impact tools in promoting our 
national security interests’.164 President Clinton pursued this initiative and issued several 
statements embracing environmental problems as security concerns, and government offices 
were created, such as a the Global Environmental Affairs Directorate at the National Security 
Council, a Department of Defense Office for Environmental Security, and an Office of Under 
Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Deputy Benjamin Gilman even filed a proposal for a Bill to 
establish the National Committee on the Environment and National Security.165 
One of the most significant consequences of the change in policy funding – and 
associated with this new official institutional mushrooming – was the spread of research 
projects in North American (both the USA and Canada) and European centres on the 
relationship between environmental degradation and the outbreak of (national and 
international) violent conflict. This spread was initiated with the launch of the Environmental 
Change and Security Program (ECSP) at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C. – a 
highly recognized think-tank founded in 1968 and ranked among the top fifteen in the world. 
The first biannual reports of this Program, lead by its directors, Geoffrey D. Dalbeko and David 
D. Dalbeko, focussed on setting the theoretical basis of the Program and located its objectives 
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within the doctrinal and policy debate on whether the notion of security should be redefined 
in the post-Cold War era so as to incorporate new environmentally related factors. 166  
Then, a progressive use of case-study methodology applied to the issue ensued; and 
reports have been adapted ever since to the respective political and scientific evolutions until 
today. Following the Wilson Center groundbreaking initiation, the University of Toronto  
launched the first programme, funded by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 
Cambridge (Massachusetts) and soon referred to as the ‘Toronto Group’ or by the name of its 
director, Thomas Homer-Dixon – on environmental scarcity and conflict – with a clear ambition 
to apply empirically based methodology.167 A very similar initiative was developed on the other 
side of the Atlantic, as the Swiss Peace Federation supported the Environment and Conflicts 
Project (ENCOP), launched at the Centre for Security Studies (CCS) in Zurich, at the time 
directed by Gunther Baechler. Ever since its creation in 1990, the ENCOP was known as the 
other major collaborative research project investigating the links between environmental 
damage and degradation and actual or possible conflicts. Among the several reports that 
emerged out of this project, S. Libiszewski’s article ‘What is an Environmental Conflict’ is 
considered as having set a landmark.168 The results of the research indicated that 
environmental degradation is unlikely to determine – or lead directly to – interstate wars or 
other large-scale conflicts, though such degradation is considered as a destabilizing factor 
which potentially jeopardizes the peaceful future of either in very resource-poor countries or 
even in more developed countries.  
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<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=235>.  
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4.2.2. Opposing Voices: Ontological and Epistemological Critiques 
 
When confronted with the data found in Homer-Dixon’s first publication in 1995, 
opponents of the empirical research on the environmental causes of conflict first criticized the 
methodological weaknesses of the research undertaken. Mark Levy stressed the empirical 
uncertainty of the ‘environment–security link’, and more generally questioned the possibility 
to undertake empirical research on the causes of conflict at all.169 In doing so, he highlighted 
the difficulty of avoiding ‘double counting’ the threats under study, for in his view, ‘if one 
dissects the precise links that are alleged between environmental degradation and national 
security, for any environmental threat to be a threat it must be demonstrable a connection to 
some vital national interest and that these connections justify certain remedial measures’.170  
Similarly, D. Deudney’s critique enumerated four reasons not to take the results of the 
Toronto Group very much into account: first, he considered that Homer-Dixon’s statistics were 
unreliable, as they lacked the historical support necessary to assess the accuracy of his 
conclusions; second, he criticized the limited scope of the research sample, which in his view 
led the team to disregard how environmental scarcity may actually stimulate co-operation, as 
neoliberal institutionalism holds; and third, he deplored the lack of complex-causes analysis, 
involving an overall system in which the prospects of conflict and violence would be 
integrated.171 This last point raised by Deudney was actually openly supported by Levy, who 
engaged in an open confrontation with Homer-Dixon through a journal correspondence.172 Yet, 
                                                          
169
 M. LEVY, ‘Is the Environment a National Security Issue?, (autumn 1995) International Security, vol. 20, 
issue 2, pp. 35-63, at 37, who states that:‘we do not know much about the role of environment in 
causing conflict because we do not know much about what causes regional conflict overall. What we 
need if we wish to come to grips with any coming anarchy, is research on conflict, not on the 
environment’. 
170
 M. LEVY and T. HOMER-DIXON, ‘Correspondence: Environment and Security’, (winter 1995–1996) 
International Security, vol. 20, issue 3, pp. 189-198. A similar inter-disciplinary debate started off since 
the publication of N. P. GLEIDITSCH, ‘Armed Conflict and the Environment: a Critique on the Literature’, 
(May 1998) Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35, issue 3 pp. 381-400. His objections were replied to jointly 
by D. SCHWARTZ, T. DELIGIANNIS and T. HOMER-DIXON, ‘The Environment and Violent Conflict: A 
Response to Gleditsch’s Critique and Some Suggestions for Further Research’, in (summer 2000) 
Environmental Change and Security Project Report, issue 6, pp. 76-106. 
171
 D. DEUDNEY, ‘Environmental Security: a Critique’, supra, chapter 8. See also from the same author on 
the same lines, D. DEUDNEY, ‘The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National 
Security’, (winter 1991) Millennium, vol. 19, issue 3 pp. 461-476; and D. DEUDNEY, ‘Geopolitics and 
Change’, in M. W. DOYLE and G. J. IKENBERRY (eds.), New Thinking in International Relations Theory, 
1997, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press), pp. 91-123.  
172
 Nonetheless, Levy’s opposition of principle to the link does not impair his opinion that action on 
climate change requires a policy-making style more akin to a defence policy than to an environmental 
policy: ‘Climate change is a problem much more like the problem of containing the Soviet Union: it 
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behind the veil of criticism based on lack of scientific certainty, the opposing voices hold in fact 
a much better grounded resistance to the very notion of environmental security, related to the 
deficient structural inconsistencies of the concept as well as to the possible pervasive effects 
of expanding the realm of security policy.  
Opponents concerned with the structural deficiency of the notion of environmental 
security generally do not deny that vulnerability to conflict arising from environmental stress 
can be, to a certain extent, possible or real. Rather than denying the potential triggering or 
worsening effect of environmental degradation in armed conflicts, their core arguments focus 
on the unsuitability of the notion to undergo thorough conceptualization. Lothar Brock, who 
excelled as one of the main proponents of the ‘existential link’, arguing that environmental 
depletion arising from industrialization ought to be considered as a form of aggression, 
acknowledged however that the use of the term ‘environmental security’ would be a 
contradiction in itself, since the nature of ecological thinking is ‘dynamic and global, whereas 
security thinking is static and particularistic’.173 Hence, he suggested overcoming such a notion 
‘by redefining security to make it conducive to ecological thinking’, although no further 
developments on the suggested ‘redefinition’ were proposed. Levy spotted Brock’s point and 
replied that proponents of the existential link between environmental depletion and interstate 
conflict are precisely the ones providing the loosest definitions of security, so that the 
‘mistaken impression that any problem that is international and ecological is a security 
problem’ is actually (ironically) encouraged.174 On this point, Deudney further considered that 
the expansive move would eventually harm the notion of security in so far as ‘the rising 
fashion of linking them to risks creating a conceptual muddle rather than a paradigm of world 
new shift: a de-definition rather than a re-definition of security’.175 He also warns against ‘the 
dangers of green semantics’, considering that the rise of the environmentalist movement in 
the United States (partly with the pacifist movement) would ‘redirect social energies now 
                                                                                                                                      
requires a grand strategy to guide actions in the face of distant, uncertain threats, and an overarching 
commitment from high levels to leadership’, LEVY, supra, at 54. . 
173
 L. BROCK, ‘Security through Defending the Environment: an Illusion?’ in E. BOULDING (ed.), supra, pp. 
79-102, at 94. Also supported by R. LIPSCHUTZ, ‘Environmental Conflict and Environmental 
Determinism: The Relative Importance of Social and Natural Factors’, in N. P. GLEDITSCH (ed.), supra, 
pp.35-51; and ‘The Nature of Sovereignty and the Sovereignty of Nature: Problematizing the Boundaries  
between the Self, Society, State and System’, in K. T. LIFTIN (ed.), The Greening of Sovereignty in World 
Politics, 1998, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), pp. 109-138.  
174
 LEVY, ‘Is the Environment a National Security Issue?’, supra, at 45.  
175
 DEUDNEY, ‘The Mirage of Eco-war: the Weak Relationship among Global Environmental Change, 
National Security and Interstate Violence’, supra, at 175.  
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devoted to war and interstate violence toward environmental amelioration’.176 Michael Myers 
nonetheless diluted such far-reaching negative effects by considering that the problem is not 
so much in the notion’s alleged structural deficiency, but in the capacity of those called to 
interpret it.177  
To be sure, the key to overcome this rather infertile debate on the pro’s and con’s of 
rethinking the traditional focus of national security and the eventual scientific basis for its 
acceptance or rejection lies in the normative and political endeavour of the scholars involved 
in it. It is the second range of criticisms that tackles the real heart of this debate when dealing 
with the political and social effects that the appraisal of an extended notion of security with 
respect to environmental considerations potentially entails. As John Dryzec defined it, this 
expansive move is nothing but the manifestation of a new discourse or a new ‘shared way of 
apprehending the world.’178 Simon Dalby thereby locates the expanding move in the specific 
geopolitical framework of analysis in which it is inserted and specifically contends that ‘[t]he 
term “environmental security” has become part of a framework for advocating new 
conceptions of how the international political order should be understood and what normative 
aspirations are appropriation in the post-Cold War era’.179 The ‘non-progressive’ reading of the 
possible use of environmental security as a political discourse highlighted the fact that 
acknowledgement of the notion of ‘environmental security’ provided American foreign policy 
with a new tool to maintain the global and political status quo or even expand the USA’s 
hegemonic position, as the underlying goal of the concept (previously formulated by Senator 
Nunn) squarely fits a U.S. ambition to become the ‘global manager’.180 Absorbed by a 
                                                          
176
 DEUDNEY, ‘Environmental Security: a Critique’, supra, at 195.  
177
 See M. MYERS, ‘Environment and Security’, (spring 1989) Foreign Policy, vol. 74, pp. 23-41, at 39: ‘the 
difficulty of perceiving connections between the environment and instability may say less about the 
nature of the connections than about the limited capacity of policymakers to think methodically about 
matters that have long lain outside their purview’.  
178
 DRYZEK, The Politics of the Earth, supra, at 9: ‘[d]iscourses construct meanings, and relationships. 
[E]ach discourse rests on assumptions, judgments, and contentions that provide the basic terms for 
analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements’. 
179
 Dalby’s realistic clarification invites us to recall the above-mentioned 1952 seminal article of Arnold 
Wolfers, describing national security as an ambiguous symbol with little intrinsic meaning and yet 
capable of subordinating all other interests to those of the nation. 
180
 S. DALBY, ‘Threats from the South? Geopolitics, Equity and Environmental Security’, supra. See also, 
from the same author, ‘Geopolitics and Ecology: Rethinking the Contexts of Environmental Security’, in 
M. LOWI (ed.) Environment and Security: Discourses and Practice, supra, pp.84-100, and Dalby’s book 
Environmental Security, 2002, (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press). It is certain that 
environmental security as a notion emerged in Anglo-American security thinking, with the danger that 
ethnocentric and geopolitical assumptions this entails, since, as DALBY explains, security thinking is only 
partly an academic discourse, it is most importantly part of the process of international politics and the 
formation of American foreign policy in particular’. 
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hegemonic geopolitical strategy, environmental security helped fill the gap of the ‘missing 
enemy’ after the end of the Cold War. Some authors thus warned against its effects, both in 
the national and international spheres of State action. In its internal face, environmental 
security could lead to a policy of ‘eco-totalitarianism’, understood as the assumption by the 
State of total control, since ‘all activities virtually affect the environment’; while in its 
international dimension, the plea in favour of or the protection of the environment (thereafter 
associated with – if not directly labelled as – a security issue) are the seeds of eco-
imperialism.181 Besides, on the other hand, opponents consider that upholding an 
environmental security notion may become an obstacle to environmental co-operation, since 
the national security discourse automatically leads to a greater concern for State sovereign 
prerogatives, virtually leaving out of the basket topics that could have been made the object of 
international co-operation. There is therefore in this later objection the idea that 
environmental security also creates an issue regarding the areas of competence of 
international regulation and jurisdiction. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Security is a contested notion. The different forms and accounts of its evolving 
meaning are inherently bound to the overall historical and spatial framework in which they 
emerge. As a context-specific concept, it requires first of all identifying the actors involved in 
the configuration of a specific evolution of its understanding (both in the national and 
international realms); as an instrumental concept, it demands unveiling the underlying 
interests of its promoters, mapping the strategies of introduction, circulation and possible 
imposition of a new understanding of security in a relevant arena and, ultimately, 
disentangling as much as possible the ultimate policy or normative purpose of such a move.  
                                                          
181
 The latter point undoubtedly meets the ‘Southern critique’ to international environmental law, a 
specialized regime which was initially perceived with skepticism by recently de-colonized States, as the 
protection of the global environment could possibly be a new weapon of ‘Northern States’ to control 
‘Southern States’ economic development in the post-colonial era. Thus, developing states did not 
adhere to the normative development of IEL until ‘sustainable development’ was clearly established 
and, once on the road, developing countries perceived environmental security with skepticism, since 
thinking of environmental matters in terms of ‘global security’ obscures the equity questions essential in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and any sense of historic responsibility. Marvin Soroos 
described as follows: ‘the traditional self-defense focus on security thinking needs to be replaced by a 
cooperative and preventative approach. Security not much understood in terms of force but more of the 
construction of community and practice of mutual cooperation’, in M. SOROOS, ‘Global Change, 
Environmental Security and the Prisoner’s Dilemma’, (1994) Journal of Peace Research, vol. 31, issue 3, 
pp. 317-332, at 322.  
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The present chapter has given an account of the range of factors forming the 
framework in which the approximation to environmental issues from a security standpoint – 
or, vice versa, the introduction of environmental considerations into the notion of security – 
was effected. What primarily characterizes this move is that it was a product of both the Cold 
War powers (the United States of America and the Soviet Union). Each initiated this expansive 
move of the notion of security for different reasons and purposes, within different arenas and 
at different times.  
Whereas the first calls for redefining and ‘greening’ security sounded in American 
doctrinal circles closely related to the governmental foreign affairs and defence agencies, in 
reaction to a rising concern over ‘resource wars’ since 1973, the notion of ‘international 
environmental security’ emerged from the opposing Soviet bloc (driven by the Soviet Union 
and supported by some closely allied communist States, such as Czechoslovakia). The 
combined product of two manifestations of the Soviet ‘New Thinking’ promoted by Gorbachev 
in the mid-1980s – namely, a newly discovered Soviet national environmentalism and the 
reification of international law – the term ‘international environmental security’ was coined 
and emerged as one of the conceptual vehicles of the fundamental change of strategy 
advanced by the Soviet Union before the United Nations. There, the notion was presented 
under an ambivalent blueprint, as much as an engine of international environmental co-
operation as of international disarmament co-operation. Unsurprisingly, in spite of the 
national doctrinal move that had previously shown an incipient openness towards expanding 
the scope of security to non-military issues (including environmental ones), the United States 
of America fiercely opposed the policy-based and conceptual Soviet innovation put before UN 
organs. This rejection was nonetheless more a preventive and defensive reaction against the 
wider Soviet attempt to launch a new debate on the system of international peace and 
security, than against the notion of international environmental security as such.  
Thus, the disintegration of the Soviet Union produced a double-edged effect. On the 
one hand, the Soviet account of ‘international environmental security’ put before UN organs 
dissolved; only the positive dimension – which called for the development of international 
environmental co-operation – was followed up, although no reference to the concept 
remained. On the other hand, proving to be a useful compensation tool for the lack of an 
‘enemy syndrome’, the notion of environmental security was re-embraced by American 
governmental agencies. Important conceptual innovations in the notion of security and its 
relation to the environment mushroomed amongst the schools of international security 
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studies, and an important funding reorientation gave rise to the first empirical attempts to link 
environmental degradation or stress and violent conflict. 
  Today, the latter theoretical and empirical accounts of the relation between the 
environmental and the security spheres developed outside the United Nations system remain 
active, and have come to coincide with the emergence of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse. While this narrative can be chronologically considered as a 
‘second wave’ of the move linking the environmental and security spheres, it was launched by 
a set of actors different from the ‘international environmental security’ precedent, responded 
to different issues and interests and took place within a post-Cold War setting, and counts with 
its own specific range of empirical research. Chapters 2 and 3 are therefore devoted to the 
reconstruction of all the concrete components of this Discourse. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MAPPING THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE: 
CONSTRUCTION AND CIRCULATION IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE IN 
HEGEMONIC REGIONS: A PRODUCT OF GEO-POLITICAL CONCERNS 
2.1. Launch of the Discourse: Its Institutionalization in the European Union (EU) 
2.1.1. German Origins: Early Formulations of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse at 
a National Level 
2.1.2. European Cradle: Mainstreaming the Climate Change and International Security Discourse across 
the EU and EU Member States’ Policies 
2.2. Consolidation of the Discourse: Its Extension to the Organization of Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
2.2.1. Informal Transatlantic Extension: Exchanging Information with the Parallel U.S. Approaches to 
Climate Change and International Security 
2.2.2. Formal Transatlantic Extension: Intertwined Introduction of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse into the Agendas of Two Regional Security Organizations (OSCE and NATO) 
 
3. CIRCULATION OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE TO THE MOST 
VULNERABLE REGIONS: IN SEARCH OF A LEGITIMIZING PARTNER 
3.1. Introduction of the Discourse into the Agenda of the Pacific Islands Forum: Securitization of the 
Predominant Developmental Approach to Climate Change 
3.1.1. Shifting Oceans: Indian vs. Pacific Island States as Loci of Reception of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse 
3.1.2. Forging Ties: Reinvigorated Political Partnership and Innovative Financial Assistance for Climate-
Change Adaptation as Vehicles of Implementation of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse  
3.2. Introduction of the Discourse into the Agenda of the African Union: Diversification of the Sectors 
of Inter-Regional Co-operation  
3.2.1. Reminiscing ‘Green Ghosts’: African Scenarios of Environmental Stress and Conflict as Natural Loci 
of Reception of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
3.2.2. Developing Ties: Innovative Inter-Regional Co-operative Framework for Renewable Energy as a 
Vehicle of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse  
4. RESTRAINED ACCESS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE TO 
EMERGING REGIONS: BETWEEN DISINTEREST AND RELUCTANCE 
4.1. Treatment of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in Asia: A Distant Look 
4.1.1. Small Benches: Lack of an Appropriate Forum for Reception of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse 
4.1.2. Unfruitful Attempts: The Disinterest in Incorporating the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse into the Agendas of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) 
4.2. Treatment of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: A Reluctant Approach 
4.2.1. Reluctance in Inter-American North–South Co-operation: Heterogeneity of the Receptor Fora 
(OAS, CARICOM)  
4.2.2. Reluctance in Latin American South–South Co-operation: Competing Economic Interests and 
Ideological Divides (MERCOSUR, UNASUR, ALBA) 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
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‘Critical security-relevant knowledge about climate change has come 
from the partnership between environmental scientists and the 
defense and intelligence communities. That partnership, vibrant in 
the 1990’s, should be revived.’ 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), 2007  
 
‘In the next decades, climate change will drive as significant a change 
in the strategic security environment as the end of the Cold War.’ 
Nick Mabey, 2008  
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the linkage between the security and environmental spheres was 
introduced for the first time in the United Nations system, the international arena has 
undergone profound and radical transformations. As noted in the previous chapter, the major 
geopolitical change brought about by the disintegration of the Soviet Union had a double-
edged effect on this recently discovered ‘link’. While most initiatives in UN organs and 
institutions concerning environmental issues from a negative security standpoint remained 
virtually frozen for twenty years, the positive dimension of international environmental 
security moved notably forward since the celebration of the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development. Global environmental co-operation thus entered a new and most prolific 
phase of development in complex and broad areas – climate change, desertification, 
biodiversity protection – and the notion of sustainable development was finally solidly 
established as the underlying basis and framework of international co-operation in such 
areas.182  
Co-operation in the field of climate change initially focused on establishing the 
scientific information necessary to promote the international community’s recognition of the 
existence of the phenomenon and of the predictability of its effects, a task which was 
endorsed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change since its creation jointly by UNEP 
and WMO in 1988. As the evolution of the IPCC Assessment Reports indicates, the focus of the 
work of the IPCC has progressively paid greater attention to the economic and financial 
consequences of both the phenomenon of climate change and the measures taken by the 
international community to halt it. More recently, as the negotiations on the second 
commitment period of the international regime on climate change remain pending, the IPCC is 
concentrating on the adverse impacts of climate change, as evidenced by the 2007 IPCC 4th 
                                                          
182
 The most notable exception to this general paralysis included the increased awareness of the need to 
secure appropriate and sustainable environmental conditions for socio-economic programmes of 
development taken into account by the Security Council soon after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. 
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Assessment Report,183 which introduced a region-based approach mapping the causes and 
multiple manifestations of vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change and, more 
recently, by the publication of the Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and 
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation.184 Both documents firmly indicate that 
increased steps in international climate change co-operation focused on adaptation – rather 
than mitigation – measures will be needed.  
As attention to the adverse impacts of climate change increases, along with the 
correlative scepticism on the possibility to reach an effective political compromise for the 
period post-2012, climate change has caught the attention of security and intelligence 
communities. The linkage between the environment and security spheres that Gorbachev 
advanced in 1987 under the heading of ‘international ecological security’ is back to the front 
line, a ‘revival’ spreading nowadays within the specific context of climate change. This chapter 
is therefore devoted to the reconstruction of the political process by which climate change was 
progressively construed as a security issue. Where did the ‘Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse’ emerge and how did it reach a consolidated position on the international 
agenda?  
The political process leading to the construction of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse originally translated the will of its promoters to foresee the 
world-scale geo-political transformations that climate change impacts may generate, such as 
the determination of the future balance of power among the major powers and the 
modification of their respective regional and global share of influence. From this standpoint, it 
shows how, after its configuration by national governmental security and defence agencies of 
one European Union Member State, the discourse was successively institutionalized and 
integrated into the agenda of the European Union; then consolidated in regional organizations 
of which the European Union (EU) is a member; and finally circulated to other regional 
organizations in regions beyond the scope of the EU. This chapter also highlights the 
fundamental role played throughout this process by a newly born climate change and 
                                                          
183
 IPCC, R. K. PACHAURI and A. REISINGER (eds.), Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, (Geneva: IPCC), 104 pp. 
184
 IPCC, C. B. FIELD., V. BARRO, T. F. STOCKER, D. QIN, D. J. DOKKEN, K. L. EBI, M. D. MASTRANDREA, K. J. 
MARCH, G.-K. PLATTNER, S. K. ALLEN, M. TIGNOR, P. M. MIDGLEY (eds.), Managing the Risks of Extreme 
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, Special Report, 2012 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press), 582 pp. 
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international security research community operating in parallel to the IPCC ‘mainstream 
climate knowledge’.185  
When embarking on this reconstructive effort, the region becomes the primary level of 
analysis of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse. The main reason for this is 
that it constitutes a sufficiently wide geographical extent where the main trends in climate 
variation can become visible. Besides, as the idea of a ‘common fate’ of the region – roughly 
exposed to the same forms or manifestations of adverse climate change impacts – can be 
nurtured, the relative narrowness in scope of this level of analysis also facilitates the 
construction and identification of a common regional position with respect to the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse. Henceforth, this chapter differentiates three 
main relevant regions for the Climate Change and International Security Discourse: (1) 
hegemonic regions (proponents of the Discourse); (2) most vulnerable regions (receptors of 
the Discourse); and (3) emerging regions (alien to the Discourse).186 
                                                          
185
 Such a community may be considered as a new sort of ‘epistemic community’ (operating outside the 
realm of natural science), defined by Peter Haas as a network of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue-area. Haas further points out that, although an epistemic community may consist 
of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have: ‘(1) a shared set of normative 
and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community 
members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or 
contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for 
elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared 
notions of validity, that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise, that is, a set of common 
practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, 
presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence’, in P. HAAS, 
‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-ordination’, (1992) International 
Organization, vol. 46, nº 1, pp. 285-319, at 3.  
186
 Such a tripartite division is not intended to represent an exhaustive nor a precise description of the 
current state of international politics. It has been drawn merely for the purpose of explaining the 
dynamics of the birth and exportation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse and 
has thus been adjusted to what the Discourse required. Therefore, the term ‘hegemonic regions’ (1) 
refers to the site of birth of the Discourse (the European Union) and its extension to the OSCE and 
NATO, despite the fact that some Member States of these organizations are not OECD countries, nor 
even necessarily developed countries listed under Annex I of the UNFCCC. The location of the OSCE and 
NATO in this category stems from the fact that the EU is a member of such organizations and thus 
directly leads the extension of the Discourse in these areas. Similarly, the category of ‘the most 
vulnerable regions (2) covers regions with different types of vulnerability (the existential threat of Pacific 
Island States vs. the threat to human security for African countries), in so far as they are united by the 
fact that they served as loci of reception of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse. 
Correlatively, regions that could have fallen within such a category, since they are also vulnerable (e.g. 
Caribbean Island States), have been excluded from it because they remain alien to the Discourse. Finally, 
the category of ‘emerging regions’ (3) encompasses wide areas between the first two categories, 
including four out of five members of the BRICs group – Brazil, Russia, India and China – but excluding 
South Africa because, as a member of the African Union, it falls exceptionally within the category of 
‘most vulnerable regions’.  
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In each of these regions, different aspects of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse may be deepened and developed into new forms or simply rejected, 
depending on the underlying interests and priorities of the main driver State(s). The 
‘securitization move’ then operates through the introduction of the security approach to 
climate change into the agendas of international organizations of regional geographical scope. 
Although this mechanism of ‘intra-regional consolidation’ is common to all regions concerned, 
the nature and level of integration of the regional organizations involved and studied in this 
chapter are heterogeneous. Most of the organizations referred to have primarily security and 
defence mandates – the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU) and the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization (SCO) – yet other organizations, such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the 
Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra 
América (ALBA), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), were mainly conceived as regional frameworks for economic co-operation. In 
addition, the regional organizations studied do not represent sharp geographical delimitations, 
as two or more organizations operating within the same ‘climate change and international 
security region’ – such as the EU, the OSCE, and NATO – have partly overlapping geographical 
scopes. Despite the fact that the region constitutes the appropriate level of analysis to study 
the birth of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse and the basis of its 
consolidation in the international agenda, it is important to note that it had a ‘global outreach’, 
given that it was integrated into the agendas of the two core organs of the United Nations. 
Both the regional and global processes are intertwined and exist simultaneously in both levels 
of analysis, animating a cross-fertilization of the arguments as well as a constant inter-level 
back-and-forth circulation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse.187 Yet, 
for clarity and deeper analysis purposes, the global level of circulation of the Discourse will be 
dealt with separately in Chapter 3. 
Each section of the present Chapter is devoted to the role played by the three 
previously mentioned categories in the configuration of the Climate Change and International 
                                                          
187
 See L. GRADONI and H. RUIZ FABRI, La circulation des concepts juridiques : le Droit international de 
l’environnement’, 2009, (Paris: Société de Législation Comparée). These scholars used the notion of 
circulation to explain how globalization (or, more precisely ‘la mondialisation’) may be understood as a 
process in which legal concepts are diffused in different normative spaces or ‘regimes’. Borrowed from 
the work of Gradoni and Ruiz Fabri, the idea of ‘circulation’ is yet used in this thesis to depict the 
diffusion of a political construct rather than a legal concept. Circulation is thus understood in simple 
terms as the transfer of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse from the EU, the OSCE 
and NATO to other regional organizations. 
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Security Discourse. Section 2 traces the origins of the Discourse in hegemonic regions (EU, 
OSCE and NATO) concerned with the geo-political impacts of climate change on their absolute 
and relative power, which triggered the beginning of the involvement of the security and 
intelligence communities of EU Member States and the USA with climate change. Section 3 
shows how this initial transatlantic move was circulated to the most vulnerable regions (Pacific 
Island States and most African countries) as potential legitimizing partners of the promoters of 
the Discourse. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to the position of emerging regions where the 
impacts of climate change are not tantamount to existential threats, and access to the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse is constrained.  
 
2. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE IN 
HEGEMONIC REGIONS: A PRODUCT OF GEO-POLITICAL CONCERNS 
 
2.1. Launch of the Discourse: its Institutionalization in the European Union 
 
2.1.1. German Origins: Early Formulations of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse at a National Level 
 
The study of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse must first of all 
focus on the configuration of this alternative approach to the phenomenon as a policy of the 
European Union (EU). Although nowadays the Discourse is generally associated with the 
desperate plea of the most vulnerable countries, such as small-island developing States 
threatened by sea-level rise, the region of origin and cradle of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse is in fact located in the European continent. Ever since what is 
known as the ‘EU Process of Climate Change and International Security’ (hereafter, the EU 
Process) was officially launched in 2007, the EU has played a fundamental role as a leading 
political force promoting the development of this approach to climate change in several 
international fora – including, but not limited to, United Nations organs. Yet, the European 
concern about the effects of climate change impacts on international security, as crystallized in 
the launch of the EU Process, would not have seen the light without the prior political input of 
the German government.  
Germany started to address climate change through a security prism soon after the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, at the time when the Green Party was one of the 
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governmental forces in Germany.188 The first signs of this move can therefore be traced back 
to the environmental security precedent leading to the publication in 1999 of a collective work 
on the European perspective on environmental change and security. That was the first time a 
German author, Sebastian Oberthür, suggested that climate protection policies could 
represent a means of conflict prevention.189 The line of research opened by S. Oberthür was 
followed up in 2001 by the ‘Environmental Research Programme’ of the German Federal 
Ministry of the Environment,190 and then openly disseminated outside Germany during the 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, in Bonn, 2002. On that occasion, S. Oberthür, along with 
Dennis Tanzler and Alexander Carius (soon to become the leading researchers on this topic), 
organized and presented a side event on ‘Climate Change and Conflict Prevention’.191 The 
background papers they used to introduce this alternative approach to climate change 
(paradoxically launched during the mainstream climate-change negotiations) had been 
explicitly written on behalf of the German government. Most importantly, it already involved 
Adelphi Consult, a non-profit research organization based in Berlin that would soon become 
one of the key elements – if not the most relevant one – of the construction of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse. The same year, another prominent German 
expert on the link between the environment and the security spheres, Hans Günter Brauch, 
released a detailed study on ‘Climate Change, Environmental Stress and Conflict’. As the title 
clearly indicates, Günter Branch connected the security perspective on climate change with 
the previous exploration of the interactions between the environment and the security 
spheres192 – more precisely, with the empirical studies on environmental stress and the 
                                                          
188
 The real degree of influence of, or the role played by, the Green Party in the development of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse in Germany remains nonetheless mysterious. See J. 
RIECHMANN, Los Verdes Alemanes, 2005, (Madrid: Comares).  
189
 S. OBERTHÜR, ‘Preventing Environmentally-Induced Conflicts Through Development Policy and 
International Environmental Policy’, in A. Carius and K. M. Lietzmann (eds.), Environmental Change and 
Security: A European Perspective, 1999, (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer), pp. 249-268.  
190
 Environmental Research Programme, Project of the German Federal Ministry of the Environment on 
‘Evaluation and Development of Strategic Initiatives on Environment and Security Issues’ (FKZ 901 
19101).  
191
 S. OBERTHÜR (Ecologic Institute), D. TANZLER and A. CARIUS (Adelphi Research), ‘Climate Change and 
Conflict Prevention: the Relevance for the International Process on Climate Change’, Background Paper 
for the Special Event ‘Climate Change and Conflict Prevention’, celebrated in Bonn (Germany), 10 June 
2002, on the occasion of the 16
th
 meeting of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies. The full text is reproduced 
in Climate Change and Conflict: Can Climate Impacts Increase Conflict Potentials? What is the Relevance 
of this Issue for the International Process on Climate Change?, (2002) Environmental Policy, German 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Part III, pp. 113-143. 
192
 H. GÜNTER BRAUCH, ‘Climate Change, Environmental Stress and Conflict’, AFES-PRESS Report for the 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Also reproduced in 
Climate Change and Conflict: Can Climate Change Impacts Increase Conflict Potentials? What is the 
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outbreak of violence that had been undertaken during the mid-1990s by the Toronto School 
and the ENCOP programme.193 The confluence of these two waves in H. Günter Brauch’s 
report is not surprising at an initial stage of formation of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse. However, as the Discourse developed and became more detailed and 
complex, an autonomous ‘knowledge’ – connected with but different from the environmental 
security precedent – would be progressively generated. 
The next and most important stage in the configuration of the German strategy to 
create a Climate Change and International Security Discourse began in 2007, the year of the 
successful culmination of the climate change negotiations, with the adoption of the Bali Road 
Map and, most importantly, with the publication of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.194 
That year, the German Advisory Council on Global Change (generally referred to by its German 
acronym WBGU) released its study titled ‘World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security 
Risk’, one of the reports most quoted thereafter.195 It will be followed a year later by a second 
study by A. Carius and D. Tanzler which took up the call of H. Günter Brauch to resurrect it and 
to work on the basis of the environmental security precedent and to develop their 
investigation along the lines of the relationship between environmental stress and conflict.196 
                                                                                                                                      
Relevance of This Issue for the International Process on Climate Change?, supra, Part II, pp. 9-113. 
November 2002.  
193
 See Chapter 1, Section 4.2.2.  
194
 Only a few months later, on 12 December 2007, the IPCC was paradigmatically granted the Nobel 
Peace Prize. 
195
 German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), ‘World in Transition: Climate Change as a 
Security Risk, Summary for Policy-Makers’, 29 May 2007, Berlin, pp. 1-13. Previously, the WBGU had 
contracted the research services of Adelphi Consult for the elaboration of an in-depth study, including 
several maps and tables, of the impacts of climate change on key sectors (food, land, water, energy) of 
different regions of the world. See A. CARIUS, D. TANZLER, J. WINTERSTEIN, ‘Weltkarte von 
Umweltkonflikten – Ansätze zur Typologisierung’, Externe Expertise für das WBGU-Hauptgutachten, 
‘Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel’, 2006 (published in 2008), (Potsdam, Berlin: WBGU), 
99p. The influence of the 2007 WBGU Report in the development of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse was noteworthy, for this Report contained important conceptual and 
policy innovations. One of the definitional innovations is the notion of ‘conflict constellations’, defined 
as ‘typical causal linkages at the interface of environment and society, whose dynamic can lead to social 
destabilization and, in the end, to violence’, at 2. As to the agenda for work, the WBGU made nine main 
recommendations: (1) shaping global political change; (2) reforming the United Nations; (3) ambitiously 
pursuing international climate policy; (4) implementing the energy turnaround in the EU; (5) developing 
mitigation strategies through partnerships; (6) supporting adaptation strategies for developing 
countries; (7) stabilizing fragile States and weak States that are additionally threatened by climate 
change; (8) managing migration through co-operation and further developing international law; and (9) 
expanding global information and early warning systems (along with the adoption of an integrated 
approach to the financing of crisis prevention, development co-operation and military spending), at 7-
13.   
196
 A. CARIUS, D. TANZLER, A. MAAS (Adelphi Consult), ‘Climate Change and Security: Challenges for 
German Development Co-operation,’ April 2008, (Eschborn, Berlin), pp. 1-69. Study on behalf of the 
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Yet, far from remaining within the single outreach of the Federal Ministry of 
Environment and Conservation of Natural Resources, the bed of preliminary knowledge on the 
relevance and impacts of climate change for national security interestingly resonated in 
German national security institutions. Indeed, again in 2007 – and this, for the first time in 
German history – the Cabinet embarked on the definition of a national security interest and 
strategy, based on a model imported from the United States of America. At the time, the 
government was formed by a Grand Coalition of the Christian-Democratic Union of Germany 
and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) with the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (SDP); Angela Merkel (CDU/CSU) was the Chancellor and an equal number of cabinet 
seats has been granted to each coalition party.197 Despite the fact that such defence and 
security policy innovation did not receive the support of the Social Democratic Party, the 
project moved forward and the new National Security Council was thus established. When 
tasked with the elaboration of the first ‘Security Strategy for Germany’, the Council 
incorporated a section specifically concerned with the consequences of climate change.198 
Moreover, the launch of this innovative new model was accompanied by a return in German 
foreign policy to the traditional alliance with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and other western transatlantic organizations,199 instead of following the foreign 
policy lines of ex-Chancellor Schröder which had focused on developing bilateral relations with 
the Russian Federation and China. The initiative on linking climate change to a security 
discourse benefitted from this change of wind, as Germany began by promoting this approach 
to climate change in the EU and EU Member States.  
 
2.1.2. European Cradle: Mainstreaming the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse across the EU and EU Member States’ Policies  
 
The starting point of the Europeanization of some elements of the German National 
Security Strategy and, in particular, the consideration given to the consequences of climate 
change for national and international security, could have been found in the 2003 Security 
                                                                                                                                      
German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (GTZ), elaborated on the basis of 
the 2007 WBGU report for policy-makers. 
197
 The Grand Coalition was formed after the inconclusive results of the 2005 German federal election, 
and lasted until the end of the term in 2009. 
198
 A. SCHOCKENHOFF, ‘A National Security Strategy for Germany’, 2008, Institut für Strategie-Politik-
Sicherheits und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), Berlin, Germany, pp. 1-11.  
199
 See J. DEMPSEY, ‘Germany’s Focus on National Interests’, The New York Times, 5 May 2008, article 
available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/05/world/europe/05iht-germany.4.12581496.html>.  
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Strategy Report of the European Union.200 However, among the security threats to be faced by 
the EU in the 21st century, this document does not mention climate change nor any of the 
possible manifestations related to the phenomenon.201 This neglect remained unchanged for 
the following years (2004–2007), in which the EU underwent capital institutional 
transformations stemming from the enlargement of its membership. However, the accession 
of Germany to the EU Presidency in 2007 radically changed this picture and propelled the 
introduction of the link between climate change and security into the EU agenda. The 
conclusions of President Hans Gert-Pöttering explicitly marked the beginning of the EU 
process:  
 
‘It is becoming increasingly evident that climate change will have a 
considerable impact on international security issues. The European Council invites the High 
Representative and the European Commission to work closely together on this important issue 
and to present a joint report to the European Council in Spring 2008.’
202
 
 
An EU Steering Committee on Climate Change and International Security was 
thereafter established and the momentum for it developed. Germany thus began looking for 
allies or supporters of this approach in the EU Member States that could promote and 
reinforce the appropriation of this approach by the EU.  
The United Kingdom was the first Member State to back up the German initiative and 
quickly became one of its important co-proponents.203 Immediately taking the lead since 2007, 
                                                          
200
 European Security Strategy, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 1-
14.  
201
 Ibid., pp. 3-4. The ‘key threats’ identified by the 2003 European Security Strategy were terrorism, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Iraq war context), regional conflicts (in the Middle East, 
Kashmir, the African Great Lakes region and the Korean Peninsula), State failure (Somalia, Liberia, 
Afghanistan under the taliban regime) and organized crime (cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, 
illegal migrants and weapons). 
202
 Brussels European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, document reference: 11177/1/07 - Rev.1- Conc. 
2, 21/22 June 2007, paragraph 41, p. 11 [Emphasis added]. The confirmation that the introduction of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse stemmed from Germany can be found in the 
following document prepared by Adelphi Consult, ‘Climate Change and International Security: Activity 
Mapping of EU bodies and Member States: Activity Profile of Germany’, 2008, 10 pp. The profile 
indicated that: ‘Germany initiated the EU Process on Climate Change and International Security by 
addressing it during its Presidency in 2007. Since then, Germany has continuously supported the EU 
Process politically and provided resources. It is also a member of the Steering Group for the EU Process, 
at. 1 [Emphasis added]. 
203
 See also Adelphi Consult, ‘Climate Change and International Security, Activity Mapping of EU bodies 
and Member States: Activity Profile of the United Kingdom’, 2008, 11 pp.: ‘The UK fully supports the EU 
Process on Climate Change and International Security and is a member of its Steering Group. The main 
focus of the UK work on Climate Change and International Security is to broaden and deepen the global 
debate on Climate Change and International Security in those countries who have already started 
work, such as the U.S., by creating partnerships and sharing best practice and broaden to those 
countries who have not yet started debating the issues’, at 1. [Emphasis added]. Official confirmation of 
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the UK assumed the task to present the issue for discussion before the UN Security Council. In 
this forum, Germany does not count with the legal and political weight of a permanent 
member like the UK, nor did it have the right to participate or vote at the time, for it was not 
one of the ten non-permanent members. The UK enterprise was successful in so far as the 
debate proposed by M. Beckett, UK delegate to the UNSC, took place in April 2007 under the 
heading ‘Energy, Climate and Security’, on the basis of the lines of discussion proposed in the 
UK concept paper. A close look at this document permits identification of the flagrant use of 
most of the main findings of the 2007 WBGU Report, as well as the use of its innovative 
wordings which, for instance, conceptualized climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’.204 
Quickly becoming Germany’s strongest EU partner on this issue and ‘ambassador’ of 
the discourse before universal international organizations, the UK correlatively took steps to 
integrate this approach at a national level. A UK Climate Security Desk was thus created, along 
with the appointment of a Head of Climate Security attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Moreover, public funds were granted to a two-year research programme dedicated to several 
specific aspects of the newly born Climate Change and International Security Discourse.205 This 
promoted a more complex and detailed understanding of the security implications of climate 
change when compared to the initial 2007 WBGU report, and diversified the sources of 
knowledge about the links between climate change and security beyond German boundaries. 
Moreover, the UK seemingly followed up Germany’s security policy innovation and also 
adopted the American model. The first UK National Security Strategy was thus released in 
                                                                                                                                      
UK’s full support to the Climate Change and International Security Discourse can be found in the Letter 
from Chris Bryant MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman, on 
‘Climate Change and International Security’, dated 10th December 2009, House of Lords (European 
Union Committee, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Policy Sub-Committee C), pp. 6-7. The 
Letter ends up considering that: ‘The process of implementing and operationalising the report’s 
recommendations [EU Council Report on Climate Change and International Security] will help the UK in 
following a similar process in preparation for any potential future security review or update of the 
National Security Strategy […]. Overall, the UK strongly welcomes this report and the increasing 
interest among EU Member States and other countries, globally, on this issue.’, at 7 [Emphasis added]. 
204
 Detailed analysis of the operation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
submitted to universal international organizations is developed in Chapter 3.  
205
 For instance, the ‘Military and Climate Change Project’ conducted by the Institute for Environmental 
Security; the joint project on the security implications of climate change in China, jointly conducted by 
the UK Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Center for Naval Analysis (US-based corporation), a 
contracted report on the security implications of climate change in Colombia, conducted by the Center 
for Naval Analysis; the RUSI research into security implications of climate change in Central America; or 
the joint UK/French research project on the security implications of climate change in the Sahel, led by 
the Club du Sahel with the Hadley Centre and local and regional partners; or the scoping study on the 
vulnerability of global energy infrastructure to the impacts of climate change. See Adelphi Consult, 
‘Activity Mapping of EU Bodies and Member States: United Kingdom’, supra, pp. 3-12. 
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March 2008.206 Undoubtedly influenced by the grave impact of the 2007 flooding in England,207 
the pioneering role of the UK before the UN Security Council and the speeches of M. Beckett 
that followed the Security Council debate,208 the UK National Security Strategy expressly 
recognized climate change as one of the prospective threats deserving consideration. 
However, no overall strategy of implementation of the National Security Strategy ensued.209  
A similar reaction at a national level can be found in The Netherlands, Germany’s 
second strongest EU partner on the climate change and security linkage. Considering the 
specific vulnerability of this low-lying country and the warnings of the 2006 Report of the Royal 
Dutch Meteorological Institute (KMNI), it is not surprising that the 2007–2008 Dutch National 
Security Strategy and Work Programme dedicated a full section to climate change.210  
Moreover, the German initiative also found great support in Nordic countries, such as 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland – all sharing their concern for the future state of the Arctic 
region. Although these countries are too-weak military powers (as they do not maintain large 
armies, navies and air forces in spite of being rich) to formally include climate change in their 
national security strategies, they significantly collaborated in the development of an EU geo-
strategic vision on the issue. Of the three, Denmark is the one which had a pivotal role and can 
                                                          
206
 Cabinet Office of the British Government, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: 
Security in an Interdependent World’, March 2008, (London: The Stationery Office), 64 pp. The UK 
Strategy includes climate change under the category of drivers of instability and considers that the 
phenomenon ‘is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to 
national security’. It thereby calls for ‘[t]ackling its causes, mitigating its risks and preparing for and 
dealing with its consequences [and notes that these actions] are critical to our future security, as well as 
protecting global prosperity and avoiding humanitarian disaster’, points 3.34–3.39, pp. 20-21. 
207
 Thirteen people died and hundreds had to be rescued after parts of South Yorkshire and the East 
Riding of Yorkshire, and Gloucestershire were flooded. Around 48,000 homes were affected, and the 
cost for flooded businesses averaged between £75,000 and £112,000. See for instance, BBC News, 18 
January 2010, ‘England’s Floods Cost the Economy 3.2bn Pounds’, available at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8464717.stm>; and the Report elaborated by the UK 
Environment Agency, J. CHATTERTON, C. VIAVATTENE, J. MORRIS, E. PENNING-ROWSELL, S. TAPSELL, 
‘The Cost of the Summer 2007 Floods in England’ (January 2010) Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk 
Management Research and Development Programme (Bristol: the UK Environment Agency), 51pp.  
208
 See M. BECKETT, ‘The Case for Climate Security’ (10 May 2007) RUSI Journal, vol. 152, nº 3, pp. 54-58.  
209
 For a comment on the Strategy, explaining that it departed from the traditionally scattered or 
fragmented UK practice, which had a ‘foreign strategy’, a ‘defence strategy’ and a ‘counter-terrorism 
strategy’, as opposed to the single overall National Security Strategy of the USA since WWII, see F. 
GREGORY, ‘The UK’s First National Security Strategy: A Critical and Selective Evaluation’, (2008) Analysis 
of the Real Instituto Elcano, vol. 78, available at:     
<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elca
no/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari74-2008>  
210
 Cabinet Office of The Netherlands Government, ‘National Security, Strategy and Work Programme 
2007–2008’, 2007, (The Hague: Cabinet Office), 52 pp. For an explanatory comment on the place of the 
Strategy in the history of security planning in the Netherlands, see M. RADEMAKER, ‘National Security 
Strategy of the Netherlands: an Innovative Approach, (2008) Information & Security, vol. 23, nº 1, pp. 
51-61.  
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be considered as the ‘Nordic Driver’. The national integration of the security approach to 
climate change in Denmark developed on the basis of a general analysis of the means to 
improve the integration of climate change into Danish foreign policy. The elaboration of this 
study was tasked to the International Institute for Sustainable Development and was published 
in 2007.211 Ever since then, former Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has made 
several references to the linkage between climate change and international security, although, 
as Steen Nordstrom points out, the Ministry of Climate and Energy refrained from reinforcing 
or using such a link during the organization of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC held in Copenhagen in December 2009.212 Similarly, as reported by the Danish 
Defence Commission, the Danish defence institutions did not introduce climate change into 
the 2004–2009 and 2010–2014 Danish Defence Agreements, nor under the 2008 Danish 
Defence Global Engagement. However, on 6 November 2009, barely one month before the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, a debate on the linkage between climate change and 
security policy was held in the Danish Parliament; followed a month later by the informal High-
Level Meeting on Climate Change and Security that was, after all, celebrated on 15 December 
2009 during the Climate Summit.213 Moreover, Denmark – sometimes together with Sweden 
and Finland – became an extensive donor for contract research on regional security 
implications of climate change. Most reports were prepared by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, perhaps the second most influential research community on this 
issue after Adelphi Consult.  
Likewise, the topic attracted the attention of the Swedish Defence Research Agency, 
which financed an extensive study of the Geopolitics of Climate Change that was released in 
2007. The concept of ‘climate security’ resulting from this report became a policy issue jointly 
co-ordinated by the Swedish Ministries of Environment, of Foreign Affairs, and of Defence and 
the Prime Minister’s Office.214 Finland’s financial support and participation in contract research 
                                                          
211
 J. DREXHAGE, D. MURPHY, O. BROWN, A. COSBEY, P. DICKEY, J.-E. PARRY and J. VAN HAM 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development) and R. TARASOFSKY and B. DARKIN (Chatham 
House), ‘Climate Change and Foreign Policy: An Exploration of Options for Greater Integration’, 2007 
(Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Developmment). This work conducted with 
financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Denmark. 
212
 S. NORDSTROM, ‘Climate Security: From Agenda Setting to Policy’, March 2010, Faculted for Strategi 
og Militaere Operationer, Royal Danish Defence College, 25 pp., at 7; see also by the same author 
‘Climate Change and Security Problems: Geographical and Functional Implications for Military 
Organizations’, June 2009, (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College).  
213
 See Report of the High-Level Panel delivered by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 December 
2009. 
214
 See also M. OSTENSSON, D. K. JONSSON, R. MAGNUSSON and K.-H. DREBORG, ‘Energi och sakerhet: 
framtidsinriktade omvarldsanalyser for Forsvarsmakten [Energy and Security: Assessment of the Future 
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– managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs – was more discrete, although it is the only Nordic country to have 
incorporated climate change into its national security and defence policy.215 Finally, it is also 
worth recalling the support provided by Slovenia, as a member of the EU Steering Committee 
and under whose Presidency the Committee’s joint report was presented.216  
The engagement of Germany and other EU drivers gave rise to the launch, over a 
period extending from 14 March 2008 to 8 December 2009, of what was referred to as the ‘EU 
Climate Change and International Security Process’ and which had an impact on different areas 
of EU law and policy. The formal launch of the EU Process can be traced back to the date of 
publication of the Report of the High Representatives and the European Commission to the 
European Council on 14 March 2008 (hereafter the High-Level Report).217 The document was in 
fact drafted by Javier Solana in his capacity of Secretary-General of the Council and as EU’s 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in collaboration with the EU 
Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner.218 Barely a few months later, the 
effects of the High-Level Report became visible, as the European Commission started paying 
attention to the position of the EU with regard to the Arctic Region. In a Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the European Council on ‘The European 
Union and the Arctic Region’, dated 20 November 2008,219 the Commission acknowledged the 
link between climate change and international security and reproduced the wording of the 
High-Level Report, expressing the need for the EU to reflect upon the melting of the Arctic 
Region ‘in view of the role of climate change as a “threat multiplier”’.220 
A month after this first indication, the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse left its first trace in the EU’s security policy. The Report on the Implementation of 
                                                                                                                                      
for the Swedish Armed Forces], 2009, (Stockholm: Totalforsvarets Forskningsinstitut/Swedish Defence 
Research Agency). 
215
 See Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Finland: Views on the Possible Security Implications of Climate Change’, 
Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009, Government Report, Publications 13/2009.  
216
 Adelphi Consult, ‘Climate Change and International Security – Activity Mapping of EU bodies and 
Member States: Activity Profile of Slovenia’, 2008. Despite its position in the Steering Committee, 
Slovenia’s participation in the promotion of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse has 
remained secondary ever since. 
217
 Climate Change and International Security: Paper of the High Representative and the European 
Commission to the European Council, 14 March 2008, document reference: S/113/08, 10 pp. 
218
 This is indicated in the article in the ‘Report of the European Council on Climate Change and 
International Security’, (September 2008) Population and Development Review, vol. 34, issue 3, pp. 587-
593. 
219
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘The European 
Union and the Arctic Region’, Brussels 20/11/2008, document reference: COM (2008) 763 final, 12 pp.  
220
 Ibid., at 2.[Emphasis added]. 
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the European Security Strategy, ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, released on 11 
December 2008, modified the neglected view of the 2003 EU Security Strategy with respect to 
climate change and finally incorporated the topic as a fully independent item. This measure 
was reinforced and completed a week later by the Follow-up Recommendations of Javier 
Solana on ‘Climate Change and Security’.221 Noting that ‘the EU is well suited to taking forward 
the climate security agenda’,222 J. Solana considered that ‘climate change represents a 
fundamental challenge that should be in the mainstream of EU foreign and security policies 
and institutions’.223 He therefore recommended the adoption of three measures: (1) more 
detailed analysis of the security implications at a regional level (that is, contracting specialized 
research on how climate change intensifies existing drivers of instability); (2) integration of 
these analysis into early warning mechanisms (that is, mainstreaming the results of the 
specialized contract research on the issues); and (3) an intensified dialogue with third 
countries and organizations.224 
On the basis of J. Solana’s recommendations, the Council elaborated its Conclusions on 
Climate Change and Security, and formally adopted and released them the following year (two 
days before the opening of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Summit).225 The conclusions 
confirm that the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is a crosscutting issue 
which has been mainstreamed in several areas of EU policy, including the promotion of new 
partnerships with developing countries affected by climate change impacts: 
 
‘[T]he Council stated that climate change and its international security implications 
are part of the EU’s wider agenda for climate, energy and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, and therefore central to the endeavours of the EU. This adds an incentive to strengthen 
EU’s comprehensive efforts to reduce emissions and to increase its energy security’ [...] 
 
The Council concluded that more vulnerable parts of human society in developing 
countries and emerging countries will be adversely affected, and will need our support, but 
developed countries will also suffer. Adaptation to climate change, sound policies on 
displacement migration and conflict prevention are the most effective ways of dealing with 
the international security implications of climate change. We will address these issues in a 
spirit of partnership between developed and developing countries and confirm our 
commitment to take bold action on climate change mitigation in order to limit temperature 
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 J. SOLANA (High Representative of the EU), Joint Process Report and Follow-up Recommendations on 
Climate Change and International Security, 18 December 2008, document reference CL08-241EN, 3pp.  
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 Ibid., at 1. 
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 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Climate Change and Security, 2985
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increases to below a threshold of 2ºC and to effectively address adaptation in the Copenhagen 
Summit.’
226
 
 
The first and most immediate consequence of the institutionalization of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse in the EU was the creation of a body of empirical 
knowledge on the topic and the spread of scientific reports independently of the scientific 
authority of the IPCC and the political context in which the IPCC operates. The input to the 
body of ‘climate and security knowledge’ stemmed both from the previously mentioned 
reports commissioned by EU Member States and from a range of studies financed by the EU 
itself. On the one hand, in addition to the early German reports of a general scope elaborated 
by S. Oberthür, A. Carius, D. Tanzler and H. Günter Brauch, the increased interest of EU 
Member States led to a mushrooming of reports on the regional security implications of 
climate change. For instance, on the occasion of the Nordic–African Foreign Ministers Meeting, 
Denmark commissioned in-depth regional and sub-regional studies on Africa (West Africa in 
particular)227, as well as on the Middle East.228 Similarly, the UK developed studies on the 
consequences of climate change for security in Central America.229 On the other hand, as a 
means to better assess the geo-political consequences of the phenomenon for the future 
influence of the EU in the international arena, the EU provided funding for research on these 
matters following the same pattern of the national studies – from general analysis to concrete 
regional appraisals. The first general Report commissioned by the EU thus provided a synopsis 
of the ‘Regional Security Implications of Climate Change’,230 and was followed by a second 
report on ‘Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Understanding the Linkages, Shaping 
Effective Responses’.231 Then, the EU-commissioned research projects went on to analyse the 
                                                          
226
 Ibid., paragraphs 2 and 4,.  
227
 O. BROWN, A. CRAWFORD, ‘Climate Change and Security in Africa: A Study for the Nordic–African 
Foreign Ministers Meeting’, March 2009, (Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development), 30 pp. From the same authors, ‘Assessing the Security Implications of Climate Change for 
West Africa: Country Case Studies of Ghana and Burkina Faso’, 2008, (Winnipeg, Manitoba: International 
Institute for Sustainable Development), 66 pp. This report was also elaborated by the IISD and received 
the financial support of Denmark. 
228
 O. BROWN, A. CRAWFORD, ‘Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and The Risk of 
Violent Conflict in the Middle East,’ 2009, (Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development), 42 pp., elaborated by the IISD with financial support of Denmark and reviewed by A. 
CARIUS and A. MAAS, of Adelphi Research (Germany). 
229
S. FETZEK, ‘Climate-related Impacts on National Security in Mexico and Central America’ (2009) RUSI. 
230
 A. MAAS and D. TANZLER (Adelphi Research), ‘Regional Security Implications of Climate Change: A 
Synopsis’, conducted for the DG External Relations of the European Commission under a contract to the 
German Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety. 
231
 D. SMITH and J. VIVEKANANDA, ‘Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Understanding the Linkages, 
Shaping Effective Responses, Initiative for Peace-building Early Warning’ (November 2009). This study 
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range of situations that the Climate Change and Security Discourse could embrace in different 
parts of the world – in Asia,232 the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean islands,233 and, finally, 
scenarios for Middle America.234  
Throughout this process of creating a body of knowledge on climate change and 
international security, the German influence continued to play a crucial role. To begin with, all 
of the EU-funded reports were contracted to members of Adelphi Research, the German 
consultancy organization which had been tasked with the elaboration of the early German 
reports. The influence of this organization has been such that it prepared, under the auspices 
of the German Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, a European Activity Mapping 
and Strategy Development stemming from the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse,235 a document highlighting how the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse would potentially affect EU law and policy, not only in the realm of security, but also 
in those of energy and foreign policy.236 
The need to embark on the great energy transition had been acknowledged in the EU 
before the Climate Change and International Security Discourse emerged. Indeed, the 
innovations in EU energy policy, ranging from an increase in energy efficiency to the 
elaboration of a medium-term policy of renewable energy investments, had been launched in 
2006 and can be found in the Green Paper, ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive 
and Secure Energy’, as well as in the Roadmap on Renewable Energy established the same year 
                                                                                                                                      
followed the lines of the author’s previous work ‘A Climate of Conflict: the Links between Climate 
Change, Peace and War’ (2007) (London: International Alert), 44 pp.   
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 A. CARIUS, A. MAAS, K. FRITZSCHE (Adelphi Research), ‘Climate Change and Security: Three Scenarios 
for South West Asia’ (2009); and, from the same authors, ‘Climate Change and Security: Scenarios for 
South East Asia’ (2009). Both reports were prepared for the Directorate-General External Relations of 
the European Commission 
233
 A. CARIUS, A. MAAS, J. BARKEMEYER, ‘Climate Change and Security: Two Scenarios for the Indian–
Pacific Ocean Island States’ (2009) (Berlin: Adelphi Research). Report prepared for the Directorate-
General External Relations of the European Commission. 
234
 A. CARIUS and A. MAAS, ‘Climate Change and Security: Three Scenarios for Middle America’ (2009) 
(Berlin: Adelphi Research). Report prepared for the Directorate-General External Relations of the 
European Commission; and finally, A. CARIUS, A. MAAS, K. FRITZSCHE, ‘Climate Change and Security: 
Three Scenarios for South West Asia’ (2009) (Berlin, Adelphi Research), 27 pp. Report prepared for the 
Directorate-General External Relations of the European Commission. 
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 ADELPHI Meeting report (financed by German Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety), ‘Climate Change and International Security: Towards a European Activity Mapping 
and Strategy Development’, 25-26 June 2009, Berlin Executive Briefing. 
236
 See K. SWOLSKY and C. KAUNERT, ‘The EU and Climate Security: the Case of Successful Norm 
Entrepreneurship?’ (2011) European Security, vol. 20, issue 1, 24 pp.; and L. RUIZ DÍAZ, ‘La introducción 
del “Cambio Climático” en la Agenda de Seguridad Internacional: ¿Una Nueva Estrategia de Seguridad 
para la Unión Europea?’ [The Inclusion of “Climate Change in the International Security Agenda: A New 
Security Strategy for the European Union?’], (2009) Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad 
de Granada, vol. 12, pp. 203-221.  
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by the Commission.237 The former EU energy policy was thus just beginning to endure a 
profound transformation when the Climate Change and International Security Discourse was 
introduced into the EU agenda by the German officer H. Gert-Pöttering. As a result of this 
timely coincidence and the closeness of the subject matters, both trends were connected from 
a policy perspective. Although energy security constituted a widely developed and 
autonomous policy area of the EU, it became quickly associated with, and cited as, one of the 
most important items embraced by the Climate Change and International Security Discourse. 
Arguably, the Discourse had an impact on the EU’s approach to energy policy from 2008 
onwards. The association of the EU’s path towards energy transition with the security 
consequences of climate change arguably reinforced the idea that thorough reconfiguration of 
the EU energy strategy was an indisputable need rather than a desirable policy from an 
economic and environmental perspective (areas in which the EU leadership is usual). Indeed, 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse confirmed that the current system of 
energy access, supply and distribution in its various forms needed a profound reconfiguration 
so as to drastically reduce the dependency of the EU on energy resources (oil and gas). The 
vulnerability of the EU arising from its energy dependency, the studies revealed, would 
become all the more acute as the States and regions of origin of the resources or countries of 
passage for pipelines would be facing an increased instability stemming from the socio-political 
effects of environmental stress linked with the adverse effects of climate change. Relevant EU 
institutions were thus called upon to examine this issue.238 
On the other hand, the first effect of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse in EU foreign policy in fact affected the Discourse itself, which was extended to 
regions close to the EU (either geographically or strategically). After an informal dialogue with 
the United States, the extension to the OSCE and NATO served to consolidate the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse as conceived and understood by its proponents.  
                                                          
237
 European Commission, Green Paper: ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy’, 8 March 2006, document reference: COM(2006) 105; and European Commission, Renewable 
Energy Road Map, ‘Renewable Energies in the 21st Century: Building a More Sustainable Future’, 
Commission Communication of 10 January 2007, document reference: COM(2006) 848 final. On how the 
energy security objective is pursued in the European Union, see J. M. GLACHANT and N. AHNER, ‘Is 
Energy Security an Objective of the EU Energy Policy?’, in J.-A. VINOIS (ed.) EU Energy Law, Volume VI: 
The Security of Energy Supply in the European Union, vol. VI, 2012 (Deventer, Claeys & Casteels), pp. 5-
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2.2. Consolidation of the Discourse: The Extension to the Organization of Security and Co-
operation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 
2.2.1. Informal Transatlantic Extension: Exchanging Information with the USA – Parallel 
Approaches to Climate Change and International Security 
 
In accordance with J. Solana explicit remark, the external action of the EU that the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse necessarily required an early and crucial 
engagement with the United States of America.239 As already pointed out in Chapter 1, the USA 
began introducing environmental concerns into the realm of official national security policy 
ever since the release of its 1991 National Security Strategy.240 Thereafter, developments in 
American governmental institutions on the notion and a possible concrete policy of 
environmental security took place, partly incentivized by the results of the empirical research 
programmes on the link between environmental stress and the outbreak of violent conflict. 
Therefore, the political arena of the United States of America counted with this background 
when in the early years of the new millennium Andrew Marshall began paying attention to the 
effects that climate change could have on U.S. national security. As Director of the Office of 
Net Assessment of the United States Department of Defense, since its creation by the Nixon 
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 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘The IISS Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate Change and 
Security’, Report to the European Commission Directorate-General for External Relations, January 2011 
(Winnipeg, Manitoba: IISD), 28 pp. This Report presents the results of the event launched by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISD) on 25 February 2009, which was funded by a grant 
from the European Commission, with the purpose of analysing the impact of climate change on global 
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and security experts from government, including the military and intelligence communities, academia, 
international organizations, and the private sector. The publication of the Report was intended ‘to 
inform policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic on how to most effectively address climate change’, at 
1. 
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 U.S. State Department, ‘A National Security Strategy for the United States’, (Administration of George 
H. W. Bush, August), 1 August 1991, (Washington, D.C.: The White House), which reads, at 2: ‘But even 
after such a success [the collapse of the Soviet Union], we face not only the complex security issues 
outlined above, but a new agenda of new kinds of security issues. [T]he environmental depredations of 
Saddam Hussein have underscored that protecting the global ecology is a top priority on the agenda of 
international cooperation – from extinguishing oil fires in Kuwait to preserving the rain forests to 
solving water disputes to assessing climate change. The upheavals of this era are also giving rise to 
human migrations on an unprecedented scale, raising a host of social, economic, political and moral 
challenges to the world's nations.’ The Strategy also incorporates a independent sub-section entitled 
‘the Environment’, which reads at 22: ‘Global environmental concerns include such diverse but 
interrelated issues as stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change, food security, water supply, 
deforestation, biodiversity and treatment of wastes. A common ingredient in each is that they respect no 
international boundaries. The stress from these environmental challenges is already contributing to 
political conflict. Recognizing a shared responsibility for global stewardship is a necessary step for global 
progress. Our partners will find the United States a ready and active participant in this effort.’ [All 
emphasis added]. 
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administration in 1973,241 A. Marshall decided to allocate a 100,000 USD research grant for the 
promotion of studies on this issue. Peter Schwartz and Dough Randall were thus tasked with 
the preparation of the first report on climate change and security of the United States of 
America, entitled ‘An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Consequences for United States 
Security’, released in 2003.242 Based on previous scientific analytical models of the Ice Age, the 
report sought to anticipate the worst-case consequences for the United States that the 
possible collapse of the thermohaline circulation could provoke. It quickly attracted a lot of 
media attention.243  
Four years after this first explicit approach to climate change from a security 
perspective in U.S. official governmental institutions, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) 
released the highly influential and widely cited report ‘National Security and the Threat of 
Climate Change’.244 Mirroring the WBGU and EU High-Level Reports, climate change was 
articulated as a ‘threat multiplier’.245 Most interestingly, the focus of this report was for the 
first time expressly centred on the geo-strategic impacts of climate change and the effects of 
the phenomenon on the United States capacity in terms of military command and operative 
force.246 Such a line of investigation marked the orientation of the studies that followed. 
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 According to the description of the position provided by the U.S. Department of Defense, ‘The 
Director of Net Assessment […] develops and coordinates net assessments of the standing, trends, and 
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 The Pentagon, ‘The Pentagon and Climate Change’ (May 2004) Monthly Review (editors), vol. 56, 
issue 1, 6pp. See also examples of the reaction in American public opinion to the Pentagon report: 
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 CNA Analysis & Solutions, ‘National Security and the Threat of Climate Change’, 2007 (Alexandria, 
Va.: Center for Naval Analysis). The CNA is an organization that provides research and analysis support 
to the U.S. Navy and other sections of the Department of Defense on the basis of the CNA contract, a 
federally Funded Research and Development Center. Today it comprises two major operating 
components: the Center for Naval Analysis and the Institute for Public Research. Through the Institute 
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local governments, foundations, and other customers.  
245
 Ibid., at 1: ‘Climate change can act as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile 
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Seemingly, it also consolidated the issue as an important and autonomous object of concern in 
U.S. security and defence circles, as can be inferred from the Statement of Record on ‘National 
Intelligence Assessment of the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 
2030’, delivered in June 2008 by Thomas Fingar in the House of Representatives (to the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and to the Select Committee on Energy 
Dependence and Global Warming). T. Fingar’s Statement highlighted the fact that the future 
research plans on this topic will follow three different streams: (a) impacts of climate change in 
specific countries and regions; (b) impacts of climate change on remediation strategies on U.S. 
interests; and (c) the geo-politics of climate change or how the phenomenon may transform 
the relationships amongst major powers. Investigation programmes and reports developed 
thereafter consistently followed Fingar’s roadmap for the research. After the release of reports 
on the impacts of climate change on different regions (which followed a similar pattern to the 
reports funded by the European Union); a second range of publications dealt with the geo-
political impacts of climate change in major powers and key regions for the Unites States of 
America – China, India, Russia, North Africa, Mexico, the Caribbean, south-east Asia and Pacific 
Island States.247 These were followed by the release in 2009 and 2010 of two reports – 
elaborated through contract research by the CNA – more specifically centred on the key 
United States national security and energy policy, a geo-political area closely associated with 
climate change.248  
These three lines of research within the U.S. national security and intelligence 
communities facilitated an exchange of information, particularly with the United Kingdom – a 
connection which in turn may have animated the favourable disposition of the United Kingdom 
to assume a leading role as promoter of the Climate Change and International Security 
                                                                                                                                      
the southern Indian Ocean and which, as mentioned in the CNA Report, ‘serves as a major logistics hub 
for U.S. and British forces in the Middle East’, supra, p. 37. Many other important military bases are 
located in Pacific low-lying island States threatened by sea-level rise, such as Guam.   
247
 Such research effort comprises three phases, the last of which is still pending. The first phase led to 
the release of the following reports: National Intelligence Council (NIC), ‘China: The Impact of Climate 
Change to 2030 – Geopolitical Implications’, 2009. From the same institution and time of publication: 
‘India: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030 – Geopolitical Implications’; ‘Russia: The Impact of Climate 
Change to 2030 – Geopolitical Implications’; ‘South East Asia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030 – 
Geopolitical Implications’; ‘Mexico, Caribbean and Central America: Climate Change to 2030 – 
Geopolitical Implications’; ‘North Africa: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030 – Geopolitical 
Implications’. The second phase led to the release of the following reports: NIC, ‘China: The Impact of 
Climate Change to 2030: A Commission Report’; ‘India: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030: A 
Commissioned Report’; ‘North Africa: The Impacts of Climate Change to 2030: A Commissioned Report’; 
‘Pacific Islands: The Impacts of Climate Change to 2030: A Commissioned Report’.  
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 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), ‘Powering America’s Defense: Energy and the Risks to National 
Security’, May 2009, (Washington, D.C.: CNA), 74 pp.; and CNA, ‘Powering America’s Economy: Energy 
Innovation at the Crossroads of National Security Challenges’, July 2010, (Washington, D.C.: CNA), 49 pp. 
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Discourse in universal international organizations. Nonetheless, what began as an informal 
transatlantic exchange of information and an innovative idea for agenda-setting on climate 
change and security acquired a new formally institutionalized dimension within two pre-
existing transatlantic regional security organizations: the Organization of Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both 
developments set the basis for the consolidation of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse in transatlantic (hegemonic) regions.  
 
2.2.2. Formal Transatlantic Extension: Intertwined Introduction of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse into the Agendas of Two Regional Security Organizations 
(OSCE and NATO) 
 
The introduction of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse into the 
agenda of the OSCE relied on the previous developments within the organization tending to 
incorporate environmental co-operation among Member States as part of a comprehensive 
approach to security. For over a decade, the section on environment – incorporated in ‘basket 
two’ of the OSCE dealing with Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and 
Technology and of the Environment – was mainly devoted to co-operation for the prevention 
and management of transboundary pollution.249 Yet, since the adoption of the 1989–1990 
Vienna Report on Recommendations on the Protection of the Environment of the OSCE,250 
greater developments in this domain ensued.251 The first development was the creation in 
1997 of a new position of Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Acts, following 
the adoption of Decision nº 194252. Integrated into the OSCE Secretariat, the new Co-ordinator 
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 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, adopted in Helsinki, 1 August 1975. 
Basket II (on Co-operation in the Field of Economics, Science and Technology of the Environment): ‘The 
Participating States, convinced that their efforts to develop co-operation in the fields of trade, industry, 
science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to the 
reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole’.   
250
 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Meeting on the Protection of the Environment of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, adopted in Sophia (Bulgaria), 16 October–3 
November 1989.  
251
 The Meeting reviewed the work in the fields of prevention and control of the transboundary 
watercourses in respect of potentially hazardous chemicals, and pollution of transboundary 
watercourses and international lakes, and examined possibilities for further measures and co-operation, 
including improved exchange of information (paragraph 3). The Participating States’ recommendations 
included, inter alia, the elaboration of legal instruments (international convention or code of practice) 
on the prevention and control of the transboundary effects of industrial accidents; use of transboundary 
watercourses and international lakes; the exchange of information and co-ordination efforts in order to 
achieve closer harmonization concerning the management of hazardous chemicals. 
252
 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Decision nº 194, ‘Mandate 
for a Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities’, adopted at the 137
th
 Plenary 
Meeting, 5 November 1997, document reference: PC. DC/194, PC Journal nº 137, Agenda item 2. 
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was tasked with ‘strengthening the ability of the Permanent Council and the OSCE institutions 
to address economic, social and environmental aspects of security’.253 The Co-ordinator’s 
priorities included, inter alia: enhancing the interaction and consultation of the OSCE with 
relevant international organizations and institutions active in the environmental field, based 
on the concept of co-operative security and aimed at the development of synergies; assessing 
potential security risks stemming wholly or in part from economic, social and environmental 
factors; and developing a work programme including but not limited to annual implementation 
reviews and work related to the Security Model.254 
The creation of this position provided the structural basis for further developments in 
this area to emerge, particularly since the release in 2002 of the Porto Ministerial Declaration, 
adopted along with Decisions nº 2 and nº 5.255 The Declaration departed from the 
determination of the participating States to protect their people not only from existing but 
also from emerging threats to security, and to develop new responses to the changing nature 
of threats to security.256 It thus acknowledged that security and stability could be threatened 
by economic and environmental factors.257 Decision nº 2 specifically provided that developing 
an OSCE strategy to address threats to peace and security in the 21st century required adapting 
or supplementing the existing instruments and mechanisms of co-operation within the 
organization;258 whereas Decision nº 5 emphasized the need to improve economic and 
environmental co-operation through the entire OSCE area by means of increased project 
activities.259  
The Porto Declaration and Decisions reflected the context in which an unprecedented 
long-term collaboration programme in the field of environmental protection was being 
launched, in association with security and peacekeeping purposes in and among OSCE Member 
States, and known as the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC). Originally established 
by the OSCE, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), the launch of the ENVSEC Initiative was arguably favoured by 
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256
 Ibid., paragraph 7. 
257
 Ibid., paragraph 1. 
258
 OSCE Decision nº 2, ‘Development of an OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in 
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the appointment of a German Officer, Monika Griefahn, as Co-ordinator of the OSCE General 
Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and the Environment, as well as by the 
direct participation of Adelphi Consult researchers in the elaboration of the regional 
assessments of the ENVSEC Initiative.260 The Initiative sought to facilitate environmental co-
operation among key public decision-makers of South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. It assesses environmental problems which threaten security, societal stability and 
peace within and across borders in these regions so as then to develop and implement work 
programmes with the relevant actors. After presentation, at the Kiev Ministerial Meeting in 
May 2003, of the successful results of its Pilot Phase, from September 2002 to May 2003,261 
the Initiative moved on and several projects were launched. By 2007, ENVSEC had a portfolio 
of more than 50 projects with an overall budget of 11.3 million USD. Besides, it had been 
strengthened by the incorporation in 2004 of NATO as an associate member of the Initiative, 
followed in 2006 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the 
Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe (REC).262 
Such solid a structural background on environmental co-operation for security and 
peacekeeping purposes in the OSCE was particularly helpful for the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse to permeate this organization after its institutionalization at 
the EU. Anticipation of the extension that such Discourse would have in the OSCE can be found 
in the Preamble of the 2007 Madrid Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Security, 
adopted four months after H. Gert-Pöttering first made a reference to climate change and 
international security before the European Council in his Presidency Conclusions. The opening 
of the Madrid Declaration thus stated (in part): 
 
‘[R]ecognizing climate change as a long-term challenge; acknowledging that the 
United Nations climate process is the appropriate forum for negotiating future global action on 
climate change, and the OSCE as a regional security organization under Chapter VII of the UN 
                                                          
260
 While Monika Griefhan – co-founder of Greenpeace Germany and politician of the SPD – was 
appointed in 2003 as Officer of the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and 
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2002, and in Ashgabat, in January 2003. 
262
 OSCE, Annual Report 2007, at 94.  
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Charter, has a complementary role to play within its mandate in addressing this challenge in its 
specific region [...]’
263
 
 
Six months later, the confirmation of the reception of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse by the OSCE came with the adoption of the 2008 Astana 
Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which reads, in part: 
 
‘22. [E]xpressing concern over the impact that accentuated security challenges 
related to climate change, more particularly droughts, water scarcity and desertification, may 
have on highly sensitive areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean […] 
33. Welcoming the role that the OSCE can play in promoting environmental security 
and its complementary action with the United Nations in combating climate change [...] 
35. Taking note, with the adoption of the European Climate Plan, of the driving role of 
the European Union in combating climate change, 
36. Remembering that all these phenomena have a hand in exacerbating pre-existing 
tensions and adding to instability, thereby threatening security [...] 
38. Recalling the conclusions established in the report of the High Representative 
on the common foreign and security policy and the European Commission on security risks 
posed by climate change, at the European Council session of March 2008 [...].’
264
  
 
The effects of the incorporation of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse into the OSCE were akin to the policy consequences of the institutionalization of the 
Discourse in the EU; developments in two main fields of activity of the OSCE ensued.  
First, the Discourse first served to reactivate the dialogue on energy security in the 
OSCE area, whereby Member States were called to ‘commit themselves to a global energy 
transformation towards energy efficiency, renewable energies and energy savings’.265 
Secondly, the Discourse gave an important input to a new line of investigation on the impacts 
that climate change could possibly have on the security of the OSCE area, and encouraged the 
development of risk assessment and early warning networks for climate-related phenomena, 
such as floods and droughts. Thus, during the 2009 OSCE Chairmanship Conference, held in 
Bucharest and dedicated to ‘The Security Implications of Climate Change in the OSCE region’, 
the Co-ordinator of the OSCE Committee on Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), 
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 OSCE, Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security, adopted on 30 November 2007 at the 
Fifteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Madrid 20–30 November 2007, document reference: 
MC.DOC/4/07, paragraph 4 of the Preamble. [Emphasis added].  
264
 OSCE, Astana Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the 
Seventeenth Annual Session, Astana 29 June–3 July 2008, chapter II on Economic Affairs, Science, 
Technology and Environment, pp. 4-5. [Emphasis added]. 
265
 Ibid., paragraph 43. Energy security constitutes one of the most important co-operation pillars of the 
OSCE. See, for instance, OSCE Decision nº12/06, ‘Energy Security Dialogue in the OSCE’, adopted in 
Brussels (Belgium), on 5 December 2006, document reference: MC.DEC/12/06; followed by OSCE 
Decision nº6/09, ‘Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area’, 
adopted in Athens (Greece), on 2 December 2009, document reference: MC.DEC/6/09; and the OSCE, 
Resolutions on Energy Security and ‘Energy Cooperation’, adopted at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
held in Vilnius (Lithuania), on 29 June- 3 July 2009.  
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Goran Svilanovic, defended the creation of a specific programme dealing with this topic under 
the auspices of his Office, despite the fact that such a proposal was at odds with the global 
economic crisis and zero budget growth.266 His demand succeeded and, in February 2010, the 
OCEEA launched a research project seeking to develop scenarios for different OSCE sub-
regions and quantify the consequences of climate change for natural resources, energy and 
food availability. With financial support from Spain, the OCEEA commissioned the report 
‘Shifting Bases, Shifting Perils: A Scoping Study on Security Implications of Climate Change in 
the OSCE Region’, published in 2010. It is important to note that all studies within this 
programme were undertaken by researchers of Adelphi Consult.267 Counting with the 
information and knowledge about OSCE countries stemming from the implementation of 
ENVSEC programmes between 2003 and 2010, the same authors were tasked with the 
elaboration of a regional study on climate change and security for the OSCE region. The study, 
published in 2010 and elaborated by Adelphi Consult (in co-operation with Chatham House 
and Cimera), unsurprisingly mirrors the previous reports contracted by the European Union on 
the regional impacts of climate change.268   
Despite the idea that the OSCE may be identified as the main locus of extension of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse, the role played by NATO in such a 
process cannot be overlooked. The interest and concern of NATO regarding the effects of 
environmental issues on international security find their origins in the Cold War, since, in 1969, 
the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) was created with the aim of 
exchanging experience and information on environmental problems with regard to defence 
and security.269 Twenty-eight years later – in parallel to the creation in 1997 of the position of 
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 G. SVILANOVIC (Co-ordinator of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities), ‘The Security 
Implications of Climate Change in the OSCE region: Opening Remarks’, Chairmanship Conference, 
Bucharest, 5 October 2009, document reference: SEC.GAL/168/09, 12 October 2009. See also the 
Opening Remarks of the OSCE Secretary-General, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, delivered the same day, 
document reference: SEC.GAL/167/09, 12 October 2009; and the Statement by Mats Aberg, Swedish EU 
Presidency, ‘Climate Change and Security: Challenges and Opportunities in the OSCE region’, document 
reference: PC.DEL/805/09, 19 October 2009. Among the other speakers, it is interesting to note the 
presence of Achim Maas of Adelphi Consult, who made a PowerPoint presentation on ‘Climate Change 
and Security: Policies, Research and Scenarios’. 
267
 See Section 2.1 supra.  
268
 A. MAAS et al., ‘Shifting Bases, Shifting Perils: A Scoping Study on Security Implications of Climate 
Change in the OSCE Region and Beyond’, 2010, (Berlin: Adelphi Consult), 74 pp. 
269
 Although NATO’s primary focus is joint military defence and political strategic co-operation, Article 2 
of the Treaty also provides for the ‘development of peaceful and friendly international relations’. This 
provision has thus been considered as the pillar of civil co-operation of the Organization, and 
environmental protection has been part of it ever since its birth. See Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Press Release, ‘Environmental Co-operation 
within the NATO’, March 2007. 
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Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Acts – NATO launched the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC), embracing former Soviet States and mainly centred on co-
operation on environmental issues in the catchment areas of the Black and the Caspian Seas. 
The incorporation of NATO as an associate member of the OSCE ENVSEC Initiative in 2004 may 
thus be explained by the similarity of EAPC’s and ENVSEC’s respective fields of activity. 
Moreover, following the reorganization of NATO’s structure in 2006, the Committee on the 
Challenges of Modern Society merged into the Committee on Science for Peace and Security 
(SPS Committee),270 an institutional fusion which resulted in the development of research on 
environmental security funded and contracted by the SPS Committee.271 Soon after, specific 
attention of the organization to climate change emerged, when former NATO Secretary-
General Anders Logh Rasmussen (at the time also Prime Minister of Denmark), delivered a 
landmark speech on NATO’s role in response to the security implications of climate change. 
Barely two months before the celebration in his country of the 2009 Copenhagen Summit on 
Climate Change (COP.15/MOP.5), A. L. Rasmussen emphatically stated:272 
 
‘[W]hen it comes to climate change, building security doesn’t only mean with the 
military. But it also doesn’t exclude the military either; on the contrary, our traditional security 
structures will have a role to play. Which brings me to my third point: I believe that NATO 
should begin a discussion on how we – NATO as an organization, and individual Allies as well 
– can do better to address the security aspects of climate change’.
273
  
 
From the outset, A. L. Rasmussen suggested four improvements: a better integration 
of climate change into the national security strategies of NATO Member States; adapting 
NATO’s partnerships so as to take climate change into account; developing assessments on 
how climate change impacts impair the military capacities of NATO’s armed forces (for 
instance, by affecting military bases located on low-lying islands); and finally promoting an 
                                                          
270
 For an overall presentation of the origins and rationale of the Committee on Science for Peace and 
Security (SPS), see <http://www.nato.int/issues/science-environmental-security/index.html>. 
271
 See for instance the celebration of NATO’s Second Science Forum on Environmental Security, 
celebrated on 12 March 2008, which looked at current global security concerns related to 
environmental disruption, including – but not limited to – climate change (other themes dealt with were 
the management of shared water resources and energy security) 
(<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_8408.htm?selectedLocale=en>). A list of the projects on 
environmental security undertaken through the SPS programme and detailed information on them can 
be found at <http://www.nato.int/science/studies_and_projects/nato_funded/index.htm>. 
272
 A. L. RASMUSSEN, Speech on Emerging Security Risks: Climate Change, Piracy and Cyberdefence, 
Address by NATO’s Secretary-General to a Lloyd’s Conference in London (UK), on 1 October 2009. 
[Emphasis added]. The event brought together 200 high-level representatives from the security and 
business communities, including the Estonian Minister of Defence and the Secretary-General of the 
International Maritime Organization.  
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increase in the fuel efficiency of military vehicles so as to reduce the overall dependence of 
NATO forces on foreign sources of fuel. The boost given by this landmark speech was 
reinforced by the previously mentioned celebration of the side-event at the Copenhagen 
Climate Summit on ‘Climate Change and Security’, where A. Rasmussen recalled that the 
military is generally the first responder to natural disasters, and summarized NATO’s approach 
to dealing with the security implications of climate change as ‘consultation, adaptation and 
operation’.274 Further involvement of the organization with climate change included the 
celebration of a seminar on warfare ecology,275 as well as the mention of climate change in 
NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept.276  
All in all, what stems from this initial stage is that the initiative to approach climate 
change from a security perspective resulted from the governmental input provided by 
Germany, which thereafter brought this perspective to the European Union and its Member 
States and promoted its first institutionalization at a regional level. Within the EU, the security 
approach to climate change began to take shape and thus acquired a standing of its own that, 
from 2007, could be clearly differentiated from the environmental security precedent. The 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse can thus be said to have emerged not 
only linguistically – climate change somehow became unlinked to the wider range of 
environmental issues that may have fallen within the scope of previous studies on 
environmental security – but was also accompanied by the first accounts of the conceptual 
contours it could acquire. The first studies, contracted by the EU and produced within this 
young discursive framework, sought to provide for a detailed evaluation of the geo-political 
and security impacts of climate change in different regions of the world. In doing so, these first 
studies also laid down a prospective account, not only of how the EU itself would be directly 
hit by adverse climate change impacts, but most importantly of how the effects of climate 
change in other regions of the world would correlatively bring about changes in the geo-
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 NATO, ‘NATO Secretary-General Debates Climate Change Security Threats in Copenhagen’, NATO 
Press Release, 15 December 2009, available at: 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_60163.htm>.  
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 G. E. MACHLIS, T. HANSON, Z. ŠPIRIĆ, J. E. McKENDRY (eds.) ‘Warfare Ecology: a New Synthesis for 
Peace and Security’, Proceedings of NATO Advanced Studies Institute, 2010, (Berlin, Heidelberg, New 
York: Springer).  
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 NATO, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization: Active Engagement, Modern Defence’, adopted by the Heads of State and Government at 
the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010, paragraph 15, p. 13: ‘Key environmental and 
resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs, 
will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to 
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strategic position of the EU in the international political arena. At that stage, a particular 
concern for effects that climate change might have on energy resources was highlighted.  
Meanwhile, on the Atlantic shore, a parallel concern for the security impacts of climate 
change developed within U.S. national security institutions previously familiar with the post-
Cold-War empirical and theoretical studies on environmental security.277 Despite the fact that 
the studies contracted by the Pentagon involved different experts, those tasked with the 
reports for the EU and individual EU Member States, the general approach to the matter by 
both sides was similar; the USA also understood the security implications of climate change as 
a geo-political matter and placed special emphasis on its relation to energy security. Yet, 
despite sharing an overall common approach to the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse, it was the EU that stood as the active driver of the circulation of the Discourse to 
other specialized regional organizations. In the OSCE, the recent reception of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse, since 2008, was facilitated by the prior existence 
of an environmental security co-operation programme (ENVSEC) which, in its early years of 
activity (2003–2007), had mainly focused on the development of environmental co-operation 
amongst energy providers around the Caspian Sea. As the actors involved in the ENVSEC 
programme included Russia – the EU’s principal gas and oil provider – the OSCE was arguably a 
particularly well suited forum for adopting the conceptual approach to the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse, which is focused on energy security, for reinforcing it. 
The fact that the same research community that had previously elaborated the reports on 
Climate Change and International Security for the EU and its Member States – and 
simultaneously continued doing so – was contracted by the OSCE may be said to have had two 
effects. On the one hand, it undoubtedly favoured the consolidation of the EU approach to the 
Discourse – e.g. as a geo-political concern. On the other hand, it gave an input to the research 
community which could arguably be identified as a distinctive ‘epistemic community’. Finally, 
the involvement of NATO with the Climate Change and International Security Discourse – both 
through its direct participation in the OSCE ENVSEC programme, and through the development 
of its own autonomous line of investigation of this theme within the NATO SPS programme – 
closes the circle of construction of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in 
hegemonic regions. The next stage to be addressed concerns the circulation of the Discourse 
beyond the scope of direct influence of the EU, towards two of the most vulnerable regions. 
The Pacific Island States, as well as the majority of the African countries united by the threat to 
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the existential survival of either their populations or the States themselves – contrast strikingly 
with the solid capacity of the States where the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse has emerged to adapt to climate change.  
 
3. CIRCULATION OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE TO 
THE MOST VULNERABLE REGIONS: IN SEARCH OF A LEGITIMIZING PARTNER 
 
3.1. Introduction of the Discourse into the Agenda of the Pacific Islands Forum: 
Securitization of the Predominant Developmental Approach to Climate Change   
 
3.1.1. Shifting Oceans: Indian vs. Pacific Island States as Loci of Reception of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse 
 
Among the small island States that generally resonate within the international arena 
as active actors of the climate change negotiations – firmly defending the construction of a 
rooted international concern for the serious impacts that the phenomenon may entail for the 
survival of their States – the Maldives is probably the first to come to mind. Located in the 
Indian Ocean, this State counts with administrative divisions comprising 1,190 very small 
islands around 26 natural atolls, each of which is surrounded and delimited by an immense 
ring of breakwater coral reef (the seventh largest coral reef in the world, covering 8,500 
km2).278 Barely 10 per cent of the islands are actually inhabited, among which 80 per cent have 
become tourist resorts. The State capital, Malé, houses more than a third of the total 
population (103,000 people) within an area of scarcely two square kilometres.279 Most 
importantly, the average altitude of the Maldives scarcely reaches 0, 90 metres above sea 
level, and its highest point is at 2.4 metres – barely two centimetres above the height of Sun 
Ming Ming, the tallest basketball player so far recorded in history. 
These characteristics, coupled with a political decision of former President Maumoon 
Abdul Gayoom, made of the Maldives one of the first States – if not the first – to call the 
attention of the international community to the adverse impacts of climate change. Back in 
1987, at the time when Gorbachev’s new thinking on international law was bringing about the 
introduction of the notion of international environmental security into the agenda of the UN 
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 Information extracted from website of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Maldives to the 
United Nations, available at <http://www.un.org.mv/v2/?lid=2>.  
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 The rest of the population (298,968 inhabitants according to the 2006 Census) is scattered 
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Maldives was a British protectorate from 1887 until 1965 when it gained independence and became a 
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General Assembly, President Gayoom gave his first speech on climate change impacts before 
the Maldives’ Commonwealth partners.280 His statement led to the creation of the 
Commonwealth Expert Group on Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise, a group which thereafter 
took the lead as commissioner of case-studies on adverse effects of climate change in several 
vulnerable countries, such as Bangladesh, Guyana, Tonga, Tuvalu and Kiribati.281 A second 
study, released in March 1989, was also unilaterally contracted by the Maldives.282 Twenty 
years later, as Gayoom himself stated before the same audience, the result of this landmark 
contribution was, in his view, that ‘the Commonwealth became one of the first international 
bodies to discuss and take action on the issue of global warming’.283  
Besides, the scope of his 1987 initiative was not limited to the Commonwealth. A few 
days after pronouncing his speech in Vancouver, M. A. Gayoom stood at the UN headquarters 
before the General Assembly to deliver a statement on the threat of climate change and sea-
level rise. The occasion was, according to M. A. Gayoom himself, the first time that the issue of 
climate change was raised before world leaders at the United Nations.284 A year later, the 
General Assembly accepted the creation of the IPCC, which was finally set up in 1988. During 
the last years of the Cold War, the driving force of the Maldives remained very much alive. 
Most importantly, in 1989, it hosted the first Small Islands Conference on Sea-Level Rise ever 
celebrated, at which the participating States adopted the Malé Declaration on Global Warming 
and Sea-Level Rise.285 This declaration paved the way for the creation a few years later of such 
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 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Speech of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, 
Vancouver, British Colombia, 13–17 October 1987.  
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 M. HOLDGATE, ‘Climate Change: Meeting the Challenge’, 1987 (London: Commonwealth Secretariat). 
Following the publication of this Report – arguably the first major intergovernmental report on climate 
change and sea-level rise – Commonwealth Heads of State agreed to adopt in 1989 the Langkawi 
Declaration on Environment, which went on to influence the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.  
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 A. J. EDWARDS, The Implications of Sea-Level Rise for the Republic of Maldives, June 1989, Report to 
the Commonwealth Expert Group of Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise (Centre for Tropical Coastal 
Management (University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne).   
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 An anthology of former President Gayoom’s speeches on the global environmental challenge and the 
security of small-island developing States has recently been published in the book entitled Paradise 
Drowning, 2008, (Singapore: Business Mirror Perspective) with a foreword by R. K. Pachauri, Chairman 
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launched at the 2008 UN-sponsored Business and the Environment Conference, held in Singapore, and 
counted with the presence of Achim Steiner, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment 
Programme. 
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 UNGA, Verbatim Record A/42/PV.41, 19 October. 1987, pp. 17-31. Considering that President 
Gayoom’s speech followed that of Mrs Brundtland presenting the Report of the Commission on 
Environment and Development, ‘Our Common Future’, his presentation of the threat of sea-level rise 
was framed, on that occasion, as an issue pertaining to the capacity of climate change to impair the 
realization of ‘sustainable development’.  
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an important political coalition as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), specifically 
conceived to operate during the mainstream climate change negotiations. The Maldives firmly 
asserted that the development of global partnerships was a key element of the overall strategy 
seeking to face climate change challenges, and that the creation of AOSIS contributed 
tremendously to the development of such a strategy.286 The active participation and 
continuing leading role of the Maldives in the climate change negotiations were particularly 
epitomized when, in 1997, it became the first country to sign the Kyoto Protocol. 
Two decades after the launch of this environmental and foreign-policy strategy, 
President Gayoom recalled, before a meeting of the Royal Commonwealth Society that took 
place in London on 17 July 2007, the history of Maldives’ active leadership in the fight against 
climate change. Bearing in mind the catastrophic effects of the 2004 tsunami on the south-
eastern part of the Indian Ocean, his speech made a call ‘[t]o bring greater creativity and 
innovation to the global discourse on climate change’.287 A couple of weeks after delivering this 
speech before its Commonwealth partners, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of 
Maldives to the United Nations repeated the core message at an Informal Thematic Debate, 
held at the UN General Assembly, on ‘Climate Change as a Global Challenge’, with an 
important addendum. The opening statement of the Permanent Representative’s speech for 
the first time raised the notion of ‘security’ being connected with the danger of sea-level rise: 
  
‘Throughout the latter half of the 20
th
 century we have all come to this General 
Assembly to collectively address threats to our security and independence with creativity and 
commitment. In the 21
st
 century, our independence is threatened not by invading armies but 
by rising sea levels; not by global conflict but by global warming. (…) For the Maldives, 
climate change is short of an existential crisis’.
288
  
Considering the longstanding leading role of the Maldives, its openness to new creative 
and innovative forms of approach to the climate change discourse, as well as the statement of 
its Permanent Representative reproduced above, one have could expected the Maldives to be 
                                                                                                                                      
States included small-island States from the South Pacific, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea: (in alphabetical order) Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, 
Fiji, Grenada, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Vanuatu. 
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 Statement of the UN Resident Co-ordinator for the Alliance of Small Island States Conference, 
‘Human Dimension of Global Climate Change’, 14 November 2007, available at: 
<http://www.un.org.mv/v2/index.php?lid=14&nid=20>.  
287
 Speech by His Excellency Mr. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Republic of Maldives, ‘Is 
There a Right to a Safe Environment?’, Royal Commonwealth Society, London, Tuesday 17 July 2007. Full 
summary of the meeting available at: <http://www.iisd.ca/mea-l/guestarticle58.html>. 
288
 Statement by His Excellency Dr. Mohamed Latheef, Permanent Representative of the Republic of 
Maldives to the United Nations, during the informal debate of the General Assembly on the theme 
‘Climate Change as a Global Challenge’, UN Headquarters, New York, 31 July–1 August 2007, p. 1. 
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the first vulnerable State to be targeted by the EU for circulation of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse, and even that its reception would have occurred quite 
naturally. Yet, the Maldives seemingly took another path, preferring to put forward a different 
innovative approach to climate change focused on linking human rights with the climate 
change discourse and aiming at the launch of a process of eventual recognition of a new right 
to a safe and sustainable environment.289 Once again, this new proposal of the Maldives 
quickly resonated and gathered widespread support in the international community. To begin 
with, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) elaborated the 2007–2008 Report 
on ‘Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World’,290 which was followed by 
the unanimous adoption, on 25 September 2008, of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
Resolution 7/23 on ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’.291 The Resolution stemmed from the 
proposal of the Maldives to humanize climate change effects, as they had up until then been 
almost exclusively approached from a scientific – rather than a socio-economic – perspective. 
Linking the discourses on human rights and climate change arguably helped to reinforce 
political pressure on the need to develop financial mechanisms for climate change adaptation 
measures.  
The same year in which Resolution 7/23 was adopted, democratic elections in the 
Maldives put an end to three decades of authoritarian government led by M. A. Gayoom. 
However, this radical change in the internal political shape of the country did not affect the 
essence of the Maldives foreign strategy regarding climate change. Pursuing the line traced by 
his predecessor in this field, the newly elected President, Mohammed Nasheed, added some 
important innovations as to the operability of this policy, claiming in his speech of investiture:  
‘[W]e can do nothing to stop climate change on our own and so we have to buy land 
elsewhere. It’s an insurance policy for the worst possible outcome. After all, the Israelis [began by 
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 Ibid., at 8. The idea of coining a ‘new right’ was opposed to the previous predominant understanding 
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meeting, adopted by consensus without a vote. See also, the Submission of the Maldives to the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (25 September 2008), prepared by the Government of 
Maldives with the assistance of the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and Ms. Kim 
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buying] land in Palestine […] We do not want to leave the Maldives, but we also do not want to be 
climate refugees living in tents for decades.’292  
On the same occasion, M. Nasheed also announced that a new Sovereign Wealth Fund 
would be created with the taxes on tourist revenues, with a view to purchasing land in 
neighbouring countries with similar cultural, religious and even meteorological characteristics. 
However, as such a Fund is yet to be created, the veracity of ex-President Nasheed’s real 
intention has been put into question.293 All in all, the Maldives has undeniably been seen as a 
driving actor with a significant initial input into the effort to put the sea-level-rise issue on the 
agenda of the UN in respect of international co-operation. Nonetheless, in recent years, the 
innovations that this country has put forward have not taken the form of approaching climate 
change from an international security perspective. Rather, recent efforts of Maldives’ climate 
change foreign policy have been directed towards the launch of a different discourse strategy, 
one seeking to develop the link between climate change and human rights. Although both 
innovative trends are complementary, their origin, conception and final direction and purpose 
run in parallel.  
In fact, rather than originating in the Indian Ocean, the support for and the embracing 
of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse by small island States can be 
located in the Pacific Ocean. The twelve independent Pacific Island States (Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu) have a limited defensive capacity. In contrast to the 
hegemonic regions, in which the EU and the USA are linked through specialized regional 
security organizations (the OSCE and NATO), Pacific Island States can count on a fully effective 
regional co-operation framework that deals exclusively with security matters. For security and 
defence policies, they rely and depend on bilateral agreements with regional powers, 
particularly Australia, New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, China, India and Japan. Yet, far from 
political dissolution and demobilization, this group of small island States generally joins in the 
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planning relocation’, but that the announcement of the possible creation of such a Fund had 
nonetheless had ‘the desired effect of raising the awareness of the international community to the stark 
reality that the Maldives faces, in T. DEEN. ‘Climate Change: Small Islands Await Haitian-Type Disaster’, 
19 January 2010, Intern Press Services (News Agency), available at: 
<http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/01/climate-change-small-islands-await-haitian-type-disaster/>.   
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same group or coalition of States within the United Nations organs, organizations and 
specialized agencies. First of all, they are bound by their common membership in the group of 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS),294 where they stand together with small island States 
with a low-level capacity for adaptation located in the Caribbean Sea and in the Indian Ocean. 
Secondly, they are all united via the AOSIS political coalition that operates in the climate 
change negotiations,295 again working together with small island States located in other areas, 
but which may have a heterogeneous degree of economic development and differing levels of 
capacity to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.  
 
3.1.2. Forging Ties: Reinvigorated Political Partnership and Innovative Financial Assistance for 
Climate Change Adaptation as Vehicles of Implementation of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse 
In addition to being part of the same political groups within global organizations and 
institutions, Pacific Island States closely co-operate with Australia and New Zealand, mainly 
through the Pacific Islands Forum. Created in 1971 under the name of Pacific Islands 
Secretariat, this co-operative framework progressively acquired a higher level of integration. 
By 2000, the former Secretariat was renamed Forum and, like the OSCE, divided and 
structured its activity around three pillars: (a) economic governance; (b) political governance 
and security; and (c) strategic partnerships and co-ordination.296 Although the Forum initially 
prioritized the enhancement of economic co-operation between small island States and the 
two major regional powers, developments in the second line of work, on political governance 
and security, have taken place since the Secretariat was re-baptized Forum in 2000. More 
precisely, after the adoption in 2000 of the Biketawa Declaration, co-operation in the field of 
conflict prevention flourished.297 Five new lines of work have been launched as a result of the 
                                                          
294
 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) were recognized as a distinct group at the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992. The list of SIDS is annually 
updated and today comprises 37 SIDS which are also UN Member States (including 12 Pacific Island 
States: Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), and 14 SIDS which are not UN Member States 
(including the Cook islands and Niue which are part of the Compact of Free Association with New 
Zealand).  
295
 The Alliance of Small Island Developing States counts with 38 UN Member States, along with other 
non-self-governing territories or non-independent States that are members of UN regional commissions. 
296
 Website of the Pacific Islands Forum available at:  
<http://forum.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/conflict-prevention/>.  
297
 Pacific Islands Forum, ‘Biketawa Declaration on Conflict Prevention’, adopted at the 31
st
 Summit of 
Pacific Island Leaders, held in Biketawa (Kiribati), on 28 October 2000. The Declaration was adopted 
following the coup d’état in Fiji and the ethnic tensions in the Solomon Islands, and led to the 
engagement of Forum Member States (including Australia and New Zealand) in peacekeeping 
operations in the region.  
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Declaration, the last being centred on policy development and co-ordination of assistance to 
address the underlying causes of conflict.298 The objectives of the latter line of work, as 
described below, mark the starting point of the Forum’s involvement with climate-related 
issues from a security – and not only an economic or developmental – perspective: 
‘In partnership with Member States, regional agencies and international donors, the 
Secretariat develops evidence-based policy to help address the underlying causes of conflict 
(such as socio-economic disparities, land) and potential exacerbating factors (such as climate 
change, natural disasters, urbanisation). For example, one important part of this work has been 
a focus on efforts to manage and reduce land-related conflict in the Pacific through the Land 
Management and Conflict Minimisation project.’
299
 
 
Despite this initial acknowledgement, the Forum still required a few years to openly 
embrace the Climate Change and International Security Discourse. Considering that most 
Pacific Island States are listed as small island developing States (SIDS) and sometimes even as 
Least Developed Countries, it is not surprising that, for the first three decades of the Forum’s 
existence, the core narrative of the Member States’ regional collaboration was that of 
developmental sustainability. Its weight and importance relentlessly permeated the work of 
the Forum and the direction of its policies, even in the first five years that followed the 
adoption of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration – which, as explained above, launched the co-
operation in the field of conflict-prevention by considering climate change as an exacerbating 
factor of conflict. The regional approach to climate change from a developmental perspective 
remained steadily unchanged until the Ten-Year Pacific Plan and the New Forum Agreement 
were adopted in 2005.300 Both policy instruments operated a shift in the approach of the 
                                                          
298
 The other four lines of work seek: the development of regional dialogue; developing and 
strengthening regional conflict responses; gender mainstreaming; and partnerships. On the last line of 
action on policy development and co-ordination of assistance to address the underlying causes of 
conflict, see <http://forum.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/conflict-prevention/>.  
299
 Ibid. [Emphasis added]. The Land Management and Conflict Minimisation Project does not address 
the issue of territorial disappearance as the Maldives are doing with the creation of the Public Fund. This 
project has focused on resolving land disputes in Member States, recognizing the centrality of 
customary land tenure in the lives of the people of the Pacific and combining economic development 
and conflict prevention perspectives. More information on this Project available at: 
<http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/conflict-prevention/land-
management-conflict-minimisation.html>. 
300
 The constitutive treaty for the Pacific Islands Forum currently in force is the Agreement Establishing 
the Pacific Islands Forum, adopted at Tarawa (Kiribati), on 30 October 2000. However, in 2004, as part of 
a range of recommendations to reform the Forum, Leaders agreed on reviewing this constitutive 
Agreement to reflect the new purposes and functions of the Forum. The resulting ‘New Agreement’ was 
opened for signature on 27 October 2005, along with the ten-year ‘Pacific Plan for Strengthening 
Regional Integration and Cooperation’. While the former instrument has been signed by the sixteen 
Forum members and will enter into force once it is ratified by all of them, the latter is a ‘living 
instrument’ that evolves regularly with the upcoming visions of Pacific leaders on regional integration. It 
has thus been revised twice already, in 2007 and, more recently, in 2013.  
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Forum to climate change, from there on seen not only as providing a general framework for 
sustainable development, but also requiring the development of disaster-reduction co-
operation policies. As the 2005–2006 Annual Report of the Forum indicates, the Sustainable 
Development Programme was rationalized in 2006. Divided into Priority Initiatives, the Ten-
Year Pacific Plan listed Disaster and Climate Change.301 Nonetheless, despite this evolution, in 
2007 and 2008 the Forum seemingly got back to its roots, in so far as sustainable development 
was reinforced as the core and defining narrative of its policy. This was likely the result of the 
influence exerted by the Mauritius Strategy on Sustainable Development approved the year 
before at the UN General Assembly.302  
It is striking to note that, during the period 2005–2008, not one single Press note on 
climate change was released on the official website of the Pacific Islands Forum. Yet, as 
developed in Chapter 3, the activity of the Forum regarding climate change – and, most 
particularly, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse – did resonate in the 
corridors of the UN General Assembly between 2008 and 2009.303 The Forum’s Annual Report 
of that period also indicates that this was the time when the Forum incorporated the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse as part of its internal operations. The Report of 
the meeting of the Forum’s Regional Security Committee, held at the Forum’s headquarters in 
Suva, 4–5 June 2009, states: 
‘There was discussion on the impacts of climate change on security and consideration 
of a range of priority regional and national security issues, including reporting to members on 
Forum activities under the Forum’s Biketawa Declaration, which marks its 10
th
 year of 
operation’.
304
  
Besides, the same document indicates, under the heading of ‘human security’, that 
collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme should be enhanced with 
                                                          
301
 Pacific Islands Forum, Annual Report 2005–2006, at 35.  
302
 Pursuant to the mandate given by the UN General Assembly (in UNGA Res. 57/262), the high-level 
Mauritius International Meeting held in Port Louis, Mauritius, in January 2005. This was the culmination 
of a 10-year review of the Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small 
Island Developing States. The outcome of this meeting was the Mauritius Strategy for the Further 
Implementation of the Programme of Action on the Sustainable Development of the Small Island 
Developing States (the ‘Mauritius Strategy for Implementation’), adopted on 14 January 2005, and 
endorsed later by UNGA Res. 65/2, ‘Outcome Document of the High-level Review Meeting on the 
Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action 
for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States’, of 25 September 2010, 18
th
 plenary 
meeting, document reference: A/RES/65/2. The 2008 Niue Declaration adopted by the Pacific Islands 
Forum states that the Forum sought the accomplishment of the goals previously set out in the Mauritius 
Strategy for Implementation. 
303
 Details of this process are developed in Chapter 3. 
304
 Pacific Islands Forum, Annual Report 2008–2009, at 12. [Emphasis added]. 
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respect to a certain number of issues, ‘including work on the regional interface between 
climate change and security’.305 Arguably, the fact that, before 2008, the Pacific Islands Forum 
essentially approached climate change as an environmental and developmental issue – or, at 
best, as an issue requiring enhanced action on disaster prevention – indicates that Pacific 
Island States received the security approach to climate change from outside the region. Thus, 
the approach to climate change from a security perspective was not developed by Pacific 
Island States autonomously and in parallel to the launch in the EU of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse in 2007–2008. Rather, it is possible to assert that an inter-
regional circulation of the Discourse took place, from its forum of origin in the EU to the Pacific 
Islands Forum. The underlying reasons of this theme-based alliance between the EU and the 
Forum are certainly difficult to discover and even more difficult to prove. Though unwilling to 
make ungrounded speculations, it is still worth pointing out various data which may give some 
indications. 
First of all, it is important to recall the connection between some Pacific Island States 
and Germany – the leading driver of the first institutionalization of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse within the EU. The influence of this State in the south-east 
Pacific region stems from its former colonial presence, which is directly recalled in the 2009 
Majuro Declaration on Climate Change adopted by the Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands and Palau. Interestingly, this Declaration links the historical influence of 
Germany with the present close connection of this country with the three signatory Pacific 
Island States in matters related to climate change adaptation:  
‘14. [W]e recall our historic and ongoing close friendship with Germany, and we note the 
historic role of Germany through its former Pacific territorial possessions, including as 
expressed in the 1885 Treaty of Friendship between the Marshallese chiefs and Germany, 
and further the important role of Germany within the context of European Union, we: 
a) Note Germany’s national commitment for 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
below 1990 levels by 2020, should European Union Member States agree to a 30% 
reduction over the same period of time; 
b) Warmly welcome Germany’s commitment to assisting with advancing comprehensive 
climate adaptation strategies for small island developing states.’
306
 
Thereby, paragraph 14 b) of the Majuro Declaration offers an indication of the means 
through which the support and adoption by the Forum of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse originated in the EU may have been ensured. Seemingly, the 
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 Ibid., at 14.  
306
 Majuro Declaration on Climate Change, adopted at the 9
th
 Micronesian Presidents Summit, held in 
Majuro (Republic of the Marshall Islands), 16–17 July 2009, paragraph 14. [Emphasis added].  
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collaboration between these two regional organizations – the EU and the Pacific Islands Forum 
– may have flowed from the German commitment to enhance assistance on climate change 
adaptation. Financial assistance for adaptation can be sought through the international regime 
on climate change (UNFCCC-KP track), as well as through parallel partnerships between States 
– acting either in their individual capacity or as part of the policy of an organization to which 
they belong. Ever since the colonial States withdrew from the region, Australia and New 
Zealand had been the major donors to the Pacific Island States. It is therefore an area with 
close economic ties to – and dependency on – two Commonwealth countries.307 
Nonetheless, the European Union has been promoting external policies seeking to 
increase its influence and economic presence in the region. The benchmark of this course of 
action can be traced back to the adoption of the 2006 EU Strategy for a Strengthened 
Partnership with the Pacific.308 Following the suggestion of EU High Representative, J. Solana, 
laid down in his recommendations for the implementation of the EU Security Strategy, co-
operation between the EU and the States of the Pacific Islands Forum was strongly reinforced 
from 2008 onwards. First, both institutions jointly declared and acknowledged the serious 
current impacts of global warming, climate change and sea-level rise on the ‘economic, social, 
cultural and environmental well-being, security and future survival of Pacific island 
countries’,309 a co-operation which was then institutionalized through the launch in 2010 of the 
Joint EU–Pacific Initiative on Climate Change.310 Secondly, in parallel to the development of 
political ties between the two organizations, the circulation of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse was facilitated by the creation of the major framework 
through which financial assistance from the EU to the Forum would operate. Indeed, by a 
communication of the EU Commission to the European Council, the creation of the Global 
Climate Alliance, which was meant to provide EU Member States with a channel for their 
respective Official Donor Assistance (ODA), was announced in 2007.311 Financial assistance 
from this source is received by States vulnerable to climate change impacts, particularly Least 
                                                          
307
 Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the United States have a strong influence in Pacific Island States as 
main financial donors of official development aid. Detailed information by country can be found at: 
<http://www.aidflows.org/>.  
308
 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee of 29 May 2006, ‘EU Relations with the Pacific Islands – A Strategy for a 
Strengthened Partnership’, COM (2006) 248, Official Journal C 184, of 8 August 2006. 
309
 Declaration by the Pacific Islands Forum and the European Union on Climate Change, adopted on 7 
November 2008.  
310
 See Memorandum of Understanding, ‘Joint Pacific–EU Initiative on Climate Change’, signed on 15 
December 2010, in Strasbourg (France).  
311
 Information on the Global Climate Alliance, including data on the different country and regional 
projects, can be found at: <http://www.gcca.eu/>.  
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Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Thus, although the 
Alliance can operate in countries beyond the Pacific region, the establishment of this 
framework resulted in a strong increase in Official Developmental Assistance funds to Pacific 
Island States; within the 10th European Development Fund (2008–2013), 25 million euros for 
2009–2010 were mobilized for climate change adaptation in the Pacific region. Since 2011, two 
regional projects have been launched in the Pacific for a total amount of 19.4 million euros, 
with a view to supporting the preparation of adaptation road maps, financing the 
implementation of concrete actions in participating countries, and implementing activities that 
strengthen capacities and institutions to effectively respond to climate change.312  
Henceforth, as much as the Climate Change and International Security Discourse was 
construed by hegemonic regions to predict and evaluate the evolution of their geo-political 
positions in international relations (obstacles to their military capacity, increased dependency 
on non-reliable States to have access to natural resources, effects of climate variability on the 
operability of their overseas military bases, etc.), it has served Pacific Island States to unify 
their discourse on climate change adaptation and to formulate a common strategy opening up 
new international financial avenues.  
 
3.2. Introduction of the Discourse into the Agenda of the African Union: Diversification of the 
Sectors of Inter-Regional Co-operation  
 
3.2.1. Reminiscing ‘Green Ghosts’: African Scenarios of Environmental Stress and Conflict as 
Natural Loci of Reception of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
Africa is perhaps the continent where the destabilizing adverse impacts of climate 
change and their capacity to become a ‘threat multiplier’ can be best observed. Already in the 
mid-1990s, several case studies were conducted in African countries as the basis for empirical 
                                                          
312
 The priority areas of the first project are coastal-zone management, health, infrastructure and overall 
development, and poverty reduction; it is planned for a duration of four years (2011–2015), counts with 
a budget of 11.4 million euros and is implemented in nine Pacific Island States (Cook Islands, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Tonga and Tuvalu). More information on this project 
can be found at: <http://www.gcca.eu/technical-and-financial-support/regional-
programmes/secretariat-of-the-pacific-community-global-climate-change>. The second project is 
centred on education, research and technological development for climate change adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction; it is planned for a duration of three years (1/2011 to 12/2014), counts with a 
budget of 8 million euros and is implemented in fourteen Pacific Island States (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu). More information on this project can be found at: <http://www.gcca.eu/technical-
and-financial-support/regional-programmes/secretariat-of-the-pacific-community-global-climate-
change>.  
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research on the link between environmental stress and the outbreak of violent conflict.313 For 
instance, after the 1993–1994 Rwandan civil strife, some studies suggested that the crisis may 
have had its roots – or was at least enhanced by – the dispute confronting Tutsis and Hutus 
over land which had been degraded by the advance of desertification.314 Another paradigmatic 
example may be found in Kenya. In 2004, Wangari Mattai was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
for her community work to restore and replant Kenyan forests that were also progressively 
disappearing as a result of desertification; this initiative led to the launch of the widely known 
‘Green Belt Movement’.315 Similarly, only a few years after this movement was founded, the 
violent conflict in Sudan erupted in which farmers and nomads were opposed. The Sudan crisis 
triggered the first conflict analyses that openly and directly took into consideration how 
climate change could be harmful for the security and stability of a country – or even of a whole 
region. It was also one of the first times that a specialized agency of the United Nations had 
approached a particular conflict from a climate change and international security perspective; 
the 2007 Report on Darfur, elaborated by UNEP, followed by the declarations of the UN 
Secretary-General, Ban-Ki Moon, clearly marked a landmark moment in this sense.316   
The Sudan crisis and the approach to it by UN institutions from the climate change and 
international security perspective was also the starting point in helping to understand why 
some individual African countries and most importantly, the African Union (AU), could, in 
principle, be open to embracing the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
originated in the EU. Indeed, although climate change does not represent a direct existential 
threat to African countries as it does to low-lying small island States, the Darfur crisis pointed 
out how the adverse effects of the phenomenon can negatively trigger or enhance a grave 
humanitarian crisis and thereby contribute even more to African poverty, developmental 
                                                          
313
 See the case studies undertaken by HOMER-DIXON, supra Chapter 1, Section 4.2.1 
314
 See for instance P. UVIN, ‘Tragedy in Rwanda: the Political Ecology of Conflict’, (1996) Environment, 
vol. 38, pp. 6-15 
315
 Information on the Green Belt Movement is available at: < http://www.greenbeltmovement.org/ >.  
316
 See UNEP, ‘Sudan Post-Conflict Environment Assessment Report’, 2007, (Nairobi: UNEP), 354pp. See 
also the article written by UN Secretary General Ban-Ki MOON, ‘A Climate Culprit in Darfur’, 16 June 
2007, The Washington Post, in which he states that: ‘Amid the diverse social and political causes, the 
Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change. [I]t is no 
accident that the violence in Darfur erupted during the drought. Until then, Arab nomadic herders had 
lived amicably with settled farmers. A recent Atlantic Monthly article by Stephan Faris describes how 
black farmers would welcome herders as they crisscrossed the land, grazing their camels and sharing 
wells. But once the rains stopped, farmers fenced their land for fear it would be ruined by the passing 
herds. For the first time in memory, there was no longer enough food and water for all. Fighting broke 
out. By 2003, it evolved into the full-fledged tragedy we witness today’. Full article available at: 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.html>. This 
can also give a good sense of the context in which the first 2007 Security Council debate on ‘Energy, 
Security and Climate Change’ took place (see Chapter 3).    
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impasse, political instability and the trend to civil as well as violent transnational conflict that 
the region has been enduring for so long. Precisely when the Darfur crisis was at its peak, the 
African Union celebrated its 8th Forum, held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia),317 to specifically deal 
with the theme of ‘Science, Technology and Scientific Research for Development’, as well as to 
discuss ‘Climate Change in Africa’.318 Some statements delivered during the Forum by Heads of 
States of AU Member States indicate that approaching climate change from a security 
perspective was not out of hand at that moment. The statement of the President of Uganda, 
Yoweri Museveni, constitutes perhaps the most provocative and controversial plea in this 
sense, as he declared that climate change was ‘an act of aggression’ and demanded 
compensation from developed countries for the damage caused by it.319 Y. Museveni’s 
declaration not only resonated among African policy-makers; he also repeated it before the 
UN Security Council on the occasion of the first open-doors debate on ‘Energy, Security and 
Climate Change’, held in April 2007.320 Moreover, in a milder but seemingly interesting line, the 
President of Tunisia affirmed, during the Forum, his ‘[s]trong belief in the correlation between 
peace and security, on the one hand, and comprehensive sustainable development’,321 and 
asserted his will to ‘[f]ind appropriate formulas to settle African conflicts in an efficient and 
durable way and tackle its root causes’.322 These two references indicate that, by 2007, the 
security approach to climate change was not entirely absent from all African Union Member 
States, although it fell short of constituting a fully integrated part of the policy of the Union 
itself. Yet, within the five years that followed, the construction of a strong EU–Africa co-
operative framework on renewable energy served to extend the Climate Change and 
International Discourse to this region. 
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 Website of the 8
th
 Summit of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa, 22–27 January 2007, available 
at: <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/past/2007/january/summit/summit1.htm>.  
318
 The theme of the Conference was arguably connected with the preparation of the position of the 
African Union as a political coalition during the celebration of the 13
th
 Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC (COP.13/MOP.3) that was to be held at the end of the year in Bali (Indonesia). 
319
 See The Economist, ‘Global Warming in Africa: Drying up and Flooding Out’, Press Release, 10 May 
2007, available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/9163426?story_id=E1_JTGPQNG>. 
320
 Details on the 2007 UNSC meeting can be found in Chapter 3. O. BROWN, A. HAMMILL, R. McLEMAN, 
‘Climate Change as the New Security Threat: Implications for Africa’, (2007) International Affairs, vol. 83, 
issue 6, pp. 1141-1151. J. BUTER and M. LEROY, ‘The Environment and Conflict in Africa: Toward an 
Analytical Framework’ (2008) Conflict Trends, vol. 4, pp 25-31; D. GARCÍA, ‘The Climate Security Divide: 
Bridging Human and National Security in Africa’, (2008) African Security Review, vol., 17, issue 3, pp. 2-
17. 
321
 Statement by Sine El Abidi Ben Ali, President of the Republic of Tunisia, to the 8
th
 Ordinary Session of 
the Conference of the African Union Heads of State and Government, on ‘Science, Technology, and 
Scientific Research in the Service of Development in Africa’, Addis Ababa, 29 December–20 January 
2007.  
322
 Ibid.   
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
125 
 
3.2.2. Developing Ties: Innovative Inter-Regional Co-operative Framework for Renewable 
Energy as a Vehicle of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
The 2007 Forum of the AU offered an opportunity for the European Union to set down 
the basis of a new framework for co-operation between the two regional organizations. 
Indeed, in the presentation of the starting phase of this new collaboration, Romano Prodi – 
acting as President of the EU – explicitly referred to climate change from a security 
perspective:  
‘[I]t is not merely a problem of joining forces to react to global threats: terrorism, 
climate change and pandemics. Above all, it is a question of jointly seizing on the opportunities 
that the globalized world is making available. Development, migration, science, international 
trade, innovation, energy, the environment: these are all issues on which Europeans and 
Africans must work together, because they are bringing about changes from which both Africa 
and Europe must benefit’.
323
  
This standpoint, coupled with the adoption, by the Plenary Assembly of the African 
Union Forum, of the Report on the Follow-up of the ‘Africa–Europe Dialogue’, invites recalling 
the latest state of bilateral relations between the two organizations. The framework for 
political dialogue between the European Union and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – 
forerunner of the African Union – was set in 2000, during the celebration in Cairo (Egypt) of 
the First EU–Africa Summit.324 Since the initiation of this new framework for inter-regional co-
operation, both organizations have evolved; between 2004 and 2007, parallel processes of 
regional integration, transformation of the governance structure of each organization, and the 
adoption of new policy innovations having developed significantly. On the one hand, the 
European Union underwent an enlargement to include eastern European countries, which 
resulted in the admission of ten new EU Member States. On the other hand, 2005 was marked 
by the entry into force of the African Union Constitutive Act, which replaced the previous 
Organization of African Unity and incorporated into the re-born organization a socio-economic 
programme known as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).325 Following the 
African response to the challenges of the Millennium Development Goals, for 2015, and 
seeking to enhance sustainable development on the African continent, the European 
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 Address by the Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, to the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government of the African Union, Addis Ababa, 29 January 2007. [Emphasis added].  
324
 For a chronological summary of the long history of EU–Africa relations see: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african_union/eu_african_union/chronology/index_en.htm>.   
325
 Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted on 11 July 2000 in Lomé (Togo); see also Strategic 
Framework of the Commission of the African Union 2004–2007, adopted in May 2007. In addition to the 
AU institutions, the NEPAD secretariat (Partnership for Africa’s Development) and the Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) also play a prominent role in Africa's economic integration. 
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Commission approved, in 2005, the EU Strategy for Africa,326 a policy instrument describing the 
geo-political, economic, social and environmental dynamics of the continent and unfolding the 
basic principles for the prospective long-term EU relations with Africa. In this document, the 
importance of ensuring climate change adaptation in Africa was acknowledged and conceived 
as an urgent necessity of Africa’s development.  
The aid granted by the EU to the African continent in this new framework of co-
operation, seeking to materialize sustainable development, incorporated new forms of 
intensive co-operation in the fields of energy and climate change. This stage started off when 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse was being launched in the EU. Thus, 
the Final Declaration of the Second 2007 EU–Africa Summit, held in Lisbon, unsurprisingly 
begins as follows: 
‘On a global scale, we have today an increased understanding of our vital 
interdependence and are determined to work together in the global arena on the key political 
challenges of our time, such as energy and climate change, migration or gender issues.
327
 
Most importantly, the concrete outcome of the Second Summit was the establishment 
of the Africa–EU Strategic Partnership, also known as the ‘Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES),328 
and within which the Commission of the African Union plays a key role (although the Strategy 
remains under the political guidance of both the AU Member States and the Chairperson of 
JAES, Jean Ping, it is the Commission of the African Union that acts as the principal executive 
arm of the Partnership).329 Based on four areas of inter-regional co-operation – peace and 
security, governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, and key development 
issues – it is in the Africa–EU Strategic Partnership framework that the first signs of 
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 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
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Africa’s development, document reference: SEC(2005)125. 
327
 EU Council, ‘Lisbon Declaration’, EU–African Summit, adopted on 7 December 2007 in Lisbon, 
Document reference: 16343/07. [Emphasis added]. 
328
 Council of the European Union, ‘The Africa–EU Strategic Partnership: a Joint Africa–EU Strategy’, 
Lisbon, 9 December 2007, document reference: 16344/07. Website of the African–EU Partnership 
available at: <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/>. General Secretariat of the EU Council, ‘The 
Africa–European Union Strategic Partnership: Meeting Current and Future Challenges Together’, May 
2011. 
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 Webpage of the EU delegation to the AU, Koen Vervaeke: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy/eu-special-representatives/koen-
vervaeke.aspx?lang=en>. Both the EU and the Pan-African Parliament made a Declaration on the newly 
established JAES. Joint Parliamentary Declaration on JAES available at: 
<http://appablog.wordpress.com/2007/10/26/joint-ep-pap-statement-on-the-joint-eu-africa-strategy-
to-be-adopted-by-the-eu-and-african-heads-of-state-and-government-assembled-in-lisbon-on-8-and-9-
december-2007-for-the-2nd-eu-africa-summit/>, paragraph 10. 
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permeability of the African continent to the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse became visible. As the instrument setting up the Partnership stated:  
 ‘[T]he Joint Strategy defines the objectives of reinforcing and elevating the EU-Africa 
political partnership, to jointly address global challenges such as climate change or energy 
security and sustainability, and to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging 
people-centred partnership for all people in Africa and Europe.’
330
 
This general objective was translated and sub-divided into a set of Priority Areas of co-
operation. The Priority Area nº 1 of the Strategy – dedicated to collaboration in the field of 
security and entitled ‘Peace and Security: Promoting a Safer World’ – began by making 
reference to traditional security issues, but also integrated an innovation; paragraph 25 of the 
Strategic Partnership openly refers to climate change as a security challenge:  
‘25. [F]urthermore, over the past years a number of new global, and human security 
challenges have emerged, relating to issues such as climate change, environmental 
degradation, water management, toxic waste deposits and pandemics. There is a need for 
Africa and the EU to deepen their knowledge of the security challenges involved and jointly 
identify responses that could be formulated towards, and together with, the larger international 
community.’ 
331
 
 
Besides, Priority Area nº 4 on ‘Key Development Issues: Accelerating Process Towards 
Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals’ focuses on the means of developing inter-
State co-operation and private-sector investments and contains a specific sub-item on 
‘Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change’. Reference to the energy sector is first 
introduced discretely under the sub-heading ‘Infrastructure’, followed a few paragraphs later 
by an indication under the sub-heading on ‘Energy’, of the goals pursued in this area. Most 
importantly, this first direct reference to the place of the energy sector in EU–Africa co-
operation, which is accompanied by a description of specific policy actions which include an 
important structural governance innovation: the launch of the Africa–EU Energy Partnership 
(AEEP). This Partnership is part of JAES and results from the latter’s First Action Plan for 
Implementation (2008–2010), whereby the field of energy (Africa–EU Strategic Partnership, 
area nº 5) and that of climate change (Africa–EU Strategic Partnership, area nº 6) appear as 
‘distinct’ and self-standing areas of co-operation.332 In the field of peace and security (Africa–
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 Ibid. [Emphasis added].  
331
 Ibid., paragraph 24. [Emphasis added]. 
332
 The most important product of AEEP’s activity was the launch of the Renewable Energy Co-operation 
Programme (RECP), at the First High Level Ministerial Meeting of the AEEP, held in Vienna on 14 
September 2010. RECP is structured along three main axes of work: access to energy; energy security; 
and development of renewables and energy efficiency. This institutional innovation was part of EU 
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EU Strategic Partnership, area nº 1), the Plan for Implementation considers ‘[r]each[ing] 
common positions and implement[ing] common approaches on challenges to peace and 
security in Africa, Europe and globally’ as Priority Action nº 1. The AEEP is implemented by its 
Joint Expert Group (JEG) which is composed of representatives of African and EU Member 
States as well as of civil society organizations. The JEG is supported by one African and one EU 
Implementing Team (IT), each co-ordinated by Co-Chairs selected from each side. The AEEP’s 
Co-Chairs so far appointed to the European IT have been Austrian and – once again – German. 
The Third African–EU Summit took place in Tripoli (Libya) on 29–30 November 2010 
and resulted in the adoption of the Tripoli Declaration and the endorsement of the new 
African–EU Partnership Action Plan for the period 2011–2013. In the section entitled ‘The 
Africa–European Union Strategic Partnership: Meeting Current and Future Challenges 
Together’,333 the Action Plan finally recognizes that the Summit ‘agreed to pursue co-
operation with a view to building up local resilience capacities to address the transnational 
security threats posed inter alia by climate change, crime and terrorism in an integrated and 
comprehensive manner’.334 The incorporation within the JAES of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse was also reaffirmed and confirmed by the description of the 
Peace and Security Strategic Priority (sub-heading 2) on ‘Common and Global Peace and 
Security Challenges’, which holds that:335 
‘[W]hile today's global environment has opened up new opportunities to enhance 
international peace and security, it has also come with new security challenges, which in a 
world of increasing interdependence and close links between the internal and external 
aspects of security, only can be addressed through concerted international action, including in 
a UN context. Issues relating to transnational organised crime, international terrorism, 
mercenary activities, and human and drugs trafficking, as well as the illicit trade in natural 
resources, which are a major factor in triggering and spreading conflicts and undermining State 
structures, are of particular concern. […] 
Furthermore, over the past years a number of new global, and human security 
challenges have emerged, relating to issues such as climate change, environmental 
degradation, water management, toxic waste deposits and pandemics. There is a need for 
Africa and the EU to deepen their knowledge of the security challenges involved and jointly 
identify responses that could be formulated towards, and together with, the larger 
international community.’  
 
                                                                                                                                      
policy efforts to catalyse the transition to a renewable-based society. Further information on the Africa–
EU Partnership on the Energy Sector can be found at:  
<http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/partnerships/energy>.  
333
 European Union Council, ‘The Africa–European Union Strategic Partnership: Meeting Current and 
Future Challenges Together, EU Council Expert Series, May 2011, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of 
the European Union), p. 25-26. 
334
Ibid., p. 60. [Emphasis added]. 
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As a result of such integration of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse, the Peace and Security Partnership mentions that an initiative seeking to transform 
the Discourse into concrete policy actions was to be pursued: 
 
‘Thematic cluster sessions with experts from AU/RECs/RMs/MS/EU will be created on 
operational objectives in areas such as climate change and security, AU border programme, 
including exchange of experience, capacity building, cross-border co-operation, development of 
legal instruments, and disarmament issues (including Explosive Remnants of War), or focusing 
on geographical areas. These initiatives could lead to the organisation of Europe-Africa 
conferences on these themes.
336
  
The circulation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse from the EU 
to the most vulnerable regions – Pacific Island States and the African continent – was thus 
facilitated not only by the high degree of exposure of these regions to some of the worst-case 
scenarios of climate change impacts, but also by the dependence of these regions on European 
financial aid, either for climate change adaptation or, more generally, to fight against the 
multiple facets of economic and social shortcomings and poverty. Yet, as the case of the 
Maldives proves, for the Climate Change and International Security Discourse to be actually 
received and embraced in the most vulnerable regions, existential vulnerability and economic 
dependence are not sufficient conditions to trigger the circulation of the Discourse and ensure 
its successful incorporation. The existence of two political and institutional ‘channels’ is 
necessary for the inter-regional circulation of the Discourse to take place. It requires the 
political will of its creator – the EU – to share the Discourse with these regions, and the 
crystallization of such will through the launch of an inter-regional co-operation framework and 
the flow of financial aid. In the Pacific, the channel that served such a purpose was the EU–
Pacific Partnership on Climate Change, associated with the creation of an innovative major 
financial scheme – the Global Climate Change Alliance; whereas on the African continent, the 
Discourse permeated through the African Union–European Union Partnership and the agenda 
of the African Union directly stemmed from co-operation focused on renewable-energy 
projects. In contrast to the permeability of the Pacific and Africa to the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse, both East Asia and Latin America have seemingly remained 
distant from the Discourse or – at best – have had an ambiguous approach to it. To be sure, 
showing the existence of the Discourse in the relevant regional organizations of these areas 
would be easier than proving its inexistence. Yet, some factors may serve to explain the 
neglect of the Discourse in these regions. 
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4. RESTRAINED ACCESS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
DISCOURSE TO EMERGING REGIONS: BETWEEN DISINTEREST AND RELUCTANCE  
 
4.1. Treatment of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in Asia: A Distant 
Look 
4.1.1. Small Benches: Lack of an Appropriate Forum for Reception of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse 
 
The vulnerability of the Asian continent to climate change impacts has been well described 
and documented in the many regional reports contracted by the promoters of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse. To be sure, Asia is not a continent benefiting 
from a degree of climate-change resilience as high as that of EU Member States and of the 
USA, and the dramatic flood scenarios that have already been experienced in coastal areas, as 
in Bangladesh, are vivid proofs of the vulnerability of the continent.337 Yet, the extremely large 
geographical extent of Asia makes it necessary to address climate change impacts through 
more narrow sub-regional analysis.338 The same problem arises when approaching Asian 
regional organizations, for it is the only region covered by the present study which does not 
count with an all-embracing (or truly widely embracing) regional inter-governmental 
organization, comparable to: the African Union (comprising all 54 African States except 
Morocco); the European Union (which, after the 2004 extension to include Eastern Europe, 
comprises 27 European Member States); the States of the Pacific Islands Forum (comprising all 
12 independent Pacific Island States, the two non-self-governing territories of Niue and the 
Cook Islands, as well as Australia and New Zealand); the Organization of American States 
(comprising 35 North, Central and South American States); and the Caribbean Community 
(similarly comprising 15 Caribbean States and five associate members).  
Thus, the main regional organizations in Asia are either confined to a specific 
geographical sub-region, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); or have 
a geographical scope overlapping that of other organizations not exclusively composed of 
Asian countries, such as the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), which counts with 
Central Asian countries located at the crossroads of Europe and East Asia and which are, 
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 As a low-lying county mostly spreading over the delta of the Meghna River (fed mainly by the Ganges 
and the Brahmaputra Rivers), Bangladesh has been identified as one of the most vulnerable countries of 
south-east Asia to climate change impacts; particularly in 2004, intense floods provoked the 
displacement of roughly 20 million people and left 30 million homeless. See, for instance, BBC NEWS, 
‘Bangladesh Appeals for Flood Aid’, Press Release, 3 August 2004.  
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therefore, also part of the OSCE.339 In spite of the fact that the first main obstacle to extension 
of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse to Asia is apparently the lack of a 
forum for reception of the Discourse, the treatment that these two organizations have given to 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse deserves a closer examination.   
 
4.1.2. Unfruitful Attempts: The Disinterest in Incorporating the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse into the Agendas of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO)  
 
Initially conceived as a traditional security organization, ASEAN recently began focusing 
controversially on non-traditional security threats and preventive diplomacy.340 Some signs of 
reception of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse might therefore be 
found in this organization. Some years before the Discourse entered, and was institutionalized 
in, the EU, the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) began to open up to non-
traditional forms of security, such as the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Co-operation 
in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues.341 The Joint Declaration was adopted on 4 
November 2002 in Phnom Penh, Kampuchea, on the occasion of the 6th ASEAN–China Summit, 
presumably in the context of the rising concern about the use of force by non-State actors that 
spread worldwide after the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York. It is therefore not surprising 
that the references made in this Joint Declaration to non-traditional security threats list 
terrorism, but neglect to make any mention of environmental challenges. Yet, the 2008 
updated list of non-traditional security threats taken into account by ASEAN did not include 
climate change. Most notably, the 2009 APSC Blueprint,342 guided by the ASEAN Charter and 
setting up the programme of action in the political and security sector for the period 2009–
2015, also omits any reference to climate change. Only a reference at the beginning of the 
document recalls the environmental components of development. Yet, the Blueprint stands 
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 Some Central Asian countries are not only Member States of OSCE, but are also participating 
countries in ENVSEC projects (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan). 
340
 For a thorough explanation of this redirection, mapping its supporters and critics, see J. A. AMADOR, 
‘Asia–Pacific Regional Security Environment and Security Architecture: Choices and Prospects’, Foreign 
Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, online publication available 
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 China–ASEAN, Joint Declaration on Co-operation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, 
adopted in Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002. See also the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Republic of China on Co-operation in the Field of 
Non-Traditional Security Issues, adopted in Bangkok, 10 January 2004.   
342
 ASEAN, Political and Security Blueprint (2009–2015), adopted by ASEAN Leaders at the 14
th
 ASEAN 
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expressly as a document embracing a comprehensive approach to security and consequently 
specifically devotes a whole section to non-traditional security threats that not only include 
terrorism, but also cyberspace crimes. The absence of any reference to climate change as one 
of the non-traditional security threats to be taken into account in the agenda of work of the 
ASEAN Political and Security Community is all the more striking in that the Economic 
Community was directly engaged with the climate change negotiations when the Blueprint was 
adopted. In fact, in the same year, the organization launched the ASEAN Climate Change 
Initiative and the ASEAN Climate Change Working Group, both created with a view to 
preparing a common position of the ASEAN Member States – in favour of a legally binding 
agreement – for the 15th Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change, held in December 
2009.343 
Moreover, no trace of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is 
found in the ASEAN programme dealing with economic co-operation. During the First East Asia 
Summit, celebrated in 2006–2007, Member States of ASEAN, along with Australia, People's 
Republic of China, Republic of India, Japan, Republic of Korea and New Zealand, agreed to 
enhance the energy security of the region, and thereafter reinforced this political will by 
adopting on 15 January 2007 – less than a year before the celebration of the Bali Conference – 
the Cebu Declaration on ‘East Asian Energy Security’.344 In this Declaration, signatory States 
acknowledged the urgent need to address global warming and climate change, as well as the 
limits of global reserves of fossil energy and the unstable world fuel-oil prices, at a time when 
their economic development is increasing their energy needs. The use of the notion of energy 
security in the Declaration relates to the acknowledgment that renewable energy and nuclear 
power would increasingly represent an increasing share of global supply, triggering the 
correlative need to strengthen the development of renewable energy and promote open 
trade, facilitation and co-operation in the sector and related industries.345 Following this line, 
on 7 November 2007, shortly before the celebration of the Bali Conference to be hosted by 
Indonesia (an ASEAN Member State) and on the occasion of the Third East Asia Summit, the 
ASEAN Forum adopted the Singapore Declaration on ‘Climate Change, Energy and the 
Environment.’ Despite the fact that the word ‘security’ was this time omitted from the title of 
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 On 29 November 2009, ASEAN Member States gathered on the occasion of the Special ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, in Hua Hin, Thailand, where participants reflected on the 
progress of ongoing negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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agreed outcome at Copenhagen, 7–18 December 2009. 
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 ASEAN, Declaration on East Asian Energy Security, adopted in Cebu, 15 January 2007. 
345
 Ibid., Preamble. 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
133 
 
the Declaration, the document made direct mention of the need to ‘effectively approach the 
inter-relatedness of energy security, climate change and development’.346 Its operative part 
called for an improvement in energy efficiency and the use of cleaner energy, including the use 
of renewable (or ‘alternative’) energy resources, based on the Cebu Declaration. 
Given the similarity in the understanding of energy security between these documents 
and the EU position on this matter, one could have expected to find a reference to the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse either in the same document or, from 2008 
onwards, in other subsequent instruments adopted on the occasion of the East Asia Summit. 
However, much of the emphasis of the Singapore Declaration is put on the development of the 
mainstream climate change negotiations, so that energy security is in fact understood as part 
of a wider goal to enhance climate change adaptation (which requires transfer of technology 
for the development of renewable energies).    
Only three exceptions to ASEAN’s distant treatment of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse may be found. They result from limited attempts by the EU, 
Germany and the USA, respectively: The first exception was the celebration of the Conference 
organized by the Institute for Security and Development and the Institute of South East Asian 
Studies on ‘Regional Environmental Co-operation in the EU and ASEAN: Lessons from Two 
Regions.’347 As the presentation of the Conference theme described it, the topic had been 
chosen because: 
‘[I]t is clear that the interlinkages between environmental problems, as a non-
traditional security challenge transcending national borders, with that of modes and 
mechanism of regional and global governance to effectively counter such problems remain 
under-researched, both in theory and in practice. Second, a comparison study on environmental 
policy between EU and ASEAN would be valuable not only for these two regions but for other 
regions which are interested in a trend of regional co-operation in this field, because ASEAN is 
also one of the leading regional institutions in parallel with the EU.’
348
 
 
The second exception is more significant, as it was not confined to the academic setting, 
although it remains limited in scope. In September 2011, the ASEAN Secretariat signed an 
Agreement with Germany to address the interface between climate change and food 
security.349 The ASEAN–German Programme – funded by Germany – on ‘Response to Climate 
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 ASEAN, Joint Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment, adopted in Singapore, 21 
November 2007, paragraph 7.  
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 Presentation and description of the theme of the Conference can be found at: 
<http://www.isdp.eu/programs-a-initiatives/asia-program/asia-program-events/609-regional-
environmental-co-operation-in-eu-and-asean-lessons-from-two-regions.html>.  
348
 Ibid. [Emphasis added].  
349
 Full information on this project can be found at the official ASEAN website, available at: 
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Change: Agriculture, Forestry and Related Sectors (GAP-CC)’ was thus agreed in principle at the 
32nd SOM–AMAF Meeting, 20–21 October 2010. As a result, the ‘ASEAN Multi-Sectoral 
Framework on Climate Change: Agriculture and Forestry towards Food Security (AFCC)’ was 
endorsed as part of the overall efforts under the ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI), with 
a view to contributing to food security through sustainable use of land, forest, water and 
aquatic resources. Then, in 2010, Germany supported the implementation of the AFCC with 
three million Euros for the period 2011–2013. 
The third and last exception occurred recently at a Conference on Regional Environmental 
Security, sponsored by the Indonesian Ministry of Environment, with the U.S. Pacific Command 
and ASEAN defence forces, in 2012 in Jakarta (Indonesia). The Conference dealt with ‘the 
application of military resources and organizations to assist governments, societies and 
communities to mitigate environmental degradation’.350 Mirroring one of the facets of U.S. 
understanding of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse – and undoubtedly 
influenced by it – the Conference sought to highlight how the specific skills of military and 
security services, as well as their resources in strategic planning under conditions of 
uncertainty, could be useful for government decision-making to provide a timely response and 
humanitarian assistance.351 Nonetheless, no specific mention of climate change was 
apparently made.  
Outside of the framework of ASEAN, it is worth noting that the consolidation of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse and its inter-regional circulation to the AU 
and the Pacific Islands Forum found a relative resonance in the work of the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). As the area of action of this financial institution covers not only Asia but also the 
Pacific, references to the Climate Change and International Security Discourse can be found in 
some of the reports elaborated or contracted by the ADB. First, climate change and energy 
security – presented as a dual challenge – and concern about how climate change impacts 
threaten to raise food and energy prices have been mentioned ever since 2009;352 both topics 
                                                          
350
 See the presentation and explanation of the purposes of this event provided by Juwono Sudarsono, 
former Minister of Environment of Indonesia, published in The Jakarta Post, ‘Defending Our Regional 
Environmental Security’, Press Release, 10 April 2012 available at: 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/10/defending-our-regional-environmental-
security.html>.  
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 Ibid.  
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still remain present on the ADB study agenda.353 Second, the ADB acknowledged that the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse had innovatively re-activated Pacific 
regionalism, and it also paid attention to the issue of climate-induced migration in Asia and the 
Pacific.354 Notwithstanding these references, the ADB fell short of taking on board the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse (in any of its forms) or formally acknowledging 
the interrelatedness of climate change and international security as an independent item of its 
agenda. It simply recognized how such an approach had been developed in the Pacific region.  
Finally, from all relevant regional organizations, the Shanghai Co-operation 
Organization (SCO) is perhaps the one to have most neglected to refer to the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse. Five years after the creation of the SCO, in 2001, the SCO 
Forum was launched in Moscow, so that each SCO Member State could designate one 
authoritative research institution to be included in the Forum’s structure and to hold the 
status of National Research Centre of the SCO. None of the listed national research institutions 
has so far made any reference to or study of the impacts of climate change on the security 
policies of the SCO, and this, in spite of the fact that the SCO also openly seeks to promote co-
operation in non-traditional security areas.355 Indeed, after the recent celebration of the 6th 
Forum of the SCO, the Chinese delegate to SCO emphasized that the SCO was not likely to 
evolve into a NATO-style Asian security organization.356 Thus the SCO has been promoting co-
operation in areas such as energy, but is also focusing on economic and social integration in 
the region; and, amongst its goals, the SCO seeks solutions to problems of environment, 
                                                                                                                                      
threatens-asias-food-prices-energy-security-population-balance-adb>; as well as the keynote speech by 
Ursula Schaefer-Preuss, ADB Vice-President, delivered on the occasion of the 42
nd
 Annual Meeting of the 
ADB Board of Governors, on ‘Sustainable Land Management, Climate Change and Food Security’, which 
is available at: <http://www.adb.org/news/speeches/keynote-speech-sustainable-land-management-
climate-change-and-food-security>.  
353
 See for instance the ADB Report, ‘Food Security and Climate Change in the Pacific’, September 2011, 
ADB: Pacific Studies Series, 85pp.  
354
 See, for instance, the video ‘When Disaster Strikes: A Look at Climate-Induced Migration’, posted on 
the official website of the Asian Development Bank, 15 September 2011, available at: 
<http://www.adb.org/news/videos/when-disaster-strikes-look-climate-induced-migration>. 
355
 The brief Introduction on the official SCO website sets as the main goals of the organization 
‘strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among the member countries; 
promoting effective co-operation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture as well 
as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and other fields; making joint 
efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, moving towards the 
establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order’. See 
SCO homepage, available at: <http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp>.  
356
 See for instance, The Times of India, ‘Shanghai Co-operation Organization will not Evolve into a 
NATO-Style Military Forum: China’, Press Release, 7 June 2012, available at: 
<http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-07/china/32100311_1_shanghai-cooperation-
organisation-security-forum-china-and-russia>. 
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infrastructure, and education, and to build scientific and cultural links among its Member 
States. Despite this openness to non-traditional security issues to be dealt with by the SCO, no 
reference to climate change or environmental security co-operation was made in the 2007 
Treaty of Long-Term Neighbourliness, Friendship and Co-operation among SCO Member 
States,357nor in the new initiatives in new areas of co-operation, in the updating of the agenda 
of the organization in 2009.358 Only on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the SCO, in 2011, 
held soon after the Fukushima (Japan) tsunami in 2011, did SCO Member States timidly refer in 
the Astana Declaration to the need ‘for a united action of the international community on 
neutralizing modern threats, including the formulation on providing timely assistance to 
countries affected by natural and man-made disasters’.359 
4.2. Treatment of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in Latin American 
and the Caribbean: A Reluctant Approach 
 
4.2.1. Reluctance in Inter-American North–South Co-operation: Heterogeneity of the Receptor 
Fora (OAS, CARICOM)  
Akin to the distant look of East Asian regional organizations, the approach of Latin 
America and the Caribbean to the Climate Change and International Security Discourse can be 
said to be reluctant. To begin with, Latin American co-operation began in a wider Inter-
American context based on North–South connections, then becoming an exclusively Latin 
American co-operation framework, implying that the relevant organizations of the region 
should consist of a range of Member States with similar positions within the mainstream 
climate change negotiations. This is of course particularly evident in the case of the 
Organization of American States (OAS). As the oldest regional organization in this region and 
also as the widest in scope (it includes the USA and the Caribbean), OAS deserves first 
examination; it is also the one where some ambiguities are most likely to be encountered, 
given the political influence that the USA has within the OAS, and the influence of the former 
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 In 2009 the SCO began collaborating with Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking 
and organized crime, and also launched an initiative to combat the consequences of the global financial 
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colonial presence of some EU countries (particularly France and the United Kingdom) in the 
Caribbean.360  
Considering the institutional presence and political leverage of the USA in the OAS, the 
high level of vulnerability of the Caribbean island States (most of which are simultaneously 
members of OAS and of CARICOM), and the physical as well as political presence of the EU and 
EU Member States (including one of the main promoters of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse, the UK), it may not come as a surprise that some mention of 
environmental security can be found on the OAS’s agenda. Such references are, however, 
bound to the specific perspective of Disaster Risk Reduction in the Caribbean.361 As early as 
2001, the OAS adopted the Statutes of the Inter-American Committee on Natural Disaster 
Reduction,362 within which, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) plays an important role as 
implementing agency of several programmes related to disaster risk-reduction, natural hazards 
and climate change adaptation, such as the Inter-American Network for Disaster Mitigation.363 
It also oversees the development of renewable energy programmes in the Caribbean, funded 
both by the USA and by the EU, such as the 2008 Caribbean Sustainable Energy Programme 
(funded by the EU Energy Initiative), or CARICOM’s participation in the 2011 Global Sustainable 
Energy Island Initiative (created with U.S. funds).364 Yet, despite this logical predisposition of 
the OAS to the adoption of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, and 
                                                          
360
 In fact, both former colonial powers have conserved territorial possessions in the Caribbean: France’s 
overseas Départements of Guadeloupe and Martinique, as well as the overseas communities of Saint 
Martin and Saint Barthélemy, on the one hand (Saint Martin remaining attached to the Département de 
Guadeloupe and San Bartélémy being, since 1 January 2012, a Pays et territoire d'outre-mer); and the 
British Overseas Territories of Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Turk and Caicos, 
on the other hand.   
361
 Projects of the Caribbean Division on Disaster Risk Reduction are undertaken under the institutional 
umbrella of the OAS Department of Sustainable Development. Detailed information on these projects 
can be found at: <http://www.oas.org/dsd/Caribbean/DEFAULTCPND.htm>. 
362
 OAS, Statutes of the Inter-American Committee on Natural Disaster Reduction, adopted 16 May 
2001, document reference: CP./RES.792 (1277/01).  
363
 The Inter-American Network for Disaster Mitigation aims at developing partnerships and co-
operation agreements which can assist OAS Member States in sharing information and knowledge and 
experience on management of risks stemming from natural hazards (including, but not limited to, 
climate change impacts). More information on the mission, founding principles and strategic objectives 
of the Network can be found at <http://www.oas.org/dsd/Caribbean/Management.htm>. 
364
 Both programmes are implemented in predominantly English-speaking Caribbean Island States. They 
seek to reduce both the high level of dependence on imported petroleum for their energy and their 
vulnerability to climate change impacts (such as sea-level rise and increased hurricane force and 
frequency). The Caribbean Sustainable Energy Programme is being implemented in St Lucia, Dominica, 
St Kitts & Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Barbados as an 
observer country (further information can be found at <http://www.oas.org/osde/reia/CSEP.htm>; the 
Global Sustainable Energy Island Initiative is implemented in Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia and St Kitts & 
Nevis (further information available at: <http://www.oas.org/dsd/reia/GSEII.htm>). 
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notwithstanding some mention, since 2008, of the impacts of climate change on food security 
in the Caribbean,365 there has been no truly effective acceptance of the Discourse. In fact, not 
only does it not adopt the Discourse, the OAS actually fails to deal with climate change as a 
specific item at all. This can be explained by the fact that its wide membership includes 
Member States which have very heterogeneous interests in climate change negotiations, 
pertaining to different (when not opposed) political climate change coalitions (the USA belongs 
to the Umbrella Group, whereas all the other OAS countries are non-Annex-I countries 
belonging to the G-77+China group, the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), AOSIS 
or ALBA). This characteristic differs from those of the EU, the AU and the Pacific Islands Forum, 
which either constitute a specific political coalition in climate change negotiations (EU and the 
AU) or are all part of the same coalition (PSIDS are all part of AOSIS).  
 
4.2.2. Reluctance in Latin American South–South Co-operation: Competing Economic Interests 
and Ideological Divides (MERCOSUR, UNASUR, ALBA) 
After the OAS and the CARICOM, the Latin American South–South regional co-
operation through the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market) 
and, more recently, through the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR, the Union of 
South American Nations) and the ALBA ought to be examined. The most prominent 
characteristic of these three organizations is that they focus on the areas directly linked to the 
regions’ main concern: economic development. None of the three has a programme on 
security co-operation. While the issue of energy security was the object of the 2010 Treaty of 
South American Energy Integration in UNASUR, no reference was made to the effects that 
climate change impacts (or any other environmental problem) might bear upon it. The only 
partial concern shown by these regional organizations to the security effects of climate change 
may be found in MERCOSUR, which is apparently interested in the impacts of climate change 
on food security, as these may in turn affect the food exports, the main source of economic 
growth in Latin American countries. As for the recently created Alianza Bolivariana para los 
Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA, Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), the 
lack of any mention of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse may be 
explained by the general ideological reluctance of its Member States to assume policies 
associated with or stemming from the geo-strategic interests of hegemonic countries. Only 
                                                          
365
 The Third CARICOM/Cuba Summit, held on 8 December 2008 at Santiago de Cuba, was indeed 
devoted to the theme ‘Financial Crisis, Fuel and Food Security: Climate Change in Focus’. For a summary 
of the event, see <http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres374_08.jsp>. 
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one manifestation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse can be 
observed, close to the Venezuelan border, but limited to academic circles. It corresponds to 
the celebration on 22 January 2012 of a Conference on ‘Climate Change and Security in the 
Andean Region’, held at the Universidad de los Andes (Colombia) and a part of a larger 
succession of ‘Dialogues on Climate and Security’. Unsurprisingly, the Conference was 
prepared by Adelphi Consult and promoted by the German Foreign Office.366 
The restrained access to the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in 
East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean can therefore be explained by two main reasons. 
On the one hand, although most Asian and Latin American countries belong to the category of 
‘non-Annex-I’ countries of the UNFCCC – and may thus be considered as developing countries, 
with a lower resilience and adaptation capacities in facing climate change impacts than 
developed countries-, they are generally not exposed to the worst-case climate change 
scenarios, potentially putting at risk their existential survival as Pacific Island States 
paradigmatically embody. On the other hand, even when such extreme forms of vulnerability 
are present (as in Central America and the Caribbean when hit by cyclones and hurricanes; or 
as in south-east Asia, which suffers from increased delta flooding), the differing interests 
between the EU and the regions at stake in respect of key sectors, such as renewable energy 
or food exports, arguably explain the why no specific political framework of inter-regional co-
operation, akin to the two EU Partnerships with the Pacific Islands Forum and the African 
Union, has been launched.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
As J. Dryzec clearly defined it, a discourse is a shared way of apprehending the 
world.367 Forged in the realm of political power and embedded in language, discourses 
construct meanings and relationships; they are forms of responding to the inherent complexity 
and inter-relatedness of problems of all kinds – including environmental ones. Besides, to 
become recognizable and acquire self-standing, each new discourse needs to rely on a shared 
set of assumptions and contentions which help to define common sense and legitimate 
knowledge.368 This chapter has shown how the security perspectives on climate change that 
have emerged in international fora and research settings, far from being improvised or 
                                                          
366
 Adelphi Consult, ‘Climate Change and Security in the Andean Region’ (23 January 2012) Climate 
Security Dialogue Brief, Universidad de los Andes, 4 pp.  
367
 J. DRYZEC, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses, supra, at 9.  
368
 Ibid.  
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fortuitous, constitute the pieces of a new way of understanding climate change, hence 
referred to in this thesis as the Climate Change and International Security Discourse. Although 
its emergence and early configuration undoubtedly benefitted from prior knowledge and 
experience that policy-makers and research communities had acquired about the links 
between environment and security, the revival of this connection was not the mere 
continuation of the environmental security precedent.  
Born in Germany, where the core contentions, innovative language (for instance 
referring to climate change as a threat multiplier) and region-based methodology were settled, 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse can be truly identified as such once 
the European Union had institutionalized it. It is from such a political cradle that legitimate 
knowledge on climate change and international security was reinforced through the 
multiplication and mushrooming of EU contract reports, elaborated by the same community 
which had previously been tasked by the German Government with the early formulations of 
the links between climate change and security. Simultaneously, as individual EU Member 
States (UK, Denmark and The Netherlands) mainstreamed the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse in the realm of their national security strategies, more 
research institutions (such as the International Institute for Sustainable Development or the 
Royal United Services Institute) joined the pioneering ones (Ecologic Institute and, most 
importantly, Adelphi Consult). 
 These reports (along with the political will promoting their elaboration) have tailored 
and construed the Climate Change and International Security Discourse as a widely embracing 
framework under which, first of all, the manifestations of the adverse impacts of climate 
change (from food security to water stress, sea-level rise or the advance of desertification) are 
mapped in different regions of the world. Yet, what makes the specificity of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse – and permits its differentiation from related 
discourses on climate change adaptation and resilience – is the purpose of such a task: 
anticipating how those changes may exacerbate local or regional conflict and correlatively 
measure whether and to what extent they may modify the geo-political status of the regional 
organization and the Member States promoting the Discourse.  
Once settled, the EU sought to consolidate the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse by extending it to the OSCE and NATO areas, two regional security 
organizations of which it is a member, and that enabled the formalization of a transatlantic 
dialogue on climate change and international security with the United States. Mainstreamed in 
EU foreign policy and consolidated as a discursive product of hegemonic regions, the Climate 
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Change and International Security Discourse was then circulated to areas beyond the scope of 
the European Union which are extremely vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. 
Presumably, such circulation permits downgrading of the strong geo-political footprint of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse as originally conceived, and thereby 
legitimizes it. The contrast between the incorporation of the Discourse into the agenda of the 
Pacific Islands Forum as well as into that of the African Union and its restrained acceptance in 
Asian and Latin American regional organizations (ASEAN, SCO, OAS, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, 
UNASUR and the ALBA) makes it clear that a set of conditions is required for a successful 
circulation to take place. First of all, the political will of the promoter of the Discourse (the EU) 
to circulate it to a specific organization needs to crystallize in two ways: the creation or revival 
of a political partnership, coupled with the association of such an inter-regional co-operation 
framework with a financial flow (for instance in the form of financial assistance for adaptation 
to climate change or investments in renewable energy projects). Secondly, the forum for the 
reception of the Discourse needs to fulfil some requirements. It seems important that the 
members of the regional organization concerned have a rather homogeneous level of 
vulnerability to climate change impacts and share a similar or even common position in climate 
change negotiations. Also, the existence of a common interest with the promoters of the 
Discourse or at least the absence of competing economic interests in key areas embraced by 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse (such as food or energy security) is 
fundamental. 
  Mapping the construction and circulation of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse serves to understand its underlying rationale. What has yet to be 
discovered is whether the incorporation of the Discourse by the receptor fora of the most 
vulnerable regions has had an impact on its understanding, and whether such impact is 
discernible when the international community as a whole is confronted with the Discourse and 
operates beyond the regional level of analysis. The following Chapter, on the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse before universal international organizations (UN organs 
and institutions) is therefore devoted to this question.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE IN OPERATION: 
INTRODUCTION AND RESIGNIFICATION IN UNIVERSAL ORGANIZATIONS 
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‘So today is about the world recognizing that there is a security imperative, as 
well as economic, developmental and environmental ones, for tackling climate 
change and for our beginning to build a shared understanding of the 
relationship between energy, climate and security.’ 
Margaret Beckett, UK representative before the UN, 
Statement as Chair of the 5663
rd
 session of the United 
Nations Security Council, 17 April 2007. 
 
‘More importantly, it is historic because, in the resolution, we have agreed for 
the first time by consensus the link between climate change and security. This 
is a link that is being discussed broadly in academic papers and security 
documents in many capitals around the world, but it is the first time that we 
have formally made the link here – and I think that that is very important to 
reflect on.’ 
Australian Representative, Statement before the UN General 
Assembly, 3 June 2009. 
 
‘Many of our countries face the single greatest security challenge of all, that is, 
our survival. For that reason, we have to come to the Security Council today.’  
Marcus Stephen, President of Nauru, Statement before the 
UN Security Council, 20 July 2011. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
As recognized in the United Nations Charter, regional organizations play a 
complementary role in the achievement of the purposes of the United Nations.369 In practice, 
such relationship between regional and universal international organizations has produced a 
multi-coloured kaleidoscope of interactions which may depend on, inter alia, the material 
scope of operation of the regional organization concerned.370 As indicated in the preceding 
chapter, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse finds its roots at a regional 
level of analysis, which is the original locus of the underlying interests feeding both its birth 
and circulation, and where the political forces and linguistic innovations enabling the 
formulation of the grounds of the Discourse could first be unveiled. Yet, while the region may 
be seen as the container of the motivations intrinsic to the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse, it is at a universal level that the Discourse may turn into proper action and 
operate as a potential trigger of changes both of a collective system of international peace and 
security and the mainstream international regime on climate change developed under the 
auspices of the United Nations General Assembly. Yet, while the regional and universal levels 
                                                          
369
 The complementary role of regional arrangements is laid down in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, 
Articles 52-54.  
370
 L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, ‘Les relations entre les organisations régionales et les organisations 
universelles’, (2010) Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit international de la Haye, vol. 347, pp. 79-
406. 
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of analysis remain closely connected, the introduction of the Discourse before two core organs 
of the United Nations – the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
– can be understood as an autonomous and distinct process. How has the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse been resignified before universal organizations and which 
legal consequences can be inferred from such evolution? 
The present Chapter argues that it is at the universal level – where the Discourse is 
confronted with a full-fledged multilateral environment – that the usefulness of circulating the 
Discourse to the most vulnerable regions becomes more visible. As they supported the 
Discourse before universal organizations, these partners helped to legitimize the set of 
contentions embraced by the Climate Change and International Security Discourse and, most 
importantly, participated in the evolution of its content – from a hegemonic-led strategy 
consisting of geo-political concerns to the translation of an existential plea into policy.  
The present Chapter therefore completes the reconstruction of the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse initiated in Chapter 2, establishing the connection 
between the universal levels of analysis of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse when analysing the operation of the Discourse and its legal consequences stemming 
from the reactions of UN Member States to the Discourse before UN organs. Each Section is 
thus devoted to the successive landmark moments when UN Member States were called upon 
to discuss the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in the two core UN organs. 
Each time, the task was approached under a different title and gave rise to a different political 
and legal reaction of the organization.  
Section 2 begins with the moment in which the Discourse was introduced for the first time, 
in 2007, before the UN Security Council, and provides a detailed explanation of the dividing 
lines of the debate between the proponents and opponents of the Discourse. Section 3 then 
describes the follow-up of this first attempt which, after a shift in the commanding hands of 
the Discourse, continued its evolution and was resignified in 2009 before the UN General 
Assembly. Throughout this reconstructive effort, particular attention will be paid to the 
influence that the strong political momentum created by the on-going negotiations on the 
future of the climate-change regime may have had on the evolution of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse and its resignification before UN organs. Points of 
convergence and divergence between the Discourse and the mainstream UNFCCC–KP track 
will be highlighted in terms of the content, procedure and political alliances arising in each of 
them. Section 4 covers the return of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
before the UN Security Council, which marks a step towards the future consolidation of the 
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Discourse in the UN system. As short as the history of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse may be, the force of the plea that it contains and the seriousness of the 
problems it encompasses invites the extraction of not only policy (and philosophical) 
reflections, but also of the legal consequences of this process. The fundamental legal question 
lying behind the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, as understood 
nowadays in universal organizations, will be disclosed. 
 
2. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON ‘SECURITY, ENERGY AND CLIMATE’ (2007): THE 
FIRST ATTEMPT TO SECURITIZE CLIMATE CHANGE  
2.1. ‘Greening’ the Security Council? Origins of the Debate in Perspective  
2.1.1. Involvement of the UNSC with Environmental Issues since the End of the Cold War: From 
Ecological Crimes to Sustainable Development 
The debate on 17 April 2007 on such an innovative, multidimensional and rather 
controversial topic as ‘Energy, Security and Climate’ before the UN Security Council deserves 
analysis against the background of the Council’s history of involvement with environmental 
matters, particularly since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 put an end to the 
dormant period in which the Council had been imprisoned for forty years.371 Finally able to 
assume the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
originally assigned by Article 24 of the UN Charter, and take decisions binding upon Member 
States under Article 25, from 1991 onwards, the Security Council became more active than at 
any time before in the history of the United Nations. Yet, as the use by the Security Council of 
its powers to respond to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression 
blossomed, Christine Gray recalls, the original Charter scheme was transformed.372 Indeed, 
whilst the contest between competing models became diluted – described by Yoshiro F. 
Fukuyama as the ‘end of history’373 – and a new era governed by a ‘global standard’ was 
initiated, the Security Council was confronted with a new challenge, that of integrating new 
elements of social justice into its realm of action.374 Henceforth, despite having been set up to 
keep the peace and not to change the world order, the practice of the Security Council after 
                                                          
371
 C. GRAY, International Law and the Use of Force, 2008, 3
rd
 ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press), at 
254.  
372
 C. GRAY, supra, at 255. 
373
 Y. F. FUKUYAMA, ‘The End of History’, (summer 1986) The National Interest, vol. 16, pp. 3-18. This 
essay was later on expanded by Fukuyama in his book, The End of History and the Last Man, 1992, 
(London: Penguin Books).  
374
 M. KOSKENNIEMI, ‘The Police in the Temple. Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View’, (1995) 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 6, issue 1, pp. 325-358, at 325.  
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1991 on when and how to act was soon characterized by a willingness to use its exceptionally 
‘hard’ powers to address ‘soft’ purposes and the correlative widening of its scope of action.375  
The embrace by the Council of new factual realities – based, as Marti Koskenniemi 
highlights, on the idea that a State is not only a territorial unit but also embodies a set of 
institutions and values,376 – operated mainly through a free-ranging of what counts as a ‘threat 
to international peace and security’ under Article 39.377 Through the broadening of its 
interpretation, the Security Council seems to have shifted from a traditionally ‘negative’ 
understanding of peace – narrowly defined as the absence of armed conflict within and among 
States – towards the adoption of a ‘positive’ definition of peace – embracing the existence of 
friendly relations between States and of the economic, social, political and environmental 
conditions necessary for a lasting conflict-free society.378 Erika de Wet recalls how the 
Statement of the President of the Security Council indicated that such a possibility was 
regarded in 1991–1992, when he contended (on behalf of the Council) that ‘the absence of 
war and military conflicts amongst States did not itself ensure international peace and 
security’, and thus acknowledged that ‘the non-military sources of instability in the economic, 
social, humanitarian and the ecological fields have become threats to international peace and 
security.’379  
                                                          
375
 Ibid.  
376
 Ibid., at 432. Koskenniemi also adds that: ‘These institutions or ideas may be subject to a wide variety 
of partly internal, partly external, political, ideological or economic threats that are no less dangerous to 
the State's identity or viability than clear-cut military threats against its territory.’  
377
 Before the Security Council decides to impose military or non-military enforcement measures under 
Articles 40, 41 or 42 of the UN Charter, it must determine the existence of a threat to peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression, as defined in Article 39. The qualification of a situation as constituting 
any of these three categories (also referred to as criteria) belongs to the discretionary power of the 
Security Council. Its judgment is based on factual findings and political considerations and is not easily 
measured by purely legal criteria. Hence, the nature of this discretion and the existence of limitations to 
it remains a very controversial issue. Since 1991, the Security Council has opened this category to 
incorporate situations, irrespective of whether they risked destabilizing international relations, that 
required action by the Council in order to, inter alia: respond to grave internal humanitarian crisis 
(Somalia, 1992); halt widespread and systematic human rights violations (FRY, 1993); support 
democratic governance (Haiti and Angola, 1993; East Timor, 1999); or act de facto as a judicial forum for 
non-State actors like terrorists (Libya – Lockerbie case, 1992; Sudan 1996).  
378
 E. DE WET, ‘The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council’ (2004) (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing), at 140. Again, this division mirrors Johan Galtung’s seminal article on the distinction 
between ‘positive peace and negative peace’ that he laid down in 1969 for the first editorial of the 
Journal of Peace Research. See, GALTUNG, supra Chapter 1, note 59. The evolution within the Council 
towards an embracement of the positive definition of peace mirrors the widespread criticism of the 
traditional conception of security that simultaneously emerged later with the Cold War and resulted in 
the broadening and deepening movements of International Security Studies (such as the Copenhagen 
and the Welsh Schools). See Chapter 1, Section 4.1. 
379
 UN Security Council, S/PV.3046, Presidential Statement of the Security Council, adopted on 31 
January 1992, at 143. The new tendency of the Security Council was also reflected in: Security Council 
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Although the responsibility to maintain international peace and security contains an 
inherently preventive component, the possibility that the Council could begin dealing with 
long-term and structural causes of threats to peace – including environmental stress – which 
might not directly result in an international armed conflict, soon became highly controversial. 
Opponents of this move to enlarge the original intention of the Discourse, such as Catherine 
Tinker, criticized it for neglecting the limitations imposed on the Council by its composition and 
structure, and for deviating too much from the functions that the Council had been originally 
designed for. So, while the General Assembly was reified as the appropriate forum for dealing 
with long-term socio-economic issues, the use of Chapter VII powers of the Security Council 
regarding environmental matters was depicted as highly inappropriate, rather ineffective and 
even possibly counterproductive.380 In contrast, supporters of this shift, such as Brendan Reilly, 
viewed this criticism as a rather idealized normative position of international law, and 
contended that there is at least a residual role for the Security Council in cases of failure of 
international compliance with environmental-protection objectives that ultimately seek to halt 
gradual annihilation.381 In practice, the action of the Security Council over the last twenty years 
seems to indicate that none of these positions has become predominant; while falling short of 
pursuing a self-standing ‘environmental security’ trend that would continue the precedent 
opened up in the Cold War era, some indirect consideration has been given to environmental 
issues as part of the action of the Security Council.  
The first stage of the involvement of the Security Council with environmental issues 
relates to environmental damage caused during an armed conflict. In 1991, Security Council 
Resolution 687, for the first time, declared the State of Iraq liable for environmental harm and 
depletion of natural resources resulting from the burning of Kuwaiti oil platforms during the 
                                                                                                                                      
Summit, Statement Concerning the Council’s Responsibility in the Maintenance of International Peace 
and Security, document reference: UN Doc S/23500 (1992); and on the Report of the Secretary-General 
on an Agenda for Peace – Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-building, document 
reference: UN Doc S/24111 (1992).  
380
 See for instance C. TINKER, ‘Environmental Security in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the 
Security Council’ (1991-1992) Tennessee Law Review, vol. 59, pp. 787-801, at 794: ‘Sending in military 
troops under United Nations auspices to prevent trees being cut or to stop the building of a factory using 
polluting technology is clearly inappropriate and may itself be a threat to international peace and 
security.’ Erika de Wet supports this critique, as she contends that the Security Council is ‘a reactionary 
organ that is not equipped to attempt the prevention of all possible long-term tensions’, E. de WET, 
supra, at 139. These critiques eventually grew so much that, following the establishment of the 
Sanctions Committee, it was tantamount to a major constitutional crisis of the Security Council. Legal 
and institutional limitations to the power of this organ were sought thereafter (e.g. the applicability of 
ius cogens obligations to Security Council decisions and the possibility of judicial review of Security 
Council decisions).   
381
 Contra, B. REILLY, ‘Clear and Present Danger: a Role for the United Nations Security Council in 
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Second Gulf War. This wrongful act was characterized by the Council as a breach of 
international humanitarian law by the State of Iraq. Although harm to the environment was 
not the original act of aggression that had triggered the response measures of the Security 
Council, it did indicate the willingness of the Council to recognize environmental harm in the 
context of action undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Council thereafter 
decided the compulsory compensation of such environmental damage and set up a 
Compensation Commission for that purpose.382  
Outside the framework of armed conflicts, the second stage is connected to the 
progressive inclusion of development as a factor to be taken into consideration. As Aris 
Constantinides explains, the ‘securitization of development’ began once, under the weight of 
globalization, the artificial divide that used to keep development policies locked in the realm of 
domestic socio-economic issues faded.383 On the one hand, the Security Council was 
influenced by the move from military security to a holistic conceptualization of human security 
that the United Nations Development Programme brought to the fore in 1994.384 On the other 
hand, the development of a better understanding of the political economy of armed conflicts – 
particularly focused on how competing access to natural resources for exploitation increases 
the risk of regional instability – was accompanied by the shift from peace-keeping to the 
concept of peace-building. Such novelty, A. Constantinides explains, came to suggest ‘a more 
integrated approach to the range of issues that threatened peace and security’.385  
The approach of the Security Council to development had two main consequences. 
First, it permitted reactivation of development aid levels which, as a result of the 
disconnection between development aid and the geo-political interest of donor States during 
the Cold War, had dramatically decreased during the 1990s.386 Secondly, it greatly enhanced 
the development of the preventive action of the Council, particularly fostered by the UN 
Secretary-General’s 1998 Report on ‘The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable 
Peace in Africa’. Ever since then, instead of reserving Security Council action for control and 
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management of unstable situations, the focus was increasingly turned towards the drivers or 
root causes of instability, including poverty. 387 Such a shift became particularly visible after 
adoption of the 2005 Declaration on ‘Strengthening the Council’s Role in Conflict Prevention – 
Particularly in Africa‘.388 Interestingly, the Declaration also shows how the notion of 
development progressively dealt with by the Security Council was not understood in restrictive 
terms limited to economic development. Rather, it embraced social and human development 
which goes hand in hand with the idea of long-term environmental sustainability. Henceforth, 
acknowledging the need to adopt a broad strategy of conflict-prevention that takes into 
account non-military issues, paragraph 6 of the Declaration held that the Council should 
address: 
‘[T]he root causes of armed conflict and political and social crisis in a comprehensive 
manner, including by promoting sustainable development, poverty eradication, national 
reconciliation, good governance, democracy, gender equality, the rule of law and respect for 
and protection of human rights’.
389
 
Reference to sustainable development – understood, as defined by the Brundtland Report, 
as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs’390 – is restated in the operative part of the 
Declaration, stating the Council’s determination to strengthen UN conflict-prevention 
capacities by ‘helping to enhance durable institutions conducive to peace, stability and 
sustainable development’.391  
The progressive securitization of development – and, by extension, of sustainable 
development – constitutes the most immediate background reference to the debate on 
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‘Energy, Security and Climate’. It is thus part of the contextual framework in which the debate 
took place and helps in understanding how it was ever possible to suggest holding such a 
debate. Since the drivers of instability and root causes of conflict became part of the Council’s 
sphere of action in the late-1990s, the link between development and security was 
acknowledged in this organ. The next stage, seemingly opened by the debate, sought to take a 
step forward in linking security to two intertwined areas closely related to development. As an 
essential element of developmental policies, energy was therefore addressed jointly with 
climate change, a phenomenon which in turn may affect both security and energy access in 
different ways. On the one hand, climate change impacts are obstacles to secure access to 
energy sources; on the other, international co-operation on climate change mitigation affects 
global energy-consumption patterns. Yet, the contextual framework of the debate cannot be 
limited to explanations of the stage of evolution of the Security Council practice at the time; 
for the narratives of the debate to be disentangled, the influence of and reference to the stage 
of the climate change negotiations and the political coalitions existing therein must also be 
tackled. 
 
2.1.2. The 2007 British Proposal: Introducing the German-Driven EU Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse to Universal Organizations 
Fifteen years after the grounds of the international regime on climate change had 
been established, with the adoption of the UNFCCC, and ten years after the ‘belly’ of such a 
common basic framework had been filled with detailed mitigation target obligations by the 
Kyoto Protocol,392 the international community was constrained to begin envisioning, once 
again, what the future of international co-operation on climate change would look like. The 
opening of a new phase in the long and complex history of climate change negotiation took 
place barely two years after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol; in December 2007, 192 
UNFCCC Member States were called to gather in Bali (Indonesia) for the 13th Conference of the 
Parties/3rd Meeting of the Parties (COP.13/MP.3). An important part of the diplomatic efforts 
during that year was undoubtedly centred on the preparation of the Bali Summit, which 
included the reception of the updated scientific findings of the IPCC 4th Assessment Report. 
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It was precisely on 3 April 2007 – the day before the publication of the 4th Assessment 
Report – that Security Council Member States agreed to hold a debate on ‘Energy, Security and 
Climate’. The proposal to hold it had been filed by the United Kingdom, which had joined the 
EU Steering Committee on Climate Change and International Security a few months earlier 
and, benefitting from its status of permanent member of the Security Council, with this action 
formally became the driver and ambassador of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse before universal international organizations. Following the acceptance of the 
Security Council, the UK submitted a letter to the President of the Council in which the terms 
and general framework of the debate were laid down.393 The UK concept paper, as the 
document was referred to, introduced the topic by positing the existence of a ‘shared 
dilemma’ – the consumption of fossil fuels needed for the growth of economies will accelerate 
climate change, a phenomenon which in turn presented risks harmful to the very security the 
Security Council was trying to build.394 The concept paper also established that the aim of the 
debate would be to ‘rais[e] awareness of a set of significant future security risks as a result of 
failing to resolve the dilemma’395. Recalling Security Council Resolution 1625, the UK concept 
paper expressly located the debate on energy, security and climate change within the pre-
existing trend in Security Council practice of securitizing development and developing a broad 
and integrated conflict-prevention strategy.396 Most importantly, while climate change fell 
short of being referred to as a ‘threat to international peace and security’, either as a ‘root 
cause’ of conflict or even as a self-standing ‘driver of conflict’, the UK concept paper sought to 
justify the introduction of this issue into the agenda of the Security Council by highlighting the 
impacts that a changing climate may have on other ‘potential drivers of conflict’ (such as 
access to energy, water, food and other scarce resources, population movements and border 
disputes).397 The ‘cumulative impacts of climate change’, the paper held, ‘could exacerbate 
these drivers of conflict, and particularly increase the risk of those States already susceptible 
of conflict’.398 Quite strikingly, the conceptualization of the security implications of climate 
change was approached with a doubly doubtful wording and great causal distance from the 
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eventual – if ever – outbreak of conflict, for only the accumulation of climate change impacts 
may increase the drivers of conflict. However, possibly to counterbalance such controversial 
conceptual and causual weakness, the concept paper presented an overall exploration of the 
security implications of a changing climate in six concrete areas of international peace and 
security, more familiar to Security Council practice and which somehow add a tangible 
dimension to the initiative proposed – border disputes, migration, energy supplies, other 
resource shortage, societal stress and humanitarian crisis.399  
The choice of the timing to hold such debate was neither spontaneous nor casual; 
originated and incentivized by the beginning of the institutionalization of the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse in the EU, the UK initiative was arguably filed at a time 
when it would count with the developments of the IPCC 4th Assessment Report, a solid 
scientific foundation that could help to provide the basis for the appropriateness of dealing 
with climate change from a security perspective. As soon as the UK concept paper was 
submitted, opposition was raised, giving a preliminary image of the dividing lines to be set 
during the debate at the Security Council. On 12 April 2007, Cuba replied on behalf of the non-
aligned movement to the overall proposal as well as to the details contained in the concept 
paper. The Cuban letter highlighted the risk of encroachment by the Security Council on the 
functions and powers of both the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs, such as the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and strongly affirmed the view that the appropriate 
framework to deal with this issue was, if any, the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties. Thus, 
while acknowledging the existence of new and emerging threats and challenges to 
international security, the letter insisted on the importance of co-operation among all principal 
organs on these issues. The reaction of the G77+China group, represented by Pakistan, partly 
mirrored the preliminary position of the non-aligned movement. The letter of Pakistan to the 
President of the Security Council, dated 16 April 2007, also criticized the attempt by sponsors 
and supporters of the debate to drive the Council towards an encroachment on the roles and 
responsibilities of ‘other organs’, although the General Assembly was not specifically 
mentioned. However, the G77+China group – a heterogeneous but highly important political 
coalition in the negotiations of the international regime on climate change – added an 
argument which helped to back up this position. Indeed, it highlighted the view that the most 
vital ‘purpose’ or ‘goal’ to which energy and climate ought to be linked is not security but, 
primarily, sustainable development; and it stressed the fact that such was the understanding 
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that had been previously acknowledged in the 2005–2006 Millennium Development Goals.400 
Therefore, the Cuban letter continued, the issue fell within the mandates of the Commission 
for Sustainable Development, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), and also – albeit indirectly –the UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties. At no point, the letter stressed, had the General Assembly recognized the existence of 
such a ‘most prominent’ link between climate change and security or of a role for the Security 
Council within it either. Therefore, the opposing voices from the developing world 
fundamentally laid down two interrelated arguments for their preliminary objections. The 
substantive objection repealed the initiative seeking to link climate change and security, and, 
in contrast, defended the traditional concept of climate change as a matter intertwined with 
the right to development.401 The procedural objection in turn stressed the inappropriateness 
of the Security Council as a forum for dealing with climate change at all. The Cuban and 
Pakistani letters already conveyed a scent of how the debate would evolve.  
On 17 April 2007, the debate was opened and chaired by the British delegate, M. 
Beckett. Despite the rule that Security Council debates are in principle reserved for its fifteen 
Member States, an important number of non-Member States requested the SC’s agreement to 
their participation in the 2007 debate.402 During the Cold War, this used to be a rather 
common formula; as the inactivity of the Security Council blurred the original divide between 
the General Assembly and the Security Council set up in the UN Charter, many States not 
members of the Security Council chose to address this organ to set out their positions. 
Curiously enough, C. Gray recalls how developed countries such as France, Australia and – 
most prominently, the UK – repeatedly complained against this political strategy, for 
inappropriately seeking to turn the Security Council into a ‘mini-General Assembly’. While 
France reacted against the growing tendency to transform the debates of the Security Council 
– in principle, action-oriented –into a forum of presentation, the UK contended that speeches 
before the Security Council should preferably be delivered by Member States or, at best, by 
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non-Member States especially affected by the issue at stake.403 In recent years though, since 
the Security Council and the General Assembly reacquired the capacity to fulfil most of their 
respective original functions, it is developing countries which are now reluctant to approve the 
holding of open debates at the Security Council and have expressed concern about the risk of 
encroachment on the attributions of the General Assembly. This shift provides the background 
against which the fact that the proposal to hold the debate was filed by the UK and that the 
G77+China group and the Non-Aligned Movement immediately (perhaps almost pre-
emptively) reacted against it can be explained.  
On 17 April 2007, the Security Council was presided by the UK and comprised its five 
permanent members – UK, USA, France, Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China – 
and its ten non-permanent members – Belgium, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, 
Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia and South Africa. The petition for participation 
without right to vote was also granted to thirty-eight non-Member States, pursuant to Article 
37 of the Security Council Provisional Rules of Procedure.404 After formally opening the debate, 
the British chair introduced the UK concept paper and, in response to the preliminary reactions 
of the G77+China group and of the Non-Aligned Movement, tried to present the purpose of 
the debate as a mere beginning of a shared understanding of the relationship between energy, 
climate and security, in no case ‘seeking to pre-empt the authority of those institutions and 
processes where action is being decided’.405 The floor was then opened to more than fifty 
States which participated in a heated debate. The arguments expressed therein, in favour and 
against initiating an approach to climate, energy and security as intertwined issues, can be 
divided in two main groups. On the one hand, a group of States recognized and focused on the 
existential threat that climate change impacts entail and placed this consideration above any 
possible objection regarding the suitability of the forum; the rationale behind this group’s 
position is hereafter referred to as ‘survivalism’. Another group of States stuck to the 
mainstream conception of climate change primarily as an environmental issue closely linked to 
development and rejected any idea of ‘corrupting’ such a conception by approaching climate 
change and energy issues behind the dark veil of security policy; the rationale behind this 
group’s position is hereafter referred to as ‘developmentalism’.406 
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2.2. The Dividing Lines between ‘Survivalism’ and ‘Developmentalism’ as Two Irreconcilable 
Positions 
2.2.1. Proponents of the Debate: Hegemonic and Existential ‘Survivalists’ 
Despite the fact that proponents and supporters of the holding of the debate and the 
main contentions laid down in the UK concept paper may be put under the same umbrella, the 
group of survivalist States can be sub-divided and understood as the conjunction of two 
trends. In tune with the explanation given in Chapter 2, these two trends correspond 
essentially to the alliance between the hegemonic group of States, where the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse was born, with the most vulnerable countries, where the 
Discourse was circulated.  
As the study of the construction of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse revealed, the core of the hegemonic survival discourse is the fear that adverse 
impacts of climate change may undermine the access of hegemonic regions to energy sources 
and their correlative absolute and relative geo-political position. Former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan understood the underlying rationale of the debate in this sense and explicitly 
supported it.407 Then, when speaking on behalf of the British government – and not in its 
capacity of President of the Council – in the UK set-up, the foundation of the debate based on 
climate change was seen as a ‘threat multiplier for instability’408, an expression notably more 
precise than the terms used in the UK concept paper apparently drawn from the 2007 WBGU 
Report on ‘Climate Change and Security’ and accompanied by a direct reference to the Report 
of the U.S. Center for Naval Studies (CNA) reproducing the same term and which had been 
released the day before the debate was held.409 Such characterization was justified by 
observable facts (not predictions) for, as the UK delegate held, there is ‘widespread recognition 
that there are significant links clearly being experienced by some countries’.410 Characterizing 
climate change as a threat multiplier carried one main consequence; in response to the 
substantive preliminary objection expressed during the debate by the G77+China group and 
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the Non-Aligned Movement – stressing that climate change was primarily (if not exclusively) an 
environmental issue connected with development – the UK argued that re-consideration of ‘a 
new kind of sustainable development’ was required.411 It also made a plea for multilateral 
action and international co-operation on this matter, considering that not only is climate 
change a matter falling within the realm of security, but one that required the involvement of 
the international community as a whole, given that ‘it is not a matter of narrow national 
security. It has a new dimension. It is about our collective security in a fragile and increasingly 
interdependent world.’412  
The leadership exercised by the UK within the Security Council did not completely 
replace the driving role that Germany had previously endeavoured to play – and pursued– in 
the institutionalization of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in EU 
institutions. Despite being a non-Member State of the Security Council, Germany spoke on 
behalf of the EU. Curiously enough, no reference was made in the German statement to 
climate change as a threat multiplier, despite the fact that the term originated in this 
country.413 Climate change was instead qualified – with a terminology more familiar in recent 
Security Council practice on conflict prevention – as ‘an increasingly important factor among 
root causes of conflict’.414 After recalling the EU position at the climate change negotiations 
and referring to the progress made in the EU towards the completion of the energy transition, 
Germany highlighted three concrete policy consequences stemming from the recognition of 
climate change as an issue relevant to the realm of security: the need to establish a global 
framework of risk management, the development of the climate change adaptation concept 
and the enhancement of research on the security effects of climate change.415 The striking 
detachment of these proposals from the regular kinds of actions considered by the Security 
Council may suggest that the underlying long-term purpose of the proponents of the debate 
was to exercise political pressure in view of the celebration of the Bali Summit.  
Other EU Member States seemingly followed the German example. For instance, The 
Netherlands expressed a rather moderate position in favour of the debate. Openly 
acknowledging the connection between climate change, peace and security – altogether 
conceived as ‘global public goods of crucial importance’416 – The Netherlands considered that a 
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reassessment of the security risks was necessary for taking adequate preventive and corrective 
measures.417 Likewise, Belgium argued that the scope of security policies ought to be 
reconsidered by using a broader concept of security and calling for a shift in international 
climate change co-operation ‘from management to prevention’,418 and argued that 
environmental co-operation should be used ‘as an instrument for conflict prevention and as a 
confidence-building measure’.419 This idea reminds us of the underlying rationale of the early 
projects of the OSCE Environment and Security Initiative conducted in the Caspian Sea.420 Also, 
in contrast to the silence and inactivity shown during the institutionalization of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse in the EU, the French delegate was active during 
the debate and partly shared the position of France’s European counterparts before the 
Security Council. Recalling that the depletion of natural resources due to climate change plays 
a major role in conflicts, particularly in Africa, the delegate began by recognizing that ‘climate 
change threats are real threats’.421 From this basis, the French delegate moved on to 
eloquently characterize climate change as one of ‘the principal threats to humankind’.422 
However, an important nuance in the French position makes it partly differ from the principal 
UK position. Despite the fact that the sense of urgency of the issue was recognized and 
perhaps stressed more than by any other by hegemonic proponents of the debate, France laid 
down an institutional safeguard. Although it considered that the Security Council ‘cannot 
ignore within its mandate the threats to international security caused by global warming’, it 
expressed disagreement with the choice of the Council as ‘the number one forum’ where this 
issue should be addressed.423 Other EU Member States, such as Slovakia, Italy and the EU 
‘nordic driver’, Denmark, adhered to the German statement. Italy added a dimension to the 
debate when it recommended the creation of a United Nations Environmental Organization 
(UNEnvO) to deal with the issue at stake.424 This mention – which fell somewhat outside the 
main lines of the Security Council debate – may be explained by the fact that the movement in 
favour of creating such an organization emerged in Italy. Finally, despite not being an EU 
Member State, Ukraine also adhered to the German statement. Its reference to the 1986 
Chernobyl catastrophe recalled its proposal of a resolution on international environmental 
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security which it had promoted before the First and Second Committees of the General 
Assembly.425 
Along with this set of developed EU countries, active proponents of approaching 
climate change from a security perspective – sometimes qualified as a threat, a threat 
multiplier or a factor in the causes of conflict – and defending the role to be played by the 
Security Council, it was the group of most vulnerable States that actually justified such an 
endeavour. This group encompasses small island States as well as some African countries 
sharing the fear of the consequences of climate change for their survival – either as States or 
as communities. They may therefore be referred to as ‘existential survivalists’ – as opposed to 
the ‘hegemonic survivalists’ previously mentioned. While these voices strongly legitimized and 
upheld the move by hegemonic States to securitize climate change, they found in their 
hegemonic counterpart a powerful actor with an important diplomatic leverage capable of 
fostering international responses to climate change impacts.  
The voice of existential survivalists was best exemplified by Tuvalu, which saw the 
debate as a golden opportunity to qualify climate change by what it was, namely, an 
‘unprecedented threat’ potentially infringing their ‘fundamental rights to nationality and 
statehood as constituted under the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and other 
international conventions.’426 In contrast with the distant and blurry notions used by 
hegemonic survivalists to refer to climate change from a security perspective – from ‘threat 
multiplier’ and ‘driver of instability’ to ‘factor of the root causes of conflict’ – Tuvalu’s direct 
and forceful language qualified climate change not only as a full-fledged threat, but also one 
that largely supersedes any other threat that Small Island Developing States may ever 
encounter. The Tuvaluan delegate did not doubt in making a reference to the controversial 
statement of the president of Uganda to the African Union, in which climate change was 
qualified as a ‘low-level act of aggression’.427 Nor did Tuvalu restrain itself from developing 
such an idea further and from stating that climate change is tantamount to a ‘chemical war of 
immense proportions’.428 The daily fight of Tuvaluans for survival against the unchained forces 
of climate change could but be depicted by the allegory of war: ‘our conflict is not being fought 
with guns and missiles, but with weapons from everyday life: chimney stacks and exhaust 
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pipes’.429 As a result of this existential plea, Tuvalu appealed to the Security Council to ‘review 
the concept of environmental security within its mandate’.430 The vigorous contention of 
Tuvalu found support in other Pacific Island States. Most prominently, Papua New Guinea – 
speaking on behalf of Pacific Island States – specified the scope of such a threat when 
contending that climate change ‘lies at the heart of the existence of 12 independent Pacific 
Island States and 7 Pacific territories.’431 This was also the first time that the need for a more 
comprehensive international regime on climate change, taking into account the sovereignty 
implications for these countries, was thus openly formulated in a universal international 
forum. As issues pertaining to the protection of States’ sovereign integrity lie at the heart of 
the UN Charter and of the Security Council mandate, Papua New Guinea argued that climate 
change should qualify for raising the sensitivity of the Council. Other delegates insisted on one 
specific aspect of the existential challenge, for example, the possibility that climate change 
exposed Pacific islanders to the risk of forceful displacement. The Solomon Islands therefore 
warned that, far from constituting a simple national or regional issue, the issue of climate-
induced displacement would ‘spill over into the international scene, where environmental 
victims will not be refugees, but survivors’.432 Likewise, the Marshall Islands stressed that 
population relocation due to sea-level rise was already a present reality in the region and, 
recalling that the vanishing of entire nations ‘is simply without historical precedent’, stressed 
the consequences that the extinction of statehood would have for the definition of 
Marshallese cultural identity.433 The Federated States of Micronesia also alluded to the 
‘cultural and geographic mortality’ of Pacific Island States, qualifying climate change as a 
security threat ‘and a threat to every aspect of life of Pacific islands’.434 Moreover, closely 
associated with the plea of Pacific Island States – although not directly referring to climate 
change as a ‘security threat’ – the Maldives set out the basis for an important argument 
against the strict and exclusive characterization of climate change as a developmental issue. 
Indeed, building upon the speech on sea-level rise that former president of the Maldives, 
Abdul Gayoom, delivered before the UN General Assembly in 1987, the Indian Ocean small 
island State made it clear that the existential threat posed by climate change necessarily tailors 
and constrains any sustainability purposes. Referring to Maldives’ own recent experience, the 
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Maldivian delegate held that ‘it is ironic that the tsunami of 2004 washed away twenty years of 
development work in only six days, and right after the General Assembly had adopted 
Resolution 59/210 on the graduation of Maldives from the list of least developed countries’.435  
Finally, it is worth noting that not all of the existential survivalist pleas were expressed 
by small island developing States: some developed countries of the Pacific region also joined 
their voices to this group’s. First, as a developed country highly exposed to natural disasters, 
Japan’s statement sounded closer to the existential survivalist position than to the position of 
the hegemonic proponents of the debate (nor, a fortiori, opponents to it). Japan thus 
particularly emphasized the need to develop disaster risk-reduction measures.436 Secondly, the 
position taken by two important developed Commonwealth countries of the region, namely, 
Australia and New Zealand, showed that both these countries are close witnesses of the reality 
of Pacific Island States and important actors in the current and future resolution of the adverse 
effects of climate change – not only with regard to regional trade partnerships or investment 
in developmental programmes, but also to possible solutions for displaced people as a result 
of climate change. Although the Australian delegate acknowledged that climate change ‘is a 
different sort of threat’ to that usually debated in the Security Council, he nonetheless 
considered that ‘a failure to act now would exacerbate the risks in the future,’ and thus called 
for an intensified commitment both in mitigation and adaptation actions.437 Along the same 
line, New Zealand mentioned its support to Kiribati’s adaptation programme and emphasized 
the human dimension of the security approach to climate change and considered the debate 
as entirely appropriate for the forum selected.438  
Although the existential discourse was mainly articulated and defended by Pacific 
Island States (along with Maldives and three developed countries of the region), some African 
countries adhered to it and contributed to the construction of a more complex image of the 
security approach to climate change before the Security Council; one that bound security 
issues raised by climate change to the prominent objective of African countries to reduce 
poverty. Therefore, while Pacific Island States focused on how climate change impacts embody 
an ongoing existential threat in State-centric terms (disappearance of statehood, with the 
consequent effects on the identity of their people as a nation), the statements of African 
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countries characterized climate change impacts as a threat to African people or societies. The 
statement made by Ghana’s delegate illustrates particularly well the characterization of the 
issue as double-edged. While recalling how the advance of desertification in Saharan and sub-
Saharan countries led the former Organization of African Unity to approve containment 
measures, Ghana highlighted how, for African countries, ‘the fundamental question is how to 
alleviate the grave threats posed by climate change without compromising the target of 8% 
growth necessary for reducing poverty to tolerable levels in the next decade’.439 Thus, despite 
the fact that the risk of encroachment of competences was acknowledged by most African 
countries, the seriousness of the problem seemed to weigh in favour of holding the debate 
within the Security Council and beginning a multilateral reflection on the security impacts of 
climate change. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo accepted the Security Council 
as the appropriate forum and expected this organ to become aware of this ‘threat’ when 
designing conflict-prevention strategies, given that climate change is very often associated 
with deep and wide-ranging effects.440 The Congolese delegate also recalled the interest of, 
and concern shown by, African countries in climate change, which became the topic of the 8th 
African Union Summit celebrated in Addis Ababa on 22–30 January 2007.441 Likewise, once 
again mirroring the declarations of the Ugandan president on that occasion – characterizing 
climate change as a ‘low level act of aggression’ – the Namibian delegate to the Security 
Council held that ‘humanity and the developing countries in particular have been subjected to 
what would be described as low intensity biological or chemical warfare. Greenhouse gases 
are slowly destroying plants, animals and human beings.’442 The call for establishing a regime 
of compensation was therefore, once again, raised: ‘The cause of climate change is known. 
Those who are responsible for the problem are also known. Now it is the time to hold them 
accountable for their actions. They cannot be allowed to escape with impunity’.443 
All in all, the statements made in the Security Council debate by proponents of the link 
share some characteristics. First of all, they did not put much emphasis on the scientific data, 
despite the fact that they could count with the scientific backup of the early reports 
mentioned in Chapter 3. Rather, proponents of the debate based their statements on the 
specific manifestations of the adverse impacts of climate change as experienced in each of 
their countries. Secondly, the depiction of these specific images served as the benchmark from 
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which proponents argued that a preventive approach to adverse climate change impacts, 
differing from traditional mainstream mitigation efforts, was necessary.444  
 
2.2.2. Opponents of the Debate: Emerging States and Their ‘Developmentalist’ Allies 
Opposing the existentialist voices, discussed in the preceding section, an important 
coalition of countries, all members of the G77+China group, opposed holding the debate 
before the Security Council. These opponents were, nevertheless, a heterogeneous group with 
a mosaic of different underlying interests. The general arguments of this group can be found in 
the letter in which Pakistan, as representative of the G77+China group, laid down the 
preliminary objections to the UK concept paper.445 A similar and straightforward explanation 
was provided by Egypt: the main reason why this group rejected the debate was that it ‘views 
this open Security Council debate as an attempt by developed countries to shrug off their 
responsibilities in that regard’.446 Therefore, Egypt called for re-conducting the debate on 
climate change within its original context, namely, under the concept of sustainable 
development. Other members of the G77+China group, such as Bangladesh and the 
Philippines, explicitly upheld this view in their individual capacities.447  
Apart from the generally opposing voices raised by some members of the G77+China 
group, some specific interests were perfectly discernible. These emerged from countries that 
were Member States of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), plus the 
five emerging countries nowadays known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), and finally members of ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance led by Venezuela). The opposition 
from the BRICS coalition was first raised by China which, as a permanent member of the 
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Security Council, declared that ‘climate change may have certain security implications, but 
generally speaking it is in essence an issue of sustainable development’.448 Considering that the 
Security Council lacked expertise and was ‘not the right place to take decisions with extensive 
participation leading to widely acceptable proposals’,449 China stressed that this discussion 
should be regarded as an exception not giving rise to follow-up actions. Despite being a 
member of the African Union, South Africa chose to align with the position of the other BRICS 
countries and considered that the issue does not fall within the mandate of the Security 
Council; it also stressed that the debate ‘should not result in any outcome or summary’.450 
Similarly, Brazil considered that there is a ‘stronger link between climate change and 
development as opposed to security’, and stressed that debate on the multiple dimensions of 
climate change (including security ones) should take place in the General Assembly.451 The 
Russian position was even less indulgent. After appealing ‘to avoid panicking and 
overdramatizing the situation’, Russia listed as the appropriate forums and formats to deal 
with all aspects of climate change – including the analysis of new challenges and threats in this 
area – the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, the General Assembly, the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development, and the World Meteorological Organization.452 Finally, India reacted 
quite fiercely, considering it ‘obvious’ that climate change was not a threat in the context of 
Article 39 of the UN Charter, and even mildly threatening the international community with 
the possibility the pursuit of this route could have on the success of the climate change 
negotiations.453 
Besides, the opposition from the ALBA countries (a recently formed group of countries 
which is in contradiction to the original UNFCCC political coalition of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, known as GRULAC), put forward by Venezuela, stressed that security as well as 
energy policies fall strictly within the sovereign and legitimate national definition of priorities. 
Venezuela’s vivid reaction against any external interference in the realm of energy – which 
may also be understood in terms of Venezuela’s status as a founder member of OPEC – was 
followed by its ALBA partners Cuba and Bolivia. While the former stressed the lack of 
                                                          
448
 S/PV.5663, at 12. 
449
 Ibid.  
450
 S/PV.5663, at 16. 
451
 S/PV. 5663 (Resumption 1), at 21.  
452
 S/PV.5663, at 17. Hence, although the Russia Federation is part of the OSCE region in which the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse was consolidated from 2008 onwards, under the 
ENVSEC Initiative, the position of this country before such a global international forum as the Security 
Council seemingly followed that of the other BRICS countries.  
453
 Ibid., at 21: ‘The international community needs to be vigilant about moves that would, so to speak, 
make global warming cool again’.  
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
164 
 
transparency of the Council,454 the latter appealed to ‘the strictest interpretation of what 
constitutes a threat to the international peace and security, in accordance with Article 39 of the 
UN Charter’.455 Furthermore, speaking on behalf of OPEC countries, Qatar conceptualized 
climate change as a part of the development issue, and considered that there was a need for 
an integrated approach to development that could include the fight against climate change 
and make both compatible: ‘threats brought about by climate change do not loom over 
vulnerable States exclusively but are primarily threats to sustainable development’.456 Qatar 
also considered that the power imbalances present in the Security Council did not make it the 
optimal mechanism to deal with the threats posed by climate change, a position backed by 
Indonesia.457  
Last but not least, it is worth noting that a set of countries did not clearly opt either for 
joining the proponents or the opponents of the Security Council debate. This ‘in-between’ or 
ambiguously diluted category included Singapore, Panama, and Peru, as well as small island 
developing States not from the Pacific region, such as Barbados (partly Caribbean shoreline), 
the Comoros Islands and Mauritius (Indian Ocean shoreline), whose delegates expressed 
discomfort about the venue chosen for the debate, for reasons of procedural fairness, but 
generally upheld – or at least did not reject – the need for and suitability of approaching 
climate change from a security perspective. Most importantly, this ‘in-between’ category also 
encompasses the rather distant position of the United States of America, which strikingly 
contrasted with the U.S. national concern about the security implications of climate change 
that had led the Pentagon to contract specialized research on this matter since 2003 (including 
the CNA report released the day before the debate and explicitly mentioned by the UK 
delegate).458 The USA’s reluctance to bring this issue before the Security Council – expressed at 
a time when the consolidation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse in 
the OSCE and NATO regions had not yet taken place – may be understood as a preventive 
reaction against foreign interference in the national realms of energy and security possibly 
generated by development of international co-operation in these areas.459   
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Three main remarks may be made on this initial phase of operation of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse before a global international forum. First of all, 
consistent with the reconstruction of the origins and circulation of the Discourse described in 
Chapter 2, the global level of analysis reveals that the introduction of the security perspective 
into climate change considerations before the United Nations stemmed from an EU initiative. 
The timing chosen to launch this move, as well as the vague understanding that the EU and the 
Member States adhering to its position on the security implications of climate change, 
suggests that time-specific political interests – possibly seeking to increase the sense of 
urgency and power of leverage on the road to the Bali Summit – animated the initiative of the 
EU to launch a debate on ‘Energy, Security and Climate’ at the Security Council in April 2007. 
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that the origin of such a move stemmed from a hegemonic-
driven purpose, it was soon reinforced by the expressive and homogeneous and existential 
pleas of Pacific Island States, which clearly affirmed that climate change impacts put at stake 
the very survival of their statehood. Moreover, in spite of the official position of the African 
group against the debate, several African States adhered to the basic contentions of Pacific 
Island States and proposed a belligerent image of climate change in order to claim economic 
compensation from developed countries. Henceforth, the dynamics discernible at a global 
level of analysis mirror the previous analysis of the origins, construction and circulation of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse at the regional level. This debate can be 
characterized as an attempt to ‘securitize’ climate change and energy. According to O. 
Waever’s securitization theory, an issue is ‘securitized’ when it is introduced to a relevant 
audience – in this case, the Security Council – through a discursive process (or ‘speech acts’ in 
Austin’s theory of linguistics), in order to be taken out of the realm of normal politics.460 As the 
process is only completed when the relevant audience accepts it, reactions against the debate 
may be understood as attempts to prevent the securitization of climate change from being 
fully perfected. Hence, while most opponents of the debate did not directly deny the existence 
of security consequences stemming from climate change impacts, they firmly reacted against 
the possible political consequences of re-conceptualizing climate change as a security issue in 
terms of decreased leverage in the mainstream forums and climate change negotiations. 
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However, most proponents and opponents of the debate have one point in common: when 
speaking of the security implications of climate change, no scientific report justifying the 
approach is referred to. They have all based their position on the reaction to or support of the 
testimonials of Pacific Island States (when the reports on climate change and international 
security had not yet been developed). All in all, the strength of the opposing voices impeded 
the adoption of a presidential statement after the debate; climate change thus fell short of 
being fully securitized in 2007. Yet, as proponents of the debate sought to legitimize the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse and extend the recognition of its content 
to all UN Member States, the acceptance of the Discourse by relevant global organizations was 
pursued. The second stage of this process would take place at the UN General Assembly 
where, confronted with a fully multilateral arena, the original presentation of the Discourse by 
the EU would be restated. 
 
3. THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON ‘CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS POSSIBLE 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS’ (2009): A LEGITIMIZING AND EXPANSIVE MOVE 
3.1. The Road to Resolution 63/281 (2009): Resignifying the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse 
3.1.1. The 2008 Proposal of Pacific Island States: A Shift in the Commanding Hands 
Considering the high level of opposition to the introduction of climate change into the 
Security Council agenda, the next move envisaged by the proponents directed the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse towards the General Assembly. Shifting forums is 
commonly used as a diplomatic strategy for controversial topics with limited support within 
one body (here, the Security Council) in order to achieve a higher degree of legitimacy in 
another (here, the General Assembly) and thus, indirectly, put pressure on the Council to 
resolve the matter. It mainly implied that, for the first time, the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse was to be put before a truly global forum. The extension of 
the Discourse to a global audience, such as the UN General Assembly, would yet have 
consequences for the content and understanding of the Discourse. Instead of trying to ‘green’ 
the Security Council, the move suggested securitizing the way in which the Assembly had dealt 
with climate change until then and seemingly suggested that the division of competences 
between the two major UN organs with regard to global environmental protection may 
deserve being questioned, if not revised. 
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The long history of involvement of the General Assembly with climate change dates back 
at least to the adoption in 1989 of Resolution 44/206 on the possible adverse impacts of sea-
level rise on islands and coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal areas, promoted by the 
former president of Maldives, Abdul Gayoom.461 From this benchmark, the Assembly endorsed 
the creation of the IPCC (by WMO and UNEP) and became the patron of the climate change 
negotiations that led to the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. By the time the debate was 
taking place in the Council, the Assembly had taken note of the outcome of the IPCC 4th 
Assessment Report and of diplomatic efforts to organize the 2007 Bali Climate Change Summit, 
six months later. Following the success of the Bali Climate Change Summit, the Assembly held 
a thematic debate during the early months of 2008 entitled ‘Addressing Climate Change: the 
United Nations and the World at Work’, without, however, reflecting any of the contentions or 
perspectives on climate change introduced during the Security Council debate.  
The change occurred on 27 October 2008 when fifty-two States submitted a Draft 
Resolution to the Assembly entitled ‘Security and Climate Change’. However, neither the USA, 
the BRICS group, the OPEC countries, members of ALBA, nor countries parties to the UNFCCC 
African Group were active proponents of this draft.462 The proposal was introduced by 
members of AOSIS – led particularly by Pacific Island States – as well as by EU Member States, 
and was supported by some former Soviet Republics (OSCE members which are today mostly 
under the regional influence of the EU). Australia and New Zealand also backed the Draft 
Resolution, in consideration of their close economic and geographical connection with the 
Pacific Island States. The original survivalist group which originated and crystallized before the 
Security Council some months earlier was thus seemingly maintained on the path towards a 
general recognition of the General Assembly. The Euro–Pacific coalition structuring the core of 
this process became all the more visible after the Joint Declaration on the EU–Pacific Islands 
Partnership, of 7 November 2008. Although the Joint Declaration was delivered in a different 
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forum, it undoubtedly marked the bond between the two regions.463 All seems to indicate that 
the EU–Pacific SIDS team went ahead with their diplomatic mobilization in the corridors of the 
General Assembly.  
The first amendments to the Draft Resolution were filed on 17 November 2008 by 
OPEC countries and some of their allies, such as Egypt.464 The most significant amendment of 
the text proposed by this group of countries was a decrease in the level of recognition of a 
chain of causation between climate change and security issues – whether observed or 
anticipated. Hence, the original title of the Draft Resolution ‘Security and Climate Change’ was 
replaced by ‘Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications’.465 This aim was reinforced 
by the deletion of the four preambular paragraphs describing the role of the Security Council 
in this matter; they were replaced by the incorporation of four paragraphs at the end of the 
text which essentially sought to ensure that the recognition of the security implications of 
climate change would not bring about any structural change in the international co-operation 
and regime on climate change. Henceforth, the additional paragraphs introduced into the text 
pursued three main purposes: (1) locating the future resolution within the framework of the 
UNFCCC negotiation track; (2) recalling the longstanding history of involvement of the 
Assembly with international co-operation on climate change between 1988 and 2007 and 
putting the weight back into this organ; and (3) making reference to the link between climate 
change and development by recalling the outcome of the 2005 World Summit.466 Arguably, 
these amendments operated de facto as a de-securitization move of the issue which sought to 
restore development as the primary rationale and theoretical framework into which 
international co-operation on climate change was inserted.467 Nonetheless, in exchange, 
official acknowledgment of the existence of security implications stemming from climate 
change was achieved – although this compromise fell short of conceiving any possible security 
implications of climate change as a limit to developmental efforts. A balance between 
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existential and developmental rationales was thus carefully preserved when the amended 
Draft Resolution was presented to the General Assembly on 18 May 2009.468  
 
3.1.2. The Adoption of the Resolution by the General Assembly: Reaching a Compromise on the 
Dividing Lines of the Debate 
On 3 June 2009, the plenary of the General Assembly, chaired by Nicaragua, debated 
the amended Draft Resolution. The President of Nauru, Marcus Stephen, speaking on behalf of 
Pacific Island States, opened the debate and thereby visibly marked how the commanding 
hands of this process had shifted from the EU to the Pacific. As drivers of this political move, in 
search of recognition by the General Assembly of the security implications of climate change, 
Pacific Island States counted with an enlarged support, given that, since the Draft Resolution 
was originally filed, thirty-four additional States had become supporters and co-sponsored the 
text (small island States from other regions, some African countries and, most prominently, the 
USA). As the delegate of Nauru argued, ‘the Draft Resolution points to the adverse effects of 
climate change in a holistic manner’.469 Indeed, the final text clearly stated that the Security 
Council had the responsibility to look at the security aspects of climate change and requested 
the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report, perceived by the sponsors of the 
Draft Resolution as a ‘crucial first step as we move forward on this issue’.470 In spite of the 
insistence of Nauru on the positive and innovative aspects of the Draft Resolution in its 
compromise form, some members of the Pacific Islands Forum made declarations stressing the 
need to accept a higher level of involvement of the Security Council in the security implications 
of climate change. Thus, while Palau insisted on the role of the Security Council under Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter,471 Tuvalu urged ‘the Security Council and other relevant organs to treat 
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this issue with the urgency that a security threat of this magnitude deserves’,472 a contention 
supported by Switzerland, which regretted that the role of the Security Council had been 
downgraded by Resolution 63/281.473 Seemingly, the Solomon Islands stated that Resolution 
63/281 will allow a proactive action of the United Nations ‘before we arrive at a point when 
these threats become serious and irreversible’,474 while Fiji expressed once again the existential 
threat that climate change constitutes for small island States, as ‘the security implications of 
climate change have been, first and foremost, a threat to our very existence as sovereign 
nations. All else will be immaterial if statehood is lost.’475 Interestingly, the USA departed from 
the distance and scepticism it showed during the 2007 debate in the Security Council, and 
applauded the Draft Resolution in its amended form.  
In contrast, old opposing voices resonated again in the General Assembly. Argentina’s 
position against any involvement of the Security Council in this issue was unsurprisingly 
followed by Brazil. Maintaining the position expressed in the 2007 Security Council debate, 
Brazil stated that attempts to shift the debate on concerted action against climate change 
from development to security ought to be avoided and declared that the consensus of this text 
should not be interpreted as recognition of a direct link between climate change and 
security.476 The Brazilian objection was backed up by China, although the latter adopted a 
smoother position which did not fully deny the possible existence of security implications of 
climate change and thus considered that ‘climate change is an issue of sustainable 
development rather than a security issue’. Yet, as a measure seeking to control the effects of 
the Resolution, the Chinese statement warned of – or perhaps subtly threatened – the possible 
consequences of this securitization move on the future of the climate change regime for the 
period post-2012.477 Likewise, the Arab group declared that the UNFCCC remained the 
appropriate forum for dealing with climate change and stressed once again that the division of 
competences between the General Assembly and the Security Council laid down in the UN 
Charter should be respected.478  
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Despite the fact that these opposing voices could have conveyed the impression that 
little political advance had been achieved since the 2007 debate, in the end their effect was 
rather limited and did not seem to stand so strictly, as the General Assembly Resolution 
63/281 on ‘Climate change and its Possible Security Implications’ was endorsed, by consensus, 
on the same day of the debate.479 As the Secretary-General of the Pacific Island Forum 
explained, ‘the UNGA’s endorsement of the resolution by Pacific SIDS at the UN goes a long 
way towards the implementation of the Pacific Forum Leaders’ Niue Declaration at their 
meeting last August committing its members to advocate and support the recognition in all 
international fora the urgent social, economic and security threats by the impacts of climate 
change and sea-level rise on its members.’480 The endorsement by the General Assembly of 
Resolution 63/281 represented above all an unprecedented success story of the Pacific Island 
States which, as the Australian delegate explained ‘are not countries that usually make a lot of 
noise in this hall’. When, for once, these countries ‘came to us asking for something 
fundamentally important’, they achieved their purpose through important diplomatic 
mobilization – especially in alliance with EU countries – and some degree of compromise on 
the resulting outcome. The final text of General Assembly Resolution 63/281 stressed that ‘the 
UNFCCC is the key instrument’ of international co-operation to fight climate change, and 
softened the level of acknowledgement of the causal chain between climate change and 
security by stating that ‘the severe impacts of climate change, including sea-level rise, could 
have possible security implications.’481 In spite of this dilution, the text included an invitation to 
intensify efforts and called on the Secretary-General to prepare a Report on Climate Change 
and International Security on the basis of the contribution of States and present it to the 
General Assembly as soon as possible482 – an urgency that was likely connected with the fact 
that the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, to be held a few months later (December 2009) 
was rapidly approaching.  
The first effect of the adoption of this Resolution by the General Assembly affected the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse itself. On the one hand, as the entity 
dealing with this issue shifted from the Security Council to the General Assembly and the 
original division of competences between these two organs was restored, the adoption of the 
Resolution was legitimized and implied that, for the first time, the link between climate change 
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and security was recognized by the international community as a whole.483 Yet, throughout the 
process that finally led to the adoption of the Resolution, the shared understanding of what 
that link constituted – particularly when compared with the original presentation of the 
security implications of climate change to the Security Council in 2007 – evolved. This process, 
which may be referred to as the resignification of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse, was arguably influenced (or even directly caused) by the fact that Pacific 
Island States took over the role previously played by the EU and became drivers of the political 
movement at the General Assembly. As a result, the final recognition of the possible security 
implications of climate change excluded any reference to or connection with energy issues 
and, as the statements delivered before the General Assembly show, the new common 
understanding was that the security implications of climate change primarily refer to the 
existential threat that climate change impacts represent for the continuation of small islands’ 
statehood. This idea is consistent with the fact that, despite all the amendments to the original 
Draft Resolution and the elimination of many references to concrete manifestations of the 
security implications of climate change, the last preambular paragraph, preceding the 
operative part of the Resolution, maintained one specific reference when stating ‘[d]eeply 
concerned that the adverse impacts of climate change, including sea-level rise, could have 
possible security implications’.484  
Some effects of the Resolution, other than the points of discussion, should also be 
noted. In spite of the wide margin of operation within which the General Assembly may display 
its competences, the UN Charter falls short of investing this political organ with formal 
legislative competences within the UN system. Henceforth, it is generally admitted that the 
effects of General Assembly resolutions are in principle of a political – rather than legal – 
nature; void of any autonomous normative power, they are tantamount to mere 
recommendations and do not constitute, per se, a source of international law.485 Yet, given the 
fact that the constituency of the General Assembly is the Member States, the resolutions 
adopted by it (especially when adopted by consensus) can be understood as the expression of 
the political will of the international community as a whole. Sometimes the General Assembly 
thus stands on the fence and, while its resolutions operate as a mirror of the evolution of 
international life, they may also correlatively generate, crystallize or determine the evolution 
of international law – particularly of customary rules. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that Resolution 63/281 was adopted by consensus, 
considering that its adoption may have planted the seeds of a new legal principle or potentially 
the basis of a customary rule seems too far-fetched. And yet, the adoption of Resolution 
63/281 is not irrelevant from a legal perspective. Rather than generating a new rule, the 
fundamental legal implication of the Resolution is that it invites an unprecedented legal 
question touching upon the core institution of international law – the State: may the very 
continuation of statehood of small island States be jeopardized by climate change impacts? 
Moreover, while this question awaits an answer from the relevant global organizations, the 
effects of this Resolution can, for the time being, be considered in the realm of politics. As the 
operative part of the Resolution invited the relevant organs of the United Nations to ‘intensify 
their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security 
implications’, evolution in various areas of international co-operation may be expected (such 
as climate change adaptation, development of disaster risk-reduction policies, etc.). We may 
therefore take a closer look at whether the evolution of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse before the two core organs of the United Nations had an impact on the 
international regime on climate change and on the policy action of other UN agencies and 
institutions falling under the umbrella of the General Assembly.  
 
3.2. From UN Organs to UN Agencies and Institutions: Spreading the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse 
  
3.2.1. The Impact of the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit on the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse  
 
Although General Assembly Resolution 63/281 recognized the existence of the 
‘security implications of climate change’, it fell short of specifying what situations were to be 
considered as such. The task was given to the Secretary-General who was requested to 
elaborate as soon as possible a report ‘based on the views of the Member States and relevant 
regional and international organizations’.486 The Secretary-General submitted his Report on 
‘Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications’ to the General Assembly on 11 
September 2009, three months after the endorsement of Resolution 63/281.487 During the 
preparation phase of the Copenhagen Summit, to be held in December 2009, tension over 
climate change negotiations grew steadily. Informal pre-Summit talks between June and 
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September 2009 included the heated gatherings of Bonn (August 2009) and Barcelona 
(September 2009). At the time when the unprecedented level of global political attention on 
the Summit had reached its peak, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse was 
already solidly consolidated in ‘hegemonic regions’ (from its institutionalization in the EU to its 
extension to the OSCE and NATO regions), and its dissemination to ‘the most vulnerable 
regions’ (in particular Pacific Island States and African Union Member States) had already 
begun.488 The EU contribution to the report of the Secretary-General thus reproduced the core 
findings of the Report on Climate Change and International Security elaborated in March 2008 
by the EU High Representative and the European Commission.489 After stating that the EU 
‘stands ready to support the UN’ in the endeavour to deal with the security implications of 
climate change, the EU Report proposed that future action within the UN system should 
include: (i) debate on climate change and international security in international fora; (ii) 
enhancement of policy coherence by mainstreaming climate protection into several connected 
sectors (including development, trade and security policies), so as to keep the issue of climate 
change ‘high on the world’s agenda (...) beyond Copenhagen’; (iii) integrating climate change 
issues into existing security mechanisms (such as early warning systems, prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts); (iv) sharing analyses of the causal links between 
climate change and security, the impact of climate change on existing tensions, as well as of 
possible regional security consequences of climate change, among several relevant UN 
agencies (e.g. UNEP and the CEB, and the UNFCCC); (v) strengthening relevant observation 
networks; (vi) managing disasters by improving the capacity of UN agencies, such as the OCHA 
and the UNHCR, to anticipate increases in disasters and migration flows related to climate 
change; (vii) defining common guidelines on prevention and management in collaboration with 
the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) and the World Meteorological 
Organization and building on the Hyogo Framework for Action; (viii) development of the 
systematic use of multinational adaptation activities to create a peace-building function; (ix) 
mainstreaming climate change within the realm of UN activities (DPKO, DPA, UN Funds, 
Programmes and Specialized Agencies); (x) co-ordination of UN activities in this field with 
those of regional organizations, such as the EU or the AU; and (xi) emphasizing the capacity to 
reduce security threats stemming from climate change ‘in current negotiation processes within 
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UNFCCC on how to design adaptation strategies in the most vulnerable regions and 
countries’.490  
While the Report of the Secretary-General seemingly had to take into account other 
views, the contribution of the EU undoubtedly had an important impact on it. Indeed, while 
the Report acknowledged that the ‘nature and full degree of security implications of climate 
change are still largely untested’, and emphasized that sustainable development constituted a 
‘crucial contributor to conflict prevention’,491 it nonetheless qualified climate change as a 
‘threat multiplier’, and listed five specific ‘channels’ through which climate change could affect 
security, including – but not limited to – the possibility of reversing development processes.492 
Security implications of climate change were thus consolidated in the report of the Secretary-
General as practical limits to the effectiveness of development policies. Yet, more 
interestingly, the report also included the novel concept of ‘threat minimizers’. Defined as the 
‘conditions or actions that are desirable in their own right but also help lower the risk of 
climate-related insecurity’, it included, inter alia, climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Arguably, mainstream climate change negotiations could thus be influenced by this official 
integration of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse into the agenda of the 
United Nations. Yet, no direct or visible traces of the Discourse were discernible during the 
Copenhagen Summit. To begin with, the claims made by AOSIS – but not specifically by Pacific 
Island States – in Copenhagen did not include any allusion to the security implications of the 
climate change, not even with respect to the need to develop further climate change 
adaptation measures. As already pointed out in Chapter 2, the only reference to the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse in Copenhagen was its celebration as a side-event 
chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO.493 In fact, despite the fact that the Danish Prime 
Minister had been an active promoter of the Discourse in the NATO region, a seemingly 
precautionary approach to the Climate Change and International Security Discourse was 
adopted when organizing the Summit, given that the Discourse was – at least at its outset – 
felt to be a strategy only seeking to increase political pressure or even force a climate 
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agreement for the post-2012 period. There was therefore the fear that this controversial 
dimension of the Discourse might jeopardize the success of the negotiations. Yet, despite the 
low-profile – and almost total neglect – of the Discourse in Copenhagen, the result of the 
Summit did not reach the level of expectations, for reasons of course well outside the realm of 
the Discourse itself.  
Nonetheless, after the failure of COP.15 – or perhaps precisely because of it – research 
and work on climate change as a global challenge to be considered under a security 
perspective was not abandoned. On the one hand, it was pursued, as was indicated in the 
previous Chapter, both at the national and regional levels of analysis (USA, OSCE). On the 
other hand, the Discourse was taken on board by some UN agencies and institutions.  
 
3.2.2. Intra-institutional Circulation of the Security Approach to Climate Change in UN Agencies 
and Institutions  
Following adoption of Resolution 63/281 and release of the Report of the Secretary-
General, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse could be expected to be 
circulated within UN Specialized Agencies and institutions, albeit only to the extent that their 
respective mandates would be appropriate and therefore enable them to receive it. Thus, one 
main characteristic of the inter-institutional circulation of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse in UN Specialized Agencies and institutions is its 
‘sectoralization’ – understood as the development of the Discourse and its concretization in 
specific policies through separate clusters corresponding to the scope of action of each 
institution or agency. It appears that the Discourse generated more development in those 
agencies dealing with human rights and migration issues. These two areas, which had been 
particularly privileged by the institutional and policy changes of the mid-1990s, resulting from 
the conceptual shift of attention from State security to human security, were influenced from 
2007 onwards by the introduction of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
into UN organs, as well as, at the same time, in parallel to the policy – driven by the Maldives – 
seeking to approach climate change from a human rights perspective. The launch of a research 
programme by the Human Rights Council, following adoption in 2008 of Resolution 7/23 on 
Human Rights and Climate Change, is thus notable in this sense.494 It also attracted the 
attention of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which contracted research for 
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the elaboration of a report on this issue.495 Likewise, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
initially very reluctant to recognize ‘climate refugees’ as a distinct category, began tackling this 
issue through informal talks and seminars from 2009 onwards.496 However, the most relevant 
example of how the Discourse survived the mere context-specific instrumental issue and 
maintained its presence within universal organizations is undoubtedly the celebration in 2011 
of the second Security Council debate on the maintenance of international peace and security. 
4. THE SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON ‘MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND 
SECURITY – CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS’ (2011): TOWARDS A CONSOLIDATION OF THE 
SECURITY APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
4.1. Back to the Security Council: The Pursuit of the German Strategy  
4.1.1. Increased Awareness of Climate change Impacts in Mainstream Climate change 
Negotiations: from Copenhagen to the Durban Climate Change Summit (2009–2011) 
As the Copenhagen Conference failed to lead to a legally binding agreement for the 
second commitment period post-2012, the uncertainty in both the architecture of the regime 
and the content of the respective obligations of UNFCCC and KP Member States – particularly 
of key greenhouse-gas (GHG)-emitting countries – reached its peak. And yet, at the time that 
expectations of one day seeing continued international co-operation on climate change 
crystallize were progressively deceived, the sense of the gravity of climate change impacts and 
the urgency to respond to them was becoming more palatable than ever. The emergence of 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, and in particular its introduction into 
global organizations and its resignification therein undoubtedly contributed to the 
construction of an understanding of the dimensions that climate change impacts could 
encompass.  
One of the manifestations of this evolving awareness was the gradual shift of the 
focus, in climate change negotiations, from mitigation to increased development of 
adaptation.497 Hence, although the Copenhagen Accord fell short of establishing an agreement 
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on future mitigation compromises, it did establish an important increase in adaptation 
finance.498 Such a standpoint would prove to be important at the Durban Climate Change 
Conference celebrated a year later, where a new Adaptation Scheme was agreed.499  
Meanwhile, the already observable urgency and gravity of climate change impacts – and not 
merely based on mid-term or long-term projections – also found a reference in the work of the 
IPCC, which began the preparation of a Special Report on Climate Change and Extreme Events 
(to be released in 2013), whose core contentions would probably be reflected in the IPCC’s 5th 
Assessment Report.500 
 
4.1.2. The 2011 German Proposal: A Historical Opportunity 
 
Pursuant to the rotation principle stated in Rule 18 of the Security Council Provisional 
Rules of Procedure, Germany assumed the Presidency of the Security Council for one month in 
July 2011.501 In a letter to the UN Secretary-General on the first day of Germany’s presidency, 
Ambassador Peter Witting (German representative acting in his capacity as UNSC President) 
called for an open debate in the Council to address the issues raised by climate change impacts 
within the context of agenda item ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security’. In order 
to facilitate the achievement of this purpose, the letter included a concept paper for the 
debate, which was transmitted by the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, to UN Member 
States.502 Thus, on 20 July 2011, more than four years after the 2007 debate on ‘Energy, 
Security and Climate’, the Security Council was called upon to discuss the security perspective 
of climate change for the second time in its history. On this occasion, the composition of the 
Council counted with the four strong emerging powers that had fervently opposed the 2007 
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initiative (Brazil, India and South Africa, as non-permanent members, and China, as a 
permanent member). Three EU Member States (United Kingdom and France, as permanent 
members, and Germany, as a non-permanent member but nevertheless holding the 
presidency of the Council) were also sitting on the Council, along with the remaining two 
permanent members, United States of America and the Russian Federation; and six non-
permanent members (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Nigeria, Portugal and 
Lebanon).  
Mirroring the 2007 precedent and pursuant to Rule 37 of the Security Council 
Provisional Rules of Procedure, fifty UN Member States not sitting on the Security Council in 
July 2011 were invited to participate in the debate (without the right to vote) by the President 
of the Council.503 Likewise, in accordance with Rule 30, Achim Steiner was also invited to 
participate in the meeting in his capacity of Executive Director of the United Nations 
Environment Programme.504 All in all, sixty-five participants actively took the floor in the 
debate, including the Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Islands Affairs of Australia and the 
President of Nauru, M. Stephen, who made an eloquent and rather testimonial statement on 
behalf of the Pacific Island States, the Maldives, Seychelles and Timor-Leste. Instead of 
opening the debate by defending the German concept paper on the issue, as the British 
delegate, Margaret Beckett, had done in 2007, the President of the Council invited Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon to deliver the opening statement, followed by the briefing of the 
Executive Director of UNEP.  
While the former focused on the political appropriateness of the debate, the latter 
brought out the technical and scientific knowledge of UNEP on this issue, so as to promote the 
idea that consideration of climate change as a factor in the future stability of the international 
sphere was not just an academic matter. Both speakers unambiguously supported the German 
initiative. The introduction of the Secretary-General to the topic of discussion began by 
considering climate change and international security as a ‘double-barrelled challenge’ that not 
only exacerbated existing threats to international peace and security but was ‘a threat to the 
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international peace and security’ on its own that could lead to ‘serious security vacuums’.505 
Most importantly, his full support for the initiative was reinforced by his assessment of the 
existing multilateral agreements on climate change (the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol) 
which, in his view, provided ‘an important but incomplete foundation for action’.506 Thereby, 
he defended the vital role of the Security Council in clarifying the link between climate change, 
peace and security, as well as in mobilizing national and international action, and even 
qualified it as a ‘unique responsibility’ for the Council.507 His most advanced concession was to 
recognize that the most effective foundation for peace is securing sustainable development 
and that efforts were yet to be made at the next Rio+20 Conference (to be held a year later, in 
June 2012). This position was consistent with his former declarations always in favour of 
raising awareness of the link between climate change and international security in any of the 
UN organs. 508 
Following the Secretary-General’s undeniably strong plea in favour of the German 
initiative, A. Steiner, in his briefing to the Council on behalf of UNEP, used more cautious 
terms. His presence not only served to give a more solid scientific grounding to the initiative; 
as a programme directly linked to the General Assembly, the presence of UNEP (through its 
Executive Director) may have also, to some extent, represented the presence of the General 
Assembly within the space and sphere of influence of the Security Council. Thus, A. Steiner 
began approaching this controversial issue by asserting that the IPCC ‘remains the first point of 
reference of climate science’.509 This contention apparently discarded analysis of this issue on 
the basis of the reports (including the Secretary-General’s on ‘Climate Change and its Possible 
Security Implications’) that, as explained in Chapter 2, had been progressively shaping a new 
‘epistemic community’ on climate change and international security.510 Yet, notwithstanding 
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this separation from non-mainstream climate change science, A. Steiner continued his briefing 
by recalling that the IPCC 4th Assessment Report acknowledged that ‘climate change is 
happening and accelerating’.511 From this standpoint, he followed Ban Ki-Moon’s consideration 
that the traditional approaches to the issue of climate change are becoming insufficient, and 
asserted that ‘we have to recognize that climate change is an issue that needs to be viewed not 
just from a scientific and technological perspective of managing carbon emissions, but truly 
from a geopolitical and security perspective’.512 Moreover, he set the basis for a strong 
argument bridging the gap between apparently opposed conceptualizations of climate change 
as a sustainable-development issue, on the one hand, and as a security issue, on the other 
hand. Climate change security impacts, he explained, are ‘beginning to undermine the tenuous 
gains we have made in terms of sustainable development (...). Many of the sustainable 
development objectives, ambitions and pathways that nations have pursued are under threat 
beyond what traditionally have been the means of a national sovereign State to determine 
policies within its territory’.513  
The introduction to the debate offered by these first two speakers set the tone of the 
debate as well as the main lines from which the position of the fifteen permanent members of 
the Council would depart; it was followed by the statements of the fifty non-permanent 
members invited to participate in the debate without the right to vote.  
 
4.2. Climate Change and International Security: A Discourse in Progress 
4.2.1. Dilution of the Proponents/Opponents Divide  
In contrast to the 2007 inaugural debate of the Security Council, the 2011 debate was 
characterized by the dilution of the originally sharp division between the former ‘proponents’ 
of the link between climate change and international security and its fervent ‘opponents’. 
Within the latter category, no one continued to deny the existence of security implications 
stemming from climate change. Rather, their opposing arguments focused on the unsuitability 
of the Security Council as the right forum for such debate, which was also marked by a 
surprisingly high number of ambiguous statements, revealing the existence of unclear 
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positions (possibly undergoing evolution). As a result of the relaxation of the previously 
polarized positions, the security perspective on climate change reached a higher level of 
complexity during the debate. Sharpened and nuanced arguments, as well as the foundations 
for a common standard of acceptance, were presented, consolidating the previous 
resignification of the Discourse. 
When the call in favour of approaching climate change from a security perspective was 
launched in 2007, it was partly been seen as a temporary strategy seeking to ensure stronger 
leverage at the UNFCCC negotiations. Mainstreaming climate change within high politics and 
highlighting the overwhelming consequences of climate change impacts on the stability of 
inter-State relations could give a stronger sense of urgency and of the need to develop an 
effective adaptation framework. Yet, the persistence of this perspective since 2007, coupled 
with the limited parallel progress of the climate change negotiations for the future of the 
regime post-2012, reaffirmed both the political awareness and the commitment of an 
important group of countries and the objective need to begin to address climate change 
impacts from an alternative (security) perspective. Once again, the existentialist claims 
constituted the strongest calls in favour of this perspective. On this occasion (as in the 2009 
General Assembly debate that led to the adoption of UNGA Resolution 63/281), the leading 
voice was that of M. Stephen, President of Nauru, who spoke on behalf of the Pacific Island 
States, the Seychelles, the Maldives and Timor-Leste. President Stephen was the first 
participant invited to speak by the president of the session, once the 15 sitting members of the 
Council had delivered their statements (more precisely, after the German statement in 
defence of its concept paper). He grounded the necessity of beginning to address climate 
change from a security perspective on the insufficient effectiveness of the international regime 
on climate change in halting the multiplication of the impacts stemming from the 
phenomenon; he also recalled that Security Council practice had recognized the necessity of 
addressing the root causes of conflict, including ‘unconventional’ security threats.514 ‘Today’, – 
M. Stephen stated – ‘we ask no less of the Council’.515 Nauru’s statement was openly and fully 
endorsed by all other participating Pacific Island States, and notably Papua New Guinea, Fiji 
and Palau which added their own ‘existential claim’. While Papua New Guinea upheld directly 
cited parts of President Nauru’s statement,516 Fiji insisted on how climate change poses a 
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threat to their territorial integrity and, therefore, to their ‘very existence as sovereign States’ 
and warned of the ‘potential domino effect’ for national, regional and international security 
which ignoring the real threats posed by climate change could imply.517 Palau in turn firmly 
reproached the opponents of the debate, stating that ‘the Pacific small island States are in the 
red zone. Perhaps if others stood on their vanishing shores, they would better appreciate the 
situation.’518 Moreover, the claims of Pacific Island States were supported by their developed 
regional neighbours. Consistent with its previous positions, Australia considered that ‘the 
effects of climate change could reshape the future global security environment’519 and explicitly 
mentioned the resettlement of people which had been undertaken in Majuro, capital of the 
Marshall Islands, as a result of the increased inhabitability of the coastal zones. New Zealand 
followed up on Palau’s line of argument, stating that ‘for those low-lying small island States 
[c]limate change poses the ultimate risk – that of ceasing to exist as States and as 
communities. Debates about whether this constitutes a legitimate topic for discussion cannot 
but seem rather abstract and deeply divorced from the severity and urgency of the 
challenges they face’.520 
The response to this set of existential claims from countries opposed to approaching 
climate change from a security perspective, essentially focused on the forum in which the 
discussion was taking place. In other words, opponents in the 2011 debate argued, once again, 
that the Council was acting ultra vires, and that integrating climate change into its agenda 
constituted an encroachment on the competence granted by the United Nations Charter either 
to other UN organs (in particular, the General Assembly) or to the multilateral environmental 
agreements adopted within the UN framework (UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol). Opposition to 
the celebration of the discussion before the Council was again headed by the G77+China 
group.521 Represented by the Argentine delegate, the group highlighted the view that such 
interest in and concern over the impacts of climate change was inconsistent with the lack of 
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any ‘clear indication on the part of developed countries that they will adopt a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol’.522 This point seems to imply the ‘imperialistic 
bias’ or ‘interest-based nature’ of the reasons that feed developed countries’ support and 
insistence on the need to begin approaching climate change from a security perspective. 
Apart from the generally opposing argument laid down by the G77+China group, more 
concrete arguments have been developed since the 2007 inaugural debate. For instance, the 
position of the BRICS countries, comprising the four biggest emerging countries, which were all 
sitting on the Council in 2011, evolved substantially – from denying the existence of the 
security implications of climate change (going so far as to express doubts as to the scientific 
basis of such contentions), to a position centred mainly on the procedural argument 
concerning the limits of the Council’s competences. The Brazilian criticism of the 
encroachment by the Council on the competences of other organs was ethically grounded, 
considering that it is crucial to ensure ‘an equitable, balanced and effective solution’, and 
recalling how the basic principles of the climate change regime were agreed upon to respond 
to this purpose (e.g. common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities).523 
Furthermore, Brazil linked the possible effects of climate change on the aggravation of the 
disputes over scarce resources to the situation of underdevelopment, lack of access of the 
country at stake to resources and technology for adaptation, or, in other words, with a State’s 
previously high vulnerability and low resilience.524 It thus stressed the link between 
development and security while, in contrast, considering that the connection between climate 
change and security was only indirect.525 Finally, Brazil argued that security concepts or tools 
were inadequate and inappropriate to address complex and multi-dimensional issues such as 
climate change.526 Moreover, the Chinese view in 2011 was consistent with – if not identical to 
– the position it had previously expressed in 2007 and 2009; although climate change ‘may 
affect security,’ the Chinese statement held, it remains ‘primarily’ a sustainable development 
issue.527 China also alluded to the lack of legitimacy of the Council as a forum lacking universal 
representation for decision-making and considered – in tune with the position of the 
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G77+China group – that ‘it is the general belief of the majority of developing countries that the 
Council’s discussion on climate change will neither contribute to the mitigation efforts of 
countries nor assist affected countries in effectively responding to climate change’.528 Besides, 
following up the last argument of Brazil, the Chinese delegate argued that the Council’s 
capacity was unsuited and inappropriate to deal with this matter, since it lacks expertise as 
well as the necessary means and resources to tackle the issue of climate change.529The Indian 
statement began by expressing scepticism about the lack of reliable scientific grounds that 
may confirm the existence of a causal relationship between the security issue and climate 
change. While acknowledging that ‘climate change, in an overarching sense, is beginning to 
impact the security of the global community in the same way as poverty, food security and 
underdevelopment’, it considered that ‘sweeping generalizations (…) are, however, yet to be 
fully tested against empirical and scientific analyses’.530 Yet, General Assembly Resolution 
62/281 seemingly had an effect on the Indian position, for only sea-level rise was recognized 
by the Indian delegate as a present reality, along with ‘deeply worrisome’ issues of 
statelessness and the displacement of people.531 Most importantly, when supporting the 
Brazilian and Chinese argument that the Council did not have the appropriate tools to deal 
with an issue such as climate change,532 India went a step further, clearly stating that ‘the 
existential threat to island States or the emergence of food insecurity as a result of climate 
change cannot be resolved or remedied by the Council under Article 39 of the UNC’; this was an 
indirect but clear means of recognizing the existence of those threats as being derived from 
climate change.533 Finally, the intervention of South Africa deviated from the core contentions 
of the BRICS countries (of which it is nevertheless a member), by delivering a statement that 
was much more ambiguous than those of its BRICS partners; this was surprising, since it 
illustrates the extent to which the proponents/opponents divide that had structured the 2007 
Security Council debate had become diluted by 2011 as a result both of the operation of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse before UN organs, Specialized Agencies 
and Institutions and of the parallel circulation of the Discourse from the EU to the most 
vulnerable countries, including the AU. Considering that the celebration of this debate was 
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‘timely and opportune to highlight the reality of climate change and the threat it poses to 
African and developing countries in general and to the small island developing States and least 
developing States in particular’, South Africa concluded with the eclectic idea that climate 
change threatens ‘not only development prospects and the achievement of sustainable 
development, but also the very existence and survival of societies’.534 The most fervent and 
provocative calls against a debate on approaching climate change from a security perspective 
in the Security Council did not, however, emerge from the BRICS countries. As previously 
pointed out, the BRICS opposition was rather mild and essentially grounded on the problem of 
the division of competences among UN institutions, coupled with a slightly sceptic or prudent 
look at some of the statements on the factual links between climate change impacts and 
security. Yet, their overall opposition can be said to have decreased since their first statements 
were delivered in 2007. 
In contrast, the most fervent positions – politically and ethically – against the subject 
of debate came from four of the ALBA countries. While expressing full solidarity with small 
island States and openly embracing the view that climate change ‘is a genuine threat to the 
existence of humanity’, and considering that climate change ‘has a security dimension because 
many States may disappear and new conflicts will emerge due to the effects of extreme 
temperature change’,535 Bolivia fervently opposed the view that this subject should be 
addressed by the Security Council. The main argument supporting this opposition was, Bolivia 
sustained, the fact that the Security Council is an organ in which five of the largest emitters of 
GHGs are precisely the ones benefitting from an extraordinary and powerful position, holding 
a permanent seat as well as the right to exercise their veto.536 At the end of its argument, 
Bolivia eloquently posed the question: ‘given those conditions, is it possible for the Security 
Council to adopt resolutions on sanctions or reparations that effectively hold those countries 
responsible for the damage they are causing?’537 Finally, not only did Bolivia underscore the 
view that only the General Assembly was legitimized to tackle all dimensions of climate 
change, it also innovatively claimed that a new body ought to be created, one tasked to ‘judge 
and sanction countries that fail to reduce their emissions of GHGs, because they are provoking 
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genocide and ecocide against Mother Earth.’538The path opened up by the Bolivian 
representative was soon followed by Venezuela, which considered that the procedure was 
inconsiderate as well as another example of the exclusive nature of the Security Council’s 
decision-making.539 With an easily perceptible ironic tone, the Venezuelan delegate stated that 
his delegation was concerned about the ‘hypersensitivity shown by members of this body on 
issues beyond their competence’, a position which strikingly contrasts, Venezuela held, with 
the omission from or disregard of such members in discussion of initiatives seeking to 
legitimate and make more transparent the work of the Council.540 On these grounds, 
Venezuela became the only State out of the 65 participating in the debate that formulated its 
opposition as a clear rejection of the German initiative, and closed its statement by forcefully 
holding that ‘the increasing infringement by the Security Council of the functions and 
responsibilities of other main organs of the United Nations is a distortion of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter and is an abuse of authority that affects the rights of most Members 
of the UN.’541 While Ecuador seemed to choose a lower profile, avoiding the use of 
confrontational language and simply restating its ‘belief in the need to work to achieve 
agreements based on the already existing instruments,542 Cuba embraced a more visible 
position and adhered to the view of those countries opposing the choice of forum to discuss 
the German initiative. Thus, its statement emphasized once again the need to respect the 
respective powers and functions of the various United Nations bodies and expressed serious 
concern about the Security Council’s ‘growing interference in the functions and responsibilities 
of the other principal UN organs.’543 While considering climate change as being, ‘by definition’, 
an issue falling within the concept of sustainable development, Cuba then adopted a more 
pragmatic position. Perhaps anticipating that the release of a Presidential Statement on the 
issue was unavoidable, Cuba made the basic point that the Statement should incorporate the 
words ‘if the Security Council, despite its limitations and lack of jurisdiction’, and wished to 
approve it.544 Hence, considering climate change as a global threat that requires global 
solutions that are just, equitable and balanced, three basic points – which somehow operated 
as informal amendments to the Presidential Statement – were raised, so as to incorporate 
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safeguards ensuring that the German initiative would not open the door to developed 
countries to circumvent the grounding principles of UNFCCC as well as the specific obligations 
accepted under this instrument. First, Cuba asked for the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities to be emphasized and the importance of developed countries in 
meeting their development commitments underlined. Second, it insisted that the Presidential 
Statement should urge industrialized countries to undertake a second commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol, recalling that the goal of reducing GHG emissions by countries of the 
South cannot be formulated in a way that may obstruct their right to development. Finally, 
Cuba called for introduction into the text of an explicit recognition of the fact that 
unsustainable production and consumption patterns prevail in developed countries.‘545 
In contrast to, and notwithstanding, the sustained and still polarized opposition of 
Venezuela and Bolivia, the ambiguous positions of many members of the G77+China group, of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (represented by Egypt) and of the Group of Arab States 
(represented in the debate by Kuwait) may be considered as the clearest example of how the 
dividing lines between proponents and opponents of approaching climate change from a 
security perspective had become watered down. The only State from the Non-Aligned 
Movement that radically opposed the German initiative was Iran, which emphasized the 
argument of ALBA and BRICS on the encroachment of the Security Council on the mandates of 
the other principal organs defined in the UN Charter and advised continuing to address climate 
change from a sustainable development and not a security standpoint.546 Finally, the Group of 
Arab States, represented by Kuwait, also held an ambiguous position tending to favour some 
substantial aspects of the German initiative, recognizing and stressing the potential 
consequences that adverse climate change effects would have on the Arab region – especially 
in arid and semi-arid areas. Nevertheless, they supported the statements of the G77+China 
group and the Non-Aligned Movement against the choice of forum for debate and embarked 
on a detailed historical account of the United Nations Charter’s interpretation of the division of 
competences between the Security Council and the General Assembly.547  
All in all, the two pillars of the opposition to the German initiative essentially relied on: 
(1) the issue concerning the division of competences between the Council and the Assembly 
                                                          
545
 Ibid., at 12. 
546
 (Resumption) Ibid., at 19. 
547
 Ibid., at 20. Thereby, recalling the meaning of UNGA Res. 377/V, ‘Uniting for Peace’ of 3 November 
1950 (on the overlap of the role of the Security Council with the roles and responsibilities of the other 
principal bodies), the Group of Arab States considered that the discussion does not conform to the 
principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and ‘may infringe on the authority of those bodies 
and the rights of Member States as a whole.’ 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
189 
 
and potential mutual encroachment; and (2) the negative side-effects and circumvention of 
the grounding principles and obligations of developed countries (some of which are also 
permanent members of the Council) within the climate change regime. In contrast, recognition 
that climate change impacts constitute a security issue, particularly an existential threat for 
small island States, reached an unprecedentedly high level of acceptance which even 
encompassed States that were against using the Security Council as a new forum to tackle this 
issue. Therefore, as this common denominator was settled, responses to the former objections 
could flow more easily.  
 
4.2.2. Consolidation of a New Understanding and Adoption of the 2011 Security Council 
Presidential Statement: Starting Point of a New Security Council Practice? 
 
Responses to the opposing arguments of a procedural nature essentially held that 
rather than constituting an encroachment by the Council on the competences and functions of 
other UN organs and institutions, the Council’s actions regarding the security aspects of 
climate change were complementary to those of the General Assembly and the relevant UN 
Specialized Agencies. Recalling the under-developed work of the latter on the security aspects 
of climate change, it became difficult for opponents to argue that such encroachment really 
existed. The President of Nauru clearly specified how the division of competences between UN 
organs operates in this situation: ‘make no mistake: the UNFCCC is and must remain the 
primary forum for developing an international strategy to mitigate climate change, mobilize 
financial resources and facilitate adaptation, planning and project implementation. The 
General Assembly must continue to address the links between climate change and sustainable 
development. Likewise, the Security Council has a clear role in co-ordinating a response to the 
security implications of climate change’.548 To support this argument, the second involvement 
of the Security Council with the climate change issue can be characterized as pursuing the 
implementation of General Assembly Resolution 63/281, which called upon all relevant organs 
of the UN, ‘within their respective mandates’ to ‘intensify their efforts to address climate 
change, including its possible security implications’.549 A final comparison of the level of danger 
that climate change represents today for small island States, with the threat that the nuclear 
age once represented, finally closed M. Stephen’s intervention, in which he recalled that 
‘neither nuclear proliferation nor terrorism had ever led to the disappearance of an entire 
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nation, though that is what we are confronted with today’.550 The statement delivered by the 
EU through its Spanish representative, Pedro Serrano, reaffirmed the EU’s consistent 
characterization of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’, as defined in the 2008 Paper from 
the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council on Climate 
Change and International Security.551 Moreover, it was also the occasion to clearly unveil 
before an UN organ the close support of and the alliance between the EU and the Pacific Island 
States on this matter. Hence, the delegate explained that the EU and its Member States were 
‘working on how to enhance the EU–Pacific development partnership,’552 and underscored the 
view that the EU remained ‘committed to broadening its understanding and mainstreaming of 
climate change and its security implications in its foreign and security policies’.553 The 
statements delivered by individual EU Member States focused on firmly defending the 
complementarity argument and contended that the security implications of climate change 
must proceed in tandem with action to address the phenomenon itself. Thus, in response to 
the main Brazilian and Chinese opposing argument, the French position held that ‘the Council 
is not infringing on the competence of other UN bodies and does not want to replace other 
forums, in particular that under the Convention on Climate Change’.554 Seemingly, in reply to 
the Argentinean contention that the Council was unprepared to deal with the inherent 
complexities of climate change, France argued that ‘the Council is simply facing up to a new 
type of threats that are multiform, complex and diffuse. In that spirit we are exploring today 
the implications of these threats and the Council’s capacity to deal with them,555 and 
interestingly recalled how a few months earlier, when the Security Council was under Brazilian 
Presidency, a useful debate had been held on the links between peace, security and an equally 
complex and multiform issue as development. Henceforth, the French position stressed that 
the Council was only developing its functions in the area of conflict prevention (as had been 
developed since the late 1990s) and regretted the incoherent reactions of emerging States’. 556 
A final morally grounded touch was added to the closing of the French position, ‘to oppose 
with bureaucratic concerns the anguished appeals by our partners threatened by climate 
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change does not rise to the issues at stake. It is not dignified’.557 The United Kingdom also 
supported the French defence of the complementarity argument, though in slightly more 
diplomatic terms. It agreed with the concerns voiced by some delegations over the Council’s 
mandate to discuss this issue and that it was important that the different roles, functions and 
mandates of the various UN bodies dealing with climate change are fully respected. Yet, the 
UK stated, ‘like the Secretary-General and Mr. Steiner, we do not believe that this debate in any 
way undermines them.’558 The interventions of Slovenia, Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Belgium and Spain followed the same path traced by the two EU members with a permanent 
seat on the Security Council. Only Portugal disassociated itself from the EU position and, 
possibly led by its historical allegiance as former colonial ruler of Brazil, aligned with the 
positions expressed by the BRICS countries.559 Moreover, the complementarity argument also 
received support from countries which stood aside from the views of the G77+China group, 
the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group. For instance, Singapore held that the link 
between climate change and security was now accepted and that the aim of the debate was 
not to prejudge the ongoing negotiations in the UNFCCC; it was therefore the ‘time to continue 
with the 2007 United Kingdom initiative’.560 Similarly, Lebanon recalled that, although the 
responsibility within the UN system regarding sustainable development issues – ‘including 
climate change’ – lay with the General Assembly and ECOSOC and that the UNFCCC was the 
key mechanism for addressing climate change, the 2011 debate ‘should be viewed as an 
expression of complementarity in the work of different organs of the UN’, pursuant to the 
relevant articles of the UN Charter and of General Assembly Resolution 63/281.561 This 
procedural opposing argument was the main cause sustaining some degree of division 
between the developed and developing countries.  
In contrast, as already pointed out, substantive objections to linking climate change 
and security, which had been raised in 2007, became very much diluted; by 2011, virtually 
none of the participating countries had any trouble acknowledging that climate change may 
have security implications and that small island States, in particular, were subject to such a 
connection. Yet, recognition that the endangered statehood of small island States constitutes a 
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security concern and that such concern is a result of climate change impacts did not resolve 
the question of how climate change should itself be defined by the Security Council. Thus, 
divergent considerations remained outstanding on whether climate change was associated 
only with other existing threats to international peace and security or whether it should be 
understood as an autonomous threat multiplier or whether it constituted a fully distinct threat 
in itself.  
The view that climate change should be associated with issues that had been already 
securitized was most clearly upheld by Japan. Following a syllogism which simultaneously 
associated development and security, on the one hand, and climate change and development, 
on the other, the Japanese representative concluded that climate change is linked to security 
in so far as climate change impacts limit the attainment of sustainable development objectives 
– which in turn are a recognized factor of national and regional instability.562 To some extent, 
this basic syllogism was the benchmark from which the position of most EU Member States 
and the United States departed, although the latter took a step forward by considering climate 
change not only as a factor of previously recognized securitized issues, such as development, 
but also as an autonomous issue deserving a distinct treatment. Thus, while the UK – 
apparently following the Japanese position – acknowledged that ‘food, water, energy and 
climate security are interlinked’ and that they ‘demand a coordinated response’563, it 
maintained the position already laid down in the 2007 British concept paper and reaffirmed 
that ‘it is in that context that climate change must be seen as a threat multiplier, exacerbating 
existing tensions and increasing the likelihood of conflict’.564 Vastly reducing the association 
between climate change, security and energy issues that had been presented in 2007, the UK 
position correlatively focused on issues of statelessness, population migration, global resource 
scarcity and competition for natural resources, all exacerbated by climate change impacts. 
Only Poland maintained the original straightforward association of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse with energy security, recalling that the roots of the Discourse 
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can be traced back to its institutionalization in the EU.565 Other EU Member States referred to 
climate change as a threat multiplier. For instance, France alluded to the general impacts of 
climate change as having ‘an immense destabilizing potential and could multiply the threats to 
peace and security in the most fragile regions and States’.566 Similarly, the USA welcomed the 
German initiative – proof of the evolution of the Discourse in the UN since 2007 – and, 
recognizing that climate change ‘can erode State capacity’ and raise the ‘spectre of new and 
previously unimagined forms of statelessness’, urged the Security Council to begin acting ‘on 
the understanding that climate change exacerbates the risks and dynamics of conflict’.567 
Such institutional endeavour, the U.S. representative added, would be consistent with 
previous Security Council practice with regard to emerging security issues and which had 
previously led the Council to explore, inter alia, the link between development and security as 
well as the security implications of HIV/AIDS. The closing statement of the USA thus held that 
failure of the Council to reach a consensus, by acknowledging in its Presidential Statement only 
‘that climate change has the potential to impact peace and security, in the face of the manifest 
evidence that it does’, would, the U.S. delegate said, be ‘more than disappointing, it is pathetic, 
short-sighted and, frankly, a dereliction of duty.’568 Finally, following the conceptual escalation, 
the definition of climate change as a self-standing threat to international peace and security 
was most prominently advocated by the UN Secretary-General who, as previously pointed out, 
opened the 2011 debate by stating that climate change ‘not only exacerbates threats to the 
international peace and security, it is a threat to the international peace and security’.569 
Consistent with previous statements delivered in 2007 and 2009, Pacific Island States upheld 
the same view. Palau for instance insisted that ‘while the causes of this threat are novel, the 
effects which endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States fit squarely 
within the Council’s traditional mandate’570, along with Fiji’s eloquent contention that ‘the 
threat posed by climate change is politically blind. Its consequences can be far greater than any 
                                                          
565 S/PV. 6587 (Resumption 1), at 37. ‘Let me now turn to the energy issue. Competition over access to, 
and control over, energy resources is one of the most significant potential sources of conflict. Since much 
of the world’s strategic energy reserves are in regions that are vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change, instability is likely to increase.’  
566
 S/PV.6587, at. 15. [Emphasis added]. 
567
 Ibid., at 7. [Emphasis added]. 
568
 Ibid. This position was also upheld by Papua New Guinea, which held: ‘[W]e would argue that the 
same purposive approach as that employed in the HIV/AIDS and development issues by the Council, 
respecting the mandates of all relevant United Nation agencies and organs, should be employed to 
address the security implications of climate change.’, Ibid., at 19. 
569
 Ibid., at 3.  
570
 S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1), at 27. 
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battle fought’.571 Interestingly, France – which had referred to climate change as a threat 
multiplier, in accordance with the EU’s and EU Member States’ positions – recognized climate 
change as ‘a threat for our small island Pacific State partners, whose very existence is in peril, 
as is the survival of their territory, culture and identity’.572 
The importance of the form in which climate change may be determined by the Security 
Council lies in the fact that such definition potentially conditions the subsequent actions that 
the Council may take with regard to the issue at stake. During the debate, some States pointed 
out the concrete measures that could and should follow the consideration of climate change as 
a security issue by the Security Council. Nauru, for instance, named a range of ‘concrete steps’ 
that would progressively operate a shift of the organ ‘from a culture of reaction to a culture of 
preparedness’.573 Thus, the ‘absolute minimum actions’ suggested by Nauru included the 
appointment of a special representative on climate and security – who would bear the primary 
responsibility of analysing the projected security impacts of climate change, so that Council 
and Member States could be well informed, and the call to the Secretary-General by the 
Security Council for an assessment of the capacity of the UN system to respond to such 
impacts so that vulnerable countries can be assured that they are up to the task.574 The USA 
also made concrete proposals, which referred to the need to improve early warning systems, 
foster collaboration on the effects of climate change – ‘especially at the local and regional 
levels’ – and improving information on basic human needs (water, food, livelihood and 
energy), so that resource-driven conflicts could be anticipated and prevented.575 Last but not 
least, France pointed out the necessity of the Security Council’s taking into account the 
impacts ‘of its own decisions’ on the vulnerable environments where its operations may take 
place. It therefore held that the Security Council ‘must, as of today, take measures to ensure 
that peacekeeping operations reduce their carbon emissions and their impact on the 
environment.’576 
Although the 2011 debate did not produce a large number of innovate measures, 
important advances may be noted. The Security Council Member States were finally able to 
reach an agreement and adopted by consensus a Statement by the President of the Security 
Council regarding the Council’s consideration of the impact of climate change under the 
                                                          
571
 Ibid., at 36. 
572
  S/PV.6587, at 15. 
573
 Ibid., at 23. 
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 Ibid.  
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 Ibid., at 7. 
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 Ibid., at 15. 
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agenda item ‘Maintenance of international peace and security’.577 Reaffirming the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security 
(pursuant to Article 24 of the UN Charter), the Statement began by stressing ‘the importance 
of establishing strategies of conflict prevention’ and thus apparently sought to locate any 
future treatment of climate change within the framework of prior Security Council practice. 
The Statement then engaged with the issue of the division of competences between the 
Security Council and other UN organs regarding climate change. It then went on to recognize 
the responsibility for ‘sustainable development issues, including climate change’, conferred 
upon the General Assembly and ECOSOC.578 The Security Council’s point of departure thus 
characterized climate change as a development issue, an approach which shows the 
carefulness displayed by the Council not to distort the original characterization of the 
phenomenon – as understood since the outset of international co-operation on climate change 
in the early 1990s. Indeed, the wish to establish a complementarity between the existing 
efforts of the international community to tackle climate change and the new involvement of 
the Council with the phenomenon is particularly stressed in paragraph 3 of the Statement, 
underlining how General Assembly Resolution 63/281 recognized the UNFCCC as ‘the key 
instrument for addressing climate change’ while also inviting ‘the relevant organs of the United 
Nations, as appropriate and within their respective mandates, to intensify their efforts in 
considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications’.579 The 
stress on the fact that the Presidential Statement of the Security Council was not only in tune 
with the respective actions of the General Assembly, but actually constituted a form of 
implementation of the recommendation of the Assembly, was reinforced by a reference to 
General Assembly Resolution 65/159 on ‘Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future 
Generations of Humankind’, as well as to the Report of the Secretary-General on Climate 
Change and Its Possible Security Implications submitted in response to a request of the 
Assembly.580  
After setting the institutional framework within which the Presidential Statement 
ought to be understood, the characterization of the issue at stake, as well as the effects of 
such acknowledgement, followed. The Statement, explicitly delivered ‘on behalf of the Security 
Council’ and thus arguably representing the view of this body on the issue, expressed the 
                                                          
577
 S/PRST/2011/15: Presidential Statement on Maintenance of International Peace and Security and 
Impacts of Climate Change, paragraph 1. 
578
 Ibid., paragraph 2. 
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 Ibid., paragraph 3.  
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 Ibid., paragraph 4.  
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Security Council’s ‘concern that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long 
run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security’.581 This statement 
invites two main remarks. First, it seems clear that the Security Council wished to avoid the 
Presidential Statement being interpreted as the recognition of the existence of a causal link 
between climate change and security, despite the fact that such a connection had not yet been 
scientifically proved. The joint use of the words ‘possible’ and ‘may’ (highlighted in the citation 
here above) supports this reading of the text. Second, climate change fell short of being 
defined as a self-standing threat to international peace and security. Rather, the Statement 
seemed closer to upholding the view that climate change constitutes a ‘threat multiplier’, 
although the term was not expressly used. Third, reference to the fact that climate change 
security impacts may only be discernible ‘in the long run’ seems coherent with the initial 
presentation of the Statement inscribing it as part of the previous Security Council practice on 
conflict prevention. Despite the view that such a general approach to the phenomenon may 
seem a little ambitious when compared to the level of acknowledgement and shared 
understanding of the security implications of climate change reflected in the discussion, special 
reference to the specific way in which small island States are affected by the phenomenon 
came to counterbalance it, for indeed the Council also expressed its ‘concern that possible 
security implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level rise may arise, in 
particular in small low-lying island States’.582 Although the possible threat to the continuation 
of statehood was not explicitly formulated, the mention of the ‘implications of loss of territory’ 
supposed a step forward compared to General Assembly Resolution 63/281.  
The Council finally considered that ‘conflict analysis and contextual information of, 
inter alia, possible security implications of climate change, is important’, and thus noted that 
the phenomenon could affect the Council’s action in three ways: either when ‘such issues are 
drivers of conflict’; when they ‘represent a challenge to the implementation of the Council’s 
mandate’; or when they ‘endanger the process of consolidation of peace’. Interestingly, the 
enunciation of these three forms in which the phenomenon should be analysed in the future 
by the Council was drafted in the form of a statement without use of the word ‘may’ or 
equivalent terms. Climate change was thus recognized by the Council as a phenomenon to be 
taken into account at each of the three main stages of the Council’s action: prevention of 
conflict (peace-building operations); response to conflicts (enforcement measures under 
Chapter VI or Chapter VII); and construction of a lasting peaceful post-conflict environment 
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 Ibid., paragraph 5. [Emphasis added]. 
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(peacekeeping operations). Presidential Statements of the Security Council are generally 
considered to be hybrid instruments, falling short of having the legally binding character of 
Security Council resolutions (covered by Article 25 of the UN Charter), but undoubtedly 
constituting a stringent recommendation with important political declarative effects. Besides, 
the Council may incorporate into the Presidential Statement the measures to be carried 
forwards, either directed at the Security Council itself or at UN Member States uti singuli. In 
this case, the Council chose to merely develop ‘in-house’ measures and thus requested the 
Secretary-General ‘to ensure that his reporting to the Council contains such contextual 
information’.583 No concrete actions to be implemented by States were mentioned. The 
subsequent practice of the Secretary-General in this sense was timidly echoed in his Report on 
the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur,584 as well as in references to the 
efforts on disaster risk-reduction and climate change adaptation made in Timor-Leste.585  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
The reconstruction of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse before 
universal organizations closes the circle initiated in Chapter 2 on the construction and 
circulation of the Discourse at a regional level, which may ultimately find its roots in the 
international environmental security precedent described in Chapter 1. Whilst the universal 
level of analysis focuses on how the Discourse came into operation, the regional level of 
analysis previously laid down unveils the political forces and alliances lying hidden underneath 
the table; thus, all three chapters complement each other and help understanding of the 
                                                          
583
 Ibid.  
584
 Report of the Secretary General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 11 
October 2011, document reference: S/2011/643, informing in paragraph 27 that: ‘The government of 
North Darfur hosted a peaceful coexistence forum in El Fasher on 24 and 25 July, which was attended by 
more than 600 participants, including government officials, academics and representatives of various 
Darfur communities. The participants deliberated on the root causes of conflict, with a focus on 
environmental challenges, relations between farmers and pastoralists and the role of local conflict 
resolution mechanisms.’ 
585
 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the 
period from 20 September to 2011 to 6 January 2012), 18 January 2012, document reference: 
S/2012/43, indicating at paragraph 50 (under the heading ‘humanitarian assistance’) that: ‘On 1 and 2 
December, UNMIT, in cooperation with the Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters 
and with support from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, organized 
a workshop on disaster risk management, to review the state of preparedness for natural disasters and 
discuss the contingency planning process. From 20 to 23 November, my Special Representative for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, Margareta Wahlström, visited Timor-Leste to assist the Government in 
integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies into the national 
development policies and plans.’ 
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different aspects of the emergence of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse.  
The present chapter, devoted to the operative dimension of the Discourse, sought to 
unveil how the introduction of the Discourse before universal organizations had a double-
barrelled and reciprocal impact. On the one hand, the purpose-based incorporation of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse into the realm of work of universal 
organizations reveals the process through which an agenda-setting strategy is turned into 
concrete political action, either by transforming old patterns of international co-operation or 
by generating innovative trends. On the other hand, when confronted with a genuinely 
unlimitedly multilateral setting as the United Nations, the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse itself undergoes a process of transformation resulting from political 
exchange, negotiation and compromise. The ‘shared understanding of the world’, finally 
embodied by the Discourse after going through the prism of universal organizations, may thus 
not fully correspond to its original conception; thereafter, the concrete actions into which the 
Discourse leads may not match the original purpose of its proponents either.  
The process of operation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
before universal organizations can thus be divided into three main stages. First, the Discourse 
was introduced before the Security Council as a result of an initiative of the United Kingdom, 
one of the main ‘drivers’ of the Discourse which, as explained in Chapter 2, originated in 
Germany and was then institutionalized at the EU. This was the first contact of the Discourse 
with the UN organ primary responsible for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and took place at a time when the process of institutionalization within the EU was 
still at a very early stage of development. Its presentation before the Security Council, 
confronted with other UN Member States that would not be necessarily reached by the inter-
regional circulation of the Discourse, was thus closely attached to a geo-political view on how 
the consequences of the phenomenon could affect several key factors of international security 
– with special emphasis on its effects on the energy sector. The introduction of the Discourse 
at a time when the 2007 Bali Summit was under preparation, coupled with its original 
hegemonic-biased shape, conveyed the idea that it essentially served to exert influence and 
pressure on the mainstream climate-change negotiations through an alternative (and arguably 
illegitimate) way. Despite the fact that States threatened by the most extreme impacts of 
climate change supported the hegemonic initiative for its potential capacity to raise awareness 
and increase the sense of urgency of the phenomenon, this first attempt to ‘securitize’ climate 
change unsurprisingly encountered fierce opposition from States seeking to preserve the 
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originally grounded developmental rationale of international climate-change co-operation. 
Then, as the command was taken by Pacific Island States and the Discourse brought to the 
General Assembly, an important shift in orientation took place. Indeed, in the negotiation 
leading to the endorsement in 2009 of General Assembly Resolution 63/281 on Climate 
Change and its Possible Security Implications, the existential plea of these actors tainted the 
core understanding of the Discourse and truly re-signified it. Besides, the definition of the 
respective roles that UN organs and agencies were to play in it was also established. 
Thereafter, the security implications of climate change would be associated, in particular, with 
the territorial loss and population migration produced by sea-level rise in small island States. 
This newly fixed understanding of the meaning of the Discourse, as well as the division of 
competences over this matter among the relevant organs and organizations, was finally 
consolidated when climate change entered the agenda of the Security Council for the second 
time, in 2011.  
To be sure, the last stage – so far discernible – of the operation of the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse before universal organizations only implied that climate 
change would from now on be considered by the Secretary-General in his description of the 
contextual information of Security Council operations and did not give rise to concrete 
measures directed towards UN Member States. Yet, although so far the Discourse has not 
turned into actions that may significantly modify the behaviour of either the UN or individual 
Member States towards climate change, a fundamental consequence can be raised in the 
realm of law. Indeed, the reconstruction of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse has shown how its evolution before universal international organizations led to the 
recognition that the continuation of small islands’ statehood is potentially jeopardized by the 
looming adverse impacts of climate change. Political consensus exists which considers that this 
situation embodies and stands out as the core issue unveiled by the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse. It is an issue which, by its very subject-matter – the central 
concept of statehood – undeniably deserves and even requires consideration from an 
international-law perspective. And thus, as we get to the end of the reconstruction of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse, the point of departure of the next Part of 
this thesis becomes apparent.   
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PART II 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
DISCOURSE: 
CHALLENGES TO THE CONTINUATION OF PACIFIC ISLANDS’ STATEHOOD 
 
CHAPTER 4 
ADVERSE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON PACIFIC SMALL ISLAND STATEHOOD:  
THE CHALLENGE OF DE-TERRITORIALIZATION 
 
 
3. INTRODUCTION 
 
2. THE TERRITORIALIZATION OF NATIONHOOD: FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR IN THE CREATION OF STATES 
2.1. The Meaning of Territory at the Inception of the Modern European State 
2.1.1 From the Feudal Territorialization of Allegiance to the Westphalian Principle of Territorial 
Sovereignty 
2.1.2 The Myriad of Pre-Charter Theories on the Legal Nature of Territory 
2.2. The Meaning of Territory in the Creation of Post-Colonial Pacific Island States 
2.2.1. Decolonization and the Creation of Pacific Island States: Limited Territoriality Justified by a New 
Normative Framework 
2.2.2. Micro-States in the United Nations: Limited Territoriality Superseded by Active Participation in the 
International Community 
 
3. SCENARIO 1. PARTIAL DE-TERRITORIALIZATION OF PACIFIC ISLAND STATES: JEOPARDIZING THE 
MARITIME SPACES OF THE STATE 
3.1. Effects of Coastal Geographical Changes on Maritime Rights 
3.1.1. Coastal Geographical Transformation and Undelimited Maritime Boundaries  
3.1.2. Coastal Geographical Transformation and Maritime Delimitation Agreements  
3.2. Preventive and Responsive Measures Against the Loss of Maritime Spaces 
3.2.1. Physical Devices: Mainstreaming Coastal-Protection Strategies in National Climate-Change 
Adaptation Plans 
3.2.2. Legal Devices: Protecting Maritime Boundaries by Ratifying Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 
Fixing Baselines and Effecting Archipelagic Status 
 
4. SCENARIO 2. TOTAL DE-TERRITORIALIZATION OF PACIFIC ISLAND STATES: UNCERTAIN EFFECTS ON 
THE CONTINUATION OF THE STATE  
4.1. Fighting for the Continuation of the State through ‘Re-territorialization’ Strategies 
4.1.1. Land Acquisition by Cession or Purchase from Another State 
4.1.2. Merger with Another State  
4.2. De-territorialized Pacific Island States: A New Form of Sui Generis ‘Non-State Sovereign Entity’?  
4.2.1. Two Precedents of Existing Recognized Non-State Sovereign Entities: The Holy See and the Order 
of Malta  
4.2.2. Protecting the Pacific Island Nations through the Continuation of the State: Back to the 
Functionalist Approach to the Role of Territory in the Configuration of Statehood 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
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‘For small island States, the security implications of climate change have been, 
first and foremost, a threat to our very existence as sovereign nations. All else 
will be immaterial if statehood is lost. 
M. Vunibobo, representative of Fiji to the UN, 85
th
 General 
Assembly Plenary Meeting, 9 June 2009 
‘As a ten-year-old, I used to look at the sea with awe, at the seemingly endless 
supply of fish that I could harvest … now when I look at it, I wonder how far 
into the new millennium we will be before it overwhelms our coasts.’  
Tamari’i Tutangata, Former Director of the South Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme, 2000 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When translating and moving the content of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse from the political arena to that of international law, one first recalls the general 
concept of threat, as well as the extreme versions of it that can virtually determine the survival 
of a State. Considering that, as Charles de Visscher recalled, international law is ‘devoted above 
all to order and security’,586 the notions of threat and survival are not unfamiliar to either the 
international legal order nor to international law as a discipline. In fact, in the classical 
understanding of the modern European sovereign territorial State, the central function of such 
a State was precisely to limit war within the frontiers of Europe and thus correlatively to 
ensure the security of each State’s population (or nation) against external threats. Hence, the 
genealogy of the ‘inherent right to self-defence’ may, for instance, illustrate well the ways in 
which the notion of threat has become anchored in international law. Enshrined since 1945 in 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the right to self-defence is a derived and limited 
version of the previous concept of self-preservation,587 a commanding paradigm of the ius ad 
                                                          
586
 C. DE VISSCHER, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, 1968 revisited edition translated from 
the French by P. E. Corbett, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), Chapter 2 (The State in 
International Law), at 177. Certainly, ever since De Visscher wrote this, the purposes of international law 
have evolved so as to integrate, today more than ever before, standards of justice applicable not only in 
inter-State relations, but also in the relations between individuals or between private actors and States. 
The development of international human rights law and international criminal law, as well as the 
incursions into the so-called responsibility to protect, are prominent examples of this evolution. 
587
 An explanation of the historical evolution from the right to self-preservation to the narrowest version 
of the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, see I. BROWLIE, International Law 
and the Use of Force by States, 1963 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). See also J. WESTLAKE’s definition of self-
preservation: ‘[W]hatever right or action outside the physical limits of its own sovereignty is allowed to a 
State by these rules may be described as a right of self-preservation […] Writers on international law 
often class it among their fundamental, primitive, primary or absolute rights. It is no doubt a primitive 
instinct, and an absolute instinct in so far as it has not been tamed by reason and law, but one great 
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bellum in classical international law and the full expression of the Hobbesian model of State 
security from the 17th to the 19th century.588 Yet, despite the evolution of the law of armed 
conflict in the 20th century, culminating in the general prohibition of the use of force, provided 
for in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and limiting the scope of the right to self-defence, 
contemporary international law still falls short of regulating a State’s behaviour in most worst-
case scenarios and circumstances of extreme vulnerability. Thus, whilst the ‘national security 
interest’ remains today preserved as a domaine privilégié of the State, the assurance of State 
survival has even been considered by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion 
on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, as a circumstance blurring the existing rules on 
the use of force so much that the very assessment of the legality of the use of nuclear 
weapons was impeded.589 These are only two prime examples of how the extensive scope of 
international law is constrained when facing the core protection of its principal and privileged 
subject, an ambivalence which is connected to the double-edged functionality of the State 
with regard to the international legal order. Indeed, the State operates as the primary law-
maker in the international legal order, whilst constituting the primary subject of such order; it 
is thus a political entity with independent international legal personality which creates the set 
of rules by which it consents to be bound.590  
Yet, this notable sensitivity to the heart of the State and the accepted deference towards 
what J. Westlake called ‘the primitive instinct’ of States to preserve their survival seems to 
have been associated with strong States or even ‘big powers’. In fact, it may be that the State, 
                                                                                                                                      
function of law is to tame it’, in L. OPPENHEIM (ed.), The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public 
International Law, 1914, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), at 112. 
588
 This is particularly visible in T. HOBBES’ understanding of security laid down in Leviathan, See L. 
FOISNEAU, ‘Omnipotence, Necessity and Sovereignty: Hobbes and the Absolute and Ordinary Powers of 
God, in P. SPINGBORG (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, 2007, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
589
 ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (Advisory Opinion, 1996) I.C.J. Report 226, at 44: 
‘[I]n view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court 
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful 
in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake’. 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
590
 This is differential trait of international law referred to, from a positivistic standpoint, as a ‘consent-
based’ order. Reliance on State consent in the theory of sources of international law, as enhanced by 
the formalism and positivism of the Austrian school of the first half of the 20
th
 century has of course 
been preceded by the natural law school of thought and followed by recent challenges to it from several 
trends including, inter alia, critical legal studies, feminist critiques or third-world approaches to 
international law. For a recent reappraisal of formalism in the theory of sources of international law, see 
J. d’ ASPREMONT, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: an Theory of Ascertainment of Legal 
Rules, 2011, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Yet, our point here is simply to recall the inherent bond 
between the emergence of the modern State in the 17
th
 century and the emergence of modern 
international law as an order called on to operate amongst equal sovereign entities, a link which can be 
apprehended and acknowledged irrespective of the theory of the sources of legal obligations we rely on.  
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as a power-based structure, is what actually animates the recognition of and respect for such 
an instinct. In contrast, what the Climate Change and International Security Discourse has 
unveiled is not only that a State’s survival may be threatened by non-traditional war-like 
threats, but also that the relevant potential targets of this new type of threat are not the 
traditionally powerful, strong and stable States, but a category of State actors – post-colonial 
small island States – characterized by their inborn physical, political and economic vulnerability 
and fragility. 
It is perhaps the negative form of the idea of survival – that is, the notion of disappearance 
– which constitutes the central mindset of the second part of this thesis. As a complex and 
multiform concept, the notion of disappearance essentially carries two connotations. On the 
one hand, it refers to the threat to the tangible, physical, concrete and material dimension of 
these States’ existence (e.g. the physical submergence of their territory or the displacement of 
their population); on the other hand, it refers to the threat of their disappearance as political 
entities which therefore engages with the abstract dimensions of their existence, and 
necessarily directs the study to the concept of a State as a political construct.591 Ever since the 
emergence of the modern State as a new form of social and territorial organization endowed 
with sovereign prerogatives, the factual and the abstract dimensions of the State have been 
inseparable.592 Part II of this thesis therefore seeks to map the extent and concrete forms of 
the progressive change, deterioration and loss of the material dimension of small island States 
resulting from climate change and in particular from sea-level rise. It will then assess the 
effects that the transformation of the State as a physical entity may have on its continuation as 
a legal and political concept. Ultimately, its purpose is therefore to assess the operability of the 
concept of statehood when a State is confronted with a set of extreme environmental 
conditions, by scrutinizing the correlation between the physical basis of the State and its 
existence as a political construct. 
The first preliminary challenge to be confronted is that of analysing whether the concept 
of statehood is bound to evolve, disappear, or be redefined in innovative forms in the face of 
the climate change crisis; such analysis necessarily presupposes that statehood is a 
conceptually fixed and established institution of the international legal order; in other words, it 
                                                          
591
 This includes the ‘external’ manifestation of the States’ engagement in the international political 
arena as well as the State’s subjective perception of its own distressful situation; that is, its fears in 
relation to the threats it is facing. 
592
 As Rousseau explains: ‘[s]i l’on veut sortir de cette équivoque, il faut dans l’État distinguer deux 
choses, car celui-ci est à la fois un phénomène politico-social et un phénomène juridique’, in C. 
ROUSSEAU, infra, at 15.  
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assumes that we know when an entity ‘is or is not a State’ and we are able to understand and 
identify ‘what it is made of’, clearly depicting its criteria or constituent elements.593 Yet, 
numerous discussions and heated debates within the discipline indicate how far the concept of 
statehood is from relinquishing its characteristic ‘open texture’. Conveying an awareness of 
how approximations to the concept of State tend to be incomplete, Charles Rousseau, for 
instance, borrowed the words of the French poet Paul Valéry, ‘les mots de grande importance, 
ceux qui traduisent les notions fondamentales de la vie sociale, sont en général des symboles 
vagues, imprécis et indéterminés’.594 The straight dichotomy between constitutive and 
declaratory theories of statehood and the consequent question of the role of recognition in 
the creation of States is one clear illustration of the concept’s difficult and slippery 
apprehension of formal legal tools.595 So are the more recent critiques of the concept of a 
State which flourishes in different branches of post-modern literature (from feminist critiques 
to critical legal studies), as well as voices advocating that a change must be made to replace 
the State, as the central object of reference of the discipline, by the individual. 
Hence, both the concept of State and that of statehood suffer from potential vagueness. 
They are involved or even subsumed in a stream of constant (and arguably progressive) 
historicity.596 Coming to terms with this assumption, it may be inferred, a fortiori, that not only 
the State itself, but the ‘criteria’ by which an entity qualifies as such, equally bear the burden 
of historicity, potential vagueness and lack of preciseness and fixity of their respective 
contents. Soon before the outbreak of World War I, John Westlake stated that ‘a State is a 
society of men over whom as well as over its territory its sovereignty extends’.597 This 
positivistic and formalist approach to statehood was first endorsed by early international 
arbitral tribunals and gained weight after the adoption of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
                                                          
593
 This corresponds to a rationalistic mindset, which separates the inside from the outside and makes 
the latter apprehensible by the former.   
594
 C. ROUSSEAU, Droit international public, 1970, (Paris: Sirey), vol. II (Les Sujets de droit), at 14-15. 
Rousseau explains the State as having different faces: the organic aspect of the State; the State as a 
phenomenon of power; the State as composed of sociological elements; the State in its functional and 
purpose-based dimension; and finally, the State defined from a legal (positivistic) perspective. 
595
 Both political and conceptual reasons make it difficult to define statehood using formal international 
legal sources, as recalled by T. GRANT, ‘Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its 
Discontents’, (1999) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 37, pp. 403-457. The International Law 
Commission has also failed to work out a draft definition of statehood because of ideological divisions 
among its members. See also J. CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 1979 (2
nd
 
revised edition, 2006), (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
596
 For a critique on the role that the notion of progress has played in the development of international 
law, see T. SKOUTERIS, The Notion of Progress in International Legal Discourse, 2010, (The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press).  
597
 OPPENHEIM (ed.), supra, at 127.  
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the Rights and Duties of States, providing in Article 4(1) that ‘a State is an entity with: territory, 
population, effective government and capacity to enter into international relations’.598 Ever 
since the Convention was adopted and considered as the codification of statehood each of 
these criteria has been subject to evolution as new political situations required more nuanced 
interpretations.599  
The second challenge of this study is that, for the most part, the formulation of the criteria 
of statehood has been raised within the context of the creation, rather than extinction, of State 
entities because, as Charles Rousseau put it, ‘la durée est un élément essentiel de l’État’.600 
Creation and extinction of States cannot be dealt with in the same way, for the inherent bias in 
international law towards stability can be so acute that, as J. Crawford explains, ‘a State is not 
necessarily extinguished by substantial changes in territory, population or government, or even 
in some cases, by a combination of all three’.601 Truly enough, the extinction of statehood is 
not alien to international law, and its possibility is contemplated under different forms, such as 
dissolution, succession and secession, which have also served to revive analysis of the role that 
each criterion of statehood plays in the fate of the entity or entities arising out of such 
processes. Nonetheless, the challenge represented by climate change is likely to reveal more 
about the role and nature of the criteria of statehood for one reason: cases of State succession 
essentially constitute political transformations that trigger a process of redistribution of space 
among one or several political forces. Yet, such redistribution of the space between political 
entities has never implied/consisted of the actual loss of the material substratum or physical 
dimension of the entity (or entities) concerned. It was the political forces operating over the 
territory which changed, but the territory itself did not move. In contrast, the situation of small 
island States threatened by climate change impacts involves the transformation of a space, 
which in turn calls for a re-examination of the State as a political and legal construct.   
                                                          
598
 See for instance the award of the mixed arbitral tribunal in the case ‘Deutsche Continental Gas-
Gesellschaft vs. Poland’, (1929) Annual Digest of Public International Law, vol. 11, which held that ‘[U]n 
État n’existe qu’à condition de posséder un territoire, une population habitant ce territoire et une 
puissance publique qui s’exerce sur la population et sur le territoire’. 
599
 For instance, it is nowadays considered that the territory does not have to be necessarily fixed (in 
cases where boundary delimitation remains outstanding or in dispute with another State), nor to have a 
minimum extent either. The population size is also irrelevant for a political entity to be considered as a 
State. See J. DUURSMA, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-
determination and Statehood, 1996, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press); at 110-145. 
600
 ROUSSEAU, supra, at 16. See also D. GROSS, ‘The Temporality of the Modern State’, (1985) Theory 
and Society, vol. 14, nº 2, pp. 53-82; and H. RUIZ FABRI, ‘Génèse et disparition de l’État à l’époque 
contemporaine’, (1992) Persée, pp. 153-178. 
601
 CRAWFORD, supra, at 417.   
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In spite of these two main challenges, Part II of this thesis raises the question of how each 
of the elements or criteria of statehood is affected, in its material dimension, by climate 
change impacts in Pacific Island States and how this may impair and possibly threaten the 
continuation of these entities as States. It examines the consequences of sea-level rise and the 
changing climate for the continuation of small islands’ statehood by assessing the three 
traditionally considered core dimensions of statehood: territory (the spatial dimension); 
population (the personal dimension) and governance (the political dimension, both internal 
and external). While undertaking an analysis in which each of the three criteria are dealt with 
separately and apprehended historically as an element of the State, the study will also seek to 
establish the interactions among them, so as to identify concretely where the challenge to the 
statehood of Pacific Island States arises and to maintain them as part of the overall analysis of 
statehood. 
To do so, Part II of this thesis focuses on the situation of small island States of the Pacific 
Ocean. The choice of undertaking a regional case-study is based on three main reasons. First of 
all, among the four States in the world most likely to suffer from the impacts of sea-level rise in 
their whole territory, three of them (Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands) are located in 
the south-east Pacific region. References will nonetheless be made at certain points to the 
policies promoted by the Maldives, the fourth most vulnerable country which is in the Indian 
Ocean. Secondly, not only are these four States the embodiment of the situation revealed by 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, they are also the primary promoters 
of the circulation of this approach before universal international organizations, as shown in 
Chapter 3, above. Undertaking a regional case-study centred on the south Pacific region is 
therefore an opportunity to check whether the characterization of the situation as presented 
before international organizations corresponds to reality, by studying the development in 
terms of coastal protection and population resettlement that has already taken place. Finally, 
the case of Pacific Island States case facilitates a leap from the particular assessment of the 
challenges to State survival at a time of global environmental crisis to a general reflection on 
the concept of State in contemporary international relations and the potential avenues for an 
evolving role of international law in redefining the contours of its core defining institution.  
When assessing the effects of climate change impacts on small Pacific islands’ statehood, 
the spatial unit is the first element to be analysed. The present Chapter is devoted to 
scrutinizing the effects of the environmental crisis on the spatial dimension of these island 
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States, encompassing both their territory and the maritime spaces attached to it.602 
Considering the concept of territory as being historically contingent, this Chapter argues that, 
when assessing the effects of the adverse impacts of climate change on the territory of Pacific 
Island States, the circumstances in which their territoriality was acquired may be legally 
relevant to the determination of the legal consequences of their progressive loss of territory. 
Therefore, Section 2 of this Chapter begins by digging into the meaning of territory in the 
definition of statehood by classical international law (when it was linked to the modes and 
titles of acquisition thereof) and contrasts this original meaning with the differential role that 
operated when Pacific Islands States came into existence as independent political entities, 
when the meaning of territory was bound to the end of a history of colonial domination. After 
considering how the ‘territorialization of nationhood’ has been a fundamental factor in the 
creation of States and extracting its specific meaning in the context of southern Pacific State-
building, Section 3 explores the ‘de-territorialization process’ undergone by Pacific Island 
States. Such a process is approached by describing first the physical effects of climate change 
on these States’ land and then focuses on the jeopardy these effects impose on their territory 
in terms of the State’s dimension as a legal construct, with specific emphasis on their maritime 
rights. Finally, Section 4 of this Chapter addresses the solutions which have been put forward 
by scholars and policy-makers to limit the negative impacts of climate change on these States’ 
‘threatened statehood’, from both a physical and a legal standpoint. 
 
2. THE TERRITORIALIZATION OF NATIONHOOD: FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR IN THE CREATION 
OF STATES 
 
2.1. The Meaning of Territory at the Inception of the Modern European State 
 
2.1.1. From the Feudal Territorialization of Allegiance to the Westphalian Principle of Territorial 
Sovereignty 
                                                          
602
 For an important distinction between the concept of territory and the concept of space, see P. DE LA 
PRADELLE, ‘Notions de territoire et d’espace dans l’aménagement des rapports internationaux 
contemporains’, (1977) Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit international de La Haye, tome 157, pp. 
415-444, at 427: ‘Le territoire désigne, en droit international, une dépendance de l’ordre géophysique du 
monde, placée sous le pouvoir de disposition et de contrainte de l’État. L’espace désigne, au contact des 
territoires, les dépendances de l’ordre géophysique du monde qui échappent, par nature, à l’emprise de 
la souveraineté pour être ouvertes à l’accès et aux libertés d’usage de tous’. [Emphasis in the original 
text]. Futhermore, as La PRADELLE recalls, the emergence of the Latin term for space – namely ‘spatium’ 
– in the XII
th
 century, preceded that of the term territory – namely ‘territorium’ – which only emerged in 
the XIV
th
 century, Ibid., at 423. See also D. BARDONNET, ‘Les frontières terrestres et la relativité de leur 
tracé (problèmes juridiques choisis)’, (1976) Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit international de La 
Haye, tome 153, pp. 9-166. 
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Any international scholar faced with the task of depicting the genesis of the international 
law as a discipline has the responsibility and the power to decide where to set the starting 
point. One may choose to conceive the birth of international law as inextricably bound to the 
emergence of modern European States without looking much further back into the past. Such 
a view is largely predominant among contemporary western scholars,603 who often single out 
the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia – certifying formal equality among catholic and reformist 
European States – as the foundation stone of the discipline.604 Yet, others may prefer to 
interpret the dictum ubi ius, ibi societas widely, and consider international law to have existed 
ever since the organization of humanity into distinct political entities which required a system 
of common expectations about how the relations amongst them would operate. Though 
acknowledging that classical international law is inextricably bound to the emergence of the 
modern State, supporters of this second position include in their assessment the forms taken 
by international law in the Middle Ages and the Ancient Period. They dig first and foremost 
into the customs and principles which governed the relationships amongst Greek city-states, 
and between Rome and its incorporated territories (non-citizens)605; they also enter the 
blurred complexities of feudalism – assessing the contribution of the Holy Roman Empire and 
the early theologists to the international legal order of the time.  
These ambivalent views about the relationship between international law and the State 
are reflected in the equally unclear relationship between international law and the concept of 
                                                          
603
 Yet, the choice of one way or the other – though often driven by a practical need to narrow the 
subject matter of study – always implies a set of normative assumptions. Modernist scholars tended to 
take a look into ancient and medieval epochs, partly because the international order founded by the UN 
Charter had not yet been established. As I. BROWNLIE explains: ‘[T]he fact remains that since 1945 the 
existence of States has provided the basis of the legal order’, ‘Rebirth of Statehood’, in M. EVANS (ed.), 
Aspects of Statehood and Institutionalism in Contemporary Europe, 1996, (Dartmouth: Aldershot), at 5. 
Also, even nowadays in non-European circles, the reference to Ancient epochs of international law is 
preferred because it gives an opportunity to write about the contribution of their non European 
civilizations to the construction of the international legal order. See for instance, A. BECKER LORCA, 
Mestizo International Law, forthcoming in 2013, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).  
604
 Several times references to the Westphalia Peace Treaty as the ‘landmark’ historical fact that marked 
the birth of the new international legal order seem overemphasized and expressed at the expense of a 
more thorough contextual consideration of the historical process. 
605
 Hannis Taylor, writing immediately after the turn of the 20
th
 century, devotes a whole first chapter of 
his titanic Treatise on the Ancient and Medieval State-Systems, and considered the ancient state as the 
city-commonwealth, in H. TAYLOR, International Public Law: a Treatise, 1902, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, Limited). More recent historical accounts on international law which follow the same in-depth 
study on the pre-modern times include W. G. GREWE, The Epochs of International Law, 2000, translated 
and revised by Michael Byers, (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter), Chapter 3, pp. 62-81; as well as A. 
NUSSBAUM, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, rev.ed.1954, (Michigan: McMillan), Chapters 1-3, 
pp.1-59. 
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territory.606 The State operates as a mediator between international law and the concept of 
territory. Yet, the multiple meanings of territory found in international law also result from the 
influence of pre-modern legal systems on the Westphalian order. Therefore, to understand the 
nature of territory and grasp its evolutionary meaning and role in the international system, it 
becomes necessary to adopt the broad approach which, as put by Hannis Taylor, conceives 
States as a the result of the Greek, Roman and Medieval systems, three antecedents whose 
‘individual histories constitute only distinct stages in one unbroken and progressive 
development’.607  
The prominent role of the territory in the configuration of the modern European State 
is the result of the progressive transformation in the medieval era of the modes by which a 
chief was entitled to exercise ruling power over the community. The tribal or national concept 
of sovereignty originally applied by the Teutonic people was not associated with command 
over a particular portion of the land. Rather, such bonds between the ruler and the members 
of a people were fundamentally personal and their configuration was conceived around the 
notion of nation, whose existence was not necessarily associated with a fixed and delimited 
area.608 The historical process by which the ‘space’ gradually became an important factor in 
the configuration of sovereignty essentially began with the shift from the elective appointment 
of a head or a people to an hereditary system – according to which the ruler of the nation is 
the lord of a portion of the earth’s surface where the nation lives.609  
Although feudalism was still a strongly personal system 610 – Max Weber described it as 
‘the ruling power of a militarized nobility with manorial rights’611 – which did not see the full 
conversion to a territorial allegiance,612 the latest stage of the feudal period was characterized 
by the concern and interest of the seigniorial class in the conservation of their socio-economic 
position as landlords.613 Wilhem Grewe thus explains how this evolution impacted the 
                                                          
606
 See J. BARBERIS, ‘Les liens juridiques entre l’État et son territoire: perspectives théoriques et 
evolution du Droit international’, (1999) Annuaire Français de Droit International, vol. XLV, pp. 132-147, 
at 132. Barberis explains that: ‘le concept territoire de l’État est en rapport avec celui de “souveraineté 
territoriale” et le fait d’énoncer une définition de “territoire de l’État” implique, dans une certaine 
mesure, de donner également une définition de cette dernière’. 
607
 TAYLOR, supra, at vi.  
608
 TAYLOR, supra, at vii.  
609
 The personal conception of bonds also in Roman times – imperium.   
610
 GREWE adds that ‘in this respect it carried a Germanic stamp’, supra, at 65.  
611
 M. WEBER, Economy and Society [Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft], 1922, (New York: Free Press), at 724.  
612
 GREWE, supra, at 65: ‘Medieval polities did not know the particular territoriality of the modern State 
with its sharply defined territory as both a closed legal area and an exclusive sphere of government 
competence’. 
613
 O. HINTZE, Wesen und Wandlung der modernen Staates, 1931, at 89, cited in GREWE, supra, at 62.   
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configuration of the legal systems, for ‘as the strict personalization of the early medieval tribal 
codes diminished, areas subject to a single unified law developed, and “the law of the land” 
replaced the “tribal codes”.’614  
Ultimately, the most important outcome of feudalization was the birth of the principle 
of territorial sovereignty, defined by H. Taylor as the basis of ‘the modern conception of the 
State as a nation with fixed geographical boundaries’.615 Beyond the commonly accepted 
assertion that medieval polities fell short of being built upon the principle of territorial 
sovereignty as modern European States were, scholarly division arises when it comes to 
depicting the concept of territory of the late feudal order. Its obscure complexities generally 
invite simplification of the assessment and consideration of two main different views. On the 
one hand, the patrimonial concept of the medieval polity views the territory as the object of 
unrestricted rights of private ownership belonging to the lord or sovereign. This view was 
predominant among German scholars of the 18th and 19th centuries and is based on the notion 
of dominium borrowed from Roman law.616 In contrast, other scholars emphasize the 
imperium or public power – rather than private ownership – which was vested in the lord or 
sovereign within the territorial limits of the land he ruled. According to Grewe though, the 
reality did not completely correspond to either of these views for, as he explains, ‘in the 
Middle Ages dominium referred to a legal institution which belonged to public as well as to 
private law and which had no precedent in the laws of antiquity’,617 and the power of control 
the lord exercised over the land was not imperium in the Roman sense either – that is, as “a 
plenitudo potestatis”, a comprehensive unified sovereignty from which all of the singular rights 
of the sovereign were derived’.618 All in all, what should be rescued from this look into pre-
modern times is that feudalism paved the way for the concept of territory to become central in 
the configuration of the modern European State. Through the gradual overlap of the personal 
and the territorial character of a nation’s bonds with its ruler, formerly unnoticed ‘spaces’ 
                                                          
614
 GREWE, supra, at 64.  
615
 TAYLOR, supra, at 157.  
616
 This view is commonly shared by Hannis Taylor, Eric Suy and Julio Barberis, the latter explaining that 
‘[A]u Moyen Âge et dans les monarchies absolues, en général, le Seigneur ou le Prince disposait de son 
domaine comme d’un objet lui appartenant. Le territoire faisant partie de son patrimoine’; yet, it is 
categorically opposed by W. Grewe who considers that the sources do not support such a concept. 
617
 See GREWE, supra, at 67, who follows the explanation of Brunner who alludes to the notion of 
Gewere, described as: ‘the actual holding and exercising of a power of control over the land, on which 
the presumption of legality of the exercise of that control was based’. 
618
 Ibid.   
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were apprehended to become ‘territory’, a notion which thereby began to play a role in the 
legal and political orders of the time.619  
The territory as an institution found in the modern State a privileged habitat, within 
which it was promoted to constitute not only an important circumstantial factor of the 
organization of power,620 but a truly defining feature of the State itself (both in its historical 
and ontological dimensions) as an entity emerged in a new and unprecedented form.621 Even 
authors who consider ancient political entities as States – that is, scholars who recognize a 
plurality of State forms – agree that the differential characteristic of the modern State 
compared with its predecessors is the existence of a territorially based nation.622 Most 
importantly, the integral character of the territory and the modern State finds full realization 
and embodiment in the principle of territorial sovereignty, absolute recognition of which by 
the 1648 Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück was, as Thomas Baty explained, the only way to 
escape the prospect of eternal religious war in Europe.623 As the territory became, for the 
modern State, the ‘framework of independence and security in the political order’,624 the 
principle of territorial sovereignty is thus first and foremost meant to protect such a 
framework from external threats or aggression and, in doing so, to reaffirm the existence of 
the State independent from any other entities. M. Weber’s famous definition of the State as a 
‘human community that (…) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory’ is perhaps illustrative of this dimension of the territory.625 Yet, as the modern 
State comfortably settled down between the 16th and the 18th centuries, other facets of the 
integral bond between territory and State also arose; territorial sovereignty was not only 
                                                          
619
 See LA PRADELLE, supra, at 423, who recalls how the moment of acceptance of the Latin word 
spatium into the French vocabulary, during the 12
th
 century, preceded the acceptance of the words 
territorium and terra in the 14
th
 century.  
620
 Ibid., at 425. [Emphasis added]. La Pradelle indeed explains: ‘l’institution du territoire, promu élément 
d’une formation à caractère étatique, fait son apparition dans les documents écrits de l’Egypte des 
pharaons et dans l’Asie antérieure, en Mésopotamie, Sumer et Akkad’. [Emphasis added]. 
621
 See DE VISSCHER, supra, at 205, who explains: ‘the essential place that territory holds in the 
organization of the State and its highly symbolic meaning explain the propensity of authors as well as of 
State practice to identify the territory with the State, or at least to regard its spatial delimitation as 
inseparable from that of sovereignty’. 
622
 See for instance, TAYLOR, supra, at 26. See also the definition of State given by E.A. FREEMAN, 
Comparative Politics, 1896, (California: McMillan and Co. Ltd), at 83: ‘a considerable and continuous part 
of the earth’s surface inhabited by men who at once speak the same language and are united under the 
same government’.  
623
 T. BATY, International law, rev. ed. 2005, (New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange Ltd.), at 244.   
624
 DE VISSCHER, supra, at 205.  
625
 M. WEBER, ‘Politics as Vocation’, in Essays in Sociology, (translated and edited by H.H. GERTH and C. 
WRIGHT MILLS, 1946, (New York: Oxford University Press). The inseparable connection between the 
sovereign and the territory over which he/she rules is also clearly present in Hobbes’ Leviathan.  
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involved in the protection of the State’s independent existence, but also played a role in 
asserting both the distinctive identity of the nation the State embodies and its effective power 
within the international society.  
Though it is difficult to disentangle the historical process by which a community 
progressively develops an emotional bond to a specific part of the earth’s surface until its 
identity becomes inseparably associated with that soil, the result of such a process is, in 
contrast, quite apparent. Within the modern European nation-State,626 the territory was as 
much the locus of the exercise of public authority as the body of the nation itself. Resulting 
from and being fused with the outcome of a process whereby nationhood was ‘territorialized’, 
the modern European nation-State embraced the territory as its natural substrate and vested 
it with a strong and irreplaceable symbolic power. Considering that ‘the fabric of society is 
territorial’627, Thomas Baty eloquently depicted this symbolic dimension when saying that ‘the 
absolute sacredness of a nation’s land is the vital nerve of our present system.’628 The 
ontological function of the territory in defining both the spatial dimension of the newly 
emerged independent State entities and their identity as a distinctive political community are 
already strong reasons explaining the central position of the territory within the modern State. 
Such a prominent place continued to grow as States consolidated the cardinal role in the 
international society they undeniably played in modernity and still hold today.629 It is thus 
possible to consider that the ‘obsession with territory’ that George Scelle denounced began 
particularly to occupy the minds of international scholars at the time of the exponential 
flowering of modernist thought (from the late 18th century to the late 19th century).630 
It is widely known and generally considered that the main characteristic of modernity 
was that it brought about a new understanding of history. While Jens Bartelson considered 
how such new understanding was facilitated by the invention of a whole series of concepts, 
such as growth, evolution, development and progress, which were used to ‘define time itself 
and create sociopolitical temporality’,631 Chenxi Tang recalls and emphasizes the subjective 
historical consciousness and critical self-positioning in time which made possible the creation 
                                                          
626
 See J. BARTELSON, The Critique of the State, 2001, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), at 
45, who defines the European Nation-State as the outcome of the ‘ideally convergent concepts of nation 
and State sedimented into one uniform object of enquiry’. 
627
 BATY, supra, at 251. 
628
 Ibid., at 245. 
629
 RUIZ FABRI, supra, at 153: ‘À la fois auteurs et sujets de droit international, les États tiennent dans la 
société internationale, le rôle cardinal. Plus, l’État est devenu une valeur, voire une finalité, au point 
qu’on a pu parler de statolâtrie (S. Rials)’.  
630
 G. SCELLE, ‘L’Obsession du territoire’, 1958, (The Hague: Symbolae Verzijl), at 34. 
631
 BARTELSEN, supra.  
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of such concepts.632 Most importantly, Tang proves that modern consciousness encompassed 
as much the position of human existence in time as its position in space; that modernity also 
had an ‘intrinsic spatial dimension’ to be found in the ‘geographical imagination’ of modern 
society.633 An important element of such imagination is the association of the territorial 
features of the State with its power. Although the inextricable link of these two concepts 
(geography and power)  was known since the development of cartography well before the 
beginning of modernism,634 it was particularly enhanced during modernity as it became the 
object of the newly born discipline of political geography.  
Born in a Prussian cradle and conceptually developed by Ratzel soon after the turn of 
the 20th century,635 the German school of political geography (also known as Geopolitik) was 
concerned with the causal relationship between the geography of a State – in particular, its 
position (Lage) and its extent (Raum)636 – and its political power in foreign relations. Social 
Darwinism and scientific determinism burgeoning at the time significantly influenced the 
approach of Geopolitik to the concept of territory. In the early foundational period of the 
discipline, the State’s land, spiritually bound to the nation it embraced, was represented as a 
living organism destined to continue growing. Thus, the State’s borders were necessarily 
flexible,637 and their evolution akin to a mirror of the State’s grandeur (if the borders were 
extended) or of its decline (if the borders remained static). Territory thus conceived was both 
the full expression of the power of the State and the fundamental premise of power as such.638  
                                                          
632
 C. TANG, The Geographical Imagination of Modernity, 2008, (Standford, Calif.: Standford University 
Press), at 1. 
633
 Ibid. 
634
 Ibid., at 139.  
635
 Although it is widely known and accepted that the term ‘Geopolitik’ as such was coined by Swedish 
political scientist Rudolf Kjellén in the late 19
th
 century.  
636
 F. RATZEL, Der Lebensraum: Eine biogeographische Studie, 1901, (Darmstad, Germany: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft).  
637
 Determinism rejected by the French school of political geography, which shared ideas of flexible 
boundaries but considered these as the result of human behaviour. See in particular the work of Jacques 
ANCEL, ‘Les frontières: étude de géographie politique’, (1936) Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
international de La Haye, tome 55, vol. I, pp. 203-298, at 208-210: ‘Ainsi, la géographie des frontières est 
seulement la géographie des limites imposées à l’activité d’un groupe. Or, les groupes ne sont jamais 
immobiles. Elle vit avec les groupes, évolue avec eux, est fonction d’un équilibre. [L]a frontière n’est donc 
jamais déterminée par la nature ni par l’homme, la volonté de l’homme est l’élément déterminant. 
[J]’insiste sur ce point: la volonté de l’homme fixe la frontière’. Against this view on mobility of borders, 
because inconsistent with the notion of State, see G. JELLINEK, Allgemeine Staatslehre, cited in Ancel, 
supra, at 267.  
638
 Early expression of this idea given by the Prussian military cartographer Heinrich Gottlob Hommeyer 
who wrote that ‘the situation, current shape and external condition of the land, or the space occupied by 
the state on the earth’s surface form the basis of state power as such’, cited in C. TANG, supra, at 141. 
Thus, while sharing a similar view on the function of territory, cartography and geopolitics differ in their 
view of the nature of the land as such, its ontological characteristics.  
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The inherent multidisciplinary nature of the geopolitical discourse attracted scholars 
from adjacent disciplines soon after its inception, including international law. Alexander 
Orakhelashvili recently recalled how the object of study of geopolitics – the interaction 
between the categories of power, space and right – ‘significantly overlaps the focus of 
international law’.639 Though geopolitical knowledge remains alive, developed and applied 
within and outside governmental structures640 – particularly of hegemonic or emerging 
countries – the interdisciplinary debate between geopolitics and international legal scholarship 
seems very limited. Such radical decrease can be explained by the general association of the 
expansionist policy of the 3rd Reich with Ratzel’s theory of vital space (Lebensraum), which was 
(mis)used by the National-Socialist government to justify the violation of bordering States’ 
territorial integrity.641 In this context, it does not come as a surprise that scholars of the new 
post-war international legal order, emphatically construed around the general and principled 
prohibition of the use force, did not want to be influenced by nor associated in any way with 
German geopolitical thought. Yet, between the late 19th century and the 20th century inter-war 
period, the particular impact of political geography on the minds of modernist international 
lawyers was apparent, animating among them perhaps the most prolific debate on the 
meaning and legal status of territory in international law, and directly influencing some of their 
findings.642  
 
2.1.2. The Myriad of Pre-Charter Theories on the Legal Nature of Territory  
 
Put in historical perspective, the notion of territory has come to serve the modern 
European State through three main functions: it first provided the basis for the existence of 
the State as an independent entity while also representing the identity of its nation 
                                                          
639
 A. ORAKHELASHVILI, ‘International Law and Geopolitics: One Object, Conflicting Legitimacies?’ (2008) 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 39, pp. 155-204. He also insisted that both disciplines 
also share a common normative methodology, since they aspire to ‘transcend subjective perception and 
interest’ and focus on what it regards as objective and natural, at 155. 
640
 See for instance the range of contracted reports on geopolitics and climate change contracted by the 
U.S. Pentagon in the context of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, supra, Chapter 
2, Section 2.2.1. 
641
 On the (mis)use of geopolitical thought, see G. KEARNS, Geopolitics and Empire, 2009, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press); M. BASSIN, ‘Race Contra Space: The Conflict Between German “Geopolitik” and 
National Socialism’ (1987) Political Geography Quarterly, vol. 6, nº 2, pp. 115-134; and O. OSTERUD, ’The 
Uses and Abuses of Geopolitics’, (1988) Journal of Peace Research, vol. 2, p. 192.  
642
 A clear illustration of such impact can be found in the words of W. SCHOENBORN: ‘le droit 
international peut utiliser, au moins quant aux détails, certaines suggestions précieuses et fécondes 
résultant de découvertes récemment faites dans le domaine de la géographie politique’, in W. 
SCHOENBORN, ‘Nature juridique du territoire’, (1929) Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
international de La Haye, tome 30, vol. V, pp. 81-190, at 90.  
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(integrative function through unification and representation of a people); it delimited the 
boundaries of the exercise of the new form of public authority (organizational function of 
internal and external competences) and, finally, it played a role as both the premise and the 
full expression of the realization of the State’s power in its foreign relations (rationalization 
function on the use of power). The setting of this three-dimensional functionalist approach to 
territory helps to explain why, by the turn of the 20th century, the inseparability of State 
territory (that is, territory in its physical dimension) from statehood was clearly 
uncontroversial.643 While widely accepting the existence of such a strong bond, every attempt 
to establish a theory on the legal nature of territory in international law has been thwarted by 
what it implies – namely, that no concept of territory has been able to detach its physical 
sense from its abstract sense.644  
Perhaps triggered by the birth of geopolitics as a new school of thought centred on the 
concepts of space and territory, since the end of the 19th century interest in the concept of 
territory also reached the front line of international legal scholarship. Rather than considering 
the legal nature of the territory as such, the international legal theories sought to deal with the 
nature of State sovereignty in respect of territory.645 Modernist attempts to establish a theory 
of territory in international law will therefore be considered, while also assessing the effects 
on such attempts of the so-called ‘codification of statehood’ – by Article 1 of the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.  
 
‘Pre-codification’ Approaches: Territory as Property vs. Territory as a Space of Competence 
 
In defining the legal nature of the concept of territory and its place in the general theory of 
the State, European international scholars of the modernist epoch can be classified by their 
preference for the patrimonial theory, the constitutive theory, or the competence theory of 
territory.646  
                                                          
643
 Franz von Listz’ consideration – written in 1904 – that supremacy over territory (Landeshoheit) is one 
of the ‘very indispensable attributes of the State’, for instance, illustrates this point; F. VON LISTZ, Das 
Völkerrecht: SystematischDargestellt, 1904, (Berlin: Häring). Also, some decades later, Sir Robert 
Jennings would put this issue as follows: ‘what is intended here is not merely territory in the physical 
sense but State sovereignty in respect of territory’, in Sir Robert JENNINGS, ‘The Acquisition of Territory 
in International Law, 1963, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press), at 2. 
644
 This point is particularly made by E. SUY, ‘Réflexions sur la distinction entre la souveraineté et la 
compétence territoriale’, in R. MARCIN (ed.) Internationale Festschrift für Aldred Verdross zum 80. 
Geburststag, 1971, (Munich: Flink), at 493. 
645
 JENNINGS, supra, at 2.  
646
 This clear and bipartite distinction is adopted by Eric Suy. See E. SUY, ‘Réflexions sur la distinction 
entre la souveraineté et la compétence territoriale’, in Hommage à Verdross, supra, at 493. Julio 
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The patrimonial theory of territory, which appeared earlier in time and seems to have 
been predominant until the inter-war period, views the legal bond between territory and the 
State as a right of property. The Italian school led by Donato Donati, whose influence through 
his landmark work Stato e territorio can still be detected in the work of some contemporary 
Italian scholars, such as Paglieri,647 greatly defended this approach and developed its core 
theoretical foundations. Donati contended that the right exercised by the State in respect of its 
territory is ‘un diritto di dominio’ perfectly compatible with the right of property held by the 
individual persons inhabiting the State. This view seems to be inspired by a loose analogy with 
the rights that the Lord or King held over his land in the seigniorial epoch of late feudalism 
which, as Julio Barberis explains, lasted until absolute monarchies were replaced by 
constitutional systems in early modern times.648 Both the roots and the lasting effect of this 
theory – conceiving State sovereignty in respect of territory as a private-law relationship – 
were undoubtedly facilitated by the significant number of concepts and terminology that 
international law on the acquisition (and loss) of territory had borrowed from the Roman 
private law tradition.649 Sir Robert Jennings for instance points out how international law 
requires, ‘like the Roman law counterparts’, the presence of ‘a corpus’, as much as of an 
‘animus’, for the creation and maintenance of a title of territorial sovereignty. This parallelism 
explains the great importance given to the possession of the land (through effective control) 
for the creation and maintenance of a sovereign right over it.650 Moreover, the effects of 
                                                                                                                                      
Barberis nonetheless also distinguishes a third theory of a distinct category which conceives the territory 
as a space where the State exercises its imperium, and is led by German authors influenced by 
Geopolitik.  
647
 D. DONATI, Stato e Territorio, 1924, (Rome: Athenaeum). The patrimonial theory was followed in 
France by P. FAUCILLE, Traité de droit international public, 1922, 8ºed., (Paris: Rousseau & Cnie 
éditeurs), vol. 1, at 450.  
648
 Julio Barberis explains that the patrimonial theory considered territory as the property of the Lord or 
King himself, as shown for instance by the many examples of marriage agreements among 16
th
 
monarchies which provoked the territorial subordination of one State to another (Austria and Hungary) 
or cession of lands which were integrated into the future wife’s dowry. Barberis concludes that this 
conception (territory as the property of a private person) reflected the reality of international relations 
at the time of absolute monarchy, but that it disappeared as soon as the constitutional orders emerged, 
BARBERIS, supra, at 135-136.  
649
 H. LAUTERPACHT, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, 1927, (London: Longman, 
Greens and Co.), Chapter III; and JENNINGS, supra, at 3. Roman institutions particularly developed and 
reached their clearest form when the municipal state of Rome was progressively transformed into a 
world empire, with subject territories outside the Italian borders, in W. SCHOENBORN, supra, at 94. 
650
 The most prominent manifestation of the importance of holding effective control over the land so as 
to create and defend a right overlies the concept of ‘effectivities’. Sir Robert Jennings thus explains that 
the ‘tendency of the law has necessarily been to pay very great regard to the factual possession as 
creating title and excursions in the realms of an abstract title to sovereignty have been cautious and 
tentative.’ To sustain the view that there is widespread rejection of any idea that territorial sovereignty 
might be abstract, he cites Judge Max Huber in the Island of Palmas case, who contended that 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
218 
 
Roman private law are not only visible in the meaning of the title to territorial sovereignty 
itself, but also in the modes by which such title can be acquired (by occupation, prescription, 
cession, accession or accretion, and conquest) or lost (by cession, operations of nature, 
subjugation, prescription, dereliction and ‘revolt’) – all eminent Roman legal institutions. 
However, by considering the territory as the object of a State’s right of property (dominium), 
the patrimonial theory virtually denied the dimension of the State as an entity vested with 
imperium, embodying first and foremost a public authority displayed throughout the territory. 
Such a viewpoint can be seen as resulting from an anachronistic vision of statehood, reluctant 
to dissociate the personality of the State from that of the Head of State. Among the critics of 
this view was, for instance, John Westlake who, in 1914, upheld that ‘each State has a 
sovereignty in and over its territory which presents some points of resemblance to property in 
land, but more important points of difference’, and thus chose to ‘treat territorial sovereignty 
as distinct from property and avoid describing it as eminent domain’.651 Most of the scholarship 
though took a more ambiguous position and preferred maintaining to a great extent the high 
regard for Roman private law institutions put forward by the patrimonial theory, whilst also 
acknowledging the need to consider the mark of the State’s imperium. The general result of 
this loose mix was a legally unsatisfactory depiction of the nature of the right of a State over its 
territory – or territorial sovereignty – as being ‘akin to’ a private law relationship. As J. Brierly 
noted, this expression was ‘in the absence of any better word’, ‘a convenient way of 
contrasting the fullest rights over territory known to the law with the minor territorial rights to 
be later mentioned’.652  
The constitutive theory of territory reacted to this far-fetched consequence of the 
patrimonial theory – namely, the denial of the State’s dimension as a public authority – and, as 
its name indicates, conceived the territory as a constitutive element of the State rather than as 
the object of a State’s right. Despite the fact that this conceptual shift provided an explanation 
of the nature of territorial sovereignty more consistent with reality, its premises were strongly 
                                                                                                                                      
‘international law – the structure of which is not based on any super-state organization – cannot be 
presumed to reduce such a right as territorial sovereignty [t]o the category of an abstract right, without 
concrete manifestations’, JENNINGS, supra, at 5. 
651
 L. OPPENHEIM (ed.), John WESTLAKE: Collected Papers on Public International Law, 1914, 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), at 131. Likewise, almost two decades later, W. 
Schoenborn wrote: ‘les relations juridiques du people de l’État avec le territoire qu’il occupe sont 
assurément toujours considérées comme correspondant à un ‘droit réel’, ‘comme une espèce de 
propriété ou du moins comme un droit analogue à la propriété’, SCHOENBORN, supra, at 92. [Emphasis 
added]. Note that the relation is between the people and the territory, rather than the State and the 
territory, probably as an influence of the geopolitical concept of territory. 
652
 J. BRIERLY, The Law of Nations: an Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 1955, 5
th
 ed., 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), at 150. 
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criticized. Firstly, it was pointed out that the ‘commanding power’ of the State cannot logically 
be exercised over the territory as such, but only over the people inhabiting it.653 This criticism 
was even acknowledged by Carl Victor Fricker – regarded by Julio Barberis as the founder and 
most important representative of the constitutive theory – who distinguished the notion of 
territory (Gebiet) from that of land (Grund, Boden) and defined the former as the space 
inhabited by the people over whom the State displays its power of command.654 Moreover, 
opponents argued that, if territory was to be considered as a constitutive element of the State, 
then any transformation of the territory would necessarily provoke the parallel transformation 
of the nature and identity of the State – a circumstance which, as Eric Suy recalls, only takes 
place in very rare cases of total succession.655 Though the constitutive theory proved very 
useful for the development of the basic tenets of Geopolitik and its organic conception of the 
State, it did not achieve widespread support in international legal scholarship.656  
At the core of both the patrimonial and the constitutive theories of territory is their 
common struggle to establish an explanation of the role played by territory, as a physical 
element, within the State, as an abstract concept. The theory of competence 
(Kompetenztheorie) emerged as a reaction to this impasse and can be considered as the more 
ambitious intention to detach and free the legal nature of territory from its physical 
dimension. In seeking to establish a purely juridical concept of territory – and thereby equally 
‘demystify the State by assimilating it with the legal order’657 – the competence theory 
operated a change of paradigm.658 Triggered by the publication in 1906 of G. Radnitzky’s article 
                                                          
653
 See for instance SUY, supra, at 493, contending: ‘or, il est évident qu’une telle puissance [de 
commandement] ne peut s’exercer que sur des personnes’.  
654
 C.V. FRICKER, Gebiet und Gebietshoheit: Mit Einem Anhang Vom Staatsgebiet, 1901, cited in 
BARBERIS, supra, at 137. 
655
 Explanation is provided by E. Suy, supra, at 494, who cites the work of L. DUGUIT, Traité de Droit 
constitutionnel, 1921-1925, (Paris: Fontemoign et Cie.), vol. I, at 48. See also SCHOENBORN, supra, at 
116: ‘on ne peut pas bien se représenter que l’état puisse se séparer en principe de parties de son 
territoire, c’est-à-dire de parties de son essence! À moins qu’on admet une mutilation du corps de l’État 
analogue à l’amputation d’un membre du corps humain’.  
656
 One of the rare exceptions was Georg Jellinek, who explicitly embraced it when asserting that 
‘without the existence of human beings, we can’t speak of territory, but only of parts of the earth’s 
surface’, in Von menschlichen Subjekten ganz losgelöst gibt es kein Gebiet, sondern nur Teile der 
Erdoberfläsche, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1924, 3
rd
 ed., at 174, cited in BARBERIS, supra, at 138. Perhaps 
the most explicit and lasting trace of influence in international legal scholarship of the constitutive 
theory is the preference of some scholars to consider the population of a State as the first element of 
the State, deserving consideration before the territory. Followers of this position include Scelle, Politis 
and Rousseau himself, see ROUSSEAU, supra, at 18: ‘[L]e premier élément de l’État, comme toute société 
humaine, c’est la population’. 
657
 SUY, supra, at 495.  
658
 Ibid. Suy indeed contends that: ‘[L]es difficultés de l’établissement d’une théorie juridique du territoire 
en droit international proviennent du fait que l’on n’est pas en mesure de se détacher complètement 
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‘Die rechtliche Natur des Staatsgebiets’,659 it was mostly developed by Hans Kelsen’s specific 
application of his monistic doctrine of relations between national and international law, and 
then followed within the Austrian school by A. Verdross.660 The core contention of the theory 
of competence is to consider the territory as nothing but the space where a statist legal order 
is valid661 and within which the State can exercise its coercive power.662 Thus, whilst 
emphasizing the idea of competence, this theory downgrades the role of possession which is 
central to the patrimonial theory; nor does it accept to consider territory as a constitutive 
element of the State, since it presupposes the latter’s existence. The competence theory has 
proven to be particularly useful in explaining cases in which a State, for instance, exercises its 
competences in a territory that does not fall under its sovereignty – that is, in identifying the 
need to differentiate territorial sovereignty from territorial competence. Yet, this 
differentiation is what permits the patrimonial and constitutive theories, on the one hand, and 
competence theory, on the other hand, to be regarded as being complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive. The patrimonial and constitutive theories deal with the creation and 
maintenance of the right to territorial sovereignty; they are concerned with the nature of the 
right over the territory and how such right is created, maintained or lost. The competence 
theory operates after the title or right to territorial sovereignty over a specific portion of the 
earth has been established, and instead focuses on explaining what are the consequences of 
the existence of a right to territorial sovereignty for the validity of the legal order of the State.  
 
Codification of Statehood: Territory in the Montevideo Convention and Subsequent Practice  
 
All in all, it can be considered that to a great extent the legal theories on the bond 
between the State and its territory seemingly reflect the differing faces of ‘territorial 
functionalism’ as revealed in the preceding brief historical account. Yet, since ‘State territory is 
inseparable from statehood’, as Sir Robert Jennings categorically stated, every attempt to 
establish a legal theory of the nature of territory in international law also heavily bears the 
stamp of a particular conception of statehood. Noting that the development of these theories 
                                                                                                                                      
d’une conception physique du territoire pour n’y voir qu’une notion purement juridique’. [Emphasis 
added]. 
659
 G. RADNIZTSKY, ‘Die rechtliche Natur des Staatsgebiets’ [Juridical Nature of the State], (1906) Archiv 
für öffentliches Recht XX, 313 ff.  
660
 See the Commentary of B. CONFORTI, ‘The Theory of Competence in Verdross’, (1994) European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 5, pp. 70-77.  
661
 H. KELSEN, General Theory of the Law and the Law and the State, 1945, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press). 
662
 This second two-fold meaning was added by A. Verdross.  
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of territory only involved European intellectual circles, which to some extent represented the 
views of different ‘national schools’ – the Italian School being the house of the patrimonial 
theory, the German School, that of the constitutive theory, and the Austrian School, that of the 
competence theory, supported or complemented by French and English legal scholarship – it 
does not seem far-fetched to consider that these theories inescapably carried a ‘Eurocentric 
stamp’. 
The relevance of this background arises particularly when considering the impact of Article 
1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (hereafter, the 
Montevideo Convention) on the range of existing understandings of the legal nature of 
territory in international law at the time.663 Establishing a definition of the entities with legal 
personality to which the obligations of the Convention may be applied, Article 1 provided that: 
 
‘The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 
(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter 
into relations with the other states.’ 
 
This provision ‘witnessed ample citation’ among scholarly circles as well as in international 
courts and tribunals and,664 in the absence of a better definition of the State – resulting, for 
instance, from the International Law Commission665 – found few obstacles to its being 
considered as the ‘codification of statehood’, while arguably also existing as a general rule of 
customary international law. This current widespread embrace of the content of Article 1 
contrasts with the regional origin of the Convention, which was adopted at the Seventh 
International Conference of American States by only nineteen States.666 Commenting on the 
Montevideo Convention, T. Grant has argued that the success story of Article 1 is simply the 
reflection of a consensus on its content existing by the time of the Convention’s adoption. Yet, 
                                                          
663
 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), adopted on 26 December 
1933, entered into force on 26 December 1934, 165 L.N.T.S 19. Text reprinted (1974) in American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 28 (Suppl.), at 74.  
664
 See T. GRANT, supra, at 407, who considers that ‘the dearth of examination surrounding elements of 
the Convention’ was due to the existence of ‘consensus on territoriality, population and effectiveness by 
the eve of Montevideo’, at 418. See also J. CRAWFORD ‘The Criteria for Statehood in International Law’ 
(1976–1977) British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 48, at 93; and J. D. VAN DER VYVER, ‘Statehood 
in International Law’ (1991) Emory International Law Review, vol. 5, issue 9, at 14.  
665
 As pointed out by Grant, ideological divisions among UN Member States impeded the adoption by 
the International Law Commission of a draft definition of statehood, in GRANT, supra, at 408 (footnote 
20). 
666
 Regional origin of the convention and the small number of signatories contrasts with its successful 
influence afterwards. The signatories were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United 
States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.  
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when interpreting Article 1 as such, as well as its subsequent impact, neither the importance of 
the wider political context from which the Convention emerged nor the content of other 
provisions of the Convention can be ignored or downgraded.667  
The Convention vividly reflected the main purposes of panamericanism, a movement 
which marked transatlantic international relations of the late 19th century and early 20th 
century. Finding its roots in the Monroe Doctrine and explicitly developed in an 
institutionalized form since 1890, this movement sought to reaffirm the independence of 
young American States from their former European colonial masters. This principled goal is 
clearly expressed in Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention, which provides that ‘the political 
existence of the State is independent of recognition by the other States’. Thereby, the signatory 
States affirmed their acceptance of the declaratory theory of recognition – as opposed to the 
European-led constitutive theory, which is all the more emphasized with the explanation of 
the consequences of recognition set up in Article 6, which reads:  
 
‘The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts 
the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. 
Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.’
668
 
 
When providing that recognition of a political entity as a State by other States has only a 
declaratory effect, the Montevideo Convention conceived statehood as a matter of fact, not of 
law. Article 1 must be read through this prism, as establishing a set of ‘criteria’ – rather than 
elements – which can be objectively recognized and thus serve to prove the factual existence 
of a State, rather than to constitute the State itself.669 The result of this consideration of 
statehood as a matter of fact and the ‘objectivization’ of the criteria enunciated in Article 1, 
particularly those referring to a material existence, such as territory and population, was the 
                                                          
667 This is not an attempt to interpret the legal meaning of Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention by 
applying the Rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. It is just a view that seeks to relocate the definition of the State (and the role played by the 
concept of territory in such definition) in a wider political framework, so as to react against what 
Norberto Bobbio described as the fact that ‘lawyers have seized the problem of the State, and define it in 
this way’, (Los juristas se han adueñado del problema del Estado, y lo definen de esta forma’), in N. 
BOBBIO, N. MATTEUCI y G. PASQUINO (dir.), Diccionario de Política, 2008, (Méjico D.F.: Siglo XXI), vol. 2, 
pp. 1215-1225, at 1220.  
668
 Montevideo Convention, Article 4, supra. Full Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention reads: ‘The 
political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition 
the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and 
prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its 
services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights has no 
other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law.’  
669
 The term ‘criteria’ is borrowed from James Crawford. 
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correlative decline of the need to establish legal theories of the concept of territory and its 
functions in international law. What the territory is for a State and the legal nature of this bond 
is not as important as its actual existence (for the creation of the State) and possibly also of its 
permanence (for the continuation of the State).  
 
2.2. The Meaning of Territory in the Creation of Post-Colonial Pacific Island States 
 
2.2.1. Decolonization and the Creation of Pacific Island States: Limited Territoriality Justified by 
a New Normative Framework 
 
As already pointed out, the legal theories of territory in international law can be said to 
reflect the roles and functions that the territory played in the historical process of formation of 
the European nation-State. The present section considers how the State-building movement 
resulting from 20th century decolonization and which brought about a new form of statehood, 
generally referred to as ‘the post-colonial State’, invites a correlative adaptation of the 
understanding of the role and place of the concept of territory. When applied to the south 
Pacific region, this adaptation helps to explain why the extremely limited territorial extent of 
small Pacific Island States did not impede their constitution as independent State entities.  
The consideration of the State as a matter of fact rather than of law – resulting from 
the conception of recently independent American States and encapsulated in Article 1 of the 
Montevideo Convention – marked the prelude to the new form of the State which would fully 
materialize after the Second World War. The world order that emerged from the smoke and 
ashes was soon polarized by the division between the liberal and the communist blocs headed, 
respectively, by the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, despite their 
paramount confrontation, these two powers were united in their opposition to the 
continuation of the colonial system and thereby facilitated the incorporation of decolonization 
into the agenda of post-war international relations. Far from merely constituting a 
circumstantial political agreement, the new world order was accompanied by a radical shift in 
the normative framework concerning colonies.670 Decolonization and its product, the ‘post-
colonial state’, thus came to embody a new form of statehood; one grounded in a specific 
paradigm that finds its roots in the fourteen points of Woodrow Wilson’s inter-war plea on the 
right to self-determination. 
                                                          
670
 See G. SORENSEN, Changes in Statehood: the Transformation of International Relations, 2001, (New 
York: Palgrave McMillan), at 57.  
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Although decolonization ultimately implied the ‘global imposition’ of the State as the 
universal form of political organization, the resulting heterogeneity of the international system 
cannot be overlooked.671 The acknowledgment of a typology of States based on a 
differentiation between the modern and the post-colonial forms is drawn from M. Weber’s 
ideal types of States. As explained by Georg Sorensen, these ideal types constitute analytical 
constructs or ‘conceptual patterns’ that accentuate selected aspects of historical reality, rather 
than expressing concrete empirical findings.672 Thus, the post-colonial ideal type not only 
constitutes a new ‘form’ of statehood, but is also a potential vehicle of a new ‘understanding’ 
of statehood, complementing and rendering more complex the previous knowledge 
traditionally derived from the modern type of State. One manifestation of the contribution of 
the post-colonial State to the understanding of statehood can be found in, for instance, the 
rise of ‘independence’ as a criterion of statehood that was not only included in the list set up in 
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention but came to be considered by prominent authors, 
such as James Crawford, as the most important criterion of all.673  
As the criteria of independence became the cornerstone of post-colonial State-
building, other criteria listed in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention – both material and 
immaterial – decreased in value. Again, G. Sorensen clearly explains the general consequence 
of this move when he states that ‘the normative framework around decolonization gave the 
right of independence to ex-colonies no matter what level of actual weakness that they 
displayed’.674 It is in this context that one can understand how a set of entities with such an 
extremely limited territorial extent as that of the small Pacific island countries could emerge in 
the international system in the form of independent States, to which all the attributes of 
statehood (formal equality, territorial integrity, right to self-defence, etc.) were granted, in 
spite of their questionable capacity to exercise or protect them. The predominance of the 
normative framework in which Pacific Island States emerged as independent entities implied 
that both the material and the non-material elements of the State were subject to different 
standards from those of the modern European States. Therefore, in the meaning of territory 
for these new players in the international system, States must be attached to the specific 
                                                          
671
 As G. Sorensen remarks, despite the fact that authors from the fields of international relations and of 
international law generally have a good consideration of decolonization as a political and historical 
process – dynamics – with an enormous impact on the current shape of the international system, both 
disciplines tend to develop their theories on the basis of the modern State. 
672
 SORENSEN, supra, at 73.   
673
 This position is consistently defended by J. CRAWFORD in The Creation of States in International Law, 
supra. 
674
 SORENSEN, supra, at 83.  
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
225 
 
functionality framework of territory. In order to grasp the functionality played by the concept 
of territory in the South Pacific region and explain the emergence of micro-States in this area, 
one is again compelled to go outside the realm of law and review the historical turning points 
of the region.  
What is today referred to as the Pacific Island States corresponds to the division of 
over 20,000 islands into twelve independent political entities, scattered over an immensely 
wide oceanic space and surrounded by disproportionally big continental territories – the South 
American coasts of Peru and Chile to the east, the Oceanic New Zealand and Australian 
territories to the south and south-west, respectively, and, moving towards the north-west, the 
Asian coast to the west covering the coasts of Indonesia, Philippines and Japan. In spite of their 
recently acquired statehood, the limited extent of the territory of these entities – coupled with 
the considerable distances between the islands that form such territory and their economic 
underdevelopment – make them a good example of ‘weak players’ produced by 
decolonization. Hence, these sometimes condescendingly labelled ‘micro-States’ are 
associated with images of remoteness, smallness, vulnerability and, more recently, with a set 
of actors who, despite being completely devoid of power in the international system, insist on 
claiming the need for international action to stop the threat that climate change impacts 
constitute for their survival as States.  
And yet, the history of the Pacific Island States suggests exactly the opposite. Far from 
having been disconnected from the world’s history, this region has had close bonds with the 
big powers of each historical epoch ever since the 16th century. The history of this assemblage 
of scattered islands spread over the biggest and most unpredictable of the world’s oceans is 
the story of a transformation effected over five different ages or epochs, each of which has 
different repercussions that go far beyond their small geographical size. From being the object 
of the major powers’ geopolitical interests during the first ‘ages’ of discovery and colonization, 
or the theatre of these powers’ confrontation and their striving to establish a balance of power 
in the 20th century, the newly emerged Pacific Island States have become actors of the 
international system, themselves owners of their own geopolitical calculations and bound to 
face the specific post-colonial security struggles that make the region highly dependent on 
different forms of inter-regional and international co-operation.  
The ‘age of discovery’ marked the beginning of the region’s connection with European 
States in the early modern period. As reported by historian Mercedes Matoro Camino, after 
Fernando Magallanes completed his circumnavigation between 1519 and 1521, three Spanish 
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expeditions, conducted by Álvaro de Mendaña de Neira and Pedro Fernández de Quirós,675 
departed from the west coast of South America to the Mares del Sur (the South Seas) in search 
of a large Southern Continent referred to as Terra Australis Incognita or Terra Magellanica.676 
These explorations were followed by Portuguese and Dutch excursions, which competed with 
potential Spanish interests, but also helped the elaboration of the first cartographic images of 
the south-east Pacific, thus transforming it into a geo-political space of ‘geographical, 
economic, missionary or colonial importance’.677 From that time to the last voyage of James 
Cook in the last third of the 18th century, early European fascination would progressively 
evolve into the mercantilist system in which the Pacific became subjected to European colonial 
domination.  
The strength of these colonial bonds increased particularly as the Pacific territories not 
only constituted a source of trade but also mirrored the transforming balance of power 
occurring in Europe from the 18th century onwards. During the period referred to by Eric 
Hobsbawm as ‘The Age of Empire’ (1875–1914), the decay of the Spanish, Portuguese and 
Dutch presence in the region was replaced by the increasingly important French, British and 
then German naval forces.678 First, the French incursion into the Pacific began between 1840 
and 1850 with the annexation of the Marquesas Islands, New Caledonia (Nouvelle Calédonie) 
and Tahiti, followed by the Loyalty Islands in 1864.The great expansion of the British Empire 
over the Pacific started in 1874 with the annexation, through the Treaty of Cession with King 
Catabau, of the roughly 300 islands of Fiji. By the time Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria 
was assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914, Britain had: established its presence in south-eastern 
New Guinea after a partition agreement with Germany (1884); proclaimed British Protectorate 
over Tokelau (1889) and the Gilbert Islands – today Kiribati – (1892); negotiated an Anglo-
French Treaty of Condominium of the New Hebrides (today Vanuatu) in 1906; and put an end 
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 The first expedition, led by Álvaro de Mendaña de Neira in 1567, departed from Lima (Peru) and led 
to the discovery of the Solomon Islands in 1567. The second expedition, also led by Mendaña de Neira, 
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to the dispute with the United States on the recognition of Britain’s presence in the Ellice 
Islands (today Tuvalu), the Solomon Islands and Tonga.679 Yet, by the last decade of the 19th 
century, this playground of world powers would reflect how British dominance was gradually 
being challenged by the rise of Germany.680 Four years after having taken control of north-east 
New Guinea (1884), Germany annexed Nauru (1888) and began mining the island’s phosphate 
deposits through a consortium with the British Phosphate Commission. Germany’s increasing 
negotiating power also led to the division of Western Samoa (today Samoa) by agreement with 
the United States, concluded after the previously failed attempt to reach a tripartite 
agreement to include Britain. In addition to this imposition of its own space among those of 
the other already present powers, Germany took over the very last remnants of the Spanish 
Empire and purchased the Marianas and Caroline Islands (today Palau) a year after Spain’s 
symbolic loss of Cuba in the Spanish–American War (1898). It also spread its influence on the 
islands north of the equator by establishing the Protectorate of the Marshall Islands. 
Meanwhile, the United States maintained a low profile and its timid presence in the region was 
primarily driven by its concern for the trade route with China and Japan. Thus, right before the 
turn of the century, the United States acquired Hawaii and the island of Guam, the annexation 
of which in the same year was also an outcome of the Spanish–American War (1898). A year 
later, the USA also acquired American Samoa (following the 1890 three-powers Convention, 
although the USA only formally took power in 1926) and agreed to recognize the British 
presence in Tonga.  
The starting point of the ‘age of confrontation’ – which essentially matches Eric 
Hobsbawm’s ‘short 20th century’ (1914–1991) – was the outbreak of the Grande Guerre. 
Though the Pacific islands were spared direct destructive forces in World War I, the outcome 
of the war was nevertheless reflected once more in the region. As the German presence was 
completely eliminated, the decline of the British Empire in favour of rising regional powers 
(Australia, New Zealand and Japan) was evident. The presence of Australia, which till the war 
had been limited to the acquisition, by transfer, of former British New Guinea in 1902, grew 
since its occupation of the phosphate island of Nauru, as well as of German New Guinea, 
during the war. From 1919 to 1939, Nauru remained under an Australian administration 
exercised under a League of Nations’ mandate, jointly held by Britain, Australia and New 
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Zealand. Likewise, New Zealand’s presence in the small Pacific islands – limited until then to 
the transfer by Britain of the Cook Islands in 1901 – rose as it became the administering power 
of the former German Western Samoa in 1918 and received the administration of Tokelau 
from Great Britain in 1925. Yet, the deciding shift in the geo-political balance of the region in 
the aftermath of World War I was the rise of Japan as an important maritime power in the 
region, which may be said to have started since its victory in the battle of Tsuchima against the 
Russian Empire in 1905. Japan’s growing colonial expansion towards the south Pacific led to its 
occupation of the islands north of the equator (the Marianas, Caroline and Marshall Islands) 
during World War I. It then succeeded to these former German colonies which were united 
and renamed the Pacific Islands Territory and which it administered – supposedly – on behalf 
of the League of Nations. This would nonetheless prove to be a dead letter, since the islands 
became key naval and air bases and were used as platforms for attacking the US naval base of 
Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Hence, from being the playground of world powers, the 
Pacific islands became a battlefield of the Second World War and the place where the turning 
point of the strife – as well as of world history – took place. For a short period of time during 
the war, Japan enjoyed a dominant power position in the south Pacific, occupying Nauru, the 
Solomon and the Gilbert Islands and exercising direct political control of Papua New Guinea. 
Yet, the act of aggression of the Japanese Imperial Army against the U.S. naval base in Hawaii 
triggered the direct involvement of the American forces which would be determinant in the 
victory of the Allies, and was counterbalanced in 1943 by the major American victories against 
Japan in the islands of Makin and Tarawa (today part of Kiribati). After the war, the Japanese 
presence in the Pacific islands was almost completely eliminated. As the settlers were 
repatriated to Japan and the country deprived of all its overseas possessions, Japan’s new 
constitution provided that it would renounce the use of force and would only allocate 1% of its 
GDP to defence spending. The United States retained the exclusive control of all the naval and 
air bases around Japan (including the Okinawa base) and complemented Japan’s minimum 
self-defence arrangements by the 1951 Mutual Security Agreement. Thus, the succession to 
the USA of islands formerly under Japanese administration, after the end of World War II, 
correlatively inaugurated American dominance in the region through the establishment in 
1946 of the UN Strategic Trust Territory – covering the Marianas, Caroline and Marshall 
Islands. Moreover, in parallel with the conclusion of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with 
Japan, the USA promoted the creation of ANZUS, a defence alliance with Australia and New 
Zealand that reaffirmed the position of these regional powers.  
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The American dominance of the islands through the establishment of the Pacific Trust 
Territory, which covered an area of over 7.5 million sq. km., became very important during this 
period, as it was used by the United States in the Korean and Vietnam Wars of 1954 and 1962, 
respectively. Once again acting as a mirror of the major States’ balance of power, the region 
also witnessed – particularly since the 1980s – the surrounding presence of Soviet naval forces 
which had began an expansion towards the South Pacific. Fearing that the Pacific islands might 
become ‘a new Cuba’, the United States unsuccessfully tried to convince Japan to play a 
greater role in the defence of the Pacific, whilst, in parallel, seeking to reinforce the USA’s 
nuclear presence in the area through the operation of the ANZUS agreement. Yet, the 
reluctance of Australia and New Zealand to let U.S. nuclear-powered ships and aircraft use 
their bases led to the cancellation of the 1985 defence exercise as well as the end of 
intelligence co-operation with New Zealand. To counterbalance this situation, the USA 
concluded in 1984 an agreement with Fiji allowing the deployment of nuclear-powered 
warships from the port of Suva, Fiji’s capital.  
It is of course within the Cold War context that the south-east Pacific Island States 
began their ‘age of independence’. Although A. J. Christopher indicates that the renaming of 
French Settlements in the Pacific Ocean as French Polynesia in August 1957 can be considered 
as ‘the first official hint of Pacific island ethnic nationalism’,681 the files on this region were not 
ready to be closed before the early 1970s, with a few exceptions. Considering Pacific islands as 
being at ‘last ripe for decolonization’, David McIntyre emphatically stated that ‘in all earlier 
discussions about the future of smaller territories, the Pacific islands were at the bottom of the 
list, always in the “never” category’.682 The reluctance of administering and colonial forces to 
decolonize Pacific islands partly illustrated the Anglo-American approach to self-
determination, but also stemmed from the fear of dilution of the United Nations by several 
territories allegedly too small to support their own statehood.683 Yet, the decolonization of the 
region was triggered in 1961 when the United Nations prompted the American government to 
speed up the constitutional advances in the Pacific Trust Territory. Western Samoa (1962) and 
Nauru (1968), both under U.S. trusteeship since World War II, were therefore the first to 
acquire independence in the region. They were followed by the British Protectorates of Tonga 
(1970) and Fiji (1971).684 Tonga, Western Samoa and Fiji were thus able to attend the first 
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‘Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting’, in 1971, a new-style gathering that was held 
for the first time outside London – in Singapore – 685 and where the Commonwealth 
Declaration of Principles and the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation were 
adopted. While, in the mid-1970s, Papua New Guinea acquired independence as a single State 
(1975),686 the single British Protectorate over the Gilbert and Ellice Islands was fragmented 
into two new States following the 1974 referendum. On the one hand, the former Ellice Islands 
– with a majority Polynesian population – acquired independence as Tuvalu in 1978. It was 
followed a year later (1979) by Kiribati – with a majority Micronesian population – constituted 
by the former Gilbert, Phoenix and Line Islands, along with a special status for the phosphate 
island of Banaba (formerly Ocean Island). By the turn of the 1980s, the former Anglo-French 
condominium of the New Hebrides was dissolved and became independent as Vanuatu (1980), 
thus marking the only French retreat from the region.687 Finally, the UN Pacific Trust Territory 
composed of the islands north of the equator was fragmented into four parts. In 1986, the 
Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands acquired statehood, followed by Palau 
which, after separating from the Federated States of Micronesia in 1978, also acquired 
statehood, in 1994.688 All three chose a compact of free association with the United States as 
their preferred form of political organization,689 while the Marianas Islands, Guam and Hawaii 
were integrated into the United States. Likewise, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau were 
integrated into New Zealand as territories.690  
 
2.2.2. Micro-States in the United Nations: Limited Territoriality Superseded by Active 
Participation in the International Community 
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This reminder of the decolonization of Pacific Island States serves the purpose of 
explaining how statehood could be acquired by political entities with a very small territorial 
extent, limited population and being economically underdeveloped. Simply put, the 
territorialization of nationhood in the case of this region can be said to be a function of the 
exercise of the right to self-determination, an expression of such right. As such, the territory 
conveys the necessary physical support for these colonized ‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ to achieve 
formal independence from western colonial control; it is at the disposal of a very specific 
normative framework superseding the downfalls that very small newly emerged States may 
endure in the effective exercise of their State competences. If the historical and political 
context in which the Pacific Island States emerged explains how they could acquire formal 
independence despite their small geographical size, it is equally important to account for the 
means by which they were able to survive as members of the international community. 
Considering how they could effectively act ‘as States’ is tantamount to exploring their 
substantial inequality and to assessing whether, after being freed from colonial rule, these 
peoples’ self-determination attained a full level of realization.691  
As in the rest of the world, decolonization did not put an end to the dependence of 
now newly emerged Pacific Island States on their former ruling power. During the new ‘age of 
co-operation’, the former colonial dependencies remained functional under the informal 
control of some world powers, who maintained their presence in the region through economic 
and political support. The framework for institutional co-operation with former colonial 
powers in the region was first dominated by the acquisition, by most of the former non-self-
governing territories, of membership (either full or associate) of the Commonwealth, which 
put dominant British presence in the region back on track.692 This membership included States 
that had chosen independence as the political form of their statehood (Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa), as well 
the self-governing entities in a compact of free association with another State (Federated 
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States of Micronesia, Palau, Marshall Islands, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau).693 In the case of 
these free-association States, irrespective of their Commonwealth membership, the compacts 
of free association logically created particular and additional bilateral ties. The western – 
particularly European – presence in the region also materialized through the creation of the 
South Pacific Commission. Nonetheless, by the time the UK had entered the European Union, 
in 1973, the South Pacific Commission was replaced by the Pacific Island States Secretariat – 
which then became the Pacific Islands Forum, in 2000, to which France, the UK and the USA 
were not invited to be members; their leadership was replaced by today’s main regional 
powers, namely, Australia and New Zealand. Since its creation, the importance of this co-
operative framework has increased so as to become a vehicle of financial development 
through aid flows, technical assistance and defence co-operation (including disaster-relief 
services) from these two countries to the Pacific Island States. More recently, the European 
Union’s inclination to renew an active collaboration with Pacific Island States seems to be 
competing not only with Australia and New Zealand, but also with the rising active interest of 
the Chinese investment sector in creating a zone of influence in Oceania.694  
The inherently weak governmental and economic structures of Pacific Island States 
following decolonization undeniably favoured the maintenance of an informal but critical 
dependence on established economic and political relations with a former colonial power.695 
Therefore, qualifying for UN membership represented, for these States, unsurprisingly, the 
assurance that a future release from such informal control was possible and would allow them 
to finally achieve the right to self-determination. The United Nations was thus seen as a solid 
structure which could provide an alternative protection;696 a forum of dialogue between the 
newly emerged States and their former rulers, where the Pacific Island States could, as W. 
Harris puts it, ‘publicize grievances and forge public support which may ultimately be the most 
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effective tactic available when a microstate cannot defend itself, or when regional assistance is 
not available to limit coercion’.697  
Yet, the qualification of micro-States (including Pacific Island States) for UN 
membership was far from being easily accepted,698 particularly by the British and American 
representatives. While the preliminary question of how to define a ‘micro-State’ was not 
completely resolved,699 the heated debate within the UN on this issue is a vivid reminder of 
how smallness can be nothing but a relative weakness, since, in the context of institutionalized 
co-operation – particularly in one such as the United Nations, which is based on the principle 
of formal equality – the leverage of the majority can, at least in principle, supersede the 
control of the powerful. Thus, aware of the limited capacities of small island States, the view 
rapidly spread in the corridors of the UN that small could equally be ‘dangerous’700 – a 
perception which, interpreted through Marxist lenses, corresponds to the traditional fear of 
‘the tyranny of the majority’. By admitting to UN membership a set of small States – including 
twelve Pacific Island States), large powers would account for only for one third of the total UN 
membership, in spite of providing 90% of the organization’s budget.701 In contrast, the 
‘newcomers’ could at least hypothetically use their collective voting strength to ‘influence 
political decisions and shape the policy in the organs of the United Nations’.702 Apart from the 
political imbalances that could result from the qualification of States for UN membership, their 
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eventual repercussion on the stability of international affairs was also contemplated, fearing 
that the entrance of these States might provoke an excessive effect of regional issues, so that 
the East–West bipolar confrontation would, consequently, become multi-polar.  
In contrast, other political considerations in favour of the admission of micro-States703 
highlighted the idea that the universalization of the United Nations was a goal to be sought for 
the organization to enable it to transcend its original core role of maintaining international 
peace and security and fulfil a ‘higher’ idealist goal, that of becoming ‘an organization in which 
nearly all nations can bring their influence to bear upon problems of mutual concern and in 
turn are influenced by the policies and needs of other States’.704 This group of supporters relied 
on the normative argument in favour of the full realization of the right to self-determination 
and considered that denying UN membership to these newly independent States could be 
equated to a ‘pro-colonialist’ stand. Finally, defenders of micro-State membership of the UN 
argued that the context of Cold War détente was far more appropriate; international stability 
would be increased by broadening the organization’s membership, and would give ‘more 
multidimensional, more pluralistic and perhaps more realistic interpretations of UN 
developments’ whilst, as W. Harris explains, ‘seen from the perspective of the arms race, the 
faulting of small states for their inability to carry out Charter obligations by rendering military 
support to the UN becomes less persuasive when the political environment produced by the 
thermonuclear age is considered’.705 
It is in the context of these competing political calculations that the question of 
whether micro-States would actually have the capacity to fulfil their membership obligations 
was raised. Although it may be said that this issue was raised in support of the previously 
mentioned political considerations opposing their entrance – and thus operates in a highly 
politicized context – it was a question belonging to the realm of law in so far as it called for the 
application of Article 4 of the United Nations Charter. This provision contains the conditions 
necessary to qualify for UN membership and implies that statehood is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition; a candidate entity must not only ‘be a State’, but also ‘in the judgment of 
the Organization, be able and willing to carry out the obligations contained on the Charter’.706 
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The introduction of the criteria of capacity hints at the traditional weight of the criterion of 
effectiveness in the shaping of international rules, which had already been previously revealed 
in 1928 when Lichtenstein’s application for membership to the League of Nations was 
rejected.707 It is also a view consistent with the idea that the UN system constituted a 
reflection of the prevalence of the so-called ‘concept of large powers’ in the 1948 San 
Francisco Conference.708 
In an attempt to reconcile the core of the opposed political interests – universalization 
of the United Nations vis-à-vis preserving a similar allocation of voting power within the 
General Assembly – proposals for an alternative status to that of full membership were raised 
and discussed both in academic circles and within UN organs. The possibility of granting micro-
States with observer status was first raised by former Secretary-General U-Thant in 1965. It is a 
status with no firm legal basis which rests on UN practice and does not require amendment of 
the Charter. Being a member of a UN organ or specialized agency and recognized as a State by 
a majority of UN Member States are the requirements settled by practice. Yet, observers do 
not have the right to oral or to written participation in the General Assembly or the Security 
Council and would not be able to make proposals in these organs either. The possibility of 
regional memberships was therefore also raised, according to which a group of States would 
participate and vote jointly. This proposal had the inconvenience of requiring amendment of 
the UN Charter and was unlikely to work well in practice, for neighbouring States often have 
great disparities – especially in the context of intense nationalistic feelings existing in new 
small States.709 Yet, the most prominent proposal that was discussed within the UN Security 
Council was that of creating a form of associate membership. A year after UNITAR conducted 
its report, written by Jacques Rapoport, on the issues of micro-States, the U.S. delegate to the 
Security Council proposed to grant micro-States an associate member status that would give 
                                                                                                                                      
of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 2. The admission of any such 
state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon 
the recommendation of the Security Council.’ Besides, criteria for UN membership were developed in 
UNGA Res. 1514/XV, ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, 
adopted on 14 December 1960, 947
th
 plenary meeting, document reference: A/RES/1514 (XV), as well as 
by the ICJ advisory opinion on Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the UN, 1948, 57 
and ‘Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State’ (Advisory Opinion, 1950) ICJ 
Reports 4.  
707
 Before 1960, Luxembourg and Iceland were the only UN member micro-states.  
708
 The idea lying behind the concept of large powers is that international peace and security can best be 
conducted and maintained with an international community composed of big States, because these are 
more stable than small States – particularly in the aftermath of World War II and at a time when 
institutional co-operation was not yet so much developed. 
709
 Other proposals included the so-called ‘Fisher proposal’, consisting of a weighted vote and technical 
and information assistance provided by the permanent secretariat, in WARRIS, supra, at 48.  
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them the right to attend a meeting of ‘special interest’ to the micro-State in question, and 
eventually the right to actively participate – with no right to vote – in meetings in which the 
micro-State’s interests were directly involved.710 This solution was presented as a ‘possibility 
commensurate with its [the micro-states] capabilities’ that, in the eyes of the U.S. delegation, 
had the advantage of not requiring amendment of the Charter, for the General Assembly could 
create a new category and define the duties, privileges, and benefits of it.711 As a result of the 
American proposal, a ‘Mini-State Committee’ was established to report back to the Security 
Council, in time for this organ to make recommendations to the General Assembly during its 
24th session.712 The expert committee on the matter resumed eight times in closed meetings, 
surrounded by the general feeling that the USA was trying to force the situation and rush the 
matter, and opposition from other newly independent States which defended the view that 
imposing new criteria for admission was an attack. It was then, within the Committee, that the 
British delegation proposed an alternative form of associate membership, though this solution 
did not achieve agreement in the interim report of the Committee that was sent to the 
Security Council. Finally, both the USA and the UK proposals would be dismissed because, 
apart from the outstanding issue of the definition of a micro-State pointed out earlier by J. 
Rapoport, the UN legal department considered that a Charter amendment would in either of 
the two cases be required. As a result, in a last attempt to control the entrance of micro-
States, the USA sought to reactivate the role of the Admissions Committee as soon as the 
application of Fiji was filed, in 1970. Although the USA achieved its purpose, the resurrection 
of the Admission Committee, in practice, made no difference to the case of Fiji, nor that of the 
other micro-State applications that followed; the Admission Committee would simply convene 
for a few minutes and recommend the admission unanimously. 
The genealogy of the territory concept briefly presented above has revealed how the 
evolving meaning of the concept reflects the range of functions it has historically been called 
upon to play, and how such roles have been tackled from three main different legal 
standpoints. This historical and functionalist approach unveils the double condition of territory 
as being both a physical reality and a legal construct, two dimensions that are essential to the 
creation of States and which find in State theory a common ground. The three legal theories of 
territory have also demonstrated that, when assessing ‘the role’ or ‘the meaning’ of territory in 
                                                          
710
 UNSC, Verbatim Record, S/PV.1505 (1969); and UNSC, Verbatim Record, S/PV.L1506 (1969).  
711
 These competences derive from Articles 10 and 11 of the UN Charter, together with Article 21 of the 
General Assembly Rules of Procedure. 
712
 M. M. GUNTER, ‘The Problem of Mini-state Membership in the UN System: Recent Attempts Toward 
a Solution’, (1973) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 12, at 470-472.  
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international rules governing statehood, one ultimately needs to question the nature of the 
relationship between these two dimensions. 
Assessing the effects of transformation or loss of territory of an existing State entity – 
a process referred to hereafter as ‘de-territorialization’713 – correlatively implies the existence 
of the same double-edged meaning of the term ‘territory’. Hence, de-territorialization is to be 
understood as a bipartite process involving: (1) the set of physical changes in the territory of a 
State; and (2) the transformation of the territorial rights of the State as a result of such 
physical changes. It is equally a process that can be divided into two main scenarios 
corresponding to different stages of development and increased gravity. Scenario 1 (developed 
in Section 3 below) deals with limited or partial de-territorialization of a State, as currently 
observed in several Pacific island countries, and involves cases of acute coastal erosion, 
whereby the coastal geography of some particularly vulnerable features of an island State – in 
particular coral reefs and atolls – is transformed. This invites exploring not only the physical 
manifestations of climate change impacts on the land occupied by a State, but also the legal 
effects of these changes on the maritime spaces corresponding to such land and which are also 
an integral part of a State’s spatial dimension.  
Scenario 2 (developed in Section 4 below) contemplates the possibility of total loss of 
territory, as may be projected for at least the three Pacific Island States that are entirely low-
lying land: Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands.714 This – for now – hypothetical case raises 
the question of whether a completely de-territorialized State can or should survive as a 
sovereign independent entity, and calls for an exploration of the devices that would become 
necessary to ensure the continuation of statehood: from physical re-territorialization 
strategies, such as cession by or purchase of land of another State, to a legal fiction creating a 
sui generis sovereign entity through recognition of an ‘ex situ nationhood’. 
                                                          
713
 The basic meaning of the Latin prefix ‘de-’ is: ‘away’, ‘off’; it generally indicates reversal or removal in 
English.  
714
 Outside the Pacific Ocean, the fourth most endangered State in the world is the Maldives. In the 
south-east Pacific, Tokelau could also be included in this study, but since it is a New Zealand territory, its 
continuation as a State is not really at stake. This situation is to be distinguished from that of the 
Marshall Islands, which are in a free association with the United States and yet, as clarified by Crawford, 
the political organization of an entity does not alter its condition as a state. All other Pacific Island States 
are a mix of different types of features, and generally count with coral atolls, high coral islands, 
continental islands and volcanic or high volcanic islands. Therefore, while as a whole the region is 
undoubtedly vulnerable and directly exposed to various manifestations of the adverse impacts of 
climate change, the concrete effect of such impacts on the topographical features of an island State is 
subject to important variations.   
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3. SCENARIO 1. PARTIAL DE-TERRITORIALIZATION OF PACIFIC ISLAND STATES: JEOPARDIZING 
THE MARITIME SPACES OF THE STATE  
 
3.1. Effects of Coastal Geographical Changes on Maritime Rights 
Since the early stages of climate change regime-building, small island developing 
States have been undeniably confronted with the darkest face of the phenomenon. While 
today the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is perhaps a striking reminder 
of this image, the vulnerability of small island developing States – generally defined as the 
propensity or predisposition to be negatively affected by climate change impacts – was never 
disregarded within mainstream international co-operation on this issue.715 Integrative 
approaches to evaluating the ‘vulnerability profile’ of a region or country take into account a 
range of factors in which the biophysical attributes of the area studied, its socio-economic and 
even its cultural characteristics are taken into- consideration. Climate change effects can thus 
be measured across different thematic areas, including for instance health impacts (disasters 
due to climate-sensitive diseases), economic stress (tourism, industry and asset losses), 
weather disasters (deaths and damage caused by storms, floods and wildfires), and habitat 
loss (population at risk due to desertification and sea-level rise).716 Within the latter thematic 
area and despite difficulties in creating clear climate modelling scenarios, it is possible to 
assert that the spatial dimension of small island developing States is particularly vulnerable to 
three specific types of climate change effects: sea-level rise, ocean acidification and the 
increase in ocean temperature. Thereby, the coasts of these States are where de-
territorialization is essentially located.  
The progressively increasing coastal erosion and land loss as a consequence of sea-
level rise has long been on the international agenda. It dates back to the campaign launched by 
the Maldives which sought to raise awareness of this issue at the 1984 Commonwealth 
Ministerial Meeting which, as recalled in paragraph 13 of the UNFCCC Preamble, was followed 
by the successful introduction of the item into the work of the General Assembly.717 As already 
                                                          
715
 IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advanced Climate Change Adaptation, 
C. B. Field, V. Barros, T. F. Stocker, D. Qin, D. J. Dokken, K. L. Ebi, M. D. Mastrandrea, K. J. Mach, G.-K. 
Plattner, S. K. Allen, M. Tignor, P. M. Midgley (eds.), 2012, (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge 
University Press), at 4.  
716
 This is the division followed by the Climate Vulnerability Monitor: The State of the Climate Crisis, 
2010 Report of the Climate Vulnerability Initiative, 2012, (Madrid: DARA).   
717
 Paragraph 13 of the UNFCCC Preamble reads: Recalling also the provisions of General Assembly 
Resolution 44/206 of 22 December 1989 on the possible adverse effects of sea-level rise on islands and 
coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal areas and the pertinent provisions of General Assembly 
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acknowledged in 1997 by the IPCC in its Report entitled ‘Regional Impacts of Climate Change: 
An Assessment of their Vulnerability’, sea-level rise is ‘the most significant climate-related 
projection for small islands’. At the time of publication of the report, the projected estimate of 
future global sea-level rise was 5mm/yr (with a range of 2–9mm/yr); that is, ‘2 to 4 times 
higher than what had been experienced globally over the past 100 years’.718 While the report 
recognized that the level of vulnerability would vary from island to island, it considered that 
‘practically all small island States would be adversely affected by sea-level rise’. In the south 
Pacific region, the twelve independent small island States are indeed of different nature and 
composition and, while most of them are coral islands, there are also several continental, old 
volcanic and high volcanic features in the Pacific region. 
Climate change impacts are particularly harmful for the coastal geography of features 
based on coral skeletons. First of all, low-lying coral atolls with an altitude of less than 5 metres 
are undoubtedly the most directly exposed to sea-level rise – inundations and sea flooding 
having already been projected in 1997 for the Marshall Islands and Kiribati.719 Secondly, coral 
atolls below 5m altitude and raised coral islands with an average altitude of 60m, along with 
the coral reefs surrounding them, are extremely vulnerable to progressive bleaching primarily 
due to increased ocean temperature and ocean acidification by carbon dioxide.720 Recent 
studies have categorized South-East Asia as the region with both the highest level of 
biodiversity and the greatest degree of threat to reefs (followed by the Caribbean),721 since in 
                                                                                                                                      
Resolution 44/172 of 19 December 1989 on the implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat 
Desertification.  
718
 IPCC, IPCC, Regional Impacts of Climate Change: an Assessment of their Vulnerability, R. T. WATSON, 
M. C. ZINYOWERA, R. H. MOSS (eds.), 1997, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), chapter 9. 
719
 Ibid. 
720
 According to the Global Island Database, islands host 65% of the world’s coral reefs and include 14 of 
the 20 largest coral-reef countries. The livelihoods of islanders are inextricably linked to coral reefs, as 
they provide a source of food, protection from natural hazards, and a significant attraction for tourists. 
The increase in the atmospheric carbon concentration and in the sea-surface temperature fosters coral 
bleaching. A compilation of the global distribution of reefs can be found in UNEP-World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre (WCMC), Global Distribution of Coral Reefs - Extracted from Version 7.0 of the Global 
1km Raster Dataset Compiled by the UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 2002, (Cambridge, 
UK: ReefBase). Detailed information on the location and degree of bleaching can be found in the 
database Information on Global Coral Bleaching, ReefBase Project, WorldFish Center. This dataset is 
built upon an existing bleaching database developed at UNEP-WCMC, and has been maintained and 
regularly updated by ReefBase since 2002 from a variety of sources. The data indicate the severity of 
bleaching, categorized as low (1–10% corals bleached), medium (10–30% of corals bleached), or high 
(>30% of corals bleached). 
721
 L. BURKE et al., Reefs at Risk in Southeast Asia (RRSEA), 2002 (Washington D.C.: World Resources 
Institute). Reefs at Risk in Southeast Asia followed up the 1998 Global Reefs at Risk project conducted by 
the same institution. The current 2002 RRSEA analysis was implemented with more than 20 partner 
institutions in the region and provided a more detailed study, incorporating new features such as 
natural vulnerability, management effectiveness of protected areas and economic evaluation. In 2004, a 
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many parts of the tropics species of corals live near their temperature tolerance limits (25°–
29°C).722 
The socio-economic and ecological impacts of the physical loss of land due to coastal 
erosion of these features are undisputable. Yet, in this scenario, when approaching the legal 
consequences of coastal geographical transformation, the focus shifts towards Pacific Island 
States’ rights over maritime spaces.723 In a partial de-territorialization scenario, an assessment 
of how the spatial dimension of Pacific Island States is affected by the adverse impacts of 
climate change therefore implies studying how the transformation of the coastal geography of 
several coral features may jeopardize these States’ present rights over valuable ocean space. 
In making such an assessment, the following points consider the implication of climate change 
impacts for the law of baselines by which the outer boundary of Pacific Island States in oceanic 
zones is determined, by distinguishing delimited from undelimited maritime boundaries. 
 
3.1.1. Coastal Geographical Transformation and Undelimited Maritime Boundaries  
 
Maritime Extent of Pacific Island States and the Law of Baselines 
 
In contrast to the extreme smallness of their terrestrial space, Pacific Island States soon 
benefited from the ‘expansionist’ evolution in the distribution of ownership and jurisdiction 
over maritime spaces initiated after World War II and eventually crystallized by the adoption of 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).724 The consolidation, at 
the Third International Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973–1982), of the width of the 
territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles offshore and, most importantly, the possibility for coastal 
States to expand their jurisdiction and exploit the resources of the newly created Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) virtually compensated the land limitations of Pacific Island States’ with 
disproportionately immense maritime spaces. Other than signifying an objectively added value 
to their spatial dimension and despite the fact that their capacity to effectively exploit and 
                                                                                                                                      
similar study on the state on the reefs in the Caribbean basin was conducted, see L. BURKE and J. 
MAIDENS, Reefs at Risk in the Caribbean, 2004, (Washington DC: World Resources Institute). With 
regard to coral bleaching, the UNEP–WCMC maintains and regularly updates a database.   
722
 IPCC, Regional Impacts Report, supra. See also, UNEP–WCMC 2008. Annual Sea-Surface Temperature 
2003–2007 (derived from the NASA ‘OceanColor’ database), Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, UK. 
723
 Territorial changes are not at all unfamiliar to international law, including the notion of accretion or 
transformation caused by nature.   
724
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in Vienna (Austria) on 10 
December 1982; entered into force on 16 November 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. Although it entered into 
force only in 1994, many rules contained in the Convention were considered as already existing under 
customary international law. 
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control these big spaces is sometimes limited,725 this maritime extension provided for a source 
of income and livelihoods that would prove significantly important for the economic 
development and habitability of these States. Therefore, any effects of adverse climate change 
impacts on Pacific Island States’ maritime spaces should be considered both from the 
standpoint of territorial rights and from the perspective of the economic viability of the 
State.726  
As the earlier ‘cannon-shot rule’ vanished and the width of maritime spaces became fixed 
on the basis of geographical criteria,727 the use of traced baselines longing the coasts, and from 
which the outer boundaries of all maritime zones are measured, was established. UNCLOS 
provides that the normal baseline is the ‘low-water line along the coast’728, though in the case 
of very irregular coasts, States can trace straight baselines.729 Special rules also govern the 
tracing of baselines for reefs730 as well as for island States eligible to claim archipelagic 
status.731 After tracing the baseline in accordance with the rule corresponding to the 
configuration of the coast, coastal States may claim from that line an extension of their 
sovereignty over the adjacent ocean waters up to 12 nautical miles of territorial sea. They can 
also claim jurisdiction and right of exclusive exploitation of the living resources and subsoil 
resources up to 24 nautical miles of contiguous zone and to 200 nautical miles of exclusive 
economic zone. This boundary also serves to delimit the outer boundary of the continental 
shelf, which in some cases may be extended to 350 nautical miles. Given the extraordinary 
extension of coastal States’ rights over the adjacent waters and the correlative reduction of 
                                                          
725
 Apart from some Pacific Island States which have coastguards, most of them do not have military 
forces of their own and depend on the services provided primarily by Australia and New Zealand. Yet, 
this low capacity to defend their territory (both land and maritime) does not constitute a valid objection 
to their EEZ claims, as was clearly stated in the proceedings of the Third Law of the Sea Conference.   
726
 As will be pointed out later, the economic dimension connected with the maritime spatial dimension 
of these States is one of the most important bridges with Chapter 5 on the effects of climate change 
impacts on the populations of these States.  
727
 David Caron recalls that the cannon-shot rule ‘carried within itself the outer boundary of the maritime 
spaces – at the time the only territorial sea – possibly claimed by a coastal state’. The transition to 
geographical criteria seemingly resulted from the will to provide fishermen with more security, so that 
they could calculate their precise location at sea and to determine whether they were entering 
sovereign waters of a coastal State or not. David D. CARON, ‘Climate Change, Sea-Level Rise and the 
Coming Uncertainty in Oceanic Boundaries: a Proposal to Avoid Conflict’, in Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon 
M. Van Dyke (eds.), Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, 
Publications on Ocean Development, vol. 65, 2009, (Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff), chapter 1, at 1.  
728
 UNCLOS, Article 5 – normal baselines.  
729
 UNCLOS, Article 7 – straight baselines.  
730
 UNCLOS, Article 6 – reefs.  
731
 UNCLOS, Articles 46–47– archipelagic States. In the case of archipelagic States, the special right to 
claim archipelagic status from the commission and the right to provide for co-ordinates of archipelagic 
lines.  
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high-seas zones, the EEZs of neighbouring States are likely to overlap. In the case of 
undelimited maritime boundaries, the outer boundaries of these zones are in principle defined 
by a unilateral claim of the coastal State which is generally embodied in national legislation. 
When outer boundaries claimed by two neighbouring States overlap and no maritime 
delimitation agreement has been concluded, the boundary between the maritime spaces of 
both States will be the equidistant (for opposing coasts) or median line (for adjacent coasts). 
Table 1 includes all the political entities composing the Pacific region. This includes twelve 
independent island States (Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) as well 
as the former colonial powers or trustees which have maintained their presence through 
incorporated territories which, in some cases, enjoy a certain degree of administrative 
autonomy – namely, Tokelau and Niue (New Zealand); the Marianas Islands, Guam and 
American Samoa (United States); the Hunter and Pitcairn Islands (United Kingdom); and New 
Caledonia along with French Polynesia (France). Table 1 shows that eight out of twelve 
independent Pacific Island States have claimed archipelagic status in their national legislations, 
though this position has not always been accompanied or followed by the drawing of 
archipelagic baselines. Thus, while Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
incorporated the co-ordinates of their archipelagic lines as soon as their maritime-zones 
legislation was enacted, and Palau included in its Constitution the direction of its archipelagic 
lines by specifying the names of the features involved, the most underdeveloped States of the 
region – namely, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu 
– until very recently lacked the economic resources necessary to conduct scientific surveys and 
draw official charts.732 
As will be developed below, the latter are also precisely (and unsurprisingly) the States 
directly affected by sea-level rise, for they are mostly (as the Federated States of Micronesia) 
or entirely (as Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands) built on low-lying coral atolls. Apart from the 
legal insecurity arising out of the lack of official charts or co-ordinates of the location of the 
archipelagic baselines of these four coral-island States, the tracing of baselines in the region is 
also problematical because of the presence of important coral reefs in the region. This 
situation has, for instance, been explicitly covered by maritime-zone legislation of the two New 
Zealand territories: Tokelau’s legislation specifies that its baseline is the low-water line along 
                                                          
732
The effects of the lack of specification of the position of the archipelagic lines on the right to claim 
archipelagic status are still unclear. Apparently, it does not affect the right in itself, but can cause 
trouble proving an offence or violation of the sovereign waters.  
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the edge of the reef and the straight line joining the points where the reef is broken, whereas 
that of Niue provides that British Admiralty Charts should be used to draw the low-water lines 
and coral-reef lines. All in all, the general rule of the low-water line is not often applied in this 
region. 
Notwithstanding the complexities of drawing baselines in Pacific Island States, all these 
political entities have claimed in their national legislation the maximum breadth permitted by 
customary international law and by treaty law, since the entry into force of UNCLOS in 2004, of 
the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone.733 Moreover, the four coral-island States 
already mentioned have not made any claims on the exploitation of the subsoil resources of 
the continental shelf, since the geophysical characteristics of their territory – atolls based on 
coral reefs – results in very narrow continental margins.734 Finally, only five Pacific Island States 
explicitly claim fishery rights in the 24 nautical miles of the contiguous zone (Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), presumably because it was considered that the rights 
granted in the contiguous zone were subsumed in the breadth of their respective EEZs.   
 
 
                                                          
733
 See Table 1 below for list of all national claims to maritime zones and continental shelf.  
734
 The zone generally overlies very deep sea, hence there is no use of shelf resources, and more 
importantly of living resources (fisheries in particular). The lack of interest shown by the four Pacific 
Island States in their distance-based rights over continental shelf contrasts with the position of Papua 
New Guinea, and with Palau’s new claim to an extended continental shelf. Yet, recent studies are finding 
magnesium beds in the EEZs of Kiribati and Tuvalu, making their rights over continental shelf more 
useful than was previously thought.  
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Table 1. Unilateral Claims to Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf in the Pacific Region 
Name of State National Legislation Territorial Sea  Contiguous Zone  Exclusive 
Economic Zone  
Continental Shelf  Archipelagic Status 
Cook Islands Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act nº 16/1977 
12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. 200n.m. 
Regulated by Continental Shelf 
Act 1964 
NO 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
Territory, Economic Zones and Port 
Entry, FSM Consolidated Legislation 
Title 18/Chap.1  
12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. Not specified  YES 
Claimed but not drawn 
Article 1 Federal Constitution refers to 
the ‘Districts of the Micronesian 
Archipelago’ 
Fiji Marine Spaces Act [CAP 158A], Act 
nº18/1977, Amended by nº15/1978 
12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. 200n.m. 
Regulated in Continental Shelf 
Act [CAP 149], nº 9/1970 
YES 
Claimed and drawn in schedule  
(Co-ordinates) 
2 Archipelagos: Fiji and Rotuma 
France  
(New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia, Hunter and Wallis 
Islands) 
  
Information not available 
Kiribati Marine Zones (Declaration) Act 1983 12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. Not specified YES 
Claimed but not drawn 
Marshall Islands Marine Zones (Declaration) Act 1984 
[33MIRC Chap.1] 
12n.m. 24n.m. 200n.m. Not specified YES 
Claimed but not drawn 
Nauru Sea Boundaries Act 1997 12n.m. 24n.m. 200n.m. 200n.m. NO 
Niue(New Zealand) Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act nº220/1996 
12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. Not specified NO 
Charts for low-water lines and coral 
reefs from British Admiralty Chart 
Tokelau 
(New Zealand) 
Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act 1977 
12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. 200n.m. NO 
Baseline is low-water line along the 
edge of the reef and straight line joining 
the points where the reef is broken 
Palau Constitution of the Republic of Palau 
1979, Article 1, as amended on 15th 
July 2005 
12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. Over 200n.m. 
2005 Constitutional 
Amendment 2007 and ICCS 
Claim of Extended CS 
YES 
Claimed and drawn in 2005 
Amendment (Name of Features) 
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Papua New Guinea National Seas Act 1997 12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. 200n.m. 
Regulated in Continental Shelf 
(Living Resources) Act, Chap 
210 of Consolidated Legislation; 
and by the 1998 Oil and Gas Act  
 
YES 
Claimed and drawn in Act  
(Co-ordinates) 
3 Archipelagos: Principal, Tauu and 
Nukumanu 
Samoa Maritime Zones Act nº18/1999; 
Amendment Act nº13/2004 
12n.m. 24n.m. 200n.m. Not specified NO 
Solomon Islands Delimitation of Marine Waters Act, 
Chap 95 of Consolidated Legislation; 
Declaration of Archipelagic Lines 
1979 
12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. 200n.m. 
Regulated in the Continental 
Shelf Act, Chap 94 of the 
Consolidated Legislation 
YES 
Claimed and drawn in Declaration  
(Co-ordinates) 
Tonga Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act nº30 1978 
12n.m. Not specified 200n.m. 200nm 
Mentioned in Amended 1979 
Schedule 
NO 
Tuvalu Marine Zones (Declaration) Act 1983 
[CAP24A of Consolidated 
Legislation] 
12n.m. 24n.m. 200n.m. Not specified YES 
Claimed but not drawn  
Only declaration on internal waters 
Pitcairn, Wallis and Futuna 
Islands 
(UK) 
Pitcairn Islands      
Northern Marianas, Guam, 
American Samoa 
(USA) 
Presidential Proclamation 8030,  
10
th
 March 1983 
12n.m. 24n.m. 200n.m.  NO 
Vanuatu Maritime Zones Act (nº6/2010) 12n.m. 24n.m. 200n.m. 200nm or outer edge of 
continental margin 
YES 
Claimed and drawn in Schedule  
(Co-ordinates) 
 
       Source: Personal Elaboration from Data Found in the Pacific Islands States Legal Institute 
NOTE: All national legislations referred to in Table 1 are listed below in the Bibliography and can be directly accessed through their corresponding electronic 
links. 
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On the basis of the available information and of James Crawford’s study of the 
region,735 it is possible to list the thirty-two maritime boundaries overlapping in the Pacific 
region and which have not been the object of any delimitation agreement yet in force. From 
the twelve independent Pacific Island States, and due to the immense area of their maritime 
zones,736 Kiribati leads the list as the State with the highest number of neighbouring States 
with overlapping outer EEZ boundaries. Its ten undelimited borders are (North-West to South-
West): Kiribati/Marshall Islands; Kiribati/United Kingdom (Baker and Howland Islands); 
Kiribati/United States (Jarvis Island); Kiribati/United States (Palmyra Atoll and Kingman Reef); 
Kiribati/France (French Polynesia); Kiribati/New Zealand (Tokelau); Kiribati/Cook Islands; 
Kiribati/New Zealand (Niue); Kiribati/Tuvalu; and Kiribati/Nauru. It is followed by the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), another very extensive low-lying island State, whose 
overlapping EEZ boundaries are: FSM/Marshall Islands; FSM/United States (Guam); and 
FSM/Papua New Guinea. Fiji and the Marshall Islands also count with four overlapping and 
undelimited EEZ boundaries. On the one hand, there are Fiji/Tonga; Fiji/France (New 
Caledonia); Fiji/Tuvalu; and Fiji/France (Wallis and Futuna); on the other hand, there are the 
Marshall Islands/Federated States of Micronesia; Marshall Islands/Kiribati; Marshall 
Islands/Nauru; and Marshall Islands/United States (Wake Island). Likewise, the Solomon 
Islands have four EEZ boundaries: Solomon Islands/Vanuatu; Solomon Islands/France (New 
Caledonia); Solomon Islands/Papua New Guinea; and Solomon Islands/Australia. These are 
followed by Tuvalu, which has three EEZ boundaries: Tuvalu/Kiribati; Tuvalu/Fiji; and 
Tuvalu/France (Wallis and Futuna). Likewise, the three EEZ boundaries generated by The Cook 
Islands are: Cook Islands/Kiribati; Cook Islands/New Zealand (Niue); and Cook Islands/New 
Zealand (Tokelau). Vanuatu’s EEZ boundaries are Vanuatu/France (French Caledonia); and 
Vanuatu/Solomon Islands. Tonga’s two boundaries are: Tonga/Fiji and Tonga/American 
Samoa. Samoa has two boundaries: Samoa/American Samoa; and Samoa/New Zealand 
(Tokelau); Nauru also has two boundaries: Nauru/Marshall Islands and Nauru/Kiribati. Finally, 
the richest State of the region, Papua New Guinea, has only two undelimited boundaries: 
Papua New Guinea/Federated States of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea/Solomon 
                                                          
735
 J. CRAWFORD and D. R. ROTHWELL (eds.), The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region: 
Developments and Prospects, 1995, (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 
Publications on Ocean Development volume nº21. This work will be used as a complement to the 
present analysis, particularly for the identification of the names of features involved in the tracing of the 
equidistant or median lines of the undelimited maritime boundaries of the region.  
736
 Kiribati’s expands over 700 km2 and is the only State in the world which is part of the four 
hemispheres at the same time.   
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Islands.737 However, the regional powers also have some undelimited maritime boundaries: 
Australia/New Zealand; New Zealand (Niue)/United States (American Samoa). 
In order to consider the how the adverse effects of climate change (particularly sea-
level rise and coastal erosion) are likely to affect these thirty-two undelimited maritime 
boundaries in the Pacific region, it is essential to identify the features involved in the tracing of 
the equidistant or median delimitation lines. These correspond to the base points used for 
drawing the relevant baselines of each State. Thus, while acknowledging the difficulty of the 
task (due primarily to the lack of official charts indicating the direction of the archipelagic lines 
and the presence of coral reefs and indented coasts), Table 2 introduces a more concrete 
illustration of the effects of climate change on the maritime spatial dimension and extent of 
Pacific Island States, before embarking on a legal analysis of the data.  
Table 2 has been assembled on the basis of James Crawford’s indications; he 
enumerated the features involved in the delimitation of these boundaries. A search on the 
geophysical characteristics of these features (including their maximum altitude) has then been 
incorporated by using the Global Island Database of the United Nations Environment 
Programme, so as to differentiate five different categories of features. This geophysical 
information serves two purposes. On the one hand, each category has been associated with a 
vulnerability factor marked from 1 to 5 (1 being the level of lowest vulnerability, and 5, of the 
highest). On the other hand, the nature and geological composition of these features will be 
important in the legal analysis developed below in order to determine their corresponding 
legal regimes. Finally, the Table indicates which undelimited maritime boundary is likely to be 
affected by sea-level rise and coastal erosion.  
 
                                                          
737
 As will be developed below, the reason given to explain the reduced number of undelimited 
boundaries of Papua New Guinea is that they have been subject to treaty delimitation.   
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
248 
 
Table 2. Sea-Level Rise and Undelimited Maritime Boundaries of the Pacific Region 
Name of Feature Country Geomorphology (max. altitude) Degree of vulnerability  
(1-5) 
Potentially Affected Boundary 
Abaiang Kiribati Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Kiribati/Marshall Is.  
Ahe French Polynesia Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 French Polynesia/Kiribati 
Aneityum New Caledonia (France) Volcanic Island (852m) 1 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Arorae Kiribati Coral Atoll(<5m) 5 Kiribati/Tuvalu 
Astrolabe New Caledonia 
(France)/Vanuatu 
Reef 5 New Cal/Vanuatu 
Ata Tonga Volcanic Island 1 Tonga/Fiji 
Atafu Tokelau (NZ) Coral Atoll (4m) 5 Tokelau (NZ)/Kiribati; Tokelau (NZ)/Samoa; Tokelau (NZ)/(France)  
Baker USA territory Coral Atoll, Guano (8m) 5 Baker and Howland Islands (USA)/Kiribati 
Banaba Kiribati Raised Coral (Phosphate) Island (81m) 3 Kiribati/Marshall Islands.; Kiribati/Nauru  
Beautemps-Beauprès Vanuatu/New Caledonia 
(France) 
Oceanic Bank/Atoll (1-3m) 5 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Bellinghausen French Polynesia (France) Coral Atoll (5m) 5 French Polynesia/Kiribati 
Bougainville Papua New Guinea High Volcanic Island (2792m) 1 Papua New Guinea/Solomon Islands 
Bukatatanoa Fiji Barrier Reef 5 Fiji/Tonga 
Butaritari Kiribati Coral Atoll (1m) 5 Kiribati/Marshall Islands  
Cakau-Levu Fiji Coral Reef 5 Fiji/Tonga 
Canton USA territory/Kiribati Coral Atoll (5m) 5 Kiribati/Baker and Howland Islands (USA) 
Caroline Kiribati Coral Atoll (5m) 5 Kiribati/French Polynesia 
Ceva-i-ra Fiji Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Fiji/New Caledonia  
Ebon Marshall Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Marshall Is./Kiribati; Marshall Is./Nauru; Marshall Is./FSM  
Efate (Vate) New Caledonia 
(France)/Vanuatu 
Volcanic/Raised Coral (647m) 2 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Eromanga (Erromango) New Caledonia 
(France)/Vanuatu 
Volcanic/Raised Coral Island (886m) 2 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Espiritu Santo New Caledonia 
(France)/Vanuatu 
Volcanic/Raised Coral Island (1879m) 2 New Caledonia/Vanuatu; Vanuatu/Solomon Islands  
Fakaofo Tokelau (New Zealand) Coral Atoll (4m) 5 Tokelau (NZ)/Cook Islands; Tokelau (NZ)/Kiribati  
Fanning (Tabuaeran) Kiribati Coral Atoll (4m) 5 Kiribati/Jarvis Island (USA) 
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Fataka (Mitre) Solomon Islands Volcanic Island (122m) 2 Solomon Islands/Vanuatu 
Flint Kiribati Coral Island (8m) 4 Kiribati/French Polynesia 
Fonulalei Tonga Volcanic Island 1 Tonga/Fiji 
Futuna French territory High Volcanic Island (765m) 1 Wallis and Futuna (France)/Tuvalu  
Gardner (Nikumaroro) Kiribati Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Kiribati/Baker and Howland Islands; Kiribati/Tokelau (NZ)  
Guam USA territory Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Guam (USA)/FSM 
Hiu Vanuatu Raised Coral Island (366m) 3 Vanuatu/Solomon Islands 
Hull (Orona) Kiribati Coral Atoll (9m) 5 Kiribati/Tokelau (NZ)  
Hunga Ha'apai Tonga Volcanic Island 1 Tonga/Fiji 
Hunter (Fearn; Umaenaeg) French territory/Vanuatu Volcanic Island (260m) 1 New Caledonia/Fiji 
Huon Vanuatu Continental Island (332m) 1 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Indispensable Solomon Islands Reef – Low-tide elevation 5  Solomon Islands/Australia 
Jaluit Marshall Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Marshall Islands/Kiribati  
Jarvis USA territory Coral Island (8m) 4 Jarvis Island (USA)/Kiribati 
Kapingamarangi Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM) 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 FSM/Papua New Guinea 
Kings (Three Kings) New Zealand territory (280m) 2 New Zealand/Australia  
Kingman USA territory Reef 5 Palmyra Atoll and Kingman Reef (USA)/Kiribati 
Kiritimati-E Kiribati Coral Atoll (5m) 5 Kiribati/Jarvis Island (USA) 
Knox Marshall Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Marshall Islands/Kiribati  
Kosrae FSM High Volcanic Island (628m) 1 FSM/Marshall Islands  
Late Tonga High Volcanic Island (519m) 1 Tonga/Fiji 
Lifou Vanuatu/New Caledonia 
(France) 
Raised Coral Island (85m) 4 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Maewo Vanuatu Volcanic and Raised Coral Island (811m) 2 Vanuatu/Solomon Islands 
Mahur Papua New Guinea (PNG) Continental and Raised Coral Island 
(67m) 
2 Papua New Guinea/FSM 
Makin Kiribati Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Kiribati/Marshall Islands  
Malden Kiribati Coral Island (8m) 4 Kiribati/Jarvis Island (US) 
Malekula New Caledonia Volcanic and Raised Coral Island (879m) 1 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
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(France)/Vanuatu 
Mare Vanuatu/New Caledonia 
(France) 
Raised Coral and Volcanic Island (129m) 2 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Matahiva French Polynesia (France) Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 French Polynesia/Kiribati 
McKean USA territory/Kiribati Coral Island (5m) 4 Baker and Howland Islands/Kiribati 
Mellish Australia Reef 5 Australia/Solomon Islands 
Mera Lava Vanuatu Volcanic Cone (1017m) 1 Vanuatu/Solomon Islands 
Mili Marshall Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Marshall Islands/Kiribati  
Mokil FSM Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 FSM/Marshall Islands  
Mota Lava Vanuatu Volcanic Island/Steep Cliffs (411m) 1 Vanuatu/Solomon Islands 
Namorik Marshall Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Marshall Islands/FSM  
Namumea Tuvalu Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Tuvalu/Kiribati  
Nauru Nauru Raised Coral Island (70m) 3 Nauru/Marshall Islands; Nauru/Kiribati  
Nendo Solomon Islands Volcanic Island (549m) 1 Solomon Islands/Vanuatu 
Niguria Papua New Guinea Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Papua New Guinea/FSM 
Niutao Tuvalu Coral Island (<5m) 4 Tuvalu/Kiribati 
Niuafo'ou Tonga Volcanic Crater (205m) 1 Tonga/Fiji 
Niuatoputapu Tonga Volcanic Island (146m) 1 Tonga/American Samoa 
Niue New Zealand territory Raised Coral Island (73m) 3 Niue/Cook Islands 
Niulakita (Nurakita) Tuvalu Coral Island (<5m) 5 Tuvalu/Wallis and Futuna (France); Tuvalu/Fiji  
Norfolk  Australia Old Volcanic and Limestone (318m) 1 Australia/New Zealand  
North Minerva Tonga/Fiji Reef 5 Tonga/Fiji 
Nugarba Papua New Guinea Rock  2 Papua New Guinea/FSM 
Nui Tuvalu Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Tuvalu/Fiji 
Nuku Cikobia Fiji   Fiji/Tonga 
Nukufetau Tuvalu Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Tuvalu/Fiji 
Nukulaelae Tuvalu Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Tuvalu/Wallis and Futuna (France)  
Nukunono Tokelau (New Zealand) Coral Atoll (4m) 5 Tokelau (NZ)/Samoa 
Ofu American Samoa (USA) Volcanic Island (494m) 1 American Samoa/Samoa 
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Ono-i-lau Fiji Volcanic/Low Coral Island (113m) 2 Fiji/Tonga 
Ouvea Vanuatu Raised Coral Island (39m) 3 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Pakin FSM Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 FSM/Marshall Islands  
Palmerston Cook Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Cook Islands/Niue 
Palmyra USA territory Coral Atoll (6m) 5 Palmyra Atoll and Kingman Reef (USA)/Kiribati 
Penrhyn Cook Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Cook Islands/Kiribati  
Petrie New Caledonia (France) Reef 5 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Phillip Australia Volcanic Island (280m) 1 Australia/New Zealand  
Pingelap FSM Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 FSM/Marshall Islands 
Pocklington Papua New Guinea Reef 5 Papua New Guinea/Solomon Islands 
Pohnpei FSM Volcanic Island (791m) 1 FSM/Marshall Islands 
Rangiroa French Polynesia Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 French Polynesia/Kiribati 
Reid Fiji Reef 1 Fiji/Tonga 
Rennell (Mu Nggava) Solomon Islands Raised Coral Island (154m) 3 Solomon Islands/Vanuatu 
Rotuma Fiji Volcanic Island (256m) 1 Fiji/Tuvalu 
Santa Catalina (Owakiri) Solomon Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Solomon Islands/Vanuatu 
Savaii Samoa High Volcanic Island (1858m) 1 Samoa/American Samoa; Samoa/Tokelau (NZ) 
Shortland Solomon Islands Volcanic and Raised Coral Island 5 Solomon Islands/Papua New Guinea 
Simberi Papua New Guinea Volcanic Island (?) 1 Papua New Guinea/FSM 
South Indispensable Solomon Islands Reef 5 Solomon Islands/Australia; Solomon Islands/Vanuatu  
South Minerva Tonga/Fiji Reef 5 Tonga/Fiji 
Starbuck Kiribati Coral Island (5m) 5 Kiribati/Cook Islands  
Swains American Samoa (USA) Coral Atoll (6m) 5 American Samoa/Samoa 
Sydney Kiribati Coral Island (6m) 5 Kiribati/Tokelau (NZ)  
Tabiteuea Kiribati Coral Islet (<5m) 5 Kiribati/Tuvalu 
Tafahi Tonga Volcanic Island (519m) 1 Tonga/American Samoa 
Tamana Kiribati Coral Island (<5m) 5 Kiribati/Tuvalu 
Tanna New Caledonia 
(France)/Vanuatu 
Volcanic/Raised Coral (1084m) 1 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
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Taongi Marshall Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Marshall Islands/USA territory 
Tench Papua New Guinea Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Papua New Guinea/FSM 
Tiga (Toga corr) Vanuatu Raised Coral (240m) 3 Vanuatu/New Caledonia 
Tikehau French Polynesia Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 French Polynesia/Kiribati 
Tikopia Solomon Islands Volcanic Islet (397m) 1 Solomon Islands/Vanuatu 
Tofua Tonga High Volcanic Island (505m) 1 Tonga/Fiji 
Tongatapu Tonga Raised Coral Island (82m) 3 Tonga/Fiji 
Tupai French Polynesia Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 French Polynesia/Kiribati 
Tutuila American Samoa (USA) High Volcanic Island (653m) 1 American Samoa/Tonga; American Samoa/Samoa 
Tuvana-i-colo Fiji Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Fiji/Tonga 
Tuvana-i-ra Fiji Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Fiji/Tonga 
Ujae Marshall Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Marshall Islands/FSM  
Ujelang Marshall Islands Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 Marshall Islands/FSM  
Upolu Samoa High Volcanic Island (1143m) 1 Samoa/American Samoa 
Utupua Solomon Islands Volcanic/Raised Coral Island (380m) 2 Solomon Islands/Vanuatu 
Vanikoro (Vanikolo) Solomon Islands Recent Volcano (924m) 1 Solomon Islands/Vanuatu 
Vanuabalavu Fiji Raised Coral/Volcanic Island (283m) 2 Fiji/Tonga 
Vat Ganai Vanuatu Rock (64m) 1 Vanuatu/Solomon Islands 
Vostok Kiribati Coral Island (5m) 5 Kiribati/Cook Islands  
Vuata Vatoa Fiji Reef 5 Fiji/Tonga 
Wake USA territory Coral Atoll (6m) 5 USA territory/Marshall Islands 
Wallis French territory High Volcanic Island (765m) 1 Wallis (France)/Tokelau (NZ); Tuvalu/Wallis and Futuna (France)  
Walpole New Caledonia (France) Raised Coral Island (100m) 3 New Caledonia/Vanuatu 
Washington (Teraina) Kiribati Coral Island (5m) 5 Kiribati/Jarvis Island (US) 
 
Source: Personal Elaboration from Data Found in the United Nations Environment Programme Global Island Database
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Legal Effects of Sea-Level Rise on the Pacific Island States’ Baselines 
As one of the pioneer scholars showing concern about the effects of sea-level rise on 
maritime boundaries, David Caron pointed out that ‘the crucial point to recognize is that [t]he 
law of baselines authorizes, quite intentionally, the most insubstantial, sometimes ephemeral 
and transient, geographic features to serve as anchors for baselines thus maximizing for each 
coastal state the reach of their oceanic zones into the ocean’.738 Table 2 perfectly illustrates the 
extent of this fundamental characteristic of the law of baselines,739 for around 53% of the 
features involved in the equidistant lines of undelimited maritime boundaries in the Pacific 
region could be significantly affected by a sea-level rise of 1 metre. These have been marked in 
Table 2 as level 5 of vulnerability and correspond to 60 coral atolls or islets (maximum altitude 
of 5 metres) and coral islands (maximum altitude of 8 metres) as well as 10 coral reefs –that is, 
70 extremely vulnerable features out of the 130 features listed in the Table. When non-
volcanic raised coral islands are added to this list (6 features marked as level 4 vulnerability), 
the proportion of affected features is 58%.  
All in all, thirty-two undelimited maritime boundaries in the region are potentially affected 
by the transformation (or even total disappearance) of these geographical features.740 The 
effects of sea-level rise and coastal erosion on the boundaries are a reflection of their effects 
on the baselines in which these features are involved. Therefore, the de-territorialization of 
Pacific Island States’ maritime spaces raises two legal questions: (1) how does the physical 
transformation of the features change their legal characterization and modify the 
corresponding regime (e.g. their capacity to generate maritime spaces)?; and (2) do these 
changes in the legal nature and regime of these features necessarily generate the recession of 
                                                          
738
 D. CARON, supra, at 5.  
739
 See J. M. VAN DYKE and R. A. BROOKS, ‘Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of the 
Oceans’ Resources’, (1983) Ocean Development and International Law Journal, vol. 12, nº 3-4, pp. 265-
300. 
740
 Unsurprisingly, and from the data in Table 2, the boundaries most affected are those of Kiribati: 
Kiribati/Marshall Islands; Kiribati/French Polynesia; Kiribati/Tuvalu; Kiribati/Tokelau (New Zealand); 
Kiribati/Baker and Howland Islands (USA); Kiribati/Jarvis Island (USA); Kiribati/Palmyra Atoll and 
Kingman Reef (USA); Kiribati/Nauru; Kiribati/Cook Islands; followed by that of Wallis and Futuna 
(France)/Tokelau (New Zealand); New Caledonia (France)/Vanuatu; Marshall Islands/Nauru; Marshall 
Islands/FSM; Marshall Islands/ U.S. territory; FSM/Guam (USA); FSM/Palau; FSM/PNG; Cook 
Islands/Tokelau; Cook Islands/Niue (New Zealand); Fiji/Tonga; Fiji/New Caledonia (France); 
Tuvalu/Wallis and Futuna (France); Tuvalu/Fiji; Samoa/Tokelau (New Zealand); Samoa/American Samoa. 
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the baselines? In other words, may the features’ capacity to generate maritime spaces be 
limited by a fundamental characteristic of the law of baselines? 
 
Effect nº 1: Change of Legal Category of Features and Their Corresponding Legal Regime 
During the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, two types of competing interests 
clearly crystallized. The will of many States (including Pacific Island States) of using the 
presence of islands in their territories to secure an advantage and generate extensive maritime 
claims collided with reactions seeking to limit claims based on remote topographical features 
that would significantly diminish the extent of international seas and seabed available for 
navigation and exploitation by all as a ‘common heritage of mankind’. As recalled and narrated 
by J. Van Dyke and R. Rooks, discussions among States over the legal definition of the term 
‘island’ and the amount of maritime space attached to it can be traced back to the 1930 
League of Nations Codification Conference held at The Hague, when the diplomatic debate 
centred on how to find criteria that could limit the effects of islands in cases where 
delimitations obstructed by their presence impeded reaching an equitable result.741  
Since the consolidation of the EEZ implies that one single island could generate 
431,014 sq. km of associated maritime space, the tension between these two standpoints 
resulted in active and long negotiations on this matter. Yet, J. Van Dyke also points out that the 
drafting of Article 121 of the Law of the Sea was achieved soon after the opening of the 
Conference and was never amended afterwards. This provision, comprising three paragraphs, 
establishes a complex and controversial classification of two types of features, each able to 
generate maritime rights of a different nature and scope.742 Paragraph 1 of Article 121 
provides a legal definition of island as ‘a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide’; paragraph 2 specifies the regime applicable to legal islands 
and lists the maritime rights generated by them; and paragraph 3 establishes an exception to 
this general rule for features falling into a second category, namely ‘rocks which cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life of their own’. The differences arising out of the 
classification of a feature in one of the two categories are significant: while features under 
Article 121(1) give full effect to the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic 
                                                          
741
 VAN DYKE and ROOKS, supra. 
 
742
 J. J. CHARNEY and L. M. ALEXANDER (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 1993, (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff),  
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zone and the continental shelf, the exceptions considered under of Article 121(3) can only 
generate territorial sea. Furthermore, bearing in mind the nature of the adverse effects of 
climate change on the region, the intent of Article 121 should be complemented by Article 13 
which defines low-tide elevations as ‘a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by 
and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide’ and which do not generate any sort of 
maritime rights. A wide range of scholarly and diplomatic interpretations has arisen, since the 
adoption of the Convention, on various aspects of this triple classification of features and is to 
be kept in mind when considering how the physical effects of sea-level rise could transform a 
feature originally falling under the definition of ‘island’ into either a rock or a low-lying 
elevation. 
The definition of ‘island’ provided in Article 121(1) is perhaps the least contentious of 
the three types of features. It is generally accepted that features must fulfil two conditions to 
be considered an island in the legal sense. In conformity with Article 60(8), which provides that 
artificial islands do not generate territorial sea of their own,743 legal islands must first of all be 
naturally formed. Nonetheless, State practice seems to indicate that artificial means may be 
used to maintain the legal status of a feature by protecting it from severe erosion and sea-level 
rise, as has been done by Japan with Okinotorishima Island.744  
Secondly, features must be ‘above water at high tide,’ though it has been considered 
that exceptional episodes of sea flooding do not preclude a feature from being classified as an 
island.745 This criterion is what distinguishes islands from low-tide elevations – features 
‘submerged at high tide’ – and becomes all the more crucial in the Pacific region now that 
                                                          
743 Artificial islands generally take the form of platforms, some of which have been built up to claim the 
creation of a new State, the most notorious examples probably being that of the Principality of Sealand 
(located off the coast of the United Kingdom in the North Sea, and based in a former Second World War 
sea fort), and the Republic of Rose Island (located off the coast of Italy in the Adriatic Sea, and based on 
an artificial man-made platform). See T. SALSAS, T. BOURTZIS and G. RHODOTHEATOS, ‘Artificial Islands 
and Structures as a Means of Safeguarding State Sovereignty against Sea-Level Rise: a Law of the Sea 
Perspective’, in Proceedings of the 6th ABLOS Conference "Contentious Issues in UNCLOS - Surely Not?", 
celebrated at the International Hydrographic Bureau, Monaco, in January 2010; as well as N. 
PAPADAKIS, The International Legal Regime of Artificial Islands, 1977, (Leiden: Nijhoff). 
744
 See, for instance, A. SILVERSTEIN, ‘Okinotorishima: Artificial Preservation of a Speck of Sovereignty’, 
(1990) Brooklyn Journal of International Law, vol. 16, issue 2, pp. 409-432; and G. XUE, ‘How Much Can a 
Rock Get? A Reflection on the Okinotorishima Rock’, in M. NORQUIST (ed.), Law of the Sea Convention: 
US Accession and Globalization, 2012, (Charlottesville, Va.: Center for Oceans Law and Policy), pp. 341-
388.  
745
 Preparatory documents for the deliberations of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone contained a definition which included the phrase ‘which in normal circumstances is 
permanently above high water’. This conflicting wording led the USA to call for the inclusion of a 
reference to seasonal tidal action as well as tidal action that was subnormal or abnormal. Article 5 of 
UNCLOS finally and consistently states that the ‘normal baseline is the low-water line along the coast as 
marked on large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state’. 
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episodes of sea flooding by the so-called ‘king tide’ are gradually becoming more frequent and 
harmful, to the extent that, in some cases, forced population displacement is fostered.746 
Islands which have become low-lying elevations would thus lose all their maritime zones 
(though those located within the 12 nautical miles of the main or remaining islands may still be 
used as base points).747 
The observed displacement movements resulting from the increased frequency of king 
tides and other phenomena has also pushed several authors to consider that legal islands may 
turn into the category of ‘rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of 
their own’ described in Article 121(3), a highly controversial provision which has generated 
many divergent interpretations. Yet, a closer look into the meaning and scope of this Article 
reveals that the applicability of this provision for severely eroded legal islands could be 
disregarded on several procedural and substantive grounds. First of all, bearing in mind that 
the purpose of this exception to the general regime of islands was to limit potentially 
inequitable delimitations resulting from claims over remote features,748 Article 121(3) is 
arguably only applicable to features relevant for unilateral claims or bilateral delimitation 
purposes which are not close to a main or indisputable island.  
Secondly, given that Article 121 does not take preference over the law of baselines, 
these features can be protected from the applicability of Article 121(3) in cases when the State 
has drawn archipelagic or straight lines in accordance with Article 47 and Article 7, 
respectively. Some authors, such as Jonathan Charney, even consider that the ‘freezing’ effect 
on the legal classification of these features could be defended by States which have claimed 
archipelagic status but have not yet drawn their archipelagic baselines.749 Such interpretation 
would thus protect features which are part of Fiji, Palau and Papua New Guinea (which have 
specified in their national legislation either the names or the co-ordinates of their archipelagic 
baselines),750 but also of the mostly affected low-lying coral island States of Kiribati, Tuvalu, the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (which have claimed archipelagic 
status but have not drawn their archipelagic baselines).  
                                                          
746
 Although no universally accepted vertical tidal datum is in use. 
 
747
 UNCLOS, Article 13.  
748
 A. G. O. ELFERINK, ‘Clarifying Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: the Limits set by the 
Nature of the International Legal Process’, (1998) Boundary and Security Bulletin, vol. 6, issue 2, pp. 58-
68, who indicates that islands which might qualify as a rock can be included in a system of baselines and 
as such be used to establish the outer limits of maritime zones. 
749
 J. I. CHARNEY, ‘Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation’, (1999) American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 93, nº 4, pp. 863-878.  
750
 See Table 1 above.   
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Moreover, if these two procedural arguments were contested, it would still be possible 
to defend on substantive grounds – related to the interpretation of the meaning of the term 
‘rock that cannot sustain human habitation’ – that the applicability of Article 121(3) on 
transformed legal islands would in any case be reserved for very exceptional cases. The 
grounds of this advocacy are not to be found in case law, but rather in different doctrinal 
positions as well as in concurrent State practice. The first interpretative strategic position to be 
held regards the definition of the term ‘rock’. Much controversy has arisen over whether it 
refers to the geo-morphological characteristics of the feature concerned and should therefore 
be defined in scientific terms as a hard mass of the solid part of the earth’s crust; or whether 
the term results from a test of the socio-economic viability of the feature and should, in 
contrast, be defined in cultural–geographical terms as a ‘feature capable of supporting the 
stable community who use the ocean space surrounding it’.751 The position on this preliminary 
point is essential, for it determines the order of the methodological steps to be followed 
subsequently.752 Authors such as Robert Kolb have argued in favour of a wide interpretation 
and consider that the use of the term ‘rock’ simply resulted from the will to emphasize the 
distinction from the types of features falling under paragraph 1 of Article 121, but did not 
foresee any need to restrict its application on the basis of the geological composition of the 
features.753 B. Kwiatkowska and A. Soons have followed a similar line and consider that the 
essential element of the definition is not the term ‘rock’ – which can be replaced by island or 
islet – but the fact that the features concerned ‘cannot sustain human habitation or economic 
life of their own’. In contrast, other scholars, such as J. Charney, upholding the narrower 
interpretation of Article 121(3), have argued that the purpose of UNCLOS was to distinguish 
different types of features according to their size. Thus, as Charney explains, ‘originally islets 
and small islands used to define the features that would fall within the provision that ultimately 
became Article 121(3) and yet, the ultimate redaction of Art. 121(3) seems to apply to an even 
                                                          
751
 B. KWIATKOWSKA and A. H. A. SOONS, ‘Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks Which Cannot 
Sustain Human Habitation or Economic Life of their Own’, (1990) Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law, vol. 21, pp. 139-181, at 153.  
752
 When the geo-morphological interpretation is adopted, two questions arise: (1) is it a rock or an 
island?; and (2) if it is a rock, can it sustain human habitation or economic life of its own? Adopting the 
geographical–cultural interpretation implies raising one single question: can the feature sustain human 
habitation or economic life of its own (for, if it cannot, it is a ‘rock’ in the sense of Article 121(3).  
753
 R. KOLB, ‘L’interprétation de l’article 121, paragraphe 3, de la Convention de Montego Bay sur le 
droit de la mer: les “rochers” qui ne se prêtent pas à l’habitation humaine ou à une vie économique 
propre’, (1994) Annuaire Français de Droit International, vol. XL, pp. 876-909. Kolb upholds this 
interpretation after a close examination of the ‘travaux préparatoires’ of UNCLOS, and considers that 
the wording of Article 121 originated from the Turkish and Romanian proposals.  
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narrower range of small features than these: only “rocks”.’ All in all, no uniform rule seems to 
be available for these features wherever they are encountered. Thus, in the absence of a clear-
cut understanding of the meaning and scope of Article 121(3), States affected by it could 
defend the preservation of their maritime claims by upholding the narrower interpretation of 
the term ‘rock’ – either considering that it refers to the geological composition or, as proposed 
by Charney, to the most insignificant features. 
It is only when this interpretation of the meaning and scope of the term ‘rock’ fails to 
allow suspension of the application of Article 121(3) that an important legal island of the 
affected State – particularly in the Pacific region – may risk being re-classified as a ‘rock which 
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own’. The test of the socio-economic 
viability of the feature concerned is problematic because of its two ambivalent characteristics. 
Despite the fact that its purpose is to measure the capacity of the feature to sustain human 
population or economic life autonomously, rather than its actual condition (namely, whether 
or not it is inhabitable instead of being inhabited), its inter-temporal scope754 implies that even 
when the feature’s past capacity can be evidenced, present claims must prove that such 
capacity continues to exist.755 This may be an obstacle difficult to overcome in most features of 
Pacific Island States, which, for the vast majority, have always been uninhabited and, amongst 
those which have been inhabited, current displacement of human populations does not 
provide particularly favourable evidence of the present continuation of the features’ capacity 
to sustain human habitation or economic life of their own. In a last attempt to avoid the inter-
temporal application of Article 121(3), one could again have recourse to the second procedural 
argument mentioned above and consider, as pointed out by J. Charney, that the stability of a 
feature’s legal classification was frozen at a certain date corresponding to the drawing of the 
archipelagic lines. Yet, it is uncertain and quite doubtful that this claim may serve to preclude 
the inter-temporal application of the capacity test in cases where archipelagic status has been 
claimed but the archipelagic lines have not been drawn.756 In these cases, as well as in 
                                                          
754
 On the intertemporality of application of Article 121(3), see J. CHARNEY, ‘Rocks that Cannot Sustain 
Human Habitation), supra, who contemplated the possibility that the capacity of a rock to sustain 
human habitation and economic life of its own might change over time and therefore so might their 
legal status (ex. Guano islands): ‘[C]onsequently, the application of Art. 121(3) to a feature may vary over 
time, just as an ambulatory baseline might move in response to geographical changes’.  
755
 KIATKOWSKA and SOONS, supra, at 162. 
756
 Thus, the use of archipelagic status could be made in two different sets of circumstances: before the 
application of Article 121 at all (as a preliminary exception to the lex specialis principle), and later, if 
Article 121 was applied, as a counter-argument leaving without effect or protecting against the effects 
of the application of inter-temporal application of Article 121(3). The difference is that as a preliminary 
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situations of features pertaining to States which have not even claimed archipelagic status at 
all, the inter-temporal application of Article 121(3) would most likely generate a 
reclassification of the feature concerned and consequent redrawing of the baselines to which 
such a feature was anchored. 
 
Effect nº 2: Recession of Baselines and Retreat of the Affected Boundaries 
As David Caron explains, once the anchor of the baseline is either submerged or 
susceptible of being reclassified as a rock or as a low-tide elevation beyond 12 nautical miles, 
the baseline is to be redrawn on the basis of the still valid base points, which in turn implies 
that the outer maritime boundary generated by the previous baseline is also accordingly 
modified.757 Alexander Soons indicates that the distance over which the baseline shifts 
landwards ‘depends on the gradient of the land surface in the area involved: the lesser the 
gradient, the greater the distance’. Thereby, he concludes that in some areas a rise of the sea 
level by half a metre can provoke a shift in the baseline of ten kilometres.758 It is generally 
explained that this chain of changes is due to the fact that ‘both the baseline and the boundary 
generated by that baseline are ambulatory.’759  
This characteristic seems prima facie consistent with and resulting from the subsidiary 
and derived nature of maritime rights which, as Prosper Weil recalls, ‘have no independent 
existence, but are an extension of the pre-existing territorial sea.’760 This fundamental premise, 
stressed on many occasions by the International Court of Justice, implies that maritime 
delimitations are in most cases primarily driven by the configuration of the coast. It is equally 
applicable to undelimited boundaries based on unilateral maritime claims for – as explained by 
A. Soons on the basis of Articles 7 and 47 – ‘the drawing of straight or archipelagic baselines 
must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea 
areas lying within the lines must be closely linked to the land domain.’761 Nonetheless, while 
                                                                                                                                      
objection, archipelagic status can be more easily protected even in cases where no baselines have been 
drawn.  
757
 CARON, supra, at 9.  
758
 SOONS, supra, at 216.  
759
 CARON, supra, at 9. 
760
 P. WEIL, ‘Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation’, in J. J. CHARNEY and L. M. ALEXANDER 
(eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 1993, (Dordrecht: Nijhoff), pp. 115-130, at 115. This principle 
has been consistently recognized by the International Court of Justice in several cases, as, in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf, 1969,: ‘the land is the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over 
territorial extensions seaward’  
761
 A. SOONS, supra, at 211. Article 7 UNCLOS (straight baselines), completed by Article 47 UNCLOS 
(special ratios of archipelagic baselines).   
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the close correlation between the shape of the coastline and the direction of the baseline is 
undisputed, D. Caron recalls that when the law of baselines was first formulated in the 1930s 
and then revised in the 1970s, sea-level rise or the transformation of features due to the 
adverse impacts of climate change were not in the minds of the authors. Indeed, as he holds, 
‘despite [the fact] that coastline erosion is common, they apparently viewed such changes as 
rare and isolated’.762  
It is therefore not surprising that UNCLOS does not explicitly specify the ambulatory 
nature of baselines (and outer maritime boundaries). Yet, the majority of scholars seem to 
agree that the correlation between the shape of the coastline and the baseline is inter-
temporal and implies its necessary adaptation to the new coastal geography of the land. This 
appreciation can be solidly grounded in three arguments. First of all, as a corollary of the 
fundamental premise that ‘the land governs the sea’, baselines depend on whether the State’s 
title to the land survives, is maintained or sustained.763 Secondly, ambulatory baselines and 
outer maritime boundaries are not incompatible with UNCLOS, since the possibility of the 
regression of baselines is contemplated in Article 7(2) on deltaic baselines.764 Moreover, it has 
been argued that Article 76(9), which establishes that (under certain conditions) the outer 
limits of the continental shelf are permanently fixed,765 allows the a contrario conclusion that 
the outer limits of all other maritime zones might only be temporary.766 All in all, while the 
ambulatory or changing nature of baselines and outer maritime boundaries seems 
uncontroversial, the eventual level of protection against such modifications offered by 
claiming archipelagic status without drawn archipelagic lines remains uncertain. In contrast, 
those States which have published their archipelagic lines may be protected from changes as 
long as they do not update the information of the charts provided to the UN Secretary-General 
(Article 47(9) of UNCLOS).  
 
3.1.2. Coastal Geographical Transformation and Maritime Delimitation Agreements  
                                                          
762
 CARON, at 5.  
763
 This is the position of A. H. A. SOONS, ‘The Effects of a Rising Sea Level on Maritime Limits and 
Boundaries’, (1990) Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 37, pp. 207-232.  
764
 UNCLOS Article 7(2) – on deltaic baselines.   
765
 UNCLOS, Article 76(9) – on the continental shelf. 
766
 J. GROTE STOUTENBURG, ‘Implementing a New Regime of Stable Maritime Zones to Ensure the 
(Economic) Survival of Small Island States Threatened by Sea-Level Rise’ (2011) International Journal of 
Maritime and Coastal Law, vol. 26, pp. 263-311, at 269. A. Soons recalls that the reason for fixing 
continental shelf outer boundaries was that seabed exploitation implies high levels of investment. In A. 
SOONS, supra, at 217. This provision was intended to permanently fix the boundary between the 
continental shelf and the international seabed area in view of the legal security question which is of 
great importance for the holders of mining concessions. 
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Maritime Delimitation Agreements in the Pacific Region 
 
As illustrated in the previous section, most maritime boundaries in the South Pacific 
remain undelimited – or, at best, have been the object of maritime delimitation agreements 
which are not yet operative because the respective Parties have not yet perfected their 
consent through ratification. Indeed, of the twenty-one bilateral maritime delimitation 
agreements that have been signed in the region (including one preliminary exchange of notes 
between France (Wallis and Futuna) and Tuvalu), only seven have been ratified and are 
currently in force. Until recently, these bilateral treaties necessarily involved at least one 
former colonial or administrating power willing to clarify, after decolonization, the maritime 
boundaries generated by them just prior to the end of their colonial presence in the region. In 
cases where the other Party is not France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, 
New Zealand or Australia, the agreements involve Pacific Island States likely to generate 
important economic or political interests, such as Papua New Guinea (mineral producer and 
the richest country of the region), and Fiji (second most populated Pacific island State); or 
those remaining politically linked to their former colonial or administrating power under a 
Compact of Free Association, such as the Cook Islands, Niue or Tokelau.  
Considering the economic burden that scientific surveys of the coastal zones represent, 
the newly decolonized and underdeveloped Pacific Island States did not initiate negotiations 
on this matter until very recently. With support from the South Pacific Applied Geoscience 
Commission (SOPAC) through the Regional Maritime Boundaries Project Initiative, sub-regional 
co-operation among the three States formerly integrated into the UN Strategic Pacific Trust 
Territory led to the conclusion in 2006 of two maritime delimitation agreements between the 
Federated States of Micronesia and its respective western and eastern neighbours, Palau and 
the Marshall Islands; the former agreement having entered into force in 2008. Similarly, direct 
legal and technical assistance from the Special Advisory Services Commission (SASC) of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and of the Australian Attorney-General’s Office and the Pacific 
Islands Forum very recently fostered the historical signing, on 29 August 2012, of seven 
maritime delimitation agreements among Pacific Island States. Five of them were bilateral 
agreements between Kiribati – the Pacific island State with the widest maritime area of the 
region – and all its neighbours: (1) Tuvalu; (2) Cook Islands (New Zealand); (3) Niue (New 
Zealand); (4) Tokelau (New Zealand); and (5) the Marshall Islands; one was a trilateral 
agreement (6) among Kiribati, Nauru and the Marshall Islands, concerning the determination 
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of the tri-junction point where the EEZs of the three States intersect; one other was a bilateral 
maritime delimitation agreement (7) between Nauru and the Marshall Islands. This unique 
signing took place during the 43rd Pacific Islands Forum on ‘Large Ocean Island States: the 
Pacific Challenge’, held in Rarotonga (Cook Islands) on 30 August 2012.767 Although, of the 
eight maritime delimitation agreements involving underdeveloped Pacific Island States rather 
than former colonial powers, only one (FSM/Palau) has come into force, this move is to be 
applauded and already indicates how serious steps are being taken by Kiribati to defend its 
territorial boundaries.  
Other than the famous 1978 Torres Strait agreement between Papua New Guinea and 
Australia, which achieved a comprehensive settlement on a wide range of complex issues,768 
the primary objective of these fourteen agreements is to divide their overlapping maritime 
zones and/or their continental shelf, presumably in view of the economic merits of the zone 
for exploitation of the living and seabed resources.769 On some occasions, political, historical 
and strategic reasons have also played an important role, as in the 1980 Treaty between the 
Cook Islands and American Samoa in which the United States recognized the sovereignty of 
the Cook Islands over four islands (Pukapuka, Manahiki, Rakatanga and Penrhyn) formerly 
administered by New Zealand and claimed by the USA since the 19th century. Another 
prominent example can be found in the 1983 Agreement between Fiji and Wallis and Futuna 
(France), which has not yet come into force because of its association with the only 
outstanding territorial dispute of the region, between Vanuatu and France, on sovereignty 
over the Matthew and Hunter Islands.770 Finally, some Treaties embrace wider purposes, 
                                                          
767
 Official Press release from the Commonwealth Secretariat available at: 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org/news/249480/290812maritimeboundaries.htm>.  
768
 Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea Concerning Sovereignty 
and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two Countries, Including the Area Known as Torres 
Strait, and Related Matters, signed 18 December 1978; entered into force 15 February 1985. This treaty 
required six years of negotiation meetings between Australia and its former dependent territory, and is 
generally noted for its achievement of a comprehensive settlement of a wide range of issues, including 
the highly complicated geographical situation of the Parties in some areas such as the Torres Strait, 
where the delimitation line required negotiation on many island features.  
769
 Including transboundary highly migratory species such as tuna (Federated States of 
Micronesia/Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia/Palau). For instance, an outstanding 
dispute is that of Tonga and Fiji over the North and South Minerva Reefs: while Tonga claimed 
sovereignty in 1972, renaming them Teleki Tokelau and Teleki Tonga, respectively. Fiji has placed them 
on the edge of its own EEZ, CHARNEY and ALEXANDER (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, supra, 
Report 5-8, at 1012.  
770
 Within three months of the signature of the Fiji/France (Wallis and Futuna) Agreement. While the 
conclusion seems to strengthen the French claim over the Hunter and Matthew Islands, France accepted 
in return the use by Fiji of the 2-metre-high cay of Theva-i-ra (formerly Conway Reef) as one of its base 
points. Used by Fiji as a model of a maritime agreement.  
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establishing a framework for subregional co-operation in environmental matters or the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ traditional areas of fishing. These can be found in the two 
most recent agreements, concluded by the Federated States of Micronesia with Palau and with 
the Marshall Islands, which interestingly introduced clauses responding to the eventual 
adverse effects of climate change on their delimitation line.  
A compilation of the twenty-one existing maritime delimitation agreements (of which only 
seven are in force) in the Pacific region is provided in Table 3, below. Based on a reading of the 
Agreements themselves and the explanations provided in the reports of J. J. Charney and L. M. 
Alexander, the Table summarizes the main characteristics of each of them, including the 
method of delimitation, the name and geological composition and degree of vulnerability 
(according to the same vulnerability test given in Table 2 of the features which served as base 
points of the delimitation line), and whether the Parties have specified the exact location of 
the boundary by listing the geodetic co-ordinates of the points composing such line. 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
264 
 
Table 3: Climate-Change Effects and Maritime Delimitation Agreements in Force in the Pacific Region 
 
 
Agreement 
(Signature – Entry into 
Force) 
 
 
Length of 
Delimitation 
Line 
Zones 
Delimite
d 
Nº of 
Segment
s 
Method(s) of 
delimitation 
BASEPOINTS 
Location of Delimitation Points 
Name Type 
Degree of 
Vulnerability 
(1-5) 
 
1978–1985 
Australia/Papua New 
Guinea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         X 
 
 
 
TS 
 
Seabed 
 
Fisheries 
 
Protected 
Zone 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
AJUSTED 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
+ 
 
STRAIGHT LINES  
(Torres Strait) 
Warrior Reef 
 
Reef 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEODETIC CO-ORDINATES 
Pearcy Cay 
 
 
Cay 5 
Kawa 
 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
 
 
5 
Mata Kawa 
 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 
Kussa Coral Island 
(19m) 
5 
 
 
 
1980–1980 
France (Wallis and 
Futuna)/Tonga 
 
220n.m. 
 
EEZ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EQUIDISTANCE 
Futuna 
 
 
 
Volcanic Island 
(765m) 
 
1  
 
NO EXACT LOCATION OF DELIMITATION POINTS 
 
Article 3. B). Use of ‘Available cartographic and geodesic 
data’ to draw up the relevant cartographic documents by 
mutual agreement. 
 
Article 3.C). ‘Technical corrections’ would be made ‘at 
some future date’, as necessary to update these data 
(triggered by exchange of letters) 
 
 
Niua Fo’ou 
 
 
 
Volcanic Crater 
(205m) 
 
 
1 
Minerva 
Reefs  
Reef 5 
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1980–1983 
Cook Islands/USA 
(American Samoa) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
566n.m. 
 
 
 
 
All-
Purpose 
Boundary 
 
EEZ  
(Since 
1983 US 
claim) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
 
+ 
 
FULL EFFECT OF 
ALL FEATURES 
 
 
  
 
Pukapuka Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5  
 
 
 
 
GEODESIC CO-ORDINATES 
 
 
(WGS 72 + charts and aerial plans of 9 features) 
Nassau 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 
Suwarrow Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
Palmerston Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
Rose 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 
Manua Continental 
Island (964m) 
1 
Swains Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 
1982–1983 
Australia/France (New 
Caledonia) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1200n.m. 
 
 
 
Fisheries 
Zone 
(Australia 
1979 
claim) 
 
 
 
EEZ  
(France 
1978 
claim) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
PARTIALLY 
AJUSTED 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
+ 
 
STRAIGHT LINES  
 
+ 
FULL EFFECT OF 
MIDDLETON 
REEF 
Middleton 
Reef 
Low-Tide 
Elevation 
 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
GEODESIC CO-ORDINATES 
 
(WGS 72) 
Norfolk 
 
Old Volcanic 
Island (318m) 
 
1 
Walpole 
 
 
Raised Coral 
Island (100m) 
 
4 
Matthew 
 
Active Volcanic 
Island (117m) 
 
1 
Hunter 
 
Active Volcanic 
Island (266m) 
1 
1983–** 
Fiji/France  
(New Caledonia, Wallis 
and Futuna) 
 
South West 
Line: 
320n.m. 
 
North East 
Line: 
240n.m. 
 
 
 
 
 
EEZ 
 
South 
West Line: 
1 
 
 
North East 
Line: 4 
 
 
 
 
 
SLIGHTLY 
AJUSTED 
EQUIDISTANCE 
Theva-I-Ra 
 
Island 
 
 
5  
 
 
 
GEODESIC CO-ORDINATES 
 
(WGS 72) 
Hunter Active Volcanic 
Island (266m) 
 
1 
Futuna Volcanic Island 1 
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1983–1984 
France (French 
Polynesia)/UK (Pitcairn, 
Henderson, Ducie and 
Oeno Islands) 
 
 
 
 
350n.m. 
 
 
 
 
EEZ 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
STRICT 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
 
 
 
Temoe 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5  
 
 
 
GEODESIC CO-ORDINATES + LOXODROME LINES 
 
                 Doubts about precise location of islands 
Marutea Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
Pitcairn 
 
Volcanic Island 
(347m) 
 
1 
Oeno Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 
 
 
1985–1985  
(Exchange of notes, Interim 
Arrangement) 
France (Wallis and 
Futuna)/Tuvalu 
 
 
 
 
 
300n.m. 
 
 
 
 
EEZ 
 
Extended 
CS 
Possible 
(Tuvalu) 
 
 
 
 
To be  
determined 
 
 
 
 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
 
 
 
NOT 
SPECIFIED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOT SPECIFIED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
NO EXACT LOCATION OF DELIMITATION POINTS 
 
ABSENCE OF APPROPRIATE CHARTS 
 
RELEVANT BASELINES TO BE DEFINED BY SOPAC  
(Presence of reefs and Tuvalu’s archipelagic status) 
 
 
 
 
1988–** 
Australia/Solomon Islands 
 
 
150n.m. 
 
Fisheries 
Zone 
 
EEZ 
 
 
2 
 
 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
 
 
Mellish Reef 
 
Reef 5  
GEODESIC CO-ORDINATES 
  
(Point U: 1996 Australian Geodetic Datum; Points V and 
R1: WGS 72) 
 
Indispensable 
Reef 
Reef/Low-Tide 
Elevation 
5 
 
1989–** 
France (New 
Caledonia)/Solomon 
Islands 
 
 
CONTENTS OF THIS TREATY NOT AVAILABLE 
 
 
1989–** 
Papua New 
 
 
 
1000n.m. 
TS 
 
EEZ 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
AJUSTED 
Pocklington 
 
Reef 
 
5  
 
GEODETIC CO-ORDINATES Bougainville 
 
High Volcanic 
Island (2792m) 
1 
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Guinea/Solomon Islands 
 
CS 
Protected 
Zones 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
Shortland Volcanic and 
Raised Coral 
Island (234m) 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
1997–** 
Niue (New Zealand)/USA 
(American Samoa) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
279n.m. 
 
 
 
 
 
All-Purpose 
Boundary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
 
 
Niue 
 
 
 
 
Raised Coral 
Island (76m) 
4  
GEODETIC CO-ORDINATES 
(American Datum NAD 83 and WGS 84) 
 
New coastal geodetic positioning required to update 
information on location of base points Not specified 
 
X X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003–2003 
France (Wallis and 
Futuna)/New Zealand 
(Tokelau) 
 
 
 
 
 
101n.m. 
 
 
 
 
 
All-Purpose 
Boundary 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
EQUIDISTANCE 
Wallis 
 
 
 
High Volcanic 
Island (765m) 
 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
GEODETIC CO-ORDINATES 
 
(WGS 84) 
Futuna High Volcanic 
Island (765m) 
 
1 
Nukunonu 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
Atafu Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006–** 
Federated States of 
Micronesia/Marshall 
Islands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
755n.m. 
 
 
 
 
 
EEZ 
 
 
 
 
CS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AJUSTED 
EQUIDISTANCE 
Kosrae 
 
High Volcanic 
Island (628m) 
1  
 
 
 
 
GEODETIC CO-ORDINATES 
 
(WGS 84) 
 
Article 1.5) Significant shifts in the geographic location of 
islands used as base points may imply revision of co-
ordinates of the agreed line. 
Pingelap 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
Mwokil 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
Pohnpei 
 
Volcanic Island 
(721 m) 
1 
Ebon 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 
Namidrik 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
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Ujae 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m) 
 
5 
Ujelang Coral Atoll (<5m) 5 
 
 
2006–2008 
Federated States of 
Micronesia/Palau 
 
 
 
400n.m. 
 
EEZ 
 
CS 
(Palau 2009 
CLCS 
Submission 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
EQUIDISTANCE 
 
Ngulu 
 
Coral Atoll (<5m)  
 
5 
 
 
GEODESIC CO-ORDINATES 
 
 
Use of reefs by both Parties although Palau 2003 
legislation imposes that baselines must be drawn from 
specific features 
Yap 
 
Continental/Old 
Volcanic Island 
(173m) 
1 
Northern 
Islands 
Diversity of 
Features, 
Including 
Unspecified 
Reefs 
5 
2012– ** 
Kiribati/Cook Islands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS OF THESE TREATIES NOT YET AVAILABLE 
2012–** 
Kiribati/Nauru 
2012–** 
Kiribati/Niue (NZ) 
2012–** 
Kiribati/Tokelau (NZ) 
2012–** 
Kiribati/Marshall Islands 
2012–** 
Kiribati/Nauru/Marshall 
Islands 
2012–** 
Nauru/Marshall Islands 
 
 
Source: Personal Elaboration with Data from the Global Island Database (UNEP Island Directory), the UN-UNEP System Wise Earth Watch and International Maritime 
Boundaries: <http://gid.unep-wcmc.org/;http://islands.unep.ch/Cindex.htm>, completed with data from J. J. Charney and L. M. Alexander (eds.), International 
Maritime Boundaries, vols. 1-6 (1993-2005). 
NOTE: COMPLETE REFERENCES OF THESE TREATIES ARE LISTED IN THE BIBLIOGRAPHY.
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The following analysis is based on the information available, which concerns only 14 out of 
the 21 signed agreements listed above. Agreements signed in 2012 have not yet been publicly 
displayed. Of the 50 features listed in Table 3 which served as base points in the fourteen 
delimitation agreements, the content of which is available, 34 can be considered as highly 
vulnerable to sea-level rise and coastal erosion. These changes are, in principle, likely to 
provoke important redrawing of the baselines used for the boundary agreements – although 
the extent of their impact on the baseline may be alleviated in cases where the Parties have 
agreed not to give full effect to the features at stake. Yet, in contrast to situations involving 
undelimited maritime boundaries, the modification of the baselines does not necessarily have 
a mirroring effect on agreed delimitation boundaries.  
First of all, in the course of the negotiations, Parties may agree either to delimit their 
maritime zones by an equidistant or median line, or choose to adjust the equidistant line in 
cases where the geographical conditions of the coast or any specific political considerations 
require such adaptation. Of the 14 agreements in the Pacific region the content of which is 
available, 6 have departed from the strict equidistant line (of which, 3 are in force). Secondly, 
Parties generally specify the geodetic co-ordinates of a succession of points composing the 
delimitation line and include such data in the main body of the Treaty or in an annex, 
irrespective of whether the delimitation line agreed upon is strictly equidistant or has 
undergone adjustments. In doing so, the delimitation line is virtually fixed or ‘frozen’, as in the 
majority of the agreements listed (11 out the 14 agreements for which information is available, 
and 7 of which are in force). In contrast, the Parties may decide to merely make a reference in 
the agreement to the median line as constituting the agreed boundary line, without providing 
the geodetic co-ordinates of the delimitations points. In these cases, the boundary is not fixed 
and can be presumed to fluctuate in accordance with the changes undergone by the relevant 
baselines.771 This is the case of the following maritime agreements: France (Wallis and 
Futuna)/Tonga; Federated States of Micronesia/Palau (both in force); and Federated States of 
Micronesia/Marshall Islands (not yet in force).  
Therefore, the consequences of sea-level rise and coastal erosion for the maritime 
entitlements of Pacific Island States may radically differ, from treaties with fixed boundaries to 
agreements with unfixed boundaries. On the one hand, the change in the location of the 
                                                          
771
 SOONS, supra, at 227: ‘In cases where the delimitation agreement explicitly refers to the median line 
the boundary may shift as a result of sea level rise: asymmetrical changes of the baselines of both states 
will lead to changes in the location of the median line. The states concerned have opted for a potentially 
fluctuating boundary line.’ 
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delimitation lines of the France/Tonga, FSM/ Marshall Islands and FSM/Palau agreements may 
be simply triggered by a request of one of the Parties to update the scientific information of 
both Parties’ coastline. On the other hand, all other Treaties with fixed the delimitation points 
establish permanent and acquired territorial rights which cannot be modified unless the Treaty 
is terminated by lawful means. 
Some authors have raised the question of whether a Party can claim a fundamental 
change of circumstances to terminate a maritime delimitation agreement, as recognized in 
general international law and codified in Article 62(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. In principle, this could be raised by a Party that considers that its counterpart’s 
coastline has undergone substantial geographical modifications which decompensate the 
original balance of the delimitation line and prevent the claimant from potentially increasing 
the scope of its maritime entitlements. It would therefore seem to incentivize ‘aggressive’ or 
‘expansionist’ claims rather than to serve as a protective or defensive device against the loss of 
already acquired maritime entitlements, a trend which could possibly generate interstate 
conflicts.772 It is therefore perfectly understandable why treaties establishing a boundary 
explicitly exclude the possibility of claiming a fundamental change of circumstances under 
Article 62(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Moreover, the 
applicability of this exception is, in any case, subject to very stringent conditions which do not 
seem to be met in these cases. First of all, the circumstances motivating the claim must not 
have been foreseen by the Parties at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty. Considering that 
the dangerous effects of sea-level rise on small island States were without doubt known by 
Pacific Island States by 1984, when the Maldives clearly introduced the issue into the 
Commonwealth agenda and then into that of the UN General Assembly, States Parties to 
delimitation agreements concluded that after 1984 they could have taken it into consideration 
during the negotiations. Secondly, the changes must affect original circumstances ‘the 
existence of which constituted an essential basis of the consent of parties to be bound by the 
treaty’ (Article 62(2) VCLT). Such a condition introduces de facto a probatio diabolica, 
particularly in cases where the agreed delimitation line is simply the strict median or 
                                                          
772
 J. LUSTHAUS, ‘Shifting Sands: Sea-Level Rise, Maritime Boundaries and Inter-State Conflict’ (2010) 
Politics, vol. 30, nº 2, pp. 113-118; and D. CARON, ‘Climate Change, Sea-Level Rise and the Coming 
Uncertainty in Oceanic Boundaries: A Proposal to Avoid Conflict’, in S.-Y. HONG, and J. VAN DYKE, 
Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes and the Law of the Sea, 2009, (Leiden-Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff), chapter I, pp. 1-17. Also a concern mentioned in the 2009 UN Secretary-General’s 
Report on Climate Change and International Security, supra.  
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equidistant line.773 Finally, the changes involved must be ‘fundamental’, so as to transform the 
extent of the obligations still to be performed under the Treaty. Perhaps this last condition is 
the only one that could be met in all cases, since the disappearance of an island or severe 
coastal recession can substantially affect the baseline.774  
Having discarded this possibility, it can be concluded that delimited maritime 
boundaries shield maritime entitlements of the Parties involved – in cases where the Parties 
decide to establish the co-ordinates of the delimitation points – or at least enable Pacific Island 
States to decide and control what effects they recognize as being due to foreseen adverse 
impacts of climate change – in cases where the agreement does not provide the co-ordinates 
of the delimitation line. The freezing effect of the delimitation agreement is all the more 
important given that, as J. Grote Stoutenburg recalls, it falls within the ‘objective’ or the 
‘status’ of contracts which are an exception to the pacta tertii rule of Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and which produce effects beyond the Treaty Parties 
involved.775 Of the 14 agreements signed in the region, the content of which is available, only 3 
may really see the location of the boundary modified: France (Wallis and Futuna)/Tonga, 
Federated States of Micronesia/Palau and Federated States of Micronesia/Marshall Islands. 
Given that only the first two of these three agreements are in force, it can be concluded that 
only the maritime entitlements of four States (France, Tonga, FSM and Palau) may be really at 
stake, and that ‘partial de-territorialization’ would arise for the latter three Pacific Island 
States. Yet, despite the fact that the 11 remaining agreements have fixed maritime 
delimitation lines, present awareness of the impacts of sea-level rise and coastal erosion may 
delay even more or perhaps even prevent the 6 agreements not yet in force from being 
ratified. Eventual movements of these delimitation lines can, in some cases, become 
dangerous points of international conflict. For instance, the boundary that was agreed by the 
Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, signed but not yet ratified, involves Bougainville 
Island, centre of an important secessionist movement which drove Papua New Guinea into 
four years of civil strife. Likewise, the still pending ratification of the agreement between 
France (New Caledonia) and Fiji – which apparently favours French claims against Vanuatu 
                                                          
773
 Consent on adjusted lines becomes more explicit since compromises among the Parties are justified 
and appeared so explicitly during the negotiation period, while the application of the strict equidistance 
may signify an adherence to the principle of fair and equitable delimitation of maritime zones rather 
than to the line that takes into account specific base points with specific effects.  
774
 Contra, CARON, supra, at 641: ‘it is entirely plausible that a State might argue that circumstances had 
changed in that the parties had not foreseen such a rise in sea level’.  
775
 GROTE STOUTENBURG, supra, at 280. 
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over the Hunter and Mathew Islands, may have an impact on this still outstanding territorial 
dispute in the region. 
3.2. Preventive and Responsive Measures against the Loss of Maritime Spaces 
 
3.2.1. Physical Devices: Mainstreaming Coastal-Protection Strategies in National Climate-
Change Adaptation Plans  
 
Actions seeking to prevent de-territorialization (physical and/or legal) are a reflection 
of the tension between the need for minimum physical and economic viability of a political 
entity to continue to be considered a State and the ethical, political and legal will to find 
avenues by which to stretch those minimum standards as far as possible. Eventually, it may 
even involve finding alternative approaches to statehood after the maximum extension of such 
minimum standards is achieved, as will be developed below.776 When dealing with the partial 
de-territorialization scenario described above, measures seeking to either prevent or react 
against the effects of sea-level rise and coastal erosion on Pacific Island States’ maritime 
entitlements are mixed in nature: whilst physical actions respond to the evolution of the 
geographical transformation of the coastline, legal proposals seek to preserve the maritime 
rights of Pacific Island States in spite of the geographical transformation of their coastlines.  
There is a wide range of technological tools and socio-economic policies which can be 
implemented for coastal protection or shoreline preservation without necessarily affecting the 
consideration of the features as islands under Article 121(1) UNCLOS. Conceptually, these 
devices can be considered as adaptive measures to the adverse impacts of climate change on 
Pacific Island States’ maritime entitlements, and can be divided into two main types. The 
category of technological tools includes soft engineering devices, such as beach replenishment 
and artificial enhancement or elevation of beaches, proposed since 1990 by the IPCC Coastal 
Management Subgroup as Strategies for Adaptation to Sea-Level Rise.777 They are followed by 
more aggressive engineering devices, such as the construction of sea walls, as effectively put in 
place in the Maldives around its capital atoll Malé, or even artificial platforms within the 
State’s EEZ, as developed by Japan to prevent Okinotorishima from becoming submerged.778 
                                                          
776
 Physical and economic viability of the political entity are very closely intertwined. 
777
 J. DRONKERS et al., Strategies for Adaptation to Sea Level Rise, Report of the IPCC Coastal Zone 
Management Subgroup: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1990, (Geneva: 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 148 pp.   
778
 Article 60 UNCLOS indicates that these do not generate any maritime zones. Artificial platforms can 
be more controversial. See C. DI LEVA and S. MORITA, ‘Maritime Rights of Coastal States and Climate 
Change: Should States Adapt to Submerged Boundaries?’, (2008) World Bank, Law and Development 
Working Paper Series nº5, 52pp.  
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These hard engineering devices have nonetheless been criticized for various reasons. As 
pointed out by J. Grote Stoutenburg, the construction of sea walls is a very limited solution, 
given that it cannot be extended to all the features which serve as base points and constitutes 
an ‘economically inefficient behaviour’.779 He also highlights how this solution may be 
counterproductive both from a socio-economic and an environmental perspective. On the one 
hand, sea walls can lead to the erosion of beaches and other sediments. Thus, while stabilizing 
the high-water mark, they may foster the landward displacement of the low-water mark – 
determining the baselines – to the foot of the sea wall. On the other hand, the construction of 
sea walls in larger islands may affect their appeal as tourist destinations, an economic sector 
which Tuvalu, for instance, has been particularly keen to develop in the last decade. Moreover, 
other than the negative side-effect on the economic development of an island subject to the 
construction of a sea wall, an important decrease in the economic viability of the feature could 
arguably be used against the interested State to call into question the continued inclusion of 
the feature in the island category (as defined by Article 121(1) of UNCLOS) and to argue that it 
should be reclassified as either a ‘rock which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life 
of its own’ (Article 121(3) UNCLOS) or as an artificial island (Article 60 UNCLOS).780 
Considering the high costs generated by such technological tools, as well as the 
potential side-effects they may generate from an environmental, economic and legal 
perspective, the development of wider socio-economic frameworks appears all the more 
fundamental. As indicated by Charles di Leva and Sachito Morita, adaptation policies may thus 
include early–warning mechanisms and the introduction of coastal zoning and risk-
management plans into national development plans and into appropriate national climate 
change adaptation plans (NAPAs). It may even be advocated that more radical changes in the 
economic development models of these island States should be pursued, as recently 
implemented by the Maldives, which has attracted green technology investment and aspires 
to become the first carbon-neutral economy of the planet. 
 
3.2.2. Legal Devices: Protecting Maritime Boundaries by Ratifying Maritime Delimitation 
Agreements, Fixing Baselines and Effecting Archipelagic Status 
 
                                                          
779
 STOUTENBURG, supra, at 277: ‘[S]tates are incentivized to commit resources not where mostly 
needed, but in parts of their territory where they are necessary to retain their legal entitlements’. 
780
 This is, for instance, the position of Van Dyke on Okinotorishima, who defends it for an artificial 
island when total disappearance of the island is possible. This however can be fought from a legal 
perspective by endorsing the narrower interpretations of Article 121(1) UNCLOS.  
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Considering the economic burden that the physical and policy devices depicted above 
constitute for underdeveloped and mostly agricultural countries such as the Pacific Island 
States, scholars concerned with the potential loss of maritime territorial spaces have started to 
advocate different legal solutions, which could be raised by the concerned States, both as a 
possible complement to the artificial means of shoreline protection and irrespective of the 
cost and difficulty of their implementation.  
To be sure, in cases where a maritime delimitation agreement has been signed, the 
most immediate legal device to ensure the final preservation of the maritime spaces of the 
Parties involved is the ratification of the Treaty by all Parties so that it can enter into force. This 
is particularly important in cases where the Parties involved are Kiribati, Tuvalu or the Marshall 
Islands – three countries composed exclusively of coral atolls, for the base points used to trace 
the boundary are most likely to be highly vulnerable to climate change impacts and susceptible 
to disappearance or undergoing severe coastal recession. Henceforth, although the signature 
and adoption of the five bilateral Treaties between Kiribati and (1) Nauru, (2) Cook Islands 
(New Zealand), (3) Tuvalu, (4) Niue (New Zealand) and (5) Tokelau (New Zealand), one trilateral 
Treaty involving Kiribati, Nauru and the Marshall Islands, one bilateral agreement between 
Nauru and the Marshall Islands, and one bilateral agreement between the Federated States of 
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands already generate the obligation of the Parties involved to 
refrain from acts which may defeat the object and purpose of the Treaties,781 their final 
consent to the obligations set up in the Treaties involved would make a very import difference 
and operate as a safeguard of the maritime spaces of the respective States. Their recent 
signature is a sign that the awareness of these countries is in the right direction; yet, 
ratification should be promoted for the full operation of the protection offered by these 
Treaties to be finally displayed.  
In the absence of a maritime delimitation agreement fixing the boundary between two 
facing or adjacent States, the focus shifts towards means of preserving the original location of 
the baselines, which may have been modified by total submersion or important coastal erosion 
of key base points. Undoubtedly, the simplest way for island States to achieve this objective is 
the publication of their baselines in official charts. This solution, referred to by J. Grote 
Stoutenburg as ‘masterly inactivity’, virtually constitutes a de facto stabilization of their 
maritime zones, since the location of their baselines will be preserved until the State 
concerned decides to update the survey of its coastline and produce new charts in which 
                                                          
781
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted on 22 May 1969, entered into force on 27 
January 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Article 18.  
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coastal geographical changes would be incorporated.782 Truly enough, what begins with the 
legal depiction of the geographical characteristics of a coastal State, released in an official 
format and important for navigational purposes, eventually becomes an artificial legal 
construct which sustains a factual reality that may no longer match the real coastal scenario. 
Yet, such a legal construct, supported by the weight and continuation of the past facts – 
becoming at present a fait accompli – can at least give the affected States temporary 
protection: effective as long as their official charts are not challenged by other States. 
Moreover, as Alex Oude Elferink argues, States (such as Kiribati and Tuvalu) which are not yet 
able to afford the scientific surveys necessary to produce official charts would still be entitled 
to claim the entire suite of maritime zones, for it appears that the applicability of Article 121(3) 
UNCLOS can be suspended for rocks which are part of an archipelago.783 
Another legal solution proposed, for instance, by M. Hayashi and J. Stoutenburg,784 
involves a higher level of international co-operation. These authors suggest the development 
of collective implementation mechanisms of a new regime of stable maritime zones, through 
either a UN General Assembly resolution on stable maritime zones or the adoption of an 
Implementation Agreement on Sea-Level Rise which would provide for stable maritime zones 
and could complement the 1994 Implementation Agreement of UNCLOS.785 While this 
proposal inconveniently relies on gathering sufficient political support, which may take a long 
time, it would certainly be beneficial to Pacific Island States that do not have official charts 
showing the outer boundaries of their archipelagic lines, like Kiribati and Tuvalu, granting them 
a de iure protection of their baselines – while ratification of the set of treaties remains 
pending. Thereby, a combination of both legal strategies – production when possible and 
publication of official charts or at least their formal claim to archipelagic status, while 
negotiating in parallel the implementation of a new regime of stable maritime zones – could 
provide for a more comprehensive protection.  
 
4. SCENARIO 2. TOTAL DE-TERRITORIALIZATION OF PACIFIC ISLAND STATES: UNCERTAIN 
EFFECTS ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE STATE  
 
                                                          
782
 GROTE STOUTENBURG, supra, at 279.   
783
 A.G.O ELFERINK, ,’Clarifying Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: the Limits  Set by the 
Nature of International Legal Processes’, (1998) Boundary Security Bulletin, vol. 6, issue 2, at 59. 
784
 M. HAYASHI, ‘Sea-Level Rise and the Law of the Sea: Legal and Policy Options’, (2009) Proceedings of 
the International Symposium on Islands and Oceans, Ocean Policy and Research Foundation, pp. 78-90; 
and GROTE STOUTENBURG, supra, at 293-295. 
785
 By extension or lex lata of Article 76(9) UNCLOS on the permanent outer limits of the continental 
shelf’. 
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While the effects of sea-level rise and coastal erosion on Pacific Island States’ maritime 
territorial dimension is the most immediate territorial issue they have to face, what the region 
genuinely fears (as the Climate Change and International Security Discourse before universal 
organizations revealed) is the prospect of a total territorial loss scenario. If partial de-
territorialization – when climate change effects provoke the retreat of the shorelines and may 
even submerge entire topographical features – affects the terrestrial and maritime spatial 
dimension of the twelve independent States of the region and can potentially be exported to 
the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean as well, the total de-territorialization scenario covers (at 
least for the time being) a more restricted manifestation of the problem. Of the 193 States that 
currently exist, only four are undeniably under the threat of total loss of their territory, for 
they consist exclusively of low-lying features with an altitude of less than 5 metres and do not 
count with volcanic or continental islands. Three of these States are in the Pacific – the 
Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu; the fourth is the Maldives in the Indian Ocean. The 
prospect of these four cases of total territorial disappearance brings the central question of 
the role of the territory in international law (dealt with above in section 2 of the present 
chapter) back to the fore.  
The opening section of this chapter explored the role of the concept of territory in the 
creation of States and stressed its contingent character by differentiating the historical context 
of the modern European State from that of the post-colonial Pacific island State. Three main 
legal theories on the territory concept, all stemming from the concept of the modern 
European State, were analysed to explain the specific role of territory in the Pacific following 
decolonization. In contrast, the present section deals with the role of territory in the 
continuation of the State by questioning whether the total disappearance of the spatial 
dimension of a State necessarily implies the loss of its international legal personality. Bearing 
in mind that the natural bias of the international legal order towards stability and order 
generally favours the maintenance of existing structures, the functions of and legal theories on 
territory attached to the creation of States is not automatically mirrored in the consideration 
of the place of territory in the continuation of States.  
Thereby, what may appear as farfetched proposals by scholars willing to defend the 
legal survival of Pacific Island States merits thorough consideration. These solutions can be 
divided into two main types. First of all, scholars have pointed to strategies seeking to maintain 
and even produce some sort of territorial dimension of the State, which I refer to as ‘re-
territorialization strategies’, and generally involve the use of territory of other States under 
different legal forms. Secondly, considering the impossible maintenance of a State’s spatial 
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dimension, ultima ratio proposals advocate the continuation of de-territorialized States’ 
international legal personality, as a new form of ‘non-State sovereign entities’, and base such 
proposals on the precedents offered by the Holy See and the Sovereign Military Hospitalier 
Order of St. John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta (hereafter referred to as the Order of 
Malta). Other than considering and balancing the merits of these two types of solution from 
the standpoint of their feasibility, the present chapter argues that they must be approached by 
the functionalist method as applied to the role of territory in the creation of States. Thus, the 
fundamental question is not how Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands may preserve – in 
theory and in practice – their international legal personality despite having been deprived of 
their spatial dimension, but why should their continuation be assured in these extreme 
circumstances? Which specific purpose(s) would be fulfilled, should the survival of these 
political entities either as States or as non-State sovereign entities be acknowledged by the 
international community? All in all, at the heart of this issue lies one of the most long-standing 
riddles of modern political theory, namely, the question: What is the function of the State? 
Ultimately, this outstanding issue arises today in association with a new question of moral and 
ecological philosophy, which will be dealt with more extensively in Chapter 6: May de-
territorialized States rely on specific ethical grounds to sustain their claims in favour of the 
survival of their international legal personality? Could they even claim recognition of their 
survival as compensation for severe environmental harm?786  
4.1. Fighting for the Continuation of the State through ‘Re-territorialization’ Strategies 
 
4.1.1. Land Acquisition by Cession or Purchase from another State 
 
Alongside and complementary to measures already mentioned for shoreline 
protection, or construction of artificial platforms, the first type of scholarly proposals for 
preserving and producing the spatial dimension of the threatened States includes either 
acquisition of new land from or a merger with another State. Consistent with the influence of 
the Roman law tradition, the cession or the transfer of a part of the territory between States 
(by a treaty provision) is among the modes of acquisition and transfer of territory traditionally 
recognized as lawful under international law.787 The Pacific is not unfamiliar with either of the 
two.  
                                                          
786
 These questions should form the basis of a new normative blueprint for defending the continuation 
of Pacific islands’ international legal personality.  
787
 JENNINGS, supra, at 6.  
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Wishing to ensure its presence in the area, in 1898 Prussia purchased the Marianas 
and Caroline Islands from Spain, thereby lowering the boom on a massive colonial empire that 
had lasted for over three centuries.788 A second interesting precedent in the region involved 
the Fijian island of Rabi, purchased in 1941 by the British Phosphate Commission (BPC) for the 
purpose of relocating the inhabitants of the island of Banaba (formerly known as Ocean Island, 
today part of Kiribati) after the discovery of phosphate resources there.789 While the first case 
involved the transmission of a colonial territory from one State (Spain) to another (Prussia), 
the second case was more complex in that it involved the three partner governments of BPC 
(Australia, New Zealand and Britain) purchasing an island part of Fiji at a time when Fiji was not 
yet an independent entity, still being part of the British Empire. The precedents of purchase of 
land in the region took place within an overall context of colonial exploitation of natural 
resources and preceded the independence of the relevant political entities.  
Nowadays, the idea is back on track within a radically different landscape. The 
possibility of buying land from another State has been suggested as a means to ensure the 
survival of low-lying island nations threatened by sea-level rise. First formulated in 2008 by the 
former president of the Maldives, Mohammed Nasheed, the idea was announced immediately 
after his election. The prospective creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund in the Indian Ocean 
Island State, a sort of ultimate insurance policy sourced from tourist revenues, would finance 
the purchase of land abroad. Countries with similar cultural, religious traditions and 
                                                          
788
 Today, the Marianas have been integrated into the USA, while the Caroline Islands are part of the 
Federated States of Micronesia. 
789
 During World War II, the Japanese forces in the Pacific occupied the phosphate islands of Banaba and 
Nauru and deported their inhabitants to other islands of Micronesia. When the Japanese surrendered to 
Australian troops, the ‘accident of war’ which had already made the Banabans a displaced people was 
soon seen by the BPC as a golden occasion to settle them in a different location. Hence, the Banabans 
were told that the island had become uninhabitable because of war damage and were collected from 
different prisoner-of-war camps in Micronesia, reassembled in Tarawa, and quickly transferred to Rabi 
(Fiji), under conditions which then proved to be flawed, including the condition that the relocation was 
for a period of only two years, at the end of which anyone wishing to return to Banaba would have their 
transport arranged at the expense of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony Government. Most 
importantly, they were told that the resettlement would not impair their land rights in Banaba nor their 
right to access to any of the Banaban Funds. The inadequate settlement of roughly 4,000 Banabans in 
Rabi made them suffer from, inter alia, extreme lack of adequate shelter and severe undernourishment. 
Besides, following the respective independence of Fiji (1970) and Kiribati (1978), the legal status of the 
Banabans in both countries was unclear, leading to a situation of de facto statelessness. In Fiji, Banabans 
of Rabi were equated to Fijian Indians, until, in 2005, a 3-month period was opened for Banabans willing 
to gain citizenship by naturalization, to benefit from a waiver of the usual conditions and fees. In 
Kiribati, a seat is specifically reserved in the Parliament for a Banaban representative. Curiously enough, 
the original inhabitants of Rabi had previously been relocated to another Fijian island (Taveuni) in the 
mid-19
th
 century. Their descendants claim the right to return to their island, threatening the Banabans 
again with the prospect of resettlement. See KING and SIGRAH, ‘Te rii ni Banaba’ (2001), at: 
<www.banaba.com>.  
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meteorological conditions, such as India and Sri Lanka, were first suggested and appeared in 
the media as the possible future lands on the most paradigmatic face of the global 
environmental disaster. The term ‘climate refugees’ was coined, updating the early interest 
that UNEP had shown in the issue of environmental displacements,790 and informal talks were 
also said to have taken place between the Maldives and the governments of Australia and New 
Zealand.791 Such a fascinating and appealing policy was one of the elements of a wider strategy 
put forward before international organizations, aiming at the introduction of climate change 
into the agendas of human rights institutions and, vice versa, of promoting a human rights 
approach into climate change negotiations.792 Yet, as the Australian government denied the 
existence of any sort of informal agreement, and the Sovereign Wealth Fund was yet to be 
settled two years after the idea was first formulated, doubts about the real intentions of ex-
president Nasheed on this matter started to flourish.793 It was later confirmed that, instead of 
pursuing this road, the Maldives had given preference to a new strategy, consisting of 
becoming the first totally carbon-neutral country on the planet.794  
 Notwithstanding this change of policy in this Indian Ocean country, the idea was 
mirrored in the Pacific Ocean, as Kiribati recently initiated informal talks with Fiji on the 
possible purchase of land and relocation of Kiribati’s entire population.795 So far, Kiribati’s 
President Anote Tong informed the international community that the I-Kiribati government 
                                                          
790
 In 1988, the United Nations Environment Programme released a first report on environmental 
refugees, at the time when the precedent on international environmental security was being dealt with 
in the United Nations. EL-HINNAWI, Environmental Refugees, 1988, (Nairobi: UNEP).  
791
 See for instance B. DOHERTY, ‘Climate Change Castaways Consider Moving to Australia’, Sydney 
Morning Herald Tribune, 7 January 2012; and, from the same newspaper, B. MERCHANT, ‘To Escape 
Rising Seas, Maldives President May Move his Entire Island Nation to Australia’, 6 January 2012. 
792
 On the introduction by the Maldives of the issue of climate change and human rights, see Chapter 2 
above, Section 3.1.1, and Chapter 5 below (introduction). 
793
 See for instance, Ashby MONK, ‘Did the Maldives Pretend to Set Up a Sovereign Wealth Fund?’ 20 
February 2010, available at: <http://oxfordswfproject.com/2010/01/20/did-the-maldives-pretend-to-
set-up-a-swf/>– citing an interview with President Nasheed in which he vaguely stated: ‘The fund is now 
formulated. We will have to save for a rainy day. And during the worst-case scenarios, as responsible 
politicians, we should be able to tap funds and money set aside for a rainy day. So the fund is going on, 
and hopefully we will have something when the going gets very bad.’ 
794
 Costing the Earth – TheMovieChannel.com., 22 March 2009, available at: 
<http://www.emailwire.com/release/20736-Costing-the-Earth-TheMoveChannelcom.html>: ‘As the 
Maldivian economy relies so heavily on tourism, raking in over £700,000 each year, the Government is 
also hoping that the carbon-neutral promise will attract more environmentally conscious tourists. The 
Government is working with climate energy experts to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy 
sources.’ 
795
 To be financed in this case by Kiribati’s Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund which has been set up 
with phosphate earnings over the years and acts as a stabilizer fund, created in 1956. The economy of 
Kiribati was heavily dependent on phosphate exports which accounted for 50% of the government’s 
revenue. 
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had approved the purchase of 2,500 hectares of fertile land in Viti Levu (Fiji’s main island). The 
land belongs to a Church which sold it for 9.6 million US dollars, and may well become a way 
out for the 103,000 inhabitants of Kiribati.796 Like the Banaban precedent, the two parties 
involved in this commercial transaction would be the State of Kiribati on the one hand, acting 
in a private capacity and as a private personality (and not as a State); and the Church of Fiji, 
which also has the status of a private personality. Thus, in principle, the purchase of the land 
would not involve the States of Kiribati and Fiji as such. Yet, since the land remains under Fijian 
sovereignty, the laws applicable in that area would remain the laws of Fiji, ruling both the 
public and private spheres of life (criminal law, property law, family law, etc). This situation 
could eventually be transformed, should there be a special agreement between Fiji and 
Kiribati, in which Fiji would delegate the exercise of some competences to the State of Kiribati 
(e.g. matters of family or criminal law, police, commercial matters resolved by customary rules, 
etc.). Micro-States around the world provide particularly illustrative examples of delegation of 
competences. The Vatican State has, for instance, delegated the exercise of police security to 
Italy, by virtue of the Lateran Agreement, just as the majority of Pacific Island States have done 
with Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom. Such delegation of 
competences implies that the authorities of a foreign country may act and intervene lawfully 
within the territorial boundaries of a State to restore or maintain order, though in no case is it 
tantamount to a delegation of sovereignty as such. Moreover, the agreements not involving a 
delegation of competences may simply recognize immunity from execution or even of 
jurisdiction over the goods and properties of the land in question – a possibility which would 
be subject to the transformation of the land into a public good or its purchase by the State of 
Kiribati in its public capacity.  
In either of these scenarios, ‘re-territorialisation’ strategies through purchase of land 
seems to be a limited solution to defend the continuation of a State in a total de-
territorialization scenario, subject in any case to the will of the States involved in possible 
transactions. Although Fiji could theoretically renounce its territorial sovereignty over the 
2,500 hectares of land in Viti Levu purchased by Kiribati, it is difficult to see that this will be 
crystallized in practice, particularly given that Viti Levu is the main island of the Fijian 
archipelago. The same may be said about cases of cession of territorial sovereignty by one 
State to another, which are theoretically possible but remain rather unlikely in practice.797 It 
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 ‘Una nación entera podría mudarse a Fiji’, La Voz del Mundo, 9 March 2012.  
797
 Cases of cession of territory are all the more unlikely to arise in post-colonial States which have very 
recently acquired independence, particularly if the States at stake have already a very limited territory.   
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may, nonetheless, constitute a temporary solution for a partial de-territorialization scenario – 
as is currently developing in Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. Limited population flows 
from geographical features most at risk could be relocated in the purchased Fijian lands (under 
Fijian sovereignty).798 Meanwhile, as Rosemary Rayfuse has suggested, in their struggle for 
survival, the country of origin of the displaced people may put in place the necessary 
mechanisms to fix their original maritime entitlements (by entry into force of the maritime 
delimitation agreements signed, or by fixing their baselines through declaration of archipelagic 
status), so that the relocated populations can at least benefit from the marine resources.799  
 
4.1.2. Merger with another State 
 
Given the practical and legal difficulties associated with the idea of re-territorializing 
disappearing States through the purchase or cession of land, some authors have also raised 
the possibility of merging two or more States. Putting aside the practical difficulties of making 
such a proposal a reality, the main remaining (theoretical) difficulty arising out of such a 
possibility depends on the form of political organization to be given to the new resultant 
political entity. If, on the one hand, the chosen form of merger is a federation or free 
association, the continuation of the State undergoing severe de-territorialization ought to be 
admissible (like the Cook Islands, having the status of a self-governing territory of New 
Zealand). This may not constitute a problem as long as the low-lying State remains partly de-
territorialized, but it may be a difficult position to sustain once the complete submersion of the 
land occurs.  
Only two legal fictions could sustain these forms of merger in a total de-
territorialization scenario: (1) acknowledgement that one of the merged States comprises 
exclusively maritime territory (subject to the prior defence of the fixity of their original 
maritime entitlements); or (2) acknowledgement that the statehood of the submerged State 
continues in spite of the inexistence of any sort of spatial dimension. If neither of these legal 
forms is acknowledged, the merger of the States would necessarily take the form of an 
integration, whereby the international legal personality of one of them (presumably the State 
most at risk of disappearing) is subsumed in that of the other State and therefore disappears in 
                                                          
798
 It is important to consider here only displacements of a limited number of people affected, for, as will 
be seen in Chapter 5 below, total de-population scenarios can arguably have the same effects as total 
de-territorialization scenarios.  
799
 R. RAYFUSE, ‘International Law and Disappearing States: Utilizing Maritime Entitlements to Overcome 
the Statehood Dilemma’, supra.    
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its former independent version (before becoming part of another State, such as New Caledonia 
or French Polynesia which became integrated territories of France). 
 
4.2. De-territorialized Pacific Island States: A New Form of Sui Generis ‘Non-State Sovereign 
Entity’?  
 
4.2.1. Two Precedents of Existing Recognized Sovereign Non-State Entities: The Holy See and 
the Order of Malta 
 
As explained by Sir Robert Jennings and recalled by Judge Huber, while it is widely 
admitted that territorial sovereignty subsists even when divorced from possession, ‘excursions 
into the realm of an abstract title to sovereignty have been cautious and tentative’.800 There 
are, nonetheless, two prominent exceptions to this principled rule, whereby sovereign entities 
with international legal personality have existed (and subsisted) in spite of having lost a 
territory specifically ascribed to the exercise of their sovereign powers. These are good 
examples of Brierly’s remark, which stated that ‘there are other elements of international law 
that mean these specific criteria [set up in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention] need not be 
slavishly followed. It was these “other elements” that determined the inclusion of both the Holy 
See and the Order of Malta among the sovereign subjects of international law’.801 Drawing 
from these two historical precedents, tentative moves in academic circles started to suggest 
that the same positive fate could be endured by submerged island States.  
The Holy See, supreme organ of the Catholic Church, headed by the Pope according to 
the Code of Canon Law, and composed of the College of Cardinals governing the Church,802 is a 
non-territorial religious entity. In spite of this characteristic, inherent in its temporal nature 
and functions, the Holy See has known different moments in its history since the fall of the 
Roman Empire in which it has had a territorial basis. This situation has proven to be a fruitful 
source of confusion about its State or non-State nature since the inception of the modern 
European State, and of uncertainty, in the 20th century, about the eligibility of the Holy See for 
membership of the United Nations. The Holy See was first associated with the territorial extent 
of the Papal States, which had been created in the 9th century by Pépin le Bref and 
                                                          
800
 JENNINGS (quoting Judge Huber), supra, at 5. 
801
 BRIERLY, supra, at 150.   
802
 Holy See is a designation under Canon Law for the highest offices of the Church + its concept has its 
roots in apostolic succession according to which an unbroken chain is formed of representatives of the 
Christ from the Apostle St Peter to the present day. See Bo J. THEUTENBERG, ‘The Holy See, the Order of 
Malta and International Law’, (2003) –open online publication, pp. 1-18, at 12; and J. L. KUNZ, ‘The 
Status of the Holy See in International Law’ (1952) American Journal of International Law, vol. 46, pp. 
308-314. 
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Charlemagne (in the context of the Holy Roman Empire). Such territorial connection vanished 
in 1870 with the annexation by Italian troops of the Papal States, whereby the Apostolic 
Palaces were granted freedom (protection by Napoleon III). In spite of the annexation, the 
Holy See pursued its international political influence and activity, maintaining its diplomatic 
presence in many States and concluding treaties. This ambiguous situation lasted throughout 
the 19th century and even through the First World War, until, in 1929, the Lateran Agreement 
concluded between Italy and the Holy See established that the State of the Vatican City would 
fall under the sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff, while Rome would remain under the 
jurisdiction of Italy.803 Although the Holy See reacquired territorial visibility through the 
institution of the Vatican City, neither of the two entities has been considered a State. The 
Vatican City does not exist to support, maximize the welfare, ensure the security of the Holy 
See nor does it respond to a legitimate right to self-determination of its 800 residents and 400 
citizens (the majority of which are church officials on a non-permanent basis), for Italy 
provides a police force to patrol the Vatican City, administers punishment of crimes within the 
City, maintains the water and railways systems, as well as ensuring freedom of 
communications and transportation. Therefore, the Vatican City virtually acts as a ‘vassal 
State’, serving as the base for the administration of the Roman Catholic Church. To some 
extent, it also operates as an artificial construct that provides the Holy See with some sort of 
‘claim to territorial integrity’, which was relevant later on to the determination of the form of 
the Holy See’s participation in the United Nations that it was eligible for. After the initial 
tentative in 1944 to present the application of the State of the Vatican City for full membership 
of the United Nations – which failed essentially because of the principled policy of neutrality 
provided in Article 24 of the Lateran Treaty, the Holy See – and not the Vatican City – under 
Pope Paul VI, established, in 1964, a ‘permanent observer’ mission to the United Nations with 
offices in the UN headquarters.  
The case of the Order of Malta differs from that of the Holy See, for it has not until 
now regained any territorial basis, such as that which the Vatican City to some extent provides 
for the Holy See.804Currently, with 11,000 members, the Order of Malta has its headquarters in 
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 R. AGO, ‘Occupazione Bellica dell’ Italia e Trattato Lateranense,’ (1946) Comunicazioni e Studi, pp. 
129ff.   
804
 See O. FARRAN, ‘The Sovereign Order of Malta in International Law’, (1954) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 2, pp. 217-234. For a more recent account, see K. KARSKI, ‘The 
International Legal Status of the Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes 
and of Malta’, (2012) International Community Law Review, vol. 14, issue 1, pp. 19-32.  
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Via Condotti, in Rome. Therefore, in this sense, it is perhaps the best example of a 
contemporary de-territorialized sovereign entity. The origins of the Order date back to the 11th 
century when Blessed Gerard founded St John’s Hospital along with other fellow Dominican 
monks. The Hospital was annexed to the Monastery of St John the Baptist of Jerusalem and 
was built up to look after the dead and wounded of the Crusades that were taking place 
between Christians and Muslims. The reputation of St. John’s Hospital soon attracted the 
attention of the Pope, to the extent that, in 1113, through the Bull Pie postulatis voluntatis, 
the group headed by Blessed Gerard received official recognition as Christianity’s oldest 
religious Order, a status which granted the Order of Malta a set of privileges, including the 
right to appoint its own Grand Master. After Jerusalem surrendered to the forces of Sultan 
Saladin in 1187, the Order moved to Cyprus (1291–1309), then to Rhodes (1309–1522) and 
finally to Malta, where its dominion lasted for over three centuries, until 12 June 1798, when 
Malta surrendered to the Napoleonic forces on board the French vessel l’Orient. During this 
long period (1530–1798) Cyprus, Rhodes and Malta provided the Order with a territorial basis, 
which was successively granted, as vassal States to the Order, in a political scheme akin to that 
of the princes or bishops of the time who were united under the Holy Roman Empire. Hence, 
for the five centuries during which the Order had a territorial basis, its sovereignty over such 
spaces was recognized by its contemporary international actors. Such historical foundations 
were so deeply rooted that even after the loss of Malta, its last territorial remnant, the Order 
was de facto treated as a sui generis non-State sovereign entity with international legal 
personality. 
 
4.2.2. Protecting the Pacific Island Nations through the Continuation of the State: Back to the 
Functionalist Approach to the Role of Territory in the Configuration of Statehood 
 
The examples of the Holy See and the Order of Malta are helpful in the sense that they 
point to the importance of historical contingency and context as factors which may render 
possible the recognition of unusual forms of sovereignty not ascribed to a territorial State 
entity. To be sure, their peculiar status in today’s international legal and political system is 
undoubtedly the result of the special bond of both institutions with the long process of 
formation of the modern State and of the early European Law of Nations. While in the 20th 
century international law has undergone a process of ‘universalization’, its current status may 
be seen as a reminder of both the European origins of the international legal order and even as 
a reminiscence of Eurocentricism. Henceforth, simply recalling these two examples to support 
the cause of de-territorialized Pacific Island States and arguing that they may survive as non-
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territorial sovereign entities is not, as such, particularly useful nor enlightening, since the 
reasons why the Holy See and the Order of Malta are recognized today as special forms of non-
territorial sovereign entities cannot be applied to the case of Pacific Island States.805 Yet, these 
examples do help in one sense. In order to counter the historical weight represented by the 
two precedents of non-territorial sovereign entities and make of their example a useful tool 
for defending the continuation of Pacific Island States, it is essential to emphasize the 
functional dimension of these States at risk. Maxine Burkett’s thought-provoking article has 
offered the grounds for a first breakthrough in this matter when arguing that Pacific Island 
States should survive as de-territorialized sovereign entities, for the continuation of their 
sovereignty would better ensure the protection of their relocated populations.806 So it is at this 
point that the interrelations between the territorial and the human dimensions of the State 
surface.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 Just as the nature of the State – privileged habitat of the territory – lies outside the 
realm of law, the place of territory in international law is equally unsettled and its nature 
doubtful from a legal perspective. One way of explaining the different legal accounts of the 
concept of territory is by approaching it from a historical perspective and drawing from such a 
context the various functions that the territory has had in the international legal order. In the 
context of the modern European State, the territory was understood as a property of the State 
(property theory), an element or integral part of the State itself (constitutive theory), or the 
space wherein the competences of the State were displayed (competence theory). A fourth 
understanding of the territory concept emerges from the role it plays in Pacific Island States, 
for which the territory is an expression or manifestation of the right of Pacific islanders to self-
determination and political independence from former colonial domination. This particular 
meaning, which the concept of territory has for post-colonial Pacific Island States proves that a 
solid normative ground may balance and even supersede the viability requirement, so that a 
very limited territory may able to provide the necessary grounds for a political entity to acquire 
full-fledged statehood irrespective of its real capacities. Moreover, Pacific Island States’ spatial 
dimension is not as small as it generally seems at first sight. In fact, the small extent of their 
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 For we do already know of the flexibility that characterized the international legal order and its 
inherent capacity to adapt to its contemporary challenges. 
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 M. BURKETT, ‘The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized Nationhood and the Post-
Climate Era’, (2011) Climate Law, vol. 2, issue 1, pp. 345ff. 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
286 
 
land is largely compensated by the vast maritime spaces allocated by UNCLOS and which 
determines both their major spatial expression and their principal source of economic 
revenues. Paradoxically, for these ‘ocean States’, the sea is as much the fundamental element 
of their identity and the primary source of livelihoods, and yet also the origin of the threat to 
their continuation as States.  
Henceforth, de-territorialization due to the adverse impacts of climate change on 
Pacific Island States constitutes, first and foremost, a challenge to these States’ maritime 
entitlements. As their shorelines progressively retreat as a result of sea-level rise, baselines – 
generally considered as ‘ambulatory’ – retreat accordingly, and thus so do the outer maritime 
boundaries of the State concerned. Devices seeking to halt this effect would include the 
ratification of maritime delimitation agreements among Pacific island States and, arguably, the 
possibility to fix their baselines and to claim archipelagic status by fixing archipelagic lines and 
then refraining from updating the official charts. Less useful and more aggressive physical 
devices, such as the construction of sea walls, have also been taken into consideration.  
And yet, as efforts seeking to freeze, preserve or protect the spatial dimension of 
Pacific Island States against adverse climate change impacts flourish and develop in the region, 
the prospects of a total de-territorialization scenario cannot be ignored or overlooked. 
Alternative response measures to this extreme example of climate change impact include 
making incursions into both re-territorialization strategies, such as the purchase of land or the 
eventual merger with another State, and, most prominently, the possibility to argue that 
completely submerged Pacific Island States may continue to be recognized as a post-modern 
or contemporary form of a non-State sovereign entity. The precedents of the Holy See and the 
Order of Malta, which currently have an atypical status, prove that there is room in 
international life for some flexibility on the forms of subjects allowed by the international legal 
system, as long as strong historical and political reasons support this special treatment. It is 
also a reminder that although sovereignty is the main and principal characteristic of a State, it 
can also exist outside a State framework. Sovereignty and statehood may therefore come 
together, or be set apart, if necessary, to acknowledge the existence of a special political entity 
that plays a role in the international community. 
If the territory is a fundamental – yet not always necessary – condition for the 
recognition of sovereign entities, the next question that arises is: on which grounds may the 
continuation of Pacific islands’ sovereignty and/or statehood be defended, in spite of their 
prospective total submergence? This question invites turning attention towards the role 
played by the second dimension of a State, namely, the population, as the disappearance of 
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the State as a sovereign political entity with international legal personality may result first 
from a State’s total or acute de-population before total submergence ensues. The next chapter 
will therefore seek to show why the continuation of the State or, at least, of its sovereignty, 
even in extreme cases of total territorial loss, may be justified as a means of fulfilling a specific 
function, namely, a better protection of Pacific islanders. 
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‘It is our belief that Tuvalu, as a nation, has a right to exist forever. It 
is our basic human right. We are not contemplating migration. We are a proud 
nation with a unique culture which cannot be relocated elsewhere. We want to 
survive as a people and as a nation. We will survive. It is our fundamental 
right.’ 
Tuvalu’s Prime Minister, H.E. Apisai 
Lelemia, Poznan (Poland), UNFCCC COP. 
14/MOP.4 2008) 
 
 
  ‘We don’t want to lose our dignity. We’re sacrificing much being 
displaced, in any case. We don’t want to lose that, whatever dignity is left. So 
the last thing we want to be called is ‘refugee’. We’re going to be given as a 
matter of right something that we deserve, because they’ve taken away what 
we have.’ 
President of Kiribati, H.E. Anote Tong, 
Tarawa (Kiribati), 12 May 2009. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Just as important as the spatial dimension, the State is defined by the presence of a 
population within its territorial boundaries.807 While scholarly positions regarding the 
importance of the population for the construction of the State as a political and a cultural 
entity vary widely,808 State practice indicates that quantitative demographical weakness is not 
an obstacle to the acquisition of statehood by a political entity,809 as long as the presence of 
the population within its territory is continuous. Nowadays, as sea-level rise and coastal 
erosion gradually increase, the living conditions of Pacific islanders are jeopardized by the 
socio-economic consequences of the de-territorialization described in Chapter 4. Conceptually, 
the correlation between the territorial transformation of the Pacific Island States resulting from 
climate change impacts and the socio-economic conditions of their inhabitants can be 
apprehended through the concept of ‘habitability’. Borrowed from Article 121(3) of UNCLOS 
                                                          
807
 Montevideo Convention, supra, Article 4(1). 
808
 There are indeed divergent doctrinal positions on which is the central criterion of statehood upon 
which all others are dependent. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, sociological approaches to the State 
are more inclined to view the population as the primary criterion of statehood; and thus consider the 
territory, afterwards, as the place where the human collectivity representing nation is located. 
Ultimately, preference for the population as the central criterion of statehood tends to be linked to the 
wider reaction against what Charles Rousseau named the ‘préjugé étatique’, that is, the traditional 
conception of the international legal order tending to consider the State and not the individual as the 
primary reference object and subject of international law.  
809
 This is particularly shown by the proliferation of micro-states following decolonization, which tend to 
have populations under 1 million inhabitants, if they are not directly defined as ‘micro-states’ precisely 
because of their small population rather than because of their limited territorial extent.  
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and slightly adapting the description of this notion to the present purpose, the concept of 
habitability can be defined as the capacity of a given territory to sustain human habitation and 
the economic life necessary for such habitation. Since the habitability of a given space informs 
population behaviour and movements, such a concept is key to addressing the current issue of 
climate-induced displacements and relocation, also referred to by some international legal 
scholars as ‘climate refugees’.810  
While this issue appears as a paradigmatic image of today's post-modern global 
environmental crisis,811 international awareness of the impact of environmental conditions in 
population displacements is not an entirely new phenomenon. Following the exponential 
normative and institutional development that international environmental law underwent 
since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) initiated the first study of this issue almost three decades ago. 
The first attempt to create a legal category of ‘environmental refugees’ thus dates back to the 
1985 Report commonly referred to by the name of the study’s Chief Director, E. El-Hinnawi.812 
Following the end of the Cold War, some aspects of the El-Hinnawi Report got the chance to be 
developed, particularly after the publication in 1994 of the United Nations Development 
Programme Report on human security which incorporated as one of its pillars the need for 
adequate preservation of environmental conditions.813 
Finally, from the late 1990s onwards, the launch of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse set the beginning of a new stage, since studies of the effects of 
environmental conditions on population displacements focused on one specific environmental 
                                                          
810
 As will be developed in Part 3 of the present Chapter, definitional constraints have been encountered 
at the onset of the debate on this issue. The term ‘displacement’ alludes to the coercion felt by a group 
of people or animals forced to leave the place where they usually live, while the terms ‘relocation’ and 
‘resettlement’ mean moving to a different place and remaining indifferent to the wished or unwished 
causes of such forced migration. ‘Refugee’ is a term that may arise after the displacement/relocation 
has taken place, for it deals with the status held by the person in the new relocation site when it is 
outside the borders of the country of origin. Aware of the difficulties to fix the ‘real’ subjective 
motivation behind the observed displacements in Pacific Island States, the terms ‘displacement’ and 
‘relocation’ will be used indifferently in this Chapter, with a slight preference for the use of the term 
‘relocation’, given that it invites taking into account the process of displacement as a whole, 
encompassing even the integration of the displaced people into their new habitat. 
811
 See A. GARE, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, 1995, (London: Routledge); and L. 
GLOVER, Postmodern Climate Change, 2006, (London: Routledge).  
812
 E. EL-HINNAWI, ‘Environmental Refugees’, 1988, (Nairobi: UNEP). 
813
 As previously pointed out, the notion of human security dates back to Basket II of the OSCE, and 
came back to the forefront within the United Nations with the publication of the 1994 Human 
Development Report, which included ‘environmental security’ as one of the thematic lines composing 
human security. See Chapter 1. Henceforth, the term ‘environmental refugees’ can be said to have been 
coined alongside the emergence of the international environmental security precedent reconstructed in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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challenge, namely, climate change. As already explained in Chapter 3 above, alongside the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse, political action seeking to crystallize this 
move was headed by the Maldives delegation to the United Nations Human Rights Office, 
which, in 2007, unanimously included the issue in its the agenda under the title 'Human Rights 
and Climate Change'.814 Yet, despite the fact that the object of study has been narrowed down 
to displacement situations connected to one concrete dimension of the global environmental 
crisis, the terms 'climate-induced displacement' or 'climate refugees' can still cover a wide 
range of situations. This is due to the multiple forms of the adverse impacts of climate change, 
which include, inter alia, severe desertification, uncontrolled river flooding, extreme weather 
events (cyclones, typhoons, and tsunamis), sea-level rise or coastal erosion. As a result of this 
wide range of climate impacts, the resulting policy and doctrinal debate on this issue of 
climate-induced displacement appears to be scattered, heterogeneous and disorganized. 
Thus, this Chapter does not pretend to cover all situations which have been included in 
present studies on 'climate refugees' or 'climate-induced displacements'. Rather, the analysis 
undertaken here will be restricted to national and international displacements of Pacific 
islanders. Besides, while all displacement experiences in the region are highly valuable to 
introduce ourselves into the complexities of these situations, displacement cases originating in 
any of the three Pacific Island States most affected by de-territorialization bear capital 
specificity: the fate of the population is inextricably bound to the continuation of the State 
itself. Thus, this Chapter will focus particularly on displacements originating in the Pacific Island 
States most at risk – namely, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands. It is essentially argued 
that when establishing normative purposes (i.e. protective goals) for these specific sets of 
displaced populations and scrutinizing the range of legal status possible under international 
law to fulfil such purposes, the 'specific fact' attached to these displaced people is not only an 
element to be taken into account in ensuring more effective protection, but a necessary 
condition for any sort of legal protection scheme to cover the situation comprehensively. 
Which are the most appropriate legal and policy responses that may ensure the protection of 
all climate-displaced Pacific islanders? How does the issue of the continuation of statehood 
raised in some Pacific Island States jeopardize the formulation of such responses? 
Most studies dealing with the issue of 'climate-induced displacement' tend to respond to 
similar questions by preferring one legal regime over another (e.g. international refugee law 
versus international human rights law); suggesting the creation of a new international 
                                                          
814
 See Chapter 2 above, Section 3.2.1  
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instrument specifically designed to respond to these new challenges (e.g. 'Climate Refugee 
Protocol' to either the UNFCCC or the Refugee Convention); or advocating a wide 
interpretation of the mandate of existing international organizations tasked with refugee and 
human rights issues. Besides, an important number of these studies become trapped in a 
never-ending terminological impasse, for instance when regarding the scope of the legal 
definition of 'international refugee' covered by Article 1(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Truly enough, terminology is key in the realm of law, for the categorization of facts of life into 
legal clusters serves the association of legal consequences with each cluster.815 Yet, the 
transformation of Pacific islanders' displacements into legal categories ought to take into 
account at least the following three variables: (1) whether the displacement is national or 
transnational (spatial variable); (2) whether the continuation of the State itself may be at risk 
as a result of transnational displacements (contextual variable); (3) whether either of the two 
previous variables is subject to change and progress over time, transforming the displacement 
situation itself, as well as its political consequences, into the continuation of the State 
(temporal variable). While the first of these variables is generally presented as being key, the 
cornerstone of the analysis and the basis for the solution proposed, the other two have been 
until now systematically ignored.  
Therefore, the present chapter suggests approaching climate-induced displacement of 
Pacific islanders differently, through a methodology enabling one to grasp the diversity of this 
process within the region and to take into account all three variables, with particular emphasis 
on the contextual one. It argues that a multilayered legal protection scheme could better adapt 
to both present and prospective conditions of population displacement induced by climate 
change in the Pacific. Section 2 of this chapter begins with a comparative study of national and 
transnational law and policy approaches to relocation between Pacific Island States, used as 
factual grounds on which the proposal for a multilayered legal-protection scheme is based. 
Sections 3 and 4 explore this proposal through a scenario approach, which is divided into two 
groups by one central variable, namely, whether the continuation of the State is or is not at risk 
as a result of population displacements. 
 
 
 
                                                          
815
 This point is raised in Jane McADAM (ed.), Climate Change Displacement: Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives, 2010, (Oxford and Portland, Ore.: Hart Publishing), at 3. 
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2. COMPARING FACTUAL GROUNDS: POLICY APPROACHES TO NATIONAL AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CLIMATE-INDUCED RELOCATION IN PACIFIC ISLAND STATES  
 
As we are commonly reminded by academics – particularly by those from the field of 
anthropology, but also by international legal scholars concerned with climate-induced 
population displacement – migration is an inherent part of the history of Mankind which has 
always been practised as a normal form of adaptation to the changing conditions of the 
‘habitat’.816 For instance, most recently, V. Boege asked about the difference between the sea-
fearing Australasians who settled in South Pacific islands and used to relocate every time an 
atoll had become uninhabitable, centuries before Christ, and today’s inhabitants of Pacific 
Island States threatened by the progressive degradation of their living conditions in the same 
islands.817 V. Boege considered that the main differences were that: (1) in the historical case, 
the issue was locally confined; (2) there was a direct relationship between cause and effect, for 
the people forced to resettle were responsible for the degradation; (3) at the time, they were 
not informed either of what was happening or of their implication in the degradation; and (4) 
today, ‘not only is climate change a global phenomenon, but also the discourse about it [which] 
frames the thinking and talking about climate change and migration’.818 While agreeing with all 
these points, at least one more fundamental difference must be noted: at the time of the 
Australasians, the State had not yet made its appearance. Nor had it spread and settled as both 
the universal form of organization of collective and social life, and as a fundamental element 
structuring contemporary international relations.819 Thus, while the phenomenon of migration 
may be familiar to our remote history, the tools through which Mankind responds to it are but 
a matter of our time and ought to be tackled with the existing instruments of the present. In 
other words, the continuation embedded in the role that migration has played in the different 
stages of our evolution becomes historically contingent when we look into the present means 
                                                          
816
 The term ‘habitat’ generally refers to the natural home or environment of a living organism, be it an 
animal, a plant or an individual or group of human beings. For historical-anthropological accounts on 
‘environmental migration’, see, for instance, G. RICHARD, Ailleurs, l’herbe est plus verte: histoire des 
migrations dans le monde, 1996, (Paris: Arléa-Cordet); or C. PONTING, The New Green History of the 
World: the Environment and the Collapse of Great Civilizations, 2007, (New York: Penguin Books); and J. 
BARNETT and M. WEBBER, ‘Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits’, in J. McADAM (ed.), 
supra, pp. 57-81.   
817
 V. BOEGE, ‘Challenges and Pitfalls of Resettlement Measures: Experiences in the Pacific Region’, 
(2011) COMCAD Arbeitspapiere/Working Papers, nº 102 (Series on Environmental Degradation and 
Migration), pp. 1-40, at 7.  
818
 Ibid. Indeed, as seen in PART I of this thesis, it is the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse that is changing the understanding not only of climate-induced migration, but also of how 
climate change may jeopardize the continuation of the statehood of small island States. 
819
 On the formation of the modern European State and the differences with post-colonial island micro-
states, see Chapter 4 above, Section 2.   
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to understand and react against it.  
While migration may today still be considered as a form of adaptation, it is generally not 
considered as a ‘desirable’ reaction policy to climate change impacts. Two points support this 
appreciation. First of all, the Pacific is often seen and depicted in western mainstream social 
studies as a rather simple and homogeneous regional unit characterized by the remoteness, 
underdevelopment and almost insignificant power of leverage of a ‘bouquet of mini-States’, 
and there is a marked tendency to depict the whole region as being traditionally highly 
migratory, giving an inaccurate impression of homogeneity. Firstly, the migration rate is very 
high in Tonga and high in Tuvalu and Fiji; Palau and the Marshall Islands; the Federated States 
of Micronesia and Kiribati have a medium-low rate; while Papua New Guinea’s, the Solomon 
Islands’ and Vanuatu’s rate is low to very low.820 Secondly, even Pacific Island States with a high 
or very high migration rate do not contemplate displacement (whether internal or external) as 
a natural and uncontroversial reaction policy. Rather, when officially taken into consideration in 
adaptation, development or disaster reduction plans, relocation is always considered as the 
solution of last resort or the ‘ultimate’ form of adaptation.821 Henceforth, the following 
comparative analysis, which aims at illustrating the common perspectives and fundamental 
differences of national and transnational climate-induced relocation strategies, will be 
structured along the division between preventive and reactive relocation actions.822 
 
2.1. Regional Homogeneity of Preventive Relocation Actions  
2.1.1. Common Vulnerabilities: Underdevelopment Overexposed to Climate Change Impacts 
‘Preventive relocation actions’ can be defined as the range of measures which primarily 
aim at preserving the habitability of human settlements affected by different forms of climate-
related environmental stress (drought, cyclones, flooding, salt-water intrusion in agricultural 
                                                          
820
 See R. BEDFORD and G. HUGO, ‘Population Movement in the Pacific: Future Prospects’, Labor and 
Immigration Research Centre, Department of Labor of the New Zealand Government (with Collaboration 
of the Australian Government), February 2012, full report available at: 
<http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/population-movement-pacific-perspective-future-
prospects/04.asp>.  
821
 See, for instance, the Statement of the Global Migration Group (GMG) on the Impacts of Climate 
Change on Migration, adopted in Paris on 11 November 2011 by the Principals of the GMG. Document 
available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/GMG%20statement_Paris_english.pdf>. 
The GMG is an inter-agency group binding together sixteen agencies (14 UN agencies, the World Bank 
and the International Organization for Migration) to promote the application of relevant international 
instruments relating to migration and encourage the adoption of more coherent approaches to 
international migration generally.  
822
 The division between these two categories is that of the author.  
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lands, etc).823 The recognition of preventive relocation actions as a distinct category is not 
incompatible with the acknowledgement that relocation as such may take place and be 
considered as a possible preventive adaptation solution. Relocations as such may be integrated 
into preventive relocation plans and still be considered under this preventive heading: what 
distinguishes preventive from reactive relocation action is the principal focus of the respective 
policy under study. While most of them come from national governments, provincial and local 
decision-making and participation tend to be involved.824  Moreover, this category includes 
actions seeking to secure access to basic needs (food, water, and acceptable conditions of 
sanitation and adequate housing), as well as measures seeking to protect human settlements 
from material and physical destruction by climate change impacts (construction of shoreline 
protection, such as sea walls, protection of communication infrastructure, such as airports or 
roads, etc.). They are to be found in three different policy strands: climate change adaptation 
measures, disaster risk-reduction programmes, and development plans of the region – the 
latter having been transformed by the increased attention paid to the two former strands. 
An overall view of the configuration of preventive relocation actions in Pacific Island 
States indicates that the protection of the habitability conditions of human settlements in the 
region is being undertaken rather homogeneously, through similar forms and aiming at 
analogous purposes. This trend can be explained by factors which nurture the consolidation of 
Pacific Island States as constitutive parts of a regional unit economically headed by Australia 
and New Zealand.825 Other than these two regional leaders, Pacific Island States are first of all 
characterized by their status of micro-States, which is reflected not only in their limited 
territorial extent, but also by primary-sector-based economies which rely on agriculture and 
fisheries as principal sources of income and survival of the population. The region’s overall low 
development level is in turn connected to the equally low level of resilience and general 
adaptive capacity of Pacific Island States to climate change impacts. Consequently, these States 
embody the image of climate-related ‘vulnerability’, which is all the more reinforced when 
                                                          
823
 See E. PAGE, ‘Theorizing the Link between Environmental Change and Conflict’, (2000) Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law, vol. 9, issue 1, pp. 33-43, at 33.  
824
 This may be the result of the recent tendency, widespread in international environmental 
governance policies, to favor bottom-up approaches for their higher level of integration of the local 
communities and the positive consequences that such involvement may in turn generate for the 
effective implementation of international environmental obligations. For instance, one of the areas in 
which the bottom-up approach and enhancement of local participation has been developed is the 
implementation of REDD+ projects.  
825
 For an overview of the regional context and the role played by Australia and New Zealand in it, see 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ‘Our Near Abroad: Australia and Pacific Islands Regionalism’, 
November 2011, pp.1-84 
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contrasted with the overwhelming environmental challenges they are bound to face. While 
climate change impacts (such as coastal erosion, salt-water intrusion or drought) and climate-
variability phenomena (for instance, modifications in the El Niño/La Niña phenomena, 
typhoons or tsunamis) provoke a range of habitat disruptions that may vary from one Pacific 
island State to another,826 their geographical continuation implies that, when a disruption 
occurs, all States of the region are, to some extent, affected. Given the geographical 
continuation, general economic weakness, and common high degree of exposure to climate 
change impacts, Pacific Island States have chosen similar policy strategies to prevent the 
further degradation or destruction of the habitability conditions of their respective territories 
by climate-related challenges. Yet, the crucial factor that promotes the homogeneous or similar 
approach to preventive relocation actions is the important degree of intraregional co-operation 
on these matters which, as developed below, can be found in climate change adaptation 
actions, disaster risk-reduction programmes, and development plans of the countries at stake.  
Adaptation was recognized as an important part of the international regime on climate 
change ever since its inception.827 Yet, it is equally acknowledged that such a part was, as F. 
Yamin and J. Depledge point out, ‘flawed with problems’.828 While the global nature of climate 
change invited a global solution and gave impulse to a process of international co-operation 
seeking to involve as many States as possible,829 the inherently local (or, at best, regional) 
                                                          
826
 Detailed study on the climate change impacts suffered by each Pacific island State and territories has 
been conducted by the Applied Geo-science and Technology Division of the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community (SOPAC) under the South Pacific Sea Level Rise and Climate Monitoring Project. Country 
reports can be found at: <http://www.sopac.org/index.php/south-pacific-sea-level-a-climate-change-
monitoring>  
827
 As such, climate change adaptation thus appears in several Articles of the UNFCCC. Article 4(1) first 
indicates that ‘the Convention commits countries to prepare for and facilitate adequate adaptation to 
climate change’; then Article 4(4) explicitly states that ‘developed countries are required to assist 
developing countries in meeting costs of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change’. Article 
4(8) continues, stating that ‘all Parties are required to take the actions necessary related to funding, 
insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing 
countries arising from the adverse effects of climate change’, and is completed by Article 4(9), which 
specifies that, in doing so, countries commit themselves ‘to take full account of the specific needs and 
special situations of the least-developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of 
technology’ . 
828
 F. YAMIN and J. DEPLEDGE, The International Regime on Climate Change: A Guide to Rules, 
Procedures and Institutions, 2005, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 8, p. 213. 
829
 The move to wide multilateralism or even universalism in international environmental co-operation 
particularly spread after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Environment and Development. As 
explained by Dan Sarooshi, this move to universalism was sought not only because it would benefit the 
primary goal of environmental protection of ‘common goods’, but also signified the crystallization of a 
‘pact’ between industrialized countries and the newly decolonized developing countries willing to begin 
their own development through an industrialization process. D. SAROOSHI, The Art and Craft of 
International Environmental Agreements, 2011, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Recent 
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nature of adaptation measures became an important obstacle to securing adaptation funding 
in the earlier stages of existence of the regime.830 Besides, the confusion (deliberately sought 
by OPEC countries) between adaptation to climate change impacts and ‘response measures’ – 
namely, negative economic side-effects of mitigation actions on the oil-exporting industry – 
also contributed to the prevention of an exponential development of adaptation under the 
UNFCCC regime.831 Notwithstanding the former difficulties, the latest period of the climate 
change negotiations (particularly from the 2007 Bali Road Plan onwards) has been marked by 
an increasing attention to the role and importance of adaptation. As the structural impasse of 
the current climate change negotiations on the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol for the post-2012 period remains unsolved, the original focus on gathering concerted 
mitigation action seems to be shifting in favour of developing the operability conditions of 
adaptation measures. Thus, following the establishment of the Adaptation Fund and the launch 
of the Nairobi work programme ‘Understanding Vulnerability, Fostering Adaptation’, the latest 
landmark of this trend can be found in the adoption in Cancún (Mexico) of the 2010 Climate 
Adaptation Framework.832  
As the dynamic fostering adaptation gradually takes off, the most vulnerable State 
Parties began setting the basis for common (regional) approaches to climate change adaptation 
and understanding of vulnerability. The UNFCCC Expert Meeting on Climate Change Adaptation 
for Small Island Developing States, celebrated in Rarotonga (Cook Islands) in February 2007 is a 
                                                                                                                                      
voices against the use by developing countries of their power of leverage in international environmental 
agreements, such as the UNFCCC, to foster their developmental goals (that is, against the idea that a 
climate change regime should include redistribution as a purpose) claim the need for a more pragmatic 
approach to environmental protection. These voices include followers of the Law and Economics 
movement, such as most prominently E. POSNER and D. WEISBACH, Climate Change Justice, 2010, 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). See contra, for instance, F. SOLTAU, Fairness in 
International Climate Change Law and Policy, 2009 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press); and, 
more specifically concerned with fairness claims of developing countries in international environmental 
negotiations, K. MICKELSON, ‘South, North, International Environmental Law and International 
Environmental Lawyers?’, (2000) Yearbook of International Environmental Law, vol. 11, pp. 52-81.  
830
 For instance, the financial assistance provided by the Global Environmental Facility could only cover 
the ‘incremental costs’ of a project (e.g. the costs of implementation (mitigation) measures which 
produce a ‘universal benefit’). In F. YAMIN and J. DEPLEDGE, supra. 
831
 Article 4.8 of UNFCCC alludes to the objective of responding to the adverse effects of climate change 
in conjunction with addressing the impacts stemming from the implementation of response measures, 
which generally refers to negative side effects resulting from the implementation of climate change 
mitigation activities.   
832
 UNFCCC State Parties adopted the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) as part of the Cancun 
Agreements, adopted in Cancún, Mexico, on the occasion of the celebration of the COP 16/CMP 6. In 
the Agreements, Parties affirmed that adaptation must be addressed with the same level of priority as 
mitigation. The CAF is the result of three years of negotiations on adaptation under the Ad hoc Working 
Group on Long-Term Co-operative Action (AWG-LCA) that had followed the adoption of the 2007 Bali 
Roadmap. 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
299 
 
good illustration of the grounds on which a homogeneous approach to preventive relocation 
actions in Pacific Island States was based. As a result of the positive development of adaptation 
funding, coupled with the development of regionally concerted co-operation on this matter, all 
adaptation strategies of Pacific Island States are – unsurprisingly – linked to the UNFCCC 
process.  
First of all, approaches to preventive relocation actions are particularly similar in the 
least developed countries (LDCs) of the region that qualify for funding of National Appropriate 
Plans of Action (NAPAs) of the region. Since the adoption of the UNFCCC, NAPAs were intended 
to be a way for least developed countries to identify their most urgent adaptation needs which 
would be funded and implemented as a priority.833 Today, the five LDCs of the Pacific region 
which qualify for this funding category have submitted their respective NAPAs – Samoa (2005), 
Kiribati (2007), Tuvalu (2007), Vanuatu (2007) and the Solomon Islands (2008) – and are now 
starting their implementation.834 The greater level of homogeneity in the approach to the 
configuration of preventive relocation actions through NAPAs is essentially derived from the 
common institutional framework in which these plans are developed. All qualified countries are 
advised by the same board of experts (LEG),835 which guides them through the same 
vulnerability assessment guidelines and encourages participation at the grass-roots and 
community levels in the elaboration of NAPAs. 836 The priority areas identified by the five LDCs 
of the region focus on securing access to basic needs (in particular, water) and improved 
sanitation (Kiribati). Most interestingly, only two of the Pacific counterparts (Samoa and Tuvalu) 
                                                          
833
 Besides, States Parties that qualify as LDCs are financially supported to develop their plans of action. 
834
 Samoa, ‘National Adaptation Programme for Action’, 2005, Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Environment and Meteorology. See Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Programme for Action, May 2007, 
Ministry of Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Department of Environment; Republic of 
Vanuatu, National Adaptation Programme for Action (NAPA), 2007, National Advisory Committee on 
Climate Change; Solomon Islands, ‘National Adaptation Programme for Action’, November 2008, 
Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Meteorology; and Republic of Kiribati, ‘National Adaptation 
Programme for Action’, 2007, Ministry of Environment and Social Development.  
835
 The Least-Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), nominated by the Parties, was established at the 
7
th
 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, with the objective of supporting the preparation and 
implementation strategy of national adaptation programmes of action. Then, at the 16
th
 session of the 
COP, they reviewed the progress of the work, and the terms of reference of the expert group were 
reviewed, and the group’s mandate extended for another five years. Detailed information on the LEG is 
available at: 
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/ldc_expert_group/items/47
27.php>    
836
 Since its establishment in 2001, the LEG has prepared various documents and publications, including 
the LEG annotations to the NAPA guidelines and the step-by-step guide for implementing NAPAs. See in 
particular, ‘Annotated Guidelines for the Preparation of NAPAs’, 2002, (Bonn: UNFCCC Secretariat), doc. 
Reference FCCC/PRT/202 B, available at:  
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/library/items/3599.php?such=j&symbol=FCCC/PRT/202%20B#
beg>.  
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make reference to the protection of settlements themselves and the possibility of relocation as 
part of the set of adaptation strategies. Neither of these two NAPAs addresses the issue of 
relocation as a key priority area in itself. On the one hand, Tuvalu’s Plan simply mentions 
relocation/resettlement as a situation which should possibly be taken into account during the 
implementation of a key priority area.837 On the other, Samoa’s approach goes a bit further; 
while it also considers the protection of human settlements  as one of the issues which may 
need to be dealt with in order to secure the effectiveness of another priority area, it 
nonetheless suggests that such protection may be achieved through, inter alia, the 
construction of artificial islands.838 Yet, even Samoa’s plan falls short when compared with the 
place that relocation was given in the NAPA of the Maldives, which, as a whole, was centred on 
the ‘Safer Island’ project which openly and directly seeks to address the issue of relocation of 
human settlements as a key priority area.839  
 
2.1.2. Common Responses: Regional Co-operation Schemes for Climate Change Adaptation 
Other than the special bond and similar approaches to preventive relocation actions 
which are found in the five States Parties that qualify for NAPA funding, all thirteen Pacific 
Island States have a regional approach to climate change adaptation (into which the five NAPAs 
may be inserted). This common ‘background’ essentially results from the creation of the Pacific 
Adaptation to Climate Change Project (PACC), funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
along with the co-operation aid agencies of Australia (AusAid) and the United States of America 
(USAID) and with support of the C3D+ programme of UNITAR which aims at developing climate 
change adaptation and capacity-building.840 The project covers activities from 2009 to 2013 and 
is structured along three key lines that ‘build resilience’ to climate change in Pacific island 
States. Food production and food security is the focus of Fiji, Palau, Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands; coastal-management capacity is followed by the Cook Islands, the Federated 
                                                          
837
 Tuvalu’s NAPA, supra. 
838
 Samoa, NAPA, supra.   
839
 See Republic of Maldives, ‘National Adaptation Programme of Action, Ministry of Environment, 
Energy and Water’, December 2006. Among the actions planned in Maldives’ NAPA, the so-called ‘Safer 
Island Project’ is particularly noteworthy, at 40ff.   
840
 As explained in the official website of the Pacific Adaptation Climate Change Project, the C3D+ 
project is supported by a grant from the European Commission and is part of the larger "Capacity 
Development for Adaptation to Climate Change and GHG Mitigation" project. The C3D+ thus includes, as 
partner institutions collaborating with SPREP: the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD), the Stockholm Environmental Institute (SEI), Climate System Analysis Group (CSAG), Munasinghe 
Institute for Sustainable Development (MIND). The C3D+ SPREP component is part of the larger 
"Capacity Development for Adaptation to Climate Change and GHG Mitigation" project. 
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States of Micronesia, Samoa (Tokelau) and Vanuatu; and strengthening water resource 
management is the area of development stressed by Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu 
(and New Zealand’s territory of Niue). Additional funding provided by AusAid and USAID will 
enable Kiribati to become an additional participant in the PACC. One of the most important 
characteristics of the Project is the clear objective of mainstreaming the adaptation measures 
to climate change and climate variability in key development sectors.841 This connection, in 
tune with the previously adopted 2008 Niue Declaration on Climate Change, is bluntly 
indicated in the main internet portal of PACC, which defines the Project as being ‘designed to 
promote climate change adaptation as a key prerequisite to sustainable development in Pacific 
Island Countries’.842 The United Nations Development Programme is thus one of the 
implementing agencies of the Project, working in partnership with the Secretariat of the South 
Pacific Region Environment Programme (SPREP). 
Moreover, the homogeneous approach to preventive relocation actions is also 
facilitated by the presence of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) 
which, working in partnership with UNDP, was appointed by Pacific islands Heads of State as 
the leading co-ordination agency of the region’s response to climate change impacts. To fulfil 
this function, SPREP works through three multi-stakeholder co-operation channels: the Pacific 
Climate Change Roundtable,843 the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change844 
and the Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific (CROP) CEOs Working Group on Climate 
Change. The Secretariat conducts the development of guidelines and best practices to support 
Pacific Island States in planning and implementing national adaptation strategies, as well as to 
foster the mainstreaming process. While the forms or schemes of implementation may vary 
because the stakeholders involved in each country differ (ministries, etc), the majority of 
national adaptation plans in Pacific Island States do not include relocation plans.  
Finally, the way of dealing with preventive relocation actions in the Pacific is, in 
addition, characterized by the association of climate change adaptation and development 
                                                          
841
 Mainstreaming is generally understood as the action of incorporating adaptation to climate change 
risks and related vulnerabilities into existing institutional and decision-making processes, both at the 
community level and the national planning level. 
842
 Information extracted from the official website of the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project 
conducted through SPREP, available at: <http://www.sprep.org/pacc-home>.  
843
 The Pacific Climate Change Roundtable (PCCR) is a regional climate change forum hosted by SPREP 
and held once every two years. For more information on past and future roundtables, see the official 
portal of the PCCR, available at: <http://www.sprep.org/pacific-climate-change-
roundtable/pccrhomepage>.  
844
 See the ‘Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change (2006–2015)’, 2
nd
 ed., reprinted 
2011 (Apia, Samoa: SPREP), which timeframe builds on the previous ‘Pacific Islands Framework for 
Action on Climate Change, Climate Variability and Sea-Level Rise (2000–2004)’.  
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programmes with Disaster Risk Reduction Plans, a third sector which has progressed a lot (and 
rather autonomously) during the past decade, particularly since the adoption of the 2005 
Hyogo Framework for Action.845 The recognition of the necessity to link these sectors in the 
Pacific was fostered after the 2007 tsunami hit the whole region. The traumatic and destructive 
force of this phenomenon blatantly reminded everyone that many of the disasters experienced 
in this region are associated with climate-variability phenomena that will be exacerbated by 
climate change, such as increase in storm number and frequency; changes in cyclone direction 
and increase in their destructive force; longer periods of drought; or more acute and 
uncontrolled floods. The link between climate change adaptation, development plans and 
disaster risk reduction is thus crystallized in the design of Joint National Action Plans (JNAPs) 
which result in inter-State co-operation among these three sectors and seek to reduce 
duplication of effort and make more efficient use of already scarce resources.846 Tonga has 
already finished its JNAP and is starting the implementation phase of its pilot projects;847 the 
Marshall Islands and the Cook Islands plans are close to completion, and Tuvalu and Nauru are 
also currently developing their plans.  
 
2.2. Regional Heterogeneity of Reactive Relocation Actions  
2.2.1. Differing Scenarios: An Appraisal of Accomplished Relocations in the Region  
‘Reactive relocation actions’ may be understood as the range of measures primarily 
                                                          
845
 On the occasion of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Hyogo (Japan), in 
January 2005, the ‘Hyogo Declaration’ and the ‘Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the 
Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters’ were adopted. The Hyogo Framework for Action 
tasked the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction – established in 1999 after the adoption by 
the General Assembly of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) – with support for 
the implementation of the Framework for Action.
  
846
 See SPREP–JNAPs website, available at: <http://www.sprep.org/Adaptation/current-programmes>. 
The current JNAP process has regional organizations working side by side with national governments to 
support them in this process. A joint partnership exists between SPREP, SPC (SOPAC Division) and UNDP, 
which has been supported through bilateral assistance from governments such as Australia’s. 
847 See Joint National Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (2011–
2015), Second National Communication Project, July 2010, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change 
and National Emergency Management Office, Tonga. Tonga’s JNAP was financed by the Global 
Environment Facility through the United Nations Development Programme, the ACP–EU Natural 
Disaster Facility through the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) and the Secretariat 
of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). The JNAP focused on three main areas 
of action: (1) building and enhancing institutional capacity to mainstream climate change resilience into 
national development programs, sectoral legislation and governmental policies (including for ministries 
with responsibilities for the provision of infrastructure); (2) strengthening civil society, community and 
private-sector engagement and enhance consideration of gender issues to support climate change 
resilience-building; and (3) design the Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (SPCR) on the 
importance of climate-resilience planning responses. Find info on the relocation village.  
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dealing with relocations per se. Although some of these measures may be launched before the 
relocation actually takes place, they are nonetheless considered in this section as ‘reactive’ and 
not ‘preventive,’ for, instead of being focused on preserving the habitability of human 
settlement generally, they operate within a context or plan which is centred on an ongoing and 
specific relocation of individuals or a community. The category of ‘reactive relocation actions’ 
thus includes the preparation of a relocation plan, its implementation, as well as the ex-post 
measures directed at the creation and maintenance of the habitability of the new relocation 
area.  
The study of reactive relocation actions in the Pacific is undertaken in this section and 
is summarized in Table 4, below, in which they are considered both from a factual and a policy 
perspective. First of all, the Table aims at identifying whether and when relocations have 
already taken place in and between Pacific Island States, the number of people involved, the 
places of origin and resettlement and, most importantly, whether the relocation involved 
autonomous individuals, family units or the displacement of entire villages at a time. The Table 
then goes on to focus on the policy and legal aspects of accomplished relocations. It thus 
begins by identifying the existence of a relocation ‘plan’ – or lack thereof – and (in the 
affirmative) indicates the actors involved in it. The existence of a ‘plan’ may include 
negotiations of national land tenure agreements or new overseas migration agreements that 
are capital to secure a right to housing in the relocation area. The Table also pays attention to 
the level of participation of the people involved in the preparation or implementation of the 
relocation, distinguishing three different scenarios: (1) cases where the plan emerged from 
national or regional authorities with little or no participation of local actors (top-down 
approach); (2) cases where the plan is produced by the local communities themselves, which 
then try to convince regional or national authorities to support the plan politically and 
financially (bottom-up approach); and (3) cases where the plan results from co-operation 
amongst the different relevant levels of governance that is generally headed by the national 
government (mixed approach). Finally, the Table takes account of the range of relocation 
funding strategies, where the presence of international actors (States’ external aid 
programmes, and foreign non-State institutions like NGOs, foundations, etc.) can be measured 
against that of governmental authorities (national, provincial and local) and of local community 
actors (Churches, Council of Elders, private donations, etc.). 
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TABLE 4. Accomplished Climate-Induced Relocations in Small Pacific Island States 
 
 
 
 
CLIMATE-INDUCED RELOCATIONS IN SMALL PACIFIC ISLAND STATES 
 
Relocation Data Relocation Planning 
Year Type Number of 
People 
Place(s) of Origin Place(s) of 
Relocation 
Instrument(s) and/or Actions Approach and Actors Involved Funding 
FSM NO CLIMATE-INDUCED RELOCATIONS DOCUMENTED 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiji 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National 
Planned Village 
Relocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150 
 
 
 
 
Shoreline Village 
of 
Vunidogoloa 
 
 
(Vanua Levu 
Island) 
 
 
 
 
Higher Land 
Baptised ‘Kenani’  
– The Promised 
Land- 
 
(Vanua Levu 
Island) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No formal instrument available 
INTEGRATED 
 
*Local Communities 
 
*Ministry of Provincial 
Development 
 
*National Disaster 
Management Office 
 
*Ministry of Local 
Government, Urban 
Development, Housing and 
Environment 
 
 
 
 
Governmental 
Assistance 
(water tanks) 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiribati 
 
 
 
Regular 
Basis 
 
National 
‘Spontaneous’ 
Individual/ 
Family 
Relocation 
 
 
 
 
 
       X 
 
Outer islands 
(e.g. 
southernmost 
Betio Atoll) 
(Gilbert Islands) 
 
Tarawa 
 
 
(Kiribati’s capital, 
Gilbert Islands) 
 
 
Kiribati Adaptation Program Pilot 
Investment Phase KAPIII, 
Lands Acquisition and 
Resettlement Policy Framework 
(2011) 
 
 
TOP DOWN 
 
*Ministry of Environment, 
Lands and Agricultural 
Development (MELAD) 
 
*’Resettlement Committee’ 
 
 
 
World Bank, 
GEF, UNDP, 
Japan PHRD 
Climate 
Change Fund 
 
Since 
2002 
Overseas 
Planned 
Individual 
Relocation 
 
75 citizens 
per year 
 
Kiribati 
 
New Zealand 
 
New Zealand Pacific Access 
Category 
 
TOP DOWN 
*Government of Kiribati 
*Government of New Zealand 
 
 
           X 
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Since 
2007 
 
Overseas 
Planned 
Individual 
Relocation 
 
50 people 
currently 
enrolled 
 
Kiribati 
 
Australia 
 
Kiribati-Australia Nursing 
Initiative 
 
TOP DOWN 
 
*Government of Kiribati 
*Government of Australia 
 
 
 
          X 
 
 
Not yet 
 
 
Overseas 
Planned Families 
Relocation 
 
 
500 families 
 
 
Kiribati 
 
 
Vanua Levu Island 
 
(Fiji) 
 
 
No official Agreement. Informal 
talks on the possibility to 
purchase land 
(since 2012) 
 
TOP DOWN 
 
* Government of Kiribati 
* Private Fijian land owner  
 
 
Kiribati’s 
Revenue 
Equalization 
Reserve Fund 
(phosphate 
earnings) 
 
Marshall Is. NO CLIMATE-INDUCED RELOCATIONS DOCUMENTED  
Nauru NO CLIMATE-INDUCED RELOCATIONS DOCUMENTED 
Palau NO CLIMATED-INDUCED RELOCATIONS DOCUMENTED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Papua New 
Guinea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
National 
Planned Village 
Relocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Duke of York 
Islands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Britain Island 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       X 
 
East New 
Britain 
Provincial 
Government 
 
(provided 
emergency 
supplies and 
purchased 
resettlement 
land) 
 
 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
National 
Planned Village 
Relocation 
 
 
 
 
1750 
 
 
 
 
Carteret Islands 
 
 
Bougainville main 
island 
(Tinputz, Tearouki 
and Mabiri host 
communities) 
 
 
 
Carteret Integration Relocation 
Plan 
 
BOTTOM UP 
 
*Tulele Peisa (local NGO) 
*Council of Elders 
*Autonomous Region of 
Bougainville Regional 
Government 
*PNG National Government 
 
 
Catholic 
Church, NGOs, 
PNG National 
Government 
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Samoa 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
National 
‘Spontaneous’ 
Village 
Relocation 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
Fagamalo 
Settlement 
 
 
 
 
    Higher land 
 
 
 
No official Relocation Plan 
 
 
BOTTOM UP 
 
 
 
Congregational 
Christian 
Church of 
Samoa 
(water tanks 
donation) 
 
Solomon 
Islands 
 
 
 
2012 
 
National 
‘Spontaneous’ 
Village 
Relocation 
 
 
 
X 
 
Ava village 
and 
North Vella 
Lavella 
 
 
 
 
Giza Island 
 
 
No official Relocation Plan 
 
BOTTOM UP 
 
*Led by Chiefs of 
Communities 
 
 
X 
 
Tonga 
 
 
2012 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
             X 
 
Joint Implementation Adaptation 
and Disaster Risk Reduction Plan 
Pilot Project 
 
 
MIXED 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tuvalu 
 
 
 
 
Regular 
Basis 
 
 
 
National 
‘Spontaneous’ 
Individual/Famil
y Relocation 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Outer islands 
 
(Unspecified 
location) 
 
 
 
Funafuti 
 
(Tuvalu’s capital) 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
Since 
2002 
 
Overseas 
Planned 
Individual 
Migration 
 
 
75 citizens 
per year 
 
Tuvalu 
 
New Zealand 
(Auckland) 
 
New Zealand Pacific Access 
Category 
 
TOP DOWN 
 
*Government of Tuvalu 
*Government of New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
Not yet 
 
Overseas 
Planned 
Community 
Migration 
 
 
       X 
 
 
 
Tuvalu 
 
 
 
Australia 
 
Formal Request to Australian 
Government (2008)  
– denied but followed by Informal 
Positive Response of Australia 
Torres Straits Inhabitants 
 
MIXED 
 
 
 
X 
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Vanuatu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National 
Planned Village 
Relocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 approx. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lateu 
Settlement 
 
(Tegua Island) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher land 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lateu Community Relocation 
Project Implementation Plan 
 
 
 
INTEGRATED 
 
*South Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme 
(SPREP) 
 
* National Advisory 
Committee on Climate 
Change (NACCC) 
 
* Consultations with Local 
Communities 
 
 
 
*Canadian 
International 
Development 
Agency 
 
*NGOs 
 
*Church of 
Melanesia 
 
*NACCC 
 
 
 
Source: Personal Elaboration based on Official and Media Information Listed in the Bibliography 
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Before embarking on a comment on the information in Table 4, it is important to 
highlight a few preliminary observations. To begin with, the Table is only concerned with 
climate-induced relocations, that is, those which can be understood as an ultimate form of 
adaptation to the climate change impacts or to climate variation. In this sense, it can be seen as 
an open reaction against scholarly tendencies which depict Pacific islanders as belonging to a 
region familiar with and traditionally open to migration, and support such description by 
recalling three past forced displacement episodes. Thus, one can often find references to the 
relocation that followed the devastating environmental effects of nuclear testing undertaken by 
the United States Department of Defense in the northern part of the Marshall Islands. Kwalajei 
atoll was eventually fully evacuated and most of its inhabitants resettled in Majuro, the main 
atoll and capital city of the archipelagic State. The relocation of the Nauruans and of Banabans 
(Kiribati) to the island of Rabi (Fiji), who were forcibly expelled by former colonial and 
administering powers wishing to exploit phosphate mining resources, are the two other often 
cited examples. This tendency can be criticized from two angles. First of all, using past abuses 
committed by foreign powers before Pacific islands’ independence to support the present 
appreciation of a regional migratory behaviour is – to say the least – controversial, if not totally 
ill-considered. While past forcible displacement and present climate-induced relocations share 
the same typology of ‘victims’ and are a consequence of external actors’ harmful actions or 
behaviour, each situation should nonetheless be correctly (re)contextualized. Having said so, it 
also seems important to pay closer attention to the inequalities of present regional migration 
rates and introduce some qualifications of the generalized view that the Pacific is, still today, a 
highly permeable space of constant human circulation.848  
The second preliminary observation on the constitution of Table 4 above is that it has 
only been possible to find documentation about relocation cases in nine out of twelve Pacific 
Island States. While the existence of climate-induced relocation episodes in Palau, Federated 
States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands was mentioned in an official statement by the 
Micronesian President before the United Nations, no other documents on this subject have 
been obtainable – perhaps because of linguistic limitations. Nonetheless, the information 
found about the remaining States and displayed in Table 4 evidence adequately the existence 
of fundamental factual and policy differences in respect of climate-induced relocation within 
the region. 
                                                          
848
 The highest migration rates can be found in Tonga (very high), Tuvalu and Fiji (high); Palau and the 
Marshall Islands have medium levels, followed by the Federated States of Micronesia and Kiribati 
(medium-low). Finally, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have low overseas 
migration rates. 
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As the Table shows, most climate-induced relocations which have been documented as 
such in Pacific Island States have taken place within State boundaries. Only Tuvalu, Kiribati and 
Tonga may be said to be officially embarking on projections of overseas (climate-induced) 
relocation of their population. The main instrument serving the purpose of permanent 
relocation of Tuvaluans, I-Kiribati and Tongan islanders is the Pacific Access Category. Under 
this immigration agreement concluded by these three countries with New Zealand in 2002, up 
to 650 people can annually be granted permanent residence and working permits in New 
Zealand, with special quotas being reserved for 75 Tuvaluans, 75 I-Kiribati and 250 Tonga 
islanders. Although the quotas cover not only primary but also secondary applicants, such as 
spouses and dependent children under 25 years old, the demanding eligibility conditions for 
primary applicants initially reduced the impact of this new immigration provision. Apart from 
having to have a fair understanding of the English language, as well as a job offer in New 
Zealand, primary applicants were required to demonstrate good health as well as a sound 
character. Given that, initially, the quotas were not filled, these conditions were relaxed after 
2005.849 The Pacific Access Category provides a stable framework of migration which 
undoubtedly facilitates the creation of islanders’ communities in New Zealand which can 
promote their integration into the ‘host’ country.850 Besides, its adoption seemingly marked the 
beginning of a dynamic and engaging stage. Following the Pacific Access Category, the two 
regional powers continued opening up to their Pacific island neighbours through three new 
immigration agreements. In 2007, Australia and Kiribati agreed on the Nursing Initiative, an 
immigration and capacity-building framework ‘created to enhance Kiribati’s ability to cope with 
overpopulation and climate change by educating Kiribati youth and gain Australian and 
international employment in the nursing sector’.851 The same year, New Zealand launched the 
Recognized Seasonal Employer Policy, allowing the temporary entry of workers into the 
horticulture and viticulture industries, with a preference for people from Pacific island 
                                                          
849
 N. SBRAMANIA, ‘Pacific Islands Immigration Provisions’, 2011, Center for Climate Change Law. 
850
 See F. GEMENNE and S. SHEN, ‘Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR): 
Tuvalu and New Zealand Case Study’, 2008, pp. 1-32, (paper resulting from a research project financed 
by the European Commission, available at: <www.each-for.eu>). See also M. LOUGHRY and J. McADAM, 
‘Kiribati: Relocation and Adaptation’ (October 2008) Forced Migration Review, vol. 31, pp. 51-52.  
851
 N. SBRAMANIA, supra. This is a five-year pilot programme sponsored by AusAid (Australian official co-
operation agency), which takes place at Griffith University. It requires an undergraduate student to 
attend a four-month preparation in Kiribati, followed by another four months of nursing-diploma 
preparation at Griffith University in Australia, and then to complete a nursing diploma before starting a 
bachelor degree in nursing. Eighty students are currently enrolled in this programme.  
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countries (except Fiji).852 This policy was reproduced two years later by Australia with the 2009 
Pacific Seasonal Worker Scheme, created for the purpose of ‘encouraging Pacific island workers 
to contribute to the economic development of their home countries through remittances’.853  
While the unprecedented high level of overseas immigration from Kiribati, Tuvalu and 
Tonga to Australia and New Zealand is undeniable, the question of whether any of these new 
immigration schemes can be considered as responses to climate change impacts instead of 
regular economic migration is very controversial. Interestingly, Kiribati and Tuvalu are both 
direct beneficiaries of the permanent immigration scheme agreed with New Zealand, and yet 
each has shown radically opposed official approaches to this issue. On the one hand, the 
government of Kiribati openly considers it necessary to include overseas relocation as an 
important element of Kiribati’s climate change adaptation programme. While the level of 
consciousness of the I-Kiribati population regarding the medium- and long-term effects of 
climate change impacts for their country is uneven and rather uncertain,854 the opinion of 
President Anote Tong is quite straightforward, as he contends that ‘we can never be too well 
prepared for the effects of climate change (…) If circumstances force the migration of our 
people to other nations at some future date, we want them to go there not as climate change 
refugees but as people who are equipped to contribute meaningfully to their host nations' 
economies.’ Hence, not only does he use the term ‘climate refugees’, but even considers it a 
duty of the regional leaders to the people they govern to prepare them for worst-case 
scenarios. The most recent governmental external policy action was the initiation of informal 
talks with a private land owner of Fiji’s Vanua Levu island on the possibility to purchase 22.2 sq. 
km. of land. The early conversations between the two Parties were facilitated by Fiji’s Real 
Estate Agents Licensing Board, according to which, the purchase would be followed by the 
implementation of a development plan which would include the settlement of around 500 I-
                                                          
852
 Ibid. This visa is valid for up to seven months in an eleven-month period and is only granted in case of 
a clear need for additional seasonal workers. It allows employers to recruit non-New Zealand citizens or 
resident workers. Since 2009, up to 8000 Pacific islanders have worked under this policy, coming from 
Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, the Marshall Islands and Palau. 
853
 Ibid. Up to 2500 visas granted over a period of 3 years to workers from Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, 
Tonga and Vanuatu. For the horticultural industry, the need has to be proven by the employer. The visas 
were issued for periods of up to 7 months in any 12-month period, and did not allow dependents to 
benefit from it. The first phase, which lasted until February 2010, was used by 50 Tongan and 6 Vanuatu 
workers. Due to the lack of demand for workers, 44 of 100 visas were unused.  
854
 For instance, Harry Tong, brother of current Kiribati President Anote Tong and leader of the 
opposition, stated that the islands can never sink because his church believes that ’God promised Noah 
there would not be another flood after the last one.’ Michael McKenzie, Vicar-General of the Diocese of 
Tarawa and Nauru, qualified this position by responding that ‘God's promise is, of course, valid. But this 
sea-level rise has man-made causes and God has nothing to do with it.’  
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Kiribati families and the production of food products, as well as some materials for 
construction of shoreline protection and sea walls, to export to their home country.855 
Moreover, this openly embracing climate-induced relocation policy also had manifestations at 
the national level, as epitomized by the preparation, in 2011, of a Land Acquisition and 
Resettlement Policy Framework as part of the third phase of the Kiribati Adaptation Project. 
This policy framework – supported by international funding institutions (World Bank, the 
Global Environmental Facility, the Japan PHRD Climate Change Fund and the UNDP – was 
launched out of the acknowledgment that ‘some of the activities involved in the 
implementation of MOPs and/or Pilot Island Adaptations might require land acquisition and/or 
resettlement of the vulnerable communities to climate change and sea level rise’.856  
On the other hand, regardless of what the real intentions of Tuvalu’s governmental 
actions – such as the negotiation of the conditions of the Pacific Access Category – the official 
position of this country contrasts with that of Kiribati and tends to be much more reluctant to 
acknowledge the need of overseas climate-induced relocation planning. Ever since the 
possibility of relocating the whole population to the Fijian island of Kioa was raised in 2006 by 
a Tuvaluan-born Australian climate change campaigner,857 the successive governments seemed 
to have maintained the position expressed by Prime Minister Maatia Toafa in power at the 
time. Back then, M. Toafa stated that relocation was ‘not a priority’ and that his government 
did not regard rising sea levels as being such a threat that the entire population would need to 
be evacuated.858 This initial position of apparent denial has now evolved into one of patent 
resistance. Whilst Kiribati’s approach may be more pragmatic, Tuvalu does not resign itself to 
the idea that the fate of future Tuvaluan generations may have to be found outside of the nine 
atolls that acquired political independence in the late 1970s. The citation, at the beginning of 
the present chapter, of the current Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Apisai Lelemia, clearly transmits 
                                                          
855
 See, for instance, ‘Kiribati Mulls Fiji Land Purchase in Battle against the Sea’, BBC News, 12 March 
2011, available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17295862>. 
856
 See Kiribati Land Acquisition and Resettlement Policy Framework, 2005 (amended 2011), at 8. In 
particular, the Resettlement Committee was established by the GOK to deal with the resettlement of 
the atolls of Teraina, Tabuaeran and Kiritimati, Ibid., at 10. 
857
 Don Kennedy, retired scientist born in Tuvalu, moved to Australia forty years ago and more recently 
stated in several conferences that Tuvaluans must move to preserve their culture and survive. It appears 
that he may have the influence to speak directly with the president of Tuvalu and convince him of the 
need to move Tuvaluans to the Fijian Island of Kiao. Several newspapers seem to follow his plea and 
have widely covered the news. See, for instance: ‘Tuvalu Population Must Move to Preserve Culture’, 
The Epoch Times, 18 February 2006, available at: 
 <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-2-18/38332.html>.  
858
 The Statement by President Maatia Toafa was given as a response to Don Kennedy’s contentions. It 
was reproduced by Tuvalu News on 21 February 2006, available at: 
<http://www.tuvaluislands.com/news/archived/2006/2006-02-21.htm>. 
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this message:   ‘It is our belief that Tuvalu, as a nation, has a right to exist forever. It is our basic 
human right. We are not contemplating migration. We are a proud nation with a unique 
culture which cannot be relocated elsewhere. We want to survive as a people and as a nation. 
We will survive. It is our fundamental right.’859 Scholars such as Jane McAdam have shed light 
on the reasons behind this position, explaining how the ‘refugee’ label is rejected because it 
conveys the idea of powerlessness and victimization that is shameful in Tuvaluan culture, and 
which in contrast is not found in the traditional label of ‘economic migrants’.860  Given this 
reluctant approach to climate-induced overseas relocation planning, it does not come as a 
surprise that Tuvalu does not count so far with an instrument akin to Kiribati’s Land Acquisition 
and Resettlement Policy Framework directed at planning possible internal climate-induced 
resettlements. This gap is all the more facilitated by the fact that both Tuvalu and Kiribati have 
experienced – particularly during the past decade – a high level of inter-island migration from 
outer islands and atolls to their respective capitals (Funafuti and Tarawa). Given that such 
population movement is for a wide range of socio-economic reasons, the exact number of 
internal climate-induced relocations is difficult to determine. One thing they have in common 
is that the overpopulation of both capitals, coupled with sea-level rise, has become an 
important source of concern in Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands. While Funafuti has 
lost one metre of land around its circumference, efforts are now being displayed to protect 
with sea walls the airports of Tarawa and Majuro (capital of the Marshall Islands) from being 
constantly flooded.861  
Contrary to the high rates of inter-island migration in Tuvalu and Kiribati previously 
mentioned, internal climate-induced relocations in other Pacific Island States have been 
reported by national and even by international media and therefore tend not to pass unnoticed 
or be dissolved in the wider category of national economy-driven population movements. One 
of the first cases of climate-induced relocation that attracted widespread attention was the 
resettlement, in 2005, of the inhabitants of the Carteret Islands, located in the Autonomous 
                                                          
859
 Tuvalu’s Prime Minister, H.E. Apisai Lelemia, Poznan UNFCCC COP. 14/MOP.4 (Poznan, 2008). 
[Emphasis added].   
860
 J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, at 41 (footnote nº10), who 
reproduces the words of Anote Tong, President of Kiribati: ‘We don’t want to lose our dignity. We’re 
sacrificing much being displaced, in any case. So we don’t want to lose that, whatever dignity is left. So 
the last thing we want to be called is “refugee”. We’re going to be given as a matter of right something 
that we deserve, because they’ve taken away what we have’. 
861
 In the 1980s, the I-Kiribati government developed a plan to relocate people from the overpopulated 
main island of South Tarawa to the biggest atolls of the Line Islands.  
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Province of Bougainville of Papua New Guinea. Four years earlier, the same country had 
witnessed another previous relocation triggered by analogous causes. Yet, despite the fact that 
the precedent had affected over one thousand inhabitants of the Duke of York Islands, who 
were relocated to the province of New Britain, and implied the purchase, by the East New 
Britain Provincial Government, of resettlement lands and emergency supplies, the media 
remained quite silent about it and the situation passed almost unnoticed. The low coverage of 
the Duke of York relocation strikingly contrasts with the attention given to the 2005 Carteret 
Islands relocation, which was not only widely reproduced in the media, but also ‘competed’ 
against the parallel relocation of the Lateu settlement in Vanuatu for the title of first scenario 
of ‘climate refugees’ in history. Such a shift may be understood as a reflection of the 
progressive rise of international and public concern about climate change impacts during the 
first decade of the 21st century, as well as an indication of how the evolution of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse may affect both the understanding of and the 
policy responses to a relocation situation. What is most relevant about the Carteret and Lateu 
experiences, ever since they were labelled and identified as the first cases of ‘climate-induced 
relocations’, is that they show how relocation is far from being an easy or generally ‘natural’ 
experience in this region. Most importantly, they serve as a starting point from which it is 
possible to extract some of the variables that mark the differences between relocation 
experiences between Pacific Island States.  
 
2.2.2. Differential Factors: Geographical, Political and Socio-Cultural Dissimilarities of Pacific 
Island States    
 
To begin with, relocations between Pacific Island States are determined by a socio-
cultural variable that either qualifies or enhances the traumatic aspect of most resettlement 
experiences. This variable focuses on the existence of historical ties between the people 
affected and their land of origin. Notwithstanding the observable deterioration of their living 
conditions due to climate-change impacts, communities which have construed their identity in 
association with a specific and confined ancestral setting tend to be highly apprehensive of the 
idea of relocation. Evidence of this obstacle to socio-cultural relocation is for instance revealed 
by several interviews with Carteret islanders, and explains the tendency to delay as much as 
possible the beginning of the evacuation, even in cases where a relocation plan is ready for 
implementation. Besides, the relevance of this variable is all the more reinforced when 
relocation may directly affect indigenous peoples or an ethnic minority. In these cases, not only 
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will the impact of the resettlement on the socio-cultural identity of the communities be more 
acute, it may also impinge upon their successful integration into a new place irrespective of 
whether the relocation takes place within the same State or close to the original lands. This 
concern has already been raised by Tulele Peisa – the local NGO of Papua New Guinea which is 
currently leading the relocation of Carteret families – with regard to the inhabitants of the 
Mortlock, Tasman and Nuguria Islands who are expected to be relocated before 2015. Unlike 
the Carteret islanders and the Bougainvillians, who are predominantly Melanesians, the 
Mortlock, Tasman and Nuguria Islands are mainly inhabited by a Polynesian minority. This fact 
impedes the reproduction of successful actions which have been promoted by Tuelele Peisa to 
ensure the social integration of the Carteret islanders with the Bougainvillians, such as the 
celebration of inter-community meetings prior to relocation, and even the celebration of 
marriages. It may also constitute an additional obstacle to the acquisition of new lands from 
customary landowners in Bougainville Island.862  
In addition to the socio-cultural and historical characteristics of the population 
affected, the variety of relocation experiences among Pacific Island States is highly determined 
by a political factor. This variable takes into account: (1) whether the national government 
actually acknowledges the need to resettle part of its population or is more inclined to deny 
such a necessity (see the opposed official positions taken by Kiribati and Tuvalu explained 
above); and (2) in the affirmative, whether the presence of the national government in 
people’s daily life is effectively rooted so as to ensure the preparation of a relocation plan, as 
well as the availability of the resources necessary to implement it. Besides, such a level of 
governmental ‘presence’ in communities affected by climate change impacts will determine 
not only the existence of a relocation plan – or lack thereof – but also the approach to the 
implementation of the relocation as a whole. Thus, when the community is isolated from the 
national government and functions as a ‘cluster’ ordered by local actors (Council of Elders, 
Heads of the Church, etc.) and customary rules, bottom-up approaches will take the lead over 
top-down relocation planning.  
Relocation experiences of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji each 
provide a good illustration of the relevance of this variable. The Carteret Islands are located in 
the province of Papua New Guinea known for its mineral resources and as the cradle of several 
years of civil strife that confronted the Papuan national government against the secessionist 
forces of the Autonomous Province of Bougainville (APB). Today, the future legal status of the 
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 The original Carteret Island Integrated Relocation Programme (Bougainville, Papua New Guinea), 
incorporated fourteen steps until completion of the relocation plan.  
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province remains uncertain, as the celebration of a referendum has been delayed on several 
occasions ever since the war came to an end. As a result of this delicate political and historical 
context, the presence of the national government of Papua New Guinea in the region is rather 
limited. Thus, when the relocation of Carteret islanders began to be seen as inescapable, the 
Council of Elders of the community decided to create a local NGO which received the 
meaningful name of ‘Tulele Peisa’ (‘Surfing the waves in our own way’). This community-based 
organization thus elaborated a Carteret Integrated Relocation Plan that, after approval by the 
Council of Elders, was endorsed by the regional government of Bougainville. While the bottom-
up approach to relocation planning has the advantage of being more responsive to the real 
needs of the population affected and of taking better into account the practical post-relocation 
integration challenges, a limited presence of the national government is a potential source of 
financial struggle and limits the possibility to find appropriate relocation lands, for only the 
national government can conduct expropriations.863 For instance, the 2 million kina that the 
national government of Papua New Guinea had earmarked for the Carteret relocation and had 
deposited with the provincial government were never used. This contrasts with the increased 
governmental presence in the Solomon Islands in relocation areas, which shows how 
participation of national political actors and institutions facilitates access to international 
funding. Thus, following the resettlement of the community of North Lavella, due to the 2007 
tsunami that hit the region, the current President of the Solomon Islands stated that the 
community relocations of the Ava Labella will be conducted in the near future with the 
financial support of the European Union under the EU Global Climate Alliance.864 Likewise, the 
involvement of Vanuatu’s national government permitted the involvement of the Canadian 
International Development Agency, which financed the preparation and implementation of the 
relocation of the Lateu settlement.  
Moreover, these cases of accomplished relocations in the Pacific also indicate how the 
denial by a national government of the need to conduct relocation, as well as its ineffective or 
weak presence in the locations concerned (whether for organizational, historical, cultural or 
political reasons) correlatively strengthens local stakeholders and enhances the development 
of tailored forms of organization. In this sense, other than the paradigmatic example of the 
Council of Elders of the Papua New Guinean case, it is worth mentioning the capital presence 
                                                          
863
 For an early and thorough explanation of the land issues in Papua New Guinea, see M. J. TREBILCOCK, 
‘Customary Land Reform in Papua New Guinea: Law, Economics and Property Rights in a Traditional 
Community’, (1983) The Adelaide Law Review, vol. 9, issue 1, pp. 191-228. 
864
 Relocation of other communities, such as those of Lord Howe, Sikaiana, Fanalei and Walande Islands 
have also been earmarked.  
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of the Church in the Pacific. Sometimes, the importance of the Church is linked to its privileged 
position as a private land owner, which makes it a particularly important stakeholder in 
relocation as a potential land donor. For instance, in Fiji, the Methodist Church played a 
fundamental role during the resettlement of the coastal village of Vunidogoloa. Not only did it 
help the villagers prepare spiritually for relocation and to view it as a positive change, it was 
also fundamental in making them feel integrated into the new location of their village at a 
higher altitude. The new site was thus sanctified and received the biblical name of ‘Kenani’ – 
which means nothing less than ‘the Promised Land’ – and it was established that the first Friday 
of each month would be dedicated to fasting and praying in gratitude for the relocation. 
Besides, the Methodist Church acted in Vunidogoloa as a representative of the village before 
governmental authorities, and thus (quite successfully) claimed financial support on behalf of 
the village. Therefore, the Church has proven to be an important stakeholder that can 
potentially donate land to resettle communities, help to qualify the cultural, religious or 
spiritual obstacles to resettlement, while also being an effective local fund-raising actor.  
Finally, the third variable that determines the fundamental differences among 
relocation experiences in the Pacific is geographical. It plays a role in conjunction with the two 
other socio-cultural and governmental factors described above, and addresses the question of 
whether the nature of the original location has, for instance, changed from an agricultural to an 
urban setting, as occurred in Tuvalu and Kiribati. In cases where the relocation occurs in an 
agricultural setting, access to new land is the central issue, particularly in a region which is 
characterized by the limited extent of public lands (generally not over 2%). This feature 
seriously limits the capacity of respective governments to design and implement appropriate 
relocation plans (in particular in the Marshall Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu), is a source of conflict 
between public and private actors, and gives great importance to land-tenure negotiations. 
Moreover, the geographical variable also marks a difference between cases in which the 
relocation site is land at a higher altitude in the same island and close to the place of origin of 
the community – such as the Lateu settlement in Vanuatu – and cases in which the village is 
‘decomposed’ into family units which are moved to an already inhabited and different island, as 
happened to the Carteret islanders, who got integrated into three existing communities of 
Bougainville Island and worked in plantations there.  
All in all, we can conclude that, in contrast to the overall homogeneous and regional 
approach to the preservation of habitability conditions, disparities among Pacific Island States 
surface quite quickly when it comes to reactive relocation actions. The important efforts 
displayed in preventive relocation actions described above strikingly contrast with the 
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underdeveloped reactive relocation measures in the region. Not only is relocation not being 
dealt with from a common regional perspective, it has not yet even entered the policy agenda 
of some of the Pacific Island States at all. Moreover, in cases where reactive relocation actions 
can be identified, a country-to-country comparative study reveals a rather heterogeneous 
response to relocations per se, reminding us that the cultural, historical, political and perhaps 
even psychological differences in each of the relocation scenarios play a crucial role. The 
heterogeneity of reactive relocation actions is thus driven by a set of socio-cultural, political 
and geographical variables that form the context in which relocations take place. Therefore, 
studying how reactions to the same climate-induced relocation challenge differ among Pacific 
Island States becomes an opportunity to pierce the ‘outsider viewpoint’ of this region and to 
explore its more complex and diverse nature. 
 
3. STRUCTURING A PROPOSAL: A MULTILAYERED LEGAL PROTECION SCHEME FOR CLIMATE-
INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE PACIFIC  
 
 The comparative study discussed above has shown how preventive and reactive 
relocation actions in the Pacific have been dealt with differently, receiving uneven attention 
from governmental authorities, regional and local actors of Pacific Island States. This factual 
diversity strikingly contrasts with the ‘one-dimensional’ scholarly tendencies which elaborate 
legal protection responses to climate-induced displacement by focusing almost exclusively on 
one international legal avenue. The present section argues that any legal protection scheme for 
climate-induced displacement based on international law should reflect the factual diversity 
depicted above. It therefore proposes to conceptualize the legal framework of climate-induced 
displacement in multiple and complementary layers of protection, so as to address the issue 
through a new integrative and pluralistic scheme. Such a multilayered legal protection scheme 
must not only reflect the fundamental connection between climate-induced displacement and 
the progressive de-territorialization of Pacific Island States detailed in Chapter 4 (the former 
being a reflection of the latter), but should also relocate the human and territorial pillars within 
the ultimate issue of this thesis, namely, the survival of Pacific islands as State entities. To 
achieve this purpose, the continuation of statehood is conceived as the central variable 
structuring the multilayered legal protection scheme proposed. 
 
3.1. Existing One-dimensional Approaches to Climate-Related Displacement: A Relevant but 
Incomplete Benchmark 
 
3.1.1. Relevant Diagnosis and International Legal Regimes Analysed 
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 After being for long ignored as a distinct object of regulation, migration flows 
associated with the wide range of environmental disruptions attributable to climate change is 
becoming an ever more recurrent object of analysis in international legal scholarship. Several 
studies have already reflected upon the statutory framework in which these situations might or 
should fall, identifying normative gaps in areas of international law applicable to these 
situations, and correlatively suggesting how these gaps could or should be filled. To be sure, 
the existing literature cannot be criticized for its lack of diversity. As we shall now see in detail, 
studies have scrutinized international regimes of different nature, ranging from international 
environmental law to human rights law or refugee law and have also suggested a variety of 
solutions, from enhanced inter-regime synergies to institutional co-operation. This existing 
literature is at the core of the proposal for a multilayered legal-protection scheme and forms 
the basis of its content. As already mentioned in the introduction to the present chapter, the 
interest in this issue can be traced back to the mid-1980s, following the publication, in 1985, of 
the El-Hinnawi Report in which a group of experts of the United Nations Development 
Programme dealt with how the effects of strong environmental disruptions could trigger 
human displacements. The specificity of these situations was recognized by coining the term 
‘environmental refugees’ and even providing this widely cited definition from the El-Hinnawi 
Report:865 
’Environmental refugees are those people who have been forced to leave their 
traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption 
(natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected 
the quality of their life [sic]. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this definition is meant any 
physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render 
it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life.’ 
 
While this landmark definition legitimized dealing with this issue from international 
law and policy perspectives, it also originated a definitional impasse which is revealed by what 
Jane McAdam identifies as the defining dependency of the legal realm on language and 
terminology.866 This formula was primarily characterized by its wide temporal and special 
scope. Firstly, the condition of ‘environmental refugee’ was not limited to cases of 
                                                          
865
 E. EL-HINNAWI, supra. 
866 In J. McADAM (ed.), supra, at 3. See also F. RENAUD, J. BOGARDI, O. DUN and K. WARNER, ‘Control, 
Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?’, (2007) InterSecTions Publication Series of United 
Nations University Institute for Human Security, vol. 5. To be sure, the dependency of law on language 
and terminology stems from the fact that the recognition that a situation may evolve from the mere 
factual dimension to constitute (at least potentially) a legal category, implies the correlative generation 
of legal rights and obligations attached to it. 
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transnational displacement, but could also encompass cases of internal migration. What 
mattered was whether a move from a specific point of departure (the ‘natural habitat’) had 
taken place, irrespective of the point of arrival. Secondly, this definition held that the condition 
of ‘environmental refugee’ was not dependent on whether the displacement was temporary 
or permanent – or, in other words, the irreversibility of the disruption was not an element of 
the definition of ‘environmental refugee’. 
The controversy generated by this definition arose when international legal scholars 
(as well as lawyers from other legal fields and even from other associated disciplines) were 
faced with the need to deal with the determinant element for a migrant to be characterized as 
an ‘environmental refugee’ according to UNEP’s definition: the triggering ‘cause’ of the 
displacement, referred to in the definition by the generic term ‘environmental disruption’.867 
By strictly focusing on the need to prove a causal link between the existence of an 
environmental disruption and a human displacement, scholars arrived at a definitional impasse 
on the term ‘environmental refugees’ (which a fortiori also affected the sub-category of 
‘climate refugees’), for even assuming that a ‘disruption’ could be identified objectively, the 
place that such disruption occurs, in the mind of the migrant, inescapably belongs to the realm 
of subjectivity.868 Faced with the dissatisfactory lack of objective data and scientific 
                                                          
867
 At this point, it is important not to confuse the cause of the environmental disruption with the cause 
of the human displacement: while the former is irrelevant under the UNEP definition of ‘environmental 
refugee’ (which does not discriminate environmental disruption caused by human action from that 
resulting from natural causes), the natural causes is the determinant element characterizing a migrant 
as an ‘environmental refugee’. Thus, at first sight, this restriction could very much help the application 
of the UNEP definition to the sub-category of ‘climate refugees’, since it permits circumvention of the 
debates on the uncertain human contribution to climate change. For a general account of the issues 
raised by the definition provided in the UNEP report, see J. B. COOPER, ‘Environmental Refugees: 
Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition’, (1998) New York University Environmental Law 
Journal, vol. 6, pp. 480-529; and D. KEANE, ‘The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: 
a Search for the Meaning of “Environmental Refugees”, (2004) Georgetown International Environmental 
Law Review, vol. 16, pp. 209-223. 
868
 Some sectors in favor of recognizing human migration caused by environmental disruption as a 
distinct category called for the introduction of the migrant’s motivation as an element of the category. 
Christel Cournil and Pierre Mazzega explain that the notion of motivation refers to the numerous 
complex and interdependent factors converging in a person’s psychology and which eventually push the 
person to abandon the traditional habitat. This permits reintroduction of the notion of ‘coercion’, 
central to the characterization of ‘traditional’ refugees (e.g. suffering political persecution). See C. 
COURNIL et P. MAZZEGA, ‘Catastrophes écologiques et flux migratoires: comment protéger les “réfugiés 
écologiques”?’, (Décember 2006) Revue Européenne de Droit de l’Environnement, vol. 6, pp. 417-427. 
Moreover, eclectic positions have sought to reconcile both outlooks. For instance, Diane Bates 
suggested a distinction between three sub-categories of ‘environmental refugees’, according to the 
different degrees of free will left by the intensity and immediacy of the environmental disruption: (1) 
extreme cases leaving no space for free choice (natural disasters, close to ‘the coercion of nature’); (2) 
mid-level cases with a high degree of coercion, but leaving some time for the person to elaborate an 
adaptation strategy; (3) low-level cases of simple environmental degradation where long-term socio-
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information on the links between the existence of an environmental disruption and human 
migration flows, legal accounts reacted with the expression of a normative position. This shift 
from description to prescription resulted in polarized positions about which situations should 
be covered or excluded from the ‘environmental refugee’ category, or even whether such a 
category should be recognized at all.869  
More than twenty years after the release of the UNEP definition, a first precedent in 
the international arena that indicates a trend towards the recognition of a category of 
‘environmental refugees’, the issue is back to the front line within the specific framework of 
climate change. Most recent scholarly developments on this issue have been undoubtedly 
connected with the increased concern about this issue shown by some international 
specialized institutions and agencies which have conducted workshops on this topic and 
sometimes even incorporated it into their work programme.870 As a result, migration flows 
induced by any of the environmental disruptions associated with climate change began being 
referred to as ‘climate refugees’ or ‘climate-displaced people’. Although climate change has 
arguably become the paradigm of modern ecological challenge and is usually bound to specific 
images which did not exist in anyone’s mind back in the mid-1980s, the structure of present 
works on the protection of ‘climate refugees’ generally follows the same pattern. Thus, many 
current accounts of climate-induced displacement which pay attention to the UNEP precedent 
fall, perhaps inadvertently, into the same trap – namely, the impasse caused by the focus on 
the need to establish an objective causation between environmental disruption and human 
                                                                                                                                      
economic factors can be evaluated. See D. BATES, ‘Environmental Refugees: Classifying Human 
Migration Caused by Environmental Change’, (2002) Population and Environment, vol. 23, issue 5, pp.  
465-477. 
869
 Susan Martin points out that apocalyptic scenarios of the issue generally come from 
environmentalists, whereas migration lawyers and security studies experts tend to be skeptic about or 
even deny the existence of migration flows caused by environmental disruptions; in S. MARTIN, ‘Climate 
Change, Migration and Governance’ (2010) Global Governance, vol. 16, at 397-414. Proponents from the 
‘environmentalist sector’ generally base their normative positions on the date provided by Norman 
Myers, who estimated that, at present, 25 million people could fall within the category, a number which 
could possibly increase up to 200 million people. See, N. MYERS, ‘Environmental Refugees’, (1997) 
Population and Environment, vol.19, issue 2, at 167-182; and the widely cited alarmist account by Robert 
KAPLAN, ‘The Coming Anarchy’ (February 1994) The Atlantic Magazine. In contrast, the group of 
opponents is more heterogeneous. While the migration law sector fears that an excessive extension of 
the refugee regime may diminish the protection of ‘classical’ political refugees, opposition from the field 
of security studies pertains to a wider intra-disciplinary debate about the revision of the notion of 
security, which was launched after the end of the Cold War. Some branches of security studies (such as 
the Copenhagen School) then argued in favor of a holistic notion of security, which would not only 
encompass its traditional politico-legal dimension, but would also integrate economic, social and 
environmental sectors into it. See Chapter 1 above and B. BUZAN, O. WAEVER and J. DE WILDE, Security: 
A New Framework for Analysis, 1998, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
870
 See Chapter 3 above, Section 3.2.  
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displacement – and then try to overcome it with a prescriptive argument. Others, in contrast, 
by-pass the definitional stage or only touch upon it superficially. At the end of this ‘starting 
point’, both trends tend plainly to conclude that defining ‘climate refugees’ is a controversial 
issue, and then get to the core object of their analysis, namely, the state of the law when 
dealing with such situations.  
Legal accounts of ‘climate refugees’ primarily focus on describing and evaluating the 
current state of the international legal framework within which such situations may fall. At 
least three international regimes have been scrutinized by different scholars engaged in this 
evaluation: international refugee law (including specificities of regional developments); 
international human rights law; and international climate-change law. Most assessments 
consider that the real problem is either the lack of regulation or its inappropriateness to tackle 
the phenomenon in question. Thereby, the overall conclusion is generally formulated as a 
problem of regulatory scarcity.871 To be sure, the lack of or the inappropriateness of 
international regulation dealing with the ‘climate refugees’ should not come as a surprise, for 
migration remains an issue primarily regulated at the national level (or regional level for States 
Parties to a regional integration organization like the European Union). As policy decisions in 
this field tend to be closely associated with State sovereignty, bottom-up legal developments – 
from the national regulation to its eventual recognition in the international arena – are thus 
more likely to be found in relation to migration issues than in top-down law-making – from 
adoption of an international agreement to its implementation at the domestic level.  
If most regulations of migration flows are in principle adopted at the domestic level, 
international refugee law is an exception to it.872 Given the generalized use of the ‘climate 
refugee’ formula, eyes unsurprisingly turn towards this international regime when seeking to 
assess the level of response that the international legal order can provide in these situations. 
However, the results of this first exploration were quickly disappointing. International refugee 
law is a regime characterized by the specific historical context from which it emerged, and the 
correlative political objective embedded in the regulation, which originally sought responding 
to the case of numerous Europeans who had been displaced by the Second World War.873 This 
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 S. MARCHI, ‘Global Governance: Migration’s Next Frontier’ (2010) Global Governance, vol. 16, at 323.  
872
 The two main international instruments that will be referred to in this thesis are the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 22 July 1951; entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 
137 (hereafter referred to as the Refugee Convention); and its Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967; entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267.  
873
 See for instance, J. ELLIE, ‘The Historical Roots of Co-operation between the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration’, (2010) Global Governance, vol. 12, pp. 
345-360. 
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strong chronological and geographical specificity explains the inherent tendency of the regime 
to remain narrow in scope.874 The ‘fear of persecution’ by the authorities of the migrant’s State 
of citizenship must be the cause of the displacement for recognition of the refugee status to be 
granted. This central condition thus requires a persecution of a specific nature and a high 
degree of coercion attached to it. Some accounts stress, on the one hand, the difficulty of 
seeing how an environmental disruption induced by climate change could in any way be 
conceived as a persecution induced by political, ethnic, racial, religious or social motivations. 
Others also remind us that most situations of acute environmental stress caused by disruptions 
potentially associated with climate change do not seem to fulfil the essential requirement of 
coercion either (apart from cases of unexpected and grave natural disasters). Finally, the 
inherently narrow scope of application of international refugee law is also seen as unsuited to 
cover the situation of ‘climate refugees’ for it requires the proof of an individualized or 
personalized persecution and does not grant refugee status to internally-displaced people, two 
figures which contrast with the general acknowledgment that ‘climate refugees’ will take the 
form of mass flows875 and may not necessarily lead to transboundary displacements.  
To some extent, the potential openness of the regime to cover these situations may be 
optimistically evaluated by pointing out the trend particularly followed by some EU Member 
States. When discussions about the evolution of the EU Temporary Protection Directive 
arose,876 Finland suggested introducing an explicit reference to ‘climate refugees’ as a specific 
                                                          
874
 This strict narrowness of the main material scope of application of the two instruments of 
international refugee law contrast with the broadness of the UNEP definition of ‘environmental 
refugees’. See Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, which defines of the term ‘refugee’ ‘as a result 
of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.’ The temporary limitation was then countermanded by Article 1(2) of the Refugee Protocol, 
which states that: ‘For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as regards 
the application of paragraph 3 of this Article, mean any person within the definition of Article I of the 
Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and..." and the words 
"...as a result of such events", in Article 1 A (2) were omitted.’  
875
 See S. SINGH JUSS, International Migration and Global Justice, 2006, (Hamshire, UK/ Burlington, USA: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd.), at 211, who highlights the view that governmental oppression is very rarely the 
specific cause of environmental refugees’ displacement, particularly because of the need to prove that 
the persecution is personal or individualized.  
876
 Council Directive 21/55/EC, of 20 July 2001, on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in 
the event of mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between 
Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, 7 August 2001, L 212/12-23. Although this Directive is a regional instrument 
pertaining to the field of asylum law, it accepts a wider scope of applicability than the 1951 Refugee 
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category falling within the scope of Article 2, recognizing that the European temporary 
protection could be granted to ‘who may fall within the scope of Article 1A of the Geneva 
Convention or other international or national instruments giving international protection, in 
particular (…) persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or 
generalized violations of their human rights.’877 Although opposition from Spain and Belgium 
prevented the Finnish proposal from being adopted in the EU instrument, Member States 
remained free to widen the scope of application of the protection when transposing the 
objectives of the European regulation to their national legal orders. This possibility was 
followed by Finland and Sweden, whose respective national legislations currently provide for 
specific protection of ‘environmental refugees’.878 
In turn, scholars address the possible solutions that the human rights regime may 
provide to protect ‘climate refugees’, either as an alternative or as a complementary regime to 
refugee law.879 Truly enough, the inapplicability of international refugee law for cases of 
‘climate refugees’ can be overcome by international human rights law, which is characterized 
by its wide material and personal scope of application as well as by its universal vocation. 
Almost by definition, international human rights law is applicable to ‘every human being’.880 
                                                                                                                                      
Convention and its Protocol, and seemingly becomes also an instrument of temporary human rights 
protection through Article 2. For this reason, it is addressed in the ‘human rights section’.  
877
 Following this line, the United Nations High Commission for the Refugees recommended in 2008 
granting protection to people affected by climate change, natural disasters, and other forms of acute 
distress, ‘UNHCR ‘Climate Change, the Environment, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: a 
UNHCR Perspective’, (Policy and Evaluation Service, 29-01-08). See also the results of a seminar held by 
the International Organization for Migration in the same year, International Organization for Migration, 
‘Expert Seminar: Migration and the Environment’, (2008) 10 International Dialogue on Migration. 
878
 See The Finnish Aliens Act (301/2004, amendments up to 973/2007 included), Section 109(1); and 
The Swedish Aliens Act (2005/716). See also V. KOLMANNSKOG and F. MYRSTAD, ‘Environmental 
Displacement in European Asylum Law’, (2009) European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 11, at 316, 
who highlight the fact that a press release from the United Kingdom Foreign Office seemingly indicated 
a possible evolution in this sense.  
879
 Jane McAdam, for instance, is one of the scholars most prominently arguing against the 
characterization of climate-displaced people as refugees, and instead emphasizes the important 
complementary function of the human rights regime for these cases, in J. McADAM (2012), Climate 
Change, Forced Migration and International Law, supra, Chapter 2 and 3, pp. 39-98. 
880
 See, for instance, United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948), 
Preamble in fine (‘The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration on Human Rights as a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (…)’); or the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (adopted16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, 
Article 6 (‘every human being has a right to life’); Article 7 (‘no one should be subjected to torture’), 
Article 8 (‘no one shall be held in slavery’), Article 9 (‘everyone has a right to liberty and security’). [All 
emphasis added]. Therefore, both nationally and internationally displaced people, owing to 
environmental disruptions, may fall within the scope of the regime, and who also count on the 
protection (non-binding but based in positive law) of the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, (2004) Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement, full text and further 
information available at: <http://www.idpguidingprinciples.org/>. 
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Besides, the fact that most international human rights law instruments only timidly (if ever) 
recognize an autonomous human right to the environment is not an obstacle to the claims of 
‘climate refugees’, for the affected peoples may invoke violations of, inter alia, basic human 
rights to life, health and shelter.881 In this context, the report of the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) interestingly lists four main categories of human rights which, following an 
acute environmental disruption, are very likely to be curtailed. These categories follow an order 
established on the basis of the ‘urgent need of protection’ criterion.882  
The work of the IASC thus highlights the view that the factual context in which ‘climate 
refugees’ emerge can affect the system of human rights protection just as exceptionally as 
armed conflict situations do. However, contrary to armed conflict situations (which are covered 
by international humanitarian law), the discernible factual context which produces ‘climate 
refugees’ does not gives rise to the application of a specific set of rules operating as lex 
specialis. Aware of this gap, the work of the IASC points to a possible alternative path for future 
protection of climate refugees under international human rights law. This would consist of the 
recognition of an emerging obligation of the State of origin (where ‘climate refugees’ had their 
natural habitat) to build up an effective system of risk prevention prior to the manifestation of 
the acute environmental disruption. Hence, under this (arguably controversial) perspective, the 
State’s lack of preventive action would be tantamount to a human rights ‘violation’.883 
                                                          
881
 In contrast, the severe consequences of acute environmental disruption permit basing their claims on 
‘core’ human rights, rather than on the ‘right to a healthy environment’ (which, as the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights indicates, has not received strong judicial recognition yet). Apart from 
the already mentioned right to life, shelter and health, the protection of local culture at stake, the most 
paradigmatic case at present is that of the Inuit People. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Petition to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from 
Global Warming Caused by Acts or Omissions of the United States, submitted by Sheila Watt-Cloutier 
with the support of the Circumpolar Inuit Conference, on Behalf of All Inuit of the Arctic Regions of the 
United States and Canada, 7 December 2005. For more information, see the website of the Circumpolar 
Inuit Conference, available at: <www.inuit.org>. 
882
 Inter-l Agency Standing Committee, (2006) Operational Guidelines for the Protection of Human Rights 
in Natural Disasters; followed by a manual conceived to guide the action in situ, IASC, ‘Human Rights 
and Natural Disasters, Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in 
Situations of Natural Disasters, (pilot version, March 2008). The four categories are: (1) protection of 
life, security and physical, mental and moral integrity; (2) protection of rights related to the basic needs 
of life; (3) protection of socio-economic and cultural rights; and (4) protection of other civil and political 
rights. See also, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Preparedness for 
Climate Change: a Study to Assess the Future Impact of Climatic Changes upon the Frequency and 
Severity of Disasters and the Implications for Humanitarian Responses and Preparedness, 2–6 December 
2003, (Report Prepared for the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent). 
883
 The ex ante character of the protection is central to this suggestion, for once the environmental 
disruption has crystallized the State may suffer from a structural deficiency affecting its capacity to 
protect the population. The violation itself would therefore consist of the negligence of the State in not 
acting before the crystallization of an acute environmental disruption which de facto diminished its 
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Finally, given that the central element of characterization as a distinct category is 
primarily drawn from the cause of their displacement, namely, an acute environmental 
disruption, a look into the possibilities that international environmental law may offer for the 
protection and governance of ‘climate refugees’ was bound to be explored by international 
scholars. At the beginning of the 1990s, voices had already been raised in favour of 
constructing an international environmental regime into which the issue of ‘climate refugees’ 
would be integrated. When the 1992 Rio Summit on Environment and Development took place 
and the three Framework Conventions on climate change, biological diversity and 
desertification were adopted,884 Gregory McCue, for instance, argued that the increased 
international co-operation in the protection of the environment, on the one hand, and the 
issue of migration flows induced by environmental crisis, on the other, were bound by a cause 
and effect link.885 Therefore, McCue argued, setting both issues apart would damage the 
effectiveness of any attempt to find solutions to the global environmental crisis.886 
Nonetheless, individuals do not have a space within the international regime on climate 
change which did not specifically take into consideration the issue of ‘climate refugees’ either. 
In sum, the finding of the studies on the possibilities offered by the international legal 
order for the protection and governance of ‘climate refugees’ can be summarized as follows: 
(1) international refugee law is too context-specific and closely bound to State sovereignty to 
enable the automatic inclusion of ‘climate refugees’ within its scope of application; (2) despite 
international human rights law’s wider scope of application, the regime is not effective enough 
either, for it has not so far recognized acute environmental disruptions as a specific context in 
which curtailment of human rights may occur. Thus, the regime leaves ‘climate refugees’ 
legally ‘unarmed’ both before the country of origin (by limiting their claim of human rights 
violation against their own State) and also before the country of arrival. Finally, (3) the 
                                                                                                                                      
capacity to help its population thereafter. The ‘human rights violations’ would therefore not stem from 
the environmental disruption as such, but from the incapacity of the State to continue guaranteeing the 
protection of its population’s human rights after the disaster. In this sense, Kolmannskog and Myrstad 
have argued that the EU Temporary Protection Directive could be applicable to cases of ‘mass flows’ of 
‘climate refugees’, since acute environmental disruptions can affect the institutional structure of the 
State in a similar way to armed conflicts, in V. KOLMANNKOG and F. MYRSTAD, supra, at 316-317. 
884
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (adopted 9 May 1992, entered 
into force 24 March 1994), 31 ILM 849 (1992); Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (UNCCD) (adopted 17 June 
1994; entered into force 26 December 1996), ILM 1328 (1994); and Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993), 31 ILM 822 (1992).  
885
 See for instance, G. S. McCUE, ‘Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to 
Involuntary Migration’, (1993–1994) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, vol. 6, pp. 
151-190. 
886
 Ibid. 
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international regime on climate change law has been conceived as an inter-State agreement 
which was built up independently of non-State actors, and therefore any attempt to link the 
regime with the recognition of ‘climate refugees’ would be bound to meet this structural 
obstacle. All these findings lead to a shared and unique diagnosis which can be referred to as 
the lack of appropriate international regulation. Henceforth, proposals to respond to this 
normative scarcity and inappropriateness followed this diagnosis. They have taken different 
forms and have been conceived at different levels of analysis, yet they all share a common 
ground – namely, the belief that further normative and institutional growth is the solution.887 
From this standpoint, three main types of collective actions have been suggested in literature 
on ‘climate refugees’: reform of the existing instruments; creation of a new instrument; and/or 
development of synergies among existing regimes.  
 
3.1.2. Limited Normative and Institutional Solutions Proposed 
 
Proposals of normative reforms suggest that the scope of application of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol may be extended to cover ‘climate 
refugees’, either by amendment of the Convention itself, through loose interpretation of the 
instruments by the relevant international institutions, or through specific regional 
developments of the regime, such as that within the EU. Given the political difficulty 
associated with treaty amendment procedures and the context-specific rationale of the 
regime, proposals have generally focused on more indirect ways of obtaining the protection of 
the refugee regime, such as by using the margin of interpretation that international 
institutions have regarding the instruments regulating their mandates. Thus, the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees could, for instance, be asked to endorse an evolutive 
interpretation of the High Commission’s mandate, as it was already called upon to do, soon 
after its creation, to permit its continuation beyond the three-year mandate that had originally 
been accepted.888 Following this line, it is worth noting that, in 2008, the High Commission 
released a recommendation to the European Union in favour of incorporating ‘climate 
refugees’ within the scope of application of the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive.889 Yet, 
notwithstanding this openness, the Commission has not changed its position when it comes to 
                                                          
887
 See, for instance, in a previous number of this journal dedicated to climate change governance, M. 
MONTINI, ‘Reshaping Climate Change Governance for Post-2012’, (2011) European Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol. 4, issue 1, pp. 8-24, at 17-21; and R. LEAL-ARCAS, ‘Alternative Architecture for Climate 
Change: Major Economies’, (2011) European Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 4, issue 1, pp. 26-55, at 34-52.  
888
 See KOLMANNSKOG and MYRSTAD, supra.   
889
 Ibid.  
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dealing with the scope of application of its own mandate. As K. E. McNamara pointed out, by 
not recognizing environmental disruptions as one of the possible ‘forms of victimization’ which 
may be a ground for a request for the Commission’s assistance, the Commission maintains a 
very strict interpretation of both the terms of its mandate and of the conditions set up in the 
definition of ‘refugee’ in Article 1(2) of the Refugee Convention.890 
Proposals of normative reform not only encompass the revision of the international 
instruments of refugee law, but may also refer to regional regulations and, most particularly, 
those developed within a space potentially receiving ‘climate refugees’, such as the European 
Union.891 In this sense, advocates of normative reform through regional arrangements have 
found support in the evolution of the 2004 EU Qualification Directive, in which Article 2(e) 
recognizes that claimants who have been denied refugee status (understood as defined in 
Article 1(2) of the Refugee Convention) may eventually benefit from a subsidiary protection 
regime, had they faced a ‘real threat of suffering a serious harm’.892 Although the High 
Commission’s final list of the acts and facts that can be considered as being likely to provoke 
‘serious harm’ does not include grave environmental disruptions, the issue was discussed at 
the European Commission. This debate may find its roots in the 2002 petition from the 
European Parliament calling for the protection of transboundary migrants induced by acute 
environmental disruptions.893 Moreover, it has also been suggested that the protection of 
                                                          
890
 This conclusion has been reached for instance in a study based on 45 interviews of UN ambassadors 
and senior diplomats related to the institutions, see K. E. McNAMARA, ‘Conceptualizing Discourses on 
Environmental Refugees at the United Nations’, (2007) Population and Environment, vol. 29, pp. 12-24. 
However, recent accounts seem to point to a more open position of the UN since 2009. See, for 
instance, Experts Round Table, ‘Climate Change and Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses. 
Discussion document available at: <http://www.acnur.org/t3/que-hace/medio-ambiente/>.  
891
 C. COURNIL, ‘Les réfugiés écologiques: quelle(s) protection(s), quel(s) statut(s)?’, (2006) Revue de 
Droit Public, vol.4, pp. 1035-1066. 
892
 Directive 2004/83/CE du Conseil, 29 avril 2004, on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted, Official Journal of the European 
Union, 30 September 2004, L 304/12ff. This Directive was the result of a process initiated in 1999 by the 
‘Tampere Decision’ to work towards the creation of a common European asylum system. Tampere 
European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Conclusions of the Presidency, available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_es.htm>. 
893
 European Parliament, 2002, Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the protection granted, COM 
(2001) 510-C5-0573/2001-2001/0207 (CNS), Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(Rapporteur Jean Lambert). Even more paradigmatic was the proposal for a European Declaration on the 
Status of Environmental Refugees, of 6 April 2004, nº9/2004 (received 28 signatures from the European 
Green Party), which was not however adopted by the European Parliament. Given that the Qualification 
Directive is still under revision, it is possible to expect future evolution in this sense. Moreover, it is 
worth recalling that the European Commission has explored the relation between climate change and 
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‘climate refugees’ may be achieved through international or national judicial institutions, 
which could consider ‘climate aggression’ as falling within the evolutive interpretation of the 
notion of persecution, or accept the ‘right to environmental asylum’ or by recourse to 
alternative and less controversial notions, such as that of ‘non-refugee survival migrants’ 
suggested by A. Betts.894  
The second category of solutions proposed in reaction to the ‘regulatory scarcity’ 
diagnosis suggests that the adoption of a new international convention for the protection of 
climate refugees would be most suitable.895 The advantage of this proposal, put forward by, for 
instance, Franck Biermann, Ingrid Boas and David Hodkinson is that it enables taking full 
account of the specific contextual dimension of ‘climate refugees’ and constructing a system of 
protection tailored to the specific characteristics of these situations. Besides, the proposal may 
even be mirrored at a national level, as suggested in Australia by a political party of the 
opposition that proposed the creation of a right to environmental asylum.896 Nonetheless, co-
                                                                                                                                      
migration when discussing the establishment of a common European migration policy. See European 
Commission, Communication on Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: Increasing Co-
ordination, Coherence and Synergies, 8 October 2008, COM (2008) 611/3. On the recent increase in 
European concern about the issue of ‘climate refugees’, see N. ITANO, ‘Europe Fears “Climate 
Migrants”', (2008) Christian Science Monitor, vol. 100, issue 76, at 6. 
894
 A. BETTS, ‘Survival Migration: a New Protection Framework’, (2010) Global Governance, vol. 16, pp. 
361-382. This perspective suggests extracting the common ground of all climate-induced migration, 
irrespective of the effect of the degree of coercion and the urgency of the environmental disruption on 
the migrant’s psychology, so as to bind all these ‘types’ of migration under a single common triggering 
element: the search for survival. Betts’ proposal has been backed by civil society actors, see Oxfam 
International, The Right to Survive: the Humanitarian Challenge for the 21st Century, 2009, Oxfam 
International). 
895
 F. BIERMANN and I. BOAS, ‘Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol’, (2008) 
Environment Magazine, vol. 50, issue 6, pp. 10-16, and, by the same authors, ‘Global Adaptation 
Governance: the Case of Protecting Climate Refugees’, in F. Biermann, Philipp Pattberg and Fariborz 
Zelli, Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency and Adaptation, 2010, (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 255-269. Following the same line, M. HULME, ‘Climate Refugees, 
Cause for a New Agreement?’, (November/December 2008) Environment, vol. 50, issue 6, pp. 50-52; R. 
DOCHERTY and T. GIANNINI, ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: a Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change 
Refugees’, (2009) Harvard Environmental Law Review, vol. 53, pp. 49-403; D. HODKINSON and L. 
YOUNG, ‘In the Face of a Looming Catastrophe: a Convention for Climate Change Displaced Persons’, 
(2012), available at <www.ccdpconvention.com>, based on previous works, such as D. HODKINSON et 
al., ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes in: a Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate Change’, (2010) 
Monash University Law Review, vol. 36, at 69; D. HODKINSON et al., ‘Copenhagen, Climate Change 
“Refugees” and the Need for a Global Agreement’, (2009) Public Policy, vol. 4, pp. 155-174; and D. 
HODKINSON et al., ‘Towards a Convention for People Displaced by Climate Change’, (2008), New Critic, 
vol. 8, pp. 1-6, available at:  
< http://www.ias.uwa.edu.au/new-critic>.   
896
 The Australian Labor Party called for an international coalition to accept climate refugees from the 
Pacific, in response to the government’s position, which was against the recognition of such category, 
and the Australian Green Party (Senator Kerry Nettled) put forward a Migration (Climate Refugees) 
Amendment Act in 2007, which sought the revision of the Australian 1958 Migration Act by introducing 
a definition of ‘climate change induced environmental disaster’ and a clause on the granting of ‘climate 
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operation on this matter at the international level remains highly controversial and, therefore, 
the adoption of a Climate Refugee Convention as a Protocol to the UNFCCC remains unlikely to 
crystallize in the short term.  
Finally, alternative ‘mid-way’ proposals stress the potential utility of developing inter-
regime synergies to complement adaptation mechanisms of the international regime on 
climate change. Angela Williams has therefore suggested that these synergies could be 
displayed through the development of the regional agreements operating under the 
UNFCCC.897 This proposal remains close to the classical conception of migration as a form of 
adaptation to the changing conditions of the habitat, and bases the normative connection on 
the obligation of States Parties to the Convention and to the Kyoto Protocol to co-operate and 
help finance adaptation measures.898 Given that migration flows tend to take place within the 
same region for reasons of geographical (and sometimes also cultural) proximity, the proposal 
to enhance regional co-operation in these matters has, in principle, various advantages: it 
sounds practical and potentially more effective, since co-operation at this level of analysis 
helps to tailor the regulation to the specific reality of the region; it avoids relying on the 
political will of a large number of States to adopt an international regulation for ‘climate 
refugees’; and the preservation of the traditional definition of refugee contained in the 1951 
Refugee Convention is ensured. Moreover, another proposal advancing the benefits of inter-
regime connections suggests approaching climate change from a human rights perspective.899 
This position stems from the fact that the adverse effects of the phenomenon are very likely to 
affect and even obstruct achievement of the object and purposes of the main international 
human rights instruments, previously elaborated for the protection of citizens from abuses by 
their own States.900 Moreover, the international regime on climate change, built to decrease 
                                                                                                                                      
refugees visas’. Amended text available at: 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill/mrab2007342/>. 
897
 A. WILLIAMS ‘Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law’, (October 
2008) Law and Policy, vol., 30, issue 4, pp. 502-529.  
898
 UNFCCC, Article 4(e). 
899
 See Stephen HUMPHREYS (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change, 2010, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press). This book is the result of a collective contribution and results from the 
2008 programme initiated at the United Nations Human Rights Council by Resolution 7/23, Human 
Rights and Climate Change, adopted on 28 March 2008. Information about the programme currently in 
courseis available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/study.htm>. 
900
 See, for instance, J. HALL and D. WEISS, ‘Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change Adaptation 
and Human rights Law’, (2012) Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 37, at 309-364; M. LIMON, ‘Human 
Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action’, (2009) Harvard Environmental Law 
Review, vol. 33, pp. 439-476; and S. McINERNEY-LANKFORD, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights: an 
Introduction to Legal Issues, (2009) Harvard Environmental Law Journal, vol. 33, pp. 431-437. A more 
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the aggravation of global warming (mitigation policies) and to halt its adverse effects once it 
becomes inevitable (adaptation policies), may create side-effects in the realization of human 
rights. Mitigation policies establish the future distribution and usage of natural resources 
among States with no concern for the effects that such new redistribution may have on 
individuals. Finally, adaptation policies, which are by nature more suited to address the new 
climate change challenges, such as ‘climate refugees’, remain insufficiently financed and 
underdeveloped. However, the main difficulty of this proposal is to reconcile the two 
underlying rationales of each international regime, which are different in nature and structure, 
so as to regulate the issue by integrating both dimensions in a coherent and holistic way.901  
Undoubtedly, the three international regimes, established prima facie to operate in 
cases of climate-induced displacement, which have already been dealt with in international 
legal scholarship, are highly appropriate to address the relocation cases in the Pacific, depicted 
above. Firstly, as already pointed out in this section, international environmental law – 
particularly climate change adaptation law and policy – is already an indispensable tool for 
preventing the excessive degradation of the habitability conditions of settlements in the Pacific 
that may lead to international or transnational relocations. The regional co-operation amongst 
all Pacific Island States, conducted multilaterally through the SPREP Pacific Adaptation Project, 
as well as bilaterally through Joint National Action Plans, are currently vivid examples of the 
relevance of this regime to this issue of climate-induced displacement. Moreover, it is worth 
analysing whether transnational climate-induced displacements of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans to 
Fiji, Australia or New Zealand may be covered by international refugee law, so as to eventually 
provide them with legal protection tools in ‘host countries’. Finally, in all situations indicated in 
this study, whether at a preventive and reactive stage of the relocation process and regardless 
of whether the displacement is international or internal, a wide range of Pacific islanders’ 
substantive and procedural human rights are fundamentally at stake.  
Nonetheless, the pitfall of the approaches suggested lies in the fact that they tend to 
focus exclusively in one of the three legal avenues. As the issue of climate-induced 
displacement is analysed from one angle – mainly human rights, refugee law or international 
environmental law – solutions emerging from the identification of the normative and 
                                                                                                                                      
detailed account of the relevance of human rights law and human rights approaches to climate change 
law is developed in Section 4.1.1 below.  
901
 Thus, the discourse on the protection of global commons, inclusive and communitarian, contrasts 
with the rationale of the human rights discourse, fundamentally individualistic and adversarial. See S. 
HUMPHREYS, ‘Competing Claims: Human Rights and Climate Harms’, in S. Humphreys (ed.), supra, at 37-
69. 
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institutional deficiencies existing in each of the three regimes are also conceived from a 
unidirectional perspective. Although the proposals formulated so far are multiple and diverse – 
ranging from normative development and reform to inter-regime solution synergies, 
institutional co-operation and judicial activism – they are all based on an equally ‘universalist’ 
normative blueprint, which does not match the inherently heterogeneous – and therefore 
particularistic – condition of Pacific climate-induced relocations depicted above. Therefore, 
while acknowledging the relevance of the regimes analysed, as well as the solutions proposed 
so far, it is fundamental to consider that a legal protection framework must be able to adapt to 
the specificities of each relocation case, which result from the socio-cultural, geographical and 
political variables explained above. Rather than prioritizing the use of problematic theoretical 
approaches which are then tested in pilot countries and often lead to definitional impasses, the 
reality displayed by this regional case study invites the elaboration of a legal protection scheme 
by induction.  
 
3.2. Multidimensional Legal Protection Scheme for a Heterogeneous Factual Landscape: A 
New Integrative and Pluralistic Proposal 
 
3.2.1. Widening the Spectrum: A Myriad of Potentially Applicable International Legal Regimes 
 
Vladimir S. Soloyov wrote that ‘the moral principle does not allow us to transform a 
concrete person, a living man with his inseparable and essential national characteristics into an 
empty abstract subject with all his determining peculiarities left out’.902 Taking stock of this 
challenging and compelling warning – as well as ethical dictum – the present section suggests 
approaching the issue of climate-induced relocation through a scheme consisting of several 
layers of legal protection. Such a scheme contemplates and includes the protection that can be 
offered by the three legal regimes laid out above and already analysed in international legal 
scholarship, but not limited to them. While avoiding falling into an excessively casuistic 
approach to climate-induced relocation in the region, the multilayered legal protection scheme 
is proposed to provide a legal translation of the factual heterogeneity previously highlighted, 
one that acknowledges the variability of forms of vulnerability and the respective specific 
needs resulting from the variables previously identified. Such factual differences are thus the 
source from which the structure of the scheme emerges, which has the advantage of 
introducing a certain degree of flexibility into the comparison with the existing ‘universalist’ 
approach to this issue, while simultaneously pointing to new and unexplored legal avenues 
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which may be relevant in cases of climate-induced relocation. These become ever more visible 
when the configuration of this multilayered legal protection scheme (which will only consider 
treaty law) is based on the role of the different States involved in climate-induced relocation 
cases are called on to play.  
Moreover, it is intended to cover Pacific islanders or the ‘population’ of Pacific Island 
States. As a matter of principle, the category of ‘population’ will be understood in a wide sense 
covering all people subject to the (territorial) jurisdiction of a Pacific island State, including – 
but not limited to – the citizens living in any of the countries under study, as well their 
permanent residents.903 This is ‘abstract’ and a structural approximation prior to identifying 
instruments, the relevant provisions at stake and their applicability in the region.  
 
TABLE 5. Multilayered Legal Protection Scheme for Climate-Induced Displacements in the 
Pacific 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2. (Re)-Introducing the Role of the State in the Configuration of a Legal Protection in 
Climate-Induced Relocation 
The fundamental place of the State actions is generally and primarily associated with 
its role as a factor in preventive relocation measures – such as the development of climate 
change adaptation projects with neighbouring States. To a certain extent, this role is equally 
                                                          
903
 To some extent, this proposal seeks structuring along one coherent axis what Jane McAdam had 
already defined as the fragmentation of climate displacement governance. See J. McADAM, 
Environmental Displacement Governance, (2010) UNSLRS Paper 1, pp. 1-33 
 STATEHOOD NOT AT RISK STATEHOOD ENDANGERED 
 
 
Possibly Relevant Legal Regime  
National Displacement Transnational Displacement 
 
Prevention 
 
Relocation 
Partial Total 
State of 
origin 
Host 
State 
State of 
origin 
Host 
State 
International Human Rights Law Yes Yes Yes Yes ? Yes 
National Human Rights Law (Constitutional 
Law) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes ? Yes 
International Environmental Law Yes Yes ? ? No No 
National Environmental Law Yes Yes No No No No 
International Migration Law No No Yes Yes ? Yes 
National Migration Law No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced 
People 
? Yes No No No No 
International Refugee Law/Statelessness Status No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
333 
 
pinpointed with regard to reactive relocation actions – such as the elaboration of relocation 
plans, provision of funding, and organization of its implementation phase – particularly in cases 
where relocation takes place at a national level and the State has full competence in the 
process as a whole. The recognition of the presence of the State in these cases limits the 
traditional dichotomies confronting Mankind and the Environment, on the one hand, and the 
Individual against The State, on the other.904 Instead, it invites the conceptualization of a 
tridimensional relationship, in which the protection of the people against environmental 
disruptions of their habitat is ensured by the active role of the State in which such habitat lies. 
As Table 4 above showed, the role varies according to the specific needs of each case; whereas 
in bottom-up approaches to relocation planning, the State acts primarily as a co-ordinator of 
the actions elaborated and undertaken by provincial and local actors; top-down approaches are 
bound to endow the State with a more active role, in which it is called on to manage, finance 
and design relocation plans, and even negotiate the international agreements that may be 
necessary (e.g. Kiribati and Tuvalu).905 
Yet, there is a second and equally fundamental function of the State in the context of 
climate-induced displacement which has generally and consistently been neglected. While 
acting as an operative that seeks to guarantee the basic living conditions of its population, the 
State itself becomes simultaneously the subject of protection of its own preventive and 
reactive relocation actions. This secondary subject of protection is particularly visible when 
taking into consideration the threat that large amounts of transnational displacements may 
represent for the continuation of statehood of Pacific Island States. In these cases, the 
protection of the State’s continuation is a sort of by-product of the actions seeking to protect 
the population affected by relocation, since all contributions to the pre-emption of 
transnational climate-induced displacement may also be understood as protection strategies 
for the continuation of statehood. Simply put, the fate of Pacific islanders is bound to the fate 
of their respective Pacific island State. 
The multilayered legal protection scheme proposed is shown in Table 5, above, which is 
                                                          
904
 Binary divisions stem from enlightenment and French rationalism. They are also at the root of the 
anthropocentric view of environmental protection, which has been criticized extensively by, for 
instance, C. REDWELL, ‘Life, the Universe and Everything: a Critique of Anthropocentric Rights’, in A. 
BOYLE and M. ANDERSON (eds.), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, 1996, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Paperbacks), pp. 71-108 
905
 On the specificities of the role of the State in environmental protection contexts, see T. MARAUHN, 
‘The Changing Role of the State’, in D. BODANSKI, J. BRUNÉE and E. HEY (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law, 2007, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press) Chapter 31, pp. 
727-747. 
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structured by one main variable, namely, whether the continuation of the State is put at stake 
by presently or potentially large amounts of transnational population displacements or not. It 
considers that the continuation of the State is not at risk when climate-induced displacements 
and relocations take place at a national level, cases in which there is only one State directly 
engaged in the relocation. The State’s obligations and responsibilities, corollary of the rights of 
the population affected, may be divided into two groups, according to whether they belong to 
a relocation prevention phase or to a reactive relocation phase. In cases where climate-induced 
displacements and relocations take place at an international or transnational level, the 
continuation of the State may be at risk. Although these situations are up to now a minority in 
the Pacific, they cannot be disregarded in future projections, for they undoubtedly constitute 
the more challenging scenarios for international law and policy in various areas and a potential 
source of important developments and controversies in the field. This scenario is therefore 
sub-divided into two groups – situations of partial de-population and situations of total de-
population. From a legal perspective, the web of responsibilities and obligations becomes more 
complex, for at least two States come into play – the State of origin and the host State. All in all, 
Table 5 shows how different areas of national and international law may be relevant to the 
protection of people displaced as a result of the effects of climate change, depending on the 
scenario in which such displacement (and eventual relocation) takes place. It serves as a 
roadmap or frame of reference in which legal analysis of the extent of the rights and duties of 
both the States involved and the populations affected can be situated. 
However, setting up the structure of a legal protection scheme is not enough. To make 
it meaningful, it is necessary to determine or identify in detail the specific typologies, 
boundaries and legal content of each of the situations marked in Table 5. The purpose of the 
following section (4) is therefore to identify how climate change impacts on vulnerable 
communities can substantiate an international protection claim under a variety of regimes. In 
doing so, identifying the States involved in each scenario is fundamental. The next section will 
thus reflect the divisions shown in Table 5, primarily marked by the ‘contextual variable’ 
separating scenarios in which climate-induced displacement takes place within the boundaries 
of a State and therefore do not risk jeopardizing the continuation of the State, from overseas 
relocation scenarios potentially putting at stake the continuation of the State of origin of the 
population. 
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4. SPECIFYING THE PROPOSAL’S LEGAL CONTENT: FRAGMENTED AND FLEXIBLE REGULATION 
FOR CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION IN THE PACIFIC   
 
4.1. Statehood Not at Risk: National Climate-Induced Displacements in Pacific Island States  
 
As shown in Table 4, cases of climate-induced displacement so far encountered in the 
Pacific have predominantly taken place at a national level. While their relocation undoubtedly 
affects the population, it does not correlatively endanger nor does it raise the question of the 
continuation of the State itself, for no total ‘de-population’ is taking place. Therefore, this 
section focuses on the specific content to be given to the legal-protection scheme for the 
people affected by relocation in cases where the contextual variable is not only steady but also 
revitalized, as the State has the active task of responding to the challenge that climate-change 
disruptions represent for the habitability conditions of the population settled in its territory. 
One is thus led to scrutinize the responsibilities and obligations of the State towards its 
inhabitants, both individually and collectively (local communities). In this setting, the State can 
be approached as much as the primary guarantor of the continuation of the bond between a 
population and their territory as – in cases where the original location of the settlements has to 
be evacuated – the ultimate guarantor of the underlying conditions necessary for the creation 
of such a bond with the new site. Following the distinction laid down in the preceding section, 
the two main sorts of strategies for response to climate-induced relocation that the State is 
expected to undertake are defined by a temporal variable: preventive relocation strategies – 
mainly focused on strengthening adaptation capacity and resilience with respect to the 
habitability conditions of the original site of the human settlements; and reactive relocation 
strategies centred on the evacuation and resettlement procedure, as well as integration into 
the new site. When determining the content of the legal framework applicable to internal 
policy strategies in response to an internal issue, national law will play a role as great as – if not 
greater than – international law.  
 
4.1.1. Legal Framework in a Preventive Relocation Phase: Preservation of Basic Habitability 
Conditions 
 
Limited Direct Applicability of Human Rights Treaty Law with General Scope 
 
International human rights law is undoubtedly the first international legal regime to 
explore in order to identify and define the ‘rights holders’ and ‘duty bearers’ in a situation 
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involving individuals and the State in a vertical relationship.906 In preventive relocation 
scenarios – where the State is called upon to take measures to preserve what we referred to 
above as the habitability conditions of its population – a range of fundamental rights, such as 
the right to health, the right to food, the right to access to water and the right to appropriate 
sanitation are involved, essentially corresponding to rights contained in the International 
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCRs).907 As recalled by the 2011 World 
Bank Study on Human Rights and Climate Change, it is generally acknowledged that the 
recognition of such rights in the Covenant does not impose on States Parties an immediate 
obligation of result. Rather, the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is conceived 
as a progressive evolution ‘in accordance with the capacities of each State’.908 Moreover, the 
Commission on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has specified three different types 
of duties incumbent upon the State within the territory under its jurisdiction and effective 
control for the realization the rights contained in the Covenant. These are the duty to respect, 
the duty to protect, and the duty to fulfil treaty-based rights.909  
                                                          
906
 The focus in this study of the ‘classical’ or ‘original’ forms of human rights law (operating between 
the State and its population), in no case constitutes a negation of the applicability of this regime in 
horizontal individual–individual relationships. The focus on vertical effects of human rights obligations 
stems from the explanation of the Human Rights Committee (charged with monitoring the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), which states 
that the obligations under Article 2(1) of the Covenant ‘are binding on States [Parties] and do not, as 
such, have a direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law’. UN Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment nº 31, ‘Nature of the General Legal Obligation of State Parties to the Covenant’, 
(2004) UN Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. 
907
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966; entered 
into force on 3 January 1976, 933 U.N.T.S 3. These rights are recognized by States Parties in Article 11 on 
‘the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions’; as well as in Article 12, recognizing the right to the 
‘highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’, and stating that steps necessary to the full 
realization of this right include: ‘(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of 
environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness.’  
908
 S. McINERNEY-LANKFORD, M. DARROW and L. RAJAMANI, Human Rights and Climate Change: a 
Review of the International Legal Dimensions, May 2011, (Washington DC: World Bank), at 6. As the 
Report explains, the language of the ICESCRs ‘contemplates that, to some degree, the rights will be met 
through progressive realization rather than immediately’, although this level of flexibility in the way of 
complying with their obligations does not prevent States from having to take ‘immediate, concrete and 
targeted steps towards the realization of such rights’ and ‘show that they are using the maximum extent 
of available resources towards the realization of the rights’. 
909
 Ibid. For an explanation of the meaning and content of these three duties, see United Nations, 
Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment nº12, ‘The Right to 
Adequate Food’, 1999, E/C.12/1999/5, and CESCR, General Comment nº14, ‘The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health’, 2000, E/C.12/2000/4. The duty to respect the rights themselves refers to 
the duty of the State to refrain from actions that may interfere with, impair or violate the enjoyment of 
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Though such a tridimensional perspective on the duties of the State, the CESCR 
undoubtedly contributed to the construction of a comprehensive and global protection of the 
rights at stake, its beneficial effects have a rather limited application in the Pacific, given that 
no Pacific island State, except Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, has ratified the 
ICESCRs.910 There are many reasons possibly explaining why the Pacific has the lowest 
ratification rate of human rights treaties in the world. While the Office of the High Commission 
on Human Rights (Regional Office for the Pacific) emphasizes the obstacles related to the lack 
of resources – which may impair countries’ capacities to comply with reporting obligations911 – 
factors associated with the existence of local customs that clash with the western conception 
of economic, social and cultural rights cannot be disregarded.912 Cultural determinism can in 
effect preclude the possibility for Pacific island governments to adapt their national legislation 
to be consistent with human rights instruments, particularly in areas that are commonly 
regulated by old customary rules and local traditions (such as family law, land rights, women’s 
role in the community, etc).913  
Interestingly, Pacific Island States have preferred avoiding ratification altogether, instead of 
overcoming the points of friction between the standards imposed by human rights instruments 
and their local customs by accompanying the instrument of ratification with declarations of 
interpretation or even reservations they would deem necessary. This choice might be 
                                                                                                                                      
the rights of individuals under its jurisdiction; the duty to protect, in contrast, requires a positive and 
more active attitude of the States, which should preserve the enjoyment of the rights from interference 
by private action; and the duty to fulfill requires the States to take action to facilitate, provide and 
promote the rights at stake. 
910
 The Solomon Islands succeeded the United Kingdom as a State Party to the ICESCRs on 17 March 
1982 (maintaining the reservations previously made by the United Kingdom). Besides, on 29 September 
2009, the Solomon Islands signed the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (adopted in New York, 2008); Papua New Guinea acceded to the ICESCRs on 
21 July 2008 but has not yet signed the Optional Protocol. See Table 6 below for the ratification of other 
relevant human rights treaties. Information available at the United Nations Treaty Collection website: 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en> (for 
status of ratification of the Convention); and 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-a&chapter=4&lang=en> 
(for status of ratification of the Optional Protocol).  
911
 See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (Regional Office of the Pacific), 
Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties: Added Value for the Pacific, Discussion Paper, July 
2009, (Suva, Fiji: OHCHRs Regional Office of the Pacific), at vii.  
912
 See K. HAINES-SUTHERLAND, ‘Balancing Human Rights and Customs in the Pacific Region: a Pacific 
Charter of Human Rights’, (2010) ANU Undergraduate Research Journal, vol. 2, pp. 125-141. 
913
 For instance, the welfare of Samoan families very much depends on the capacity and willingness of 
each family’s matai to support and represent them, to the extent that the suitability to complement this 
ancestral and pre-colonial system of community organization when the matai system fails, has already 
been pointed out by the Regional Office of the Pacific of the OHCHRs, in Protection of Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced People: Challenges of the Pacific, Discussion Paper, 2011 (Fiji: Davui Printery), at 7.  
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motivated by the mistaken understanding that a State must comply with the human rights 
standards before it become a Party to the Treaty, which, according to the latest OHCHR report 
on this matter, is widespread in the region. However, it may also exemplify how States are 
sometimes reluctant to commit to obligations contained in an international treaty negotiated 
and perfected while the State in question had not yet acquired full political independence.914 
The relatively recent attempts to set the basis of a regional human rights system which – 
following the example of the European, the Inter-American and the African systems, although 
not yet so ambitious – can support this analytical interpretation of Pacific Island States’ 
behaviour. Already in 1989, the first attempt to elaborate a Pacific Charter on Human Rights 
had seen the light.915 More recently, the Pacific Islands Forum – today’s principal form of 
regional institutional co-operation – places human rights as ‘a fundamental component of the 
vision of the Pacific Island Leaders’. Initiative 12.4 of the Pacific Plan thereby supports the 
‘appropriate ratification and implementation of international and regional human rights 
conventions, covenants and agreements, and support for reporting and other requirements’, 
which is considered as an essential step to improve the institutional governance within and 
between Pacific Island States.916  
Nonetheless, in spite of these regional developments, the level of ratification of 
international human rights treaties falls too short to formally consider international human 
rights treaty law (in particular, the ICESCRs) as a possible conventional source of rights that a 
population can oppose to its State. This indirectly provokes a heavy reliance on constitutional 
law recognizing fundamental rights, as well as on the judicial and non-judicial institutions 
tasked with their protection and enforcement. According to the Regional Office of the Pacific of 
the OHCHR, most Pacific Island States recognize civil and political rights in their constitutions, 
but only timidly mention – if ever – economic, social and cultural rights.917 To be sure, an 
extended comparative study of Pacific Island States’ constitutional legislation and case law on 
                                                          
914
 This might partly explain why ratification rates of much more recent instruments, such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women are much higher. See Table 6, below.  
915
 The first unsuccessful attempt to agree on and implement a human rights charter for the Pacific can 
be traced back to 1989. It stemmed from an initiative of the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific 
(LAWASIA), Human Rights Committee, Draft Pacific Charter on Human Rights and Explanatory 
Memoranda, 1989 (Kensington, NSW: LAWASIA). See P. BUTLER, ‘A Human Rights Charter for the Pacific’ 
(paper presented at the Human Rights Research Seminar), at 2.  
916
 More details on the background and the currently ongoing revision of the Pacific Plan can be found at 
the website of the Pacific Islands Forum, including specific actions derived from it (such as collaboration 
with the Regional Office of the Pacific of the OHCHRs: <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-
governance-security/human-rights/>.  
917
 OHCHR, Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, supra, at vii.  
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the matter would be needed in order to make a precise evaluation of the level of normative 
recognition of Pacific islanders’ economic, social and cultural rights opposable against their 
State of residence. While such a delicate task falls outside the scope of the present chapter, the 
context makes it worth mentioning that the creation of National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) in the region seems to be in vogue. NHRIs apply the so-called ‘Paris Principles’918 and 
operate as interlocutors between international human rights treaty bodies and national 
institutions, seeking the promotion of human rights through national institutions’ own systems 
of assimilation. Most recently, the first NHRI of a Pacific island State was set up in Suva (Fiji), 
with the financial support of the European Union and has just released an important survey of 
the level of Fijian recognition and respect of human rights, based on Fijian case law and 
national legislation.919 If other NHRIs were to be set up in Pacific Island States, access to 
information by the Pacific islanders of each State would not only be facilitated, but would also 
help in drawing up a comparative survey of the state of recognition of economic, social and 
cultural rights in the region. 
 
Usefulness of Climate Change Law from a Human Rights Approach 
 
The fact that the main international human rights treaty relevant in a preventive 
relocation scenario phase – namely, the ICESCRs – is not applicable in eleven out of the twelve 
Pacific Island States does not, however, imply that the region has completely neglected the 
realization of the rights contained in such instrument. Albeit through indirect means associated 
with international environmental law obligations, of the three duties incumbent upon the State 
for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, the duty to protect has been 
particularly implemented. In contrast to the low rate of ratification of international human 
rights treaties, all Pacific Island States are parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
                                                          
918
 The Paris Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions for the Promotion of Human Rights,  
were adopted in 1991 by the NHRIs at an international workshop held in Paris and marked the 
standardization of this new form of international human rights co-operation. They were then endorsed 
by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/134, ‘National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights’ (with Paris Principles Annexed), 48
th
 session, 4 March 1994; as well as by 
the UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/74, ‘National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights’, 59
th
 meeting, 20 April 2005. See UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions, 2005, (Versoix, 
Switzerland: International Council for Human Rights Policy and OHCHR). More detailed information on 
NHRIs can be found at the OHCHR website at:   
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/nhri/pages/nhrimain.aspx>.  
919
 See Fiji Human Rights Commission, Bill of Rights: International Legal Analysis, updated 2009, available 
at the website of Fiji’s Human Rights Commission at: 
<http://www.fhrc.org.fj/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=12>.  
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on Climate Change as well as to the Kyoto Protocol. Under the AOSIS umbrella, they have been 
playing a very active political role ever since the start of the regime,920 certifying thereby the 
top level of concern that climate change is given in the agenda of Pacific islands’ governmental 
structures.921 To be sure, as the World Bank Report recalls, the international regime on climate 
change is not tailored as a ‘construction of a legal framework of rights/obligations between the 
individual and the State’.922 Rather, its structure responds to a ‘global goods perspective’923 and 
is more explicitly built upon the principle of reciprocity, as clearly revealed by the primary 
purpose of the regime – namely, the reduction of man-made greenhouse-gas emissions.924 Yet 
this structural characteristic does not preclude the regime from indirectly serving the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights.  
To begin with, one of the difficulties raised by the international human rights legal 
framework is that, as the World Bank report explains, it ‘appears somewhat reactive in its 
design, geared more towards redressing past or imminent harms than the speculative business 
of scientific predictions pertinent to climate change’.925 Such an ex post perspective inherent in 
human rights law strikingly contrasts with the ‘preventive’ approach inherent in climate 
mitigation within the UNFCCC. Henceforth, from a structural perspective, the climate change 
regime as a whole may be better suited to filling some of the normative lacunae in preventive 
relocation scenarios. In addition, recent developments within the regime complement this 
prima facie beneficial characteristic, as the scientific- and economy-driven rationales that 
originally grounded it are now being progressively diluted in favour of a perspective more 
inclusive of the ‘human face’ of climate change. This slow and delicate shift is becoming 
particularly visible through the changing evaluation and quantification conducted by the 
relevant institutions of the regime in the context of climate change adaptation measures. The 
most prominent example of such a ‘humanization move’ can thus be found in the criteria used 
by the IPCC when measuring climate change impacts in the most vulnerable countries. 
Particularly since the publication of the IPCC’s 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, comprehensive 
                                                          
920
 S. KRASNER (ed.), International Regimes, 1983, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), who defined 
regimes as ‘a set of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’. 
921
 For an overall view on the influence exerted by small island States in different international fora 
where their interests were involved, see J. GROTE, The Changing Tides of Small Island States Discourse: a 
Historical Overview of the Appearance of Small Island States in the International Arena, pp. 164-191 
922
 S. McINERNEY-LANKFORD, M. DARROW and L. RAJAMANI, supra, at 53. 
923
 Ibid.  
924
 Perhaps one of the most visible examples of the ‘global goods perspective’ on which the climate 
change regime is based can be found in the last paragraph of the UNFCCC Preamble, which reads ‘[The 
Parties to this Convention] Determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations’. 
925
 Ibid., at 47.[Emphasis added]. 
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social and community-based approaches have an increasingly more prominent place in the 
considerations of what the IPCC actually considers as climate change impacts.926 All in all, the 
idea that environmental degradation may interfere with the enjoyment of human rights – or 
become a great obstacle to the realization of such rights – is progressively being acknowledged 
in the international regime on climate change. This move will be referred to as the 
incorporation of a human rights approach to international climate change co-operation, taking 
the lead over the alternative strict approaches that argue in favour of inter-regime synergies 
between human rights and climate change ‘law’ (understood in a formal sense). 
As a corollary to the acknowledgement that environmental degradation may interfere 
with human rights, measures seeking to halt or diminish the impacts of climate change are 
increasingly considered as factors facilitating the realization and enjoyment of such rights. 
Specific application of the human rights approach to climate change adaptation can thus be 
found, as the ‘articulation of the relationship between adaptation and human development or 
human welfare’ is being promoted by the institutions of the human rights regime. The five 
Pacific Island States listed as Least-Developed Countries have conducted such articulation 
mainly by mainstreaming human rights, human welfare and human development all together 
during the elaboration of their Nationally Appropriate Plans of Adaptation. From a substantive 
perspective, one of the main manifestations of the link between adaptation and human 
development is that their NAPAs are primarily directed towards the preservation of the 
populations’ basic survival needs. It has also resulted in the incorporation by Pacific Island 
States, other than the five LDCs, of climate disaster management in both development and 
adaption programmes, such as the Joint Action Plans mentioned in Section 2 of this chapter. 
From a procedural perspective, the mainstreaming of these three human-centred pillars and 
spreading the application of common procedural standards, particularly the right of local 
communities to be informed and actively participate in climate-change adaptation planning, 
are desirable. Bottom-up approaches are therefore favoured, so as to reinforce the legitimacy 
of NAPAs while also potentially improving the effective implementation at the local level of 
adaptation actions financed by the climate-change institutions.  
The mention of local communities suggests that climate change law does not just 
permit articulating a protection to the socio-economic rights of individuals. Group rights can 
also find some level of normative protection in preventive relocation scenarios through the 
climate change regime, which may not even be found in international human rights treaties. 
                                                          
926
 See Chapter 2 above, Introduction.   
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Indeed, consideration of the rights of future generations is contemplated by the UNFCCC, 
whereas they have never been mentioned in the human rights framework. This point is 
particularly relevant for the next scenario (reactive relocation actions), as the descendants of 
the present generation may be deprived of the original or traditional location of their families 
and thereby suffer from irreversible cultural harm.927  
All in all, we can conclude that, in preventive relocation scenarios, international human 
rights treaty law (in particular, the ICESCRs) is of very limited applicability in the Pacific and thus 
ill-suited to provide a normative basis for Pacific islanders to claim specific actions from their 
respective governments directed towards the preservation of their habitability conditions. Yet, 
the preservation of their basic survival needs, in danger of being harmed by climate change 
impacts, can be ensured through compliance with legal obligations under the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol. The progressive incorporation of a human rights approach in the institutional 
practices of the climate change regime implies that some socio-economic rights of Pacific 
islanders are positively affected.928 To be sure, this by-product or ‘positive externality’ could be 
criticized for not being grounded in a concrete legal provision of the climate change regime. It 
is, however, compensated by the fact that the non-ratification of the most relevant 
international human rights instrument by Pacific Island States does not erase the obligations of 
all other States Parties to the Convention to co-operate in the promotion of human rights. 
Although such obligation is limited, it could arguably constitute (along with Article 4 of 
UNFCCC) a basis for Pacific islanders to claim a right to get their climate change adaptation 
plans financed.  
 
4.1.2. Legal Framework in a Reactive Phase: Recognition of Housing, Land and Property Rights  
 
Fragmented Applicability of Human Rights Instruments with Specialized Scope 
 
Efforts to protect basic survival needs of human settlements vulnerable to climate 
change impacts may not be sufficient to prevent individuals or groups of persons from 
                                                          
927
 International Law protects specific groups, particularly indigenous peoples, after the adoption of 
General Assembly Resolution 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
13 September 2007 and the ILO Convention nº 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, which do not necessarily constitute the affected communities of 
the Pacific region described in Table 1. Hence, specific protection that international human rights law 
could have eventually given is not really relevant to the cases so far studied. Only the specific protection 
of the Convention against Racial Discrimination could be relevant to the Polynesian minority of the 
Papuan islanders, who may soon have to suffer the same fate as their neighboring Carteret Islanders 
and will most probably find even more obstacles to access new lands than the Carteret Islanders.  
928
 Although subject to a high level of internal implementation and effectiveness of adaptation plans and 
programmes, which falls outside the scope of this thesis.   
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displacement. In such circumstances, referred to in this chapter as the ‘reactive’ stage, Pacific 
island governments are called upon to take measures directed at the relocation of part of their 
respective populations to a different location falling under the government’s jurisdiction or 
effective control. When seeking to determine the content of an international legal framework 
for national reactive relocation actions, the set of rights of Pacific islanders to housing, land and 
property (HLP rights) is undoubtedly the first call for a closer examination. As S. Leckie and C. 
Huggins recall, there is no single international legal instrument specifically dealing with 
housing, land and property rights.929 Thus, rather than considering them as constituting an area 
of specialization in international law, it is a crosscutting issue dealt with in numerous 
international sources of law. Some instruments recognize them as ‘self-standing’ human rights. 
Others do not single them out autonomously, but regard them as an element of the more 
general right to an ‘adequate standard of living’ (which also encompasses most of the 
economic, social and cultural rights referred to in the ‘preventive’ stage). In this context, the 
violation of HLP rights may thus be considered as a continuous violation of basic rights, such as 
the right to water, which, according to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
General Comment nº 15, is ‘inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health (Art.12, paragraph 1) and the rights to adequate housing and adequate food (Art 11, 
paragraph 1).’930 
Interestingly, focusing on the level of normative recognition of HLP rights in the Pacific 
implies in fact approaching the territorial dimension of the State, which was the object of the 
previous chapter, albeit from a different angle. HLP rights address the issue of ‘de-
territorialization’, but from the perspective of the individual, which generally falls under the 
domain of private law in western systems. This is perhaps the point where the connection 
between the two challenges inspiring the titles of chapters 4 and 5 is more visibly evident: de- 
territorialization affects the territorial pillar of the State and, by the same token, impinges upon 
the HLP rights of its population. While the right to adequate housing is rather uncontroversial 
and can be commonly found in international instruments, land and property rights tend to 
remain unaffected by international law, for the land tenure and property systems of a State or 
government may be a reflection of its ideological disposition. In addition to this characteristic, 
successive waves of colonization and administration by different foreign powers in the Pacific 
resulted in a very complex housing, land and property systems. These are the real sources and 
                                                          
929
 See S. LECKIE and C. HUGGINS, Conflict and Housing, Land and Property Rights: a Handbook on Issues, 
Frameworks and Solutions, 2011, (New York: Cambridge University Press).  
930
 CESCR, General Comment nº 15 on the Right to Water 2003, comment nº 7:  
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causes of the heterogeneity of reactive relocation actions depicted in section 1 of this chapter, 
impeding any sort of generalized legal protection scheme for the region. 
Both the preventive and the reactive relocation phases share the same relevant regime 
of international law, albeit the rights and obligations involved differ in each relocation phase. 
Thus, there are five international human rights instruments relevant to reactive relocation 
scenarios: two general instruments – the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPRs) and the previously mentioned International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCRs); and three instruments specifically designed to protect certain groups of 
people – the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the 
Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Despite the fact that the reactive phase is better suited to the 
design of the human rights legal framework than the prevention phase, its applicability 
remains, once again, subject to the ratification of the instruments in question, as summarized 
in Table 6, below. 
 
TABLE 6. Ratification by Pacific Island States of Human rights Treaties Relevant to the 
Reactive Relocation Phase 
 
 ICCPR 
(1966) 
ICESCR 
(1966) 
CERD 
(1965) 
CEDAW 
(1979) 
CRC 
(1989) 
CV O.P. 1 CV O.P. CV O.P. 
FSM NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Fiji NO NO NO NO YES YES(R) NO YES 
Kiribati NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Nauru NO SIGNED NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Marshall Is NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Palau NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
PNG YES NO YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Samoa YES NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Solomon Is NO NO YES(R) SIGNED YES YES YES YES 
Tonga NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Tuvalu NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Vanuatu YES NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
 
Source: Personal Elaboration Based on United Nations Treaty Series Database931 
 
As explained by S. Leckie and C. Huggins, the most significant articulation of the right to 
housing – considered as part of the larger right to an adequate standard of living, but also as an 
                                                          
931
 CV = Convention; OP = Optional Protocol; R =signed with reservations. 
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independent and freestanding right-932, can be found in Article 11(1) of the ICESCRs, which 
provides that States Parties to the Convention ‘recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and 
to the continuous improvement of living conditions.’933 In 1991, the CESCR enumerated the 
seven components of such a right (including ‘cultural adequacy’).934 It also stated that the right 
to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense, but should be read as the 
right to ‘live somewhere in security, peace and dignity’.935 Besides, although the nature of HLP 
rights implies that they are in principle classified in the economic, social and cultural rights 
basket, S. Leckie and C. Huggins note that the ICCPR – in particular Articles 4 and 17 – is 
increasingly being used to enforce housing rights, as homelessness is increasingly recognized as 
a threat factor in – or even a violation of – the right to life, while forced evictions are 
considered as contravening the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference within 
the home.936 Despite the fact that these formal sources of law could be a useful starting point 
for the fulfilment of a legal protection scheme in reactive relocation scenarios of Pacific 
islanders, their applicability remains rather limited, given that only two States – Papua New 
Guinea and the Solomon Islands – have ratified the ICESCR, while three – Papua New Guinea, 
Vanuatu and Samoa – have ratified the ICCPR.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that HLP rights are also contained in other human rights 
treaties aimed at the protection of particularly vulnerable groups (minorities, women and 
children). Article 5(e)(iii) of the CERD expressly prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights, and in particular of the right to housing, and compliance 
with such a provision is monitored by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
                                                          
932
 S. LECKIE and C. HUGGINS, supra, at 60.  
933
 See CESCR, General Comment nº 4, ‘The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the Covenant)’, 
1991, paragraph 3, which states that: ‘Although a wide variety of international instruments address the 
different dimensions of the right to adequate housing Article 11(1) of the Covenant is the most 
comprehensive and perhaps the most important of the relevant provisions.’ [Emphasis added]. 
934
 Ibid. paragraph 7: ‘[T]his "the inherent dignity of the human person" from which the rights in the 
Covenant are said to derive requires that the term "housing" be interpreted so as to take account of a 
variety of other considerations, most importantly that the right to housing should be ensured to all 
persons irrespective of income or access to economic resources. Secondly, the reference in Article 11(1) 
must be read as referring not just to housing but to adequate housing. As both the Commission on 
Human Settlements and the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 have stated: "Adequate shelter 
means ... adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, 
adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities - all at a 
reasonable cost’.[Emphasis added]. 
935
 Ibid.  
936
 LECKIE and HUGGINS, supra, at 61. 
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Racial Discrimination.937 Likewise, Article 14 of the CEDAW protects the rights of rural women 
to adequate housing – along with sanitation, electricity, water supply, transport and 
communications – and compliance with such provision is monitored by the CEDAW Committee. 
Although the level of ratification of the CERD is as low as the previous ‘general’ 
international human rights treaties (three ratifications, by Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga); 
the CEDAW has eight Pacific Island States Parties – Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tuvalu; while the CRC enjoys 
full ratification by Pacific Island States. To be sure, the CEDAW and the CRC do not cover the 
population of Pacific Island States, as a whole. Yet, given that the proportion of children and 
women in the population of the Pacific islands is high to very high, the extended applicability of 
the CEDAW and CRC Conventions is very important and may actually provide the core content 
of the legal protection scheme for reactive relocation actions in the Pacific.  
 
Complementary ‘Soft Law’ Normative Standards? 
 
Moreover, these meagre – yet existing – formal sources of law protecting the HLP rights of 
Pacific islanders, which serves as the basis for governmental policies, is complemented by non-
binding human rights standards. Other than Articles 17 and 25(1) of the United National 
Declaration on Human Rights – which include the right to housing and property exercised 
individually or in association with others – most international legal literature concerned with 
climate-induced displacement pays special attention to the 2005 Guiding Principles on 
Internally Displaced People (hereafter, the Guiding Principles). This instrument sets standards 
analogous to those of refugee law, for cases where the displacement and relocation have taken 
place within the boundaries of the State. The standards contained therein serve as a guide to 
governments, international organizations and all other relevant actors, in providing assistance 
and protection to internally displaced people through identification of the rights and 
guarantees relevant to the different phases of displacement (that is, assistance during 
displacement as well as guarantees for resettlement). Although the Guiding Principles are 
essentially for armed-conflict contexts, they also encompass cases of internal displacement 
                                                          
937
 Ibid. Article 5(e)(iii) of the CERD reads: ‘In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in 
Article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in 
all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or 
ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:[…] (e) 
economic, social and cultural rights, in particular: […] iii) the right to housing’. 
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generated by ‘natural disasters’.938 Perhaps, b y having an overoptimistic and exaggerated idea 
of the scope of the Guiding Principles, some scholars have seen in them an important roadmap 
from which a legal protection (through formal or informal means) to climate-induced displaced 
people could and should be elaborated. For instance, Roger Zetter (former Director of the 
Centre for Refugee Studies, at the University of Oxford) considered that ‘pending further 
research and consensus-building towards specific new norms or institutions’, the Guiding 
Principles might be seen as ‘not just a starting point, but also a model for the process of 
aggregating and adapting the norms and principles from a wide range of international 
instruments to protect the rights of the ‘environmentally displaced’.939  
Yet, the limits of this instrument and the essential differences between displacements 
fostered by internal armed conflict and those generated by natural disasters or any sort of 
environmental stress and degradation should not be underestimated. S. Leckie and C. Huggins 
rightly raise this point and defend the need ‘for a separate set of guidelines on land and natural 
disasters’.940 Indeed, concerns over HLP rights in cases of climate-induced displacement do not 
match post-conflict situations. More precisely, issues of repatriation, return or eviction of 
second occupants are not relevant in climate-induced relocation scenarios. Rather, the focus in 
these situations is on issues pertaining to the means and possibilities of acquisition of new 
land, as well as the safety and sustainability and cultural adequacy of, and community 
participation in, the relocation to such lands, along with the need to avoid discrimination of 
minority and gender groups in their access to the new lands. 
In contrast, two other main ‘soft law’ instruments already existing may be better suited 
to serve as a model for protection of climate-induced displaced people (although the ‘urgency’ 
present in these reports does not always match the progressive nature of the deterioration of 
the habitability conditions due to climate change impacts): the 2006 Operational Guidelines on 
Human Rights and Natural Disasters,941 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, as well as the 2007 
UN-HABITAT, Scoping Report on ‘Addressing Land Issues after Natural Disasters’.942 This path has 
                                                          
938
 See W. KÄLIN, Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced People: Annotations, (2008) Studies in 
Transnational Legal Policy (American Society of International Law), vol. 38 
939
 McINERNEY-LANKFORD, DARROW and RAJAMANI, supra, at 64. 
940
 LECKIE and HUGGINS, supra, at 144.  
941
 UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters: Operational 
Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, Brookings-Bern Project, June 2006 (Washington, 
D.C.: IASC); followed by the Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in 
Situations of Natural Disaster, Brookings-Bern Project, Pilot version March 2008, (Washington, D.C.: 
IASC)  
942
 D. FITZPATRICK, ‘Scoping Report: Addressing Land Issues after Natural Disasters’ (2007) (UN-
HABITAT; United Nations Settlement Programme). 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
348 
 
been recently taken by the Regional Office for the Pacific of the OHCHR, which organized in 
2007 a regional workshop on ‘Integrating Human Rights in National Disaster Management’943 
and more recently published a report on ‘Protecting HRs of Internally Displaced People by 
Natural Disasters: Challenges in the Pacific’.944  
As opposed to the preventive relocation scenario, whereby the UNFCCC was 
considered as relevant to the preservation of Pacific islanders’ habitability conditions, no 
international environmental legal instrument is relevant as a formal source of HLP rights.945 
However, instead of considering it as a formal source of rights and obligations, the UNFCCC 
could be useful in reactive relocation scenarios as a means to enforced HLP rights and 
associated basic rights, particularly as an effective and reliable source of funding. This would 
constitute the reverse scenario to the one described for the preventive relocation phase, 
whereby the main formal source of law was international environmental law (due to low level 
of ratification of the ICESCR) and human rights approaches serve to inform the best forms of 
carrying out climate change obligations.  
 
4.2. Endangered Statehood? Transnational Climate-Induced Displacements between Pacific 
Island States  
 
 Most climate-induced displacements currently take place within the boundaries of a 
State. Yet, as the deterioration of the habitability conditions of Pacific Island States becomes 
more stringent and the sustainability of the places within the country less exposed to climate 
change impacts (such as higher lands or urban centres) reached its limit, the prospects of 
transnational climate-induced displacements will undoubtedly be confirmed. In fact, migration 
of islanders (individuals or families rather than whole communities) coming from Tuvalu and 
                                                          
943
 See the Regional Workshop on ‘Integrating Human Rights into National Disaster Management’ (9–11 
May 2007), in Suva, Fiji. The purpose of this workshop was to increase the awareness and skills of UN 
and other staff involved in disaster-relief and recovery operations on the relevance of human rights 
issues in disaster management (in particular, the UN Disaster Management Team and Pacific UNDAC 
[UN Disaster Assessment & Co-ordination]) and develop a human rights check-list, specific to the Pacific, 
to be used by all concerned actors in situations of humanitarian emergencies to ensure that human 
rights concerns are effectively incorporated into natural-disaster preparedness, response and recovery. 
944
 OHCHR, ‘Ratification of Human rights Treaties in the Pacific’, supra. 
945
 Only Agenda 21, a non-binding legal instrument adopted at the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, makes reference to housing, land and property 
lands. Chapter 7.6 recalls that the right to adequate housing is a basic human right enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICESCR and considers that access to a safe and healthy 
shelter is essential to a person’s physical, psychological, social and economic wellbeing and should be a 
fundamental part of national and international action. Besides, Chapter 7.9(b) states that countries 
should adopt and/or strengthen national shelter strategies, while Chapter 7.30(f) provides that 
countries should consider developing national land-resource management plans to guide land-resources 
development and utilization and, to that end, establish appropriate forms of land tenure.  
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Kiribati – the two States with a highly reduced margin of internal relocation, due to their 
geographical configuration – to other island States, as well as to Australia and New Zealand, 
have already been documented. Table 7 shows the level of ratification of the core instruments 
composing the three special regimes potentially applicable in cases of transnational climate-
related relocations. Firstly, the relevance and applicability of refugee law – consisting of the 
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol – and international migration 
law – essentially consisting of the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families – will be dealt with in scenarios of partial de-
population. Then, as the possible extinction of some Pacific islands’ statehood following total 
de-population and de-territorialization is anticipated, the regime on statelessness may become 
relevant.  
 Transnational climate-induced relocations bear two additional elements of complexity. 
Firstly, by definition, transnational relocations imply a plurality of possible ‘duty bearers’, as the 
territoriality and jurisdiction of at least two States – the State of origin and the State of arrival 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘host’ State) – are involved. The movement of the individual 
leaving his/her country of citizenship to enter another State and become part of the shadowy 
category of ‘alien’ is viewed by international law as a transition towards a situation of increased 
weakness and potential defencelessness. Thus, the focus of international legal regimes relevant 
to international migration cases is primarily on the treatment that the alien residence-seeker 
(whether migrant worker or statutory refugee) receives on entering and eventually settling in a 
territory subject to the jurisdiction of a State that is new to the migrant. The State of origin is 
somehow left behind by international law, which accompanies the migrant from the moment 
of departure, closely follows his/her steps until the point of arrival and then remains vigilant of 
the treatment received thereafter under the jurisdiction of the host State.946 Whereas such a 
‘behavioural characteristic’ of the international legal order does not conflict with partial 
depopulation scenarios, it makes it very ill-fitted, and this calls for thorough re-examination as 
the prospects of total depopulation scenarios are anticipated. The second source of complexity 
lies in the characterization of the overall context in which climate-related displacements take 
place, since these are so much akin to situations of conflict that an extension of the regulation 
could be justified. Such debate informs the applicability of many of the international legal 
regimes relevant to cases of transnational climate-related relocations, which depends not only 
                                                          
946
 The idea that the State of origin is ignored by international law once the refugee has crossed the 
border is nevertheless subject to the exception of the right of return. See E. HADDAD, ‘The Refugee: the 
Individual between Sovereigns’, (2003) Global Society, vol. 17, pp. 297-232. 
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on the ratification rate of the countries concerned, but also on the conceptual definitions that 
raise controversy both from a legal and a policy perspective.  
 
TABLE 7. Ratification by Pacific States (including Australia and New Zealand) of International 
Treaties Relevant to Transnational Depopulation Scenarios 
 
 Refugee Status Statelessness  
 
Migrant 
Workers 
CV Protocol Status CV Reduction CV 
Australia YES YES (D) YES YES NO 
Cook Islands NO NO NO NO NO 
FSM  NO NO NO NO NO 
Fiji YES (R) YES YES (R) NO NO 
Kiribati NO NO YES (R) YES NO 
New Zealand YES (R)  YES NO YES NO 
Nauru YES YES NO NO NO 
Marshall Is. NO NO NO NO NO 
Palau NO NO NO NO SIGNED 
PNG YES (R) YES NO NO NO 
Samoa YES YES NO NO NO 
Solomon Is. YES YES NO NO NO 
Tonga NO NO NO NO NO 
Tuvalu YES (R) YES NO NO NO 
Vanuatu NO NO NO NO NO 
 
 
4.2.1. Legal Framework for Ongoing Partial De-population Scenarios: International Refugee and 
Migration Law and Complementary Human rights Treaty Law 
 
International Refugee Law and International Migration Law: Searching for a Legal Status to 
Access and Settle in a Foreign State 
 
Migration issues have traditionally been subject to the discretionary power of 
sovereign entities, and States are in principle free to decide on the conditions of entry and 
residence of aliens in their territory. Yet, for humanitarian purposes, international law, under 
certain circumstances, limits this discretional margin of appreciation.947 Refugee law 
constitutes the most stringent curtailment of a State’s sovereign power over migration issues, 
and offers the most comprehensive quality of protection that the refugee regime can afford in 
                                                          
947
 McADAM, International Law, Forced Migration and Climate Change, supra. 
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terms of certitude, scope and level of rights afforded to its beneficiaries.948 Being aware of this 
fact, international scholars quickly examined its possible applicability to situations of climate-
related displacement.949 Thus, its relevance for climate-displaced Pacific islanders merits 
examination. 
Refugee law comes into play when the State of origin is unable or unwilling to offer 
protection to its population,950 which correlatively implies that the responsibility of the host 
State towards an asylum seeker is engaged. As Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen puts it, ‘the 
refugee is poised squarely between these two conceptions of sovereignty: sovereignty as 
freedom and sovereignty as responsibility’,951 the biggest expression and justification of such 
limitation of sovereign powers being embodied in the principle of non-refoulement recognized 
in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. Although the refugee status is only declaratory and 
not constitutive – thereby offering a certain level of control by the host State – Article 33 
implies that, once the refugee status has been granted to the asylum seeker, the host State has 
the obligation not to return the alien to his/her State of origin. Such a curtailment of the host 
State’s discretionary power is nevertheless ‘compensated’ by a set of strict conditions 
necessary to the granting of refugee status (in particular, the need to prove the threat of 
individual persecution by the State of origin),952 and justified by the humanitarian context and 
purpose that underlie the regime. The principle of non-refoulement would undoubtedly offer 
an important advantage to climate-displaced people, as their permanence in the territory of 
the host State would be protected from any eventual changes in migration policy, and yet the 
right to return to their State of origin – if habitable at all – remains formally preserved. Also, 
once the refugee status is granted and the right not to be returned to the State of origin is 
engaged, a wider set of socio-economic, civil and political rights to refugees associated with the 
living conditions in the host State comes into play. Such a set of rights is granted ‘en bloc’ along 
with the status of refugee, but the enjoyment of this status by the beneficiaries depends on the 
                                                          
948
 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and he Globalization of State 
Control, 2012 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), at 30, who refers to the existence of a 
‘protection lite’, different from other standards with ‘the presence of formal protection but with lower 
degree of certainty about the scope and/or level of rights afforded’.  
949
 McADAM, International Law, Forced Migration and Climate Change, supra, chapter 2.  
950
 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra. 
951
 Ibid. 
952
 See Section 3.1 of this chapter above. Conditions have been interpreted more strictly by national 
tribunals, particularly after the end of the Cold War.  
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level of attachment a refugee demonstrates to a given country.953 Thus, ‘durable residents’ 
enjoy more sophisticated civil and political rights and may have better access to social benefits 
than others.954 The right to adequate housing, provided for in Article 21 of the Refugee 
Convention, entails an obligation for States Parties to accord refugees lawfully staying within 
their territories treatment ‘as favorable as possible’ along with a non-discrimination rule as, in 
any event, such treatment shall not be ‘less favorable than that accorded to aliens generally in 
the same circumstances’. As all these potential benefits the refugee regime could offer to 
climate-displaced people are laid down, the question that arises is whether the regime is 
applicable in the Pacific, both from a geographical and a material perspective.  
Table 7 shows that both the Refugee Convention and its Protocol have been ratified by six 
Pacific Island States – Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, Nauru, Samoa and the Solomon Islands – 
which is a rather high ratification rate when compared with the level of ratification of human 
rights treaties in general (ICESCRs and the ICCPR) dealt with above. Yet, given that the refugee 
regime is solely concerned with aliens and not a State’s own subjects, such a fact is not 
meaningful per se. The only relevant ratification to be considered is that of potential host 
States, rather than the Pacific Island States of origin, such as Tuvalu or Kiribati.955 The crucial 
point therefore is that the two regional powers and main potential host States of climate-
displaced islanders, Australia and New Zealand, have also ratified the Refugee Convention and 
its Protocol.  
Yet, the unproblematic geographical applicability of international refugee law in the most 
relevant countries of the Pacific contrasts with the highly controversial extension of the 
Convention’s material scope to cover cases of climate-related displacement. To be sure, the 
traditional paradigm of refugee law is currently challenged by new factual realities that have 
transformed the ‘asylum-seeking experience’. T. Gammeltoft-Hansen has, for instance, 
dedicated a thorough study to the measures of migration control set up before arrival in the 
host State and often carried out by private actors, and questions whether such a shift in 
location and actors for the encounter between the refugee and the host State is accompanied 
by an equal de jure shift in the scope of international refugee law.956 Climate-related 
                                                          
953
 T. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra, at 28, who explains that ‘this incremental approach reflects a 
seemingly sensible concern of the drafters not to extend the full scope of rights immediately in situations 
where refugees may arrive spontaneously in large numbers’.  
954
 Ibid.  
955
 Ibid., at 25, who explains that refugee law is ‘international’ in so far as ‘refugee protection is not 
guaranteed in a global homogeneous juridical space, but materializes as a patchwork of commitments 
undertaken by individual states tied together by multilateral treaty agreements’. 
956
 Ibid., at 231, cases referred to by this author as 'offshore and outsourcing migration’.  
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displacement equally challenges the refugee regime – for instance, by promoting rather forced 
re-examinations of the boundaries of the persecution criterion and questioning the relevance 
of the regime in cases of mass influxes – to such an extent that it leads to the rather useless 
definitional impasse already detailed in section 3.1 of this chapter. As a result, Australian and 
New Zealand courts have consistently denied the refugee status to Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati who 
claimed to be ‘climate refugees’. In fact, as J. McAdam points out, not even the existence of a 
special category of ‘environmentally displaced people’ has so far been acknowledged by 
national judges of the two regional powers.957 Thus, the direct applicability of the Refugee 
Convention does not seem possible – at least in partial de-population scenarios – although, as 
Jane McAdam rightly suggests, some of the ‘conceptual constructs’ of the refugee regime may 
be usefully transposed to a future regulation of climate-related displacement.958   
Considering the difficult applicability of the refugee regime to cases of climate-related 
displacement in the Pacific – particularly due to the lack of fulfilment of the ‘persecution 
criterion’ – international migration law appears as the second alternative international regime 
limiting the freedom of States to decide migration issues within their territory and possibly 
applicable to climate-related displacement of Pacific islanders. The first advantage of relying on 
this regime is that it seemingly matches the will of Pacific islanders and of their authorities to 
avoid the victimization and degrading effect of being labelled as ‘refugees’. President Anote 
Tong’s declaration, reproduced in the chapeau to the present chapter, is a striking and clear 
expression of this apprehension.959 Moreover, it is also consistent with the policy practice 
already existing in the region, whereby several working migration schemes already detailed in 
Section 2.2 of this chapter – such as the New Zealand Pacific Access Category or the Australian 
Pacific Immigration Scheme – have been agreed between the regional powers and Tuvalu, 
Kiribati and Tonga.960  
The general preference of Pacific islanders’ themselves to be considered under the general 
                                                          
957
 See, for instance, New Zealand and Australian cases where claimant’s demand to receive refugee 
protection for climate-change impacts was rejected. New Zealand cases: Refugee Appeal 72719/2001, 
RSAA (17 September 2001) – (Tuvaluan claimaint); Refugee Appeal 72313/2000, RSAA (19 October 
2000) – (Tuvaluant claimant); Refugee Appeal 72314/2000, RSAA (19 October 2000) – (Tuvaluan 
claimant); Australian cases: 10004726[2010] RRTA 845 (30 September 2010) – (Tongan claimant); 
0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168 (10 December 2009) – (I-Kiribati claimant); N00/34089 [2000] RRTA 1052 (17 
November 2000) – (Tuvaluan claimant). All cited in J. McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Displacement 
and International Law, supra, footnote nº43, at 47.  
958
 In particular, refugee law recognizes anticipatory flight (fear must be plausible and reasonable 
according to jurisprudence). 
959
 The ‘denial’ approach to the scope of climate change impacts and its real jeopardizing effects on the 
survival of Tuvalu’s statehood is stressed in F. GEMENNE and S. SHEN, supra.  
960
 See Section 2 of this Chapter above.  
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category of economic migrant workers, coupled with the existing regional State practice, raises 
the question of whether they could benefit from the formal protection offered by the 1990 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families. While this instrument does not facilitate the access to the territory of host 
States, as the Refugee Convention does, it nonetheless sets minimum standards on the 
treatment that immigrant workers have the right to receive once they have been granted 
working and residence (whether temporary or permanent) permits by the host State. Article 
43(1) of the Migrant Workers Convention, for instance, declares the right of all migrant workers 
to equality of treatment with nationals of the State of employment in relation to basic socio-
economic rights, such as access to housing – including social schemes – and protection against 
exploitation in respect of rents. Unfortunately, the Convention does not serve as a formal 
source of such rights, for it has not been ratified by any State of the Pacific, including the two 
regional powers.961Therefore, other than the eventual possible applicability of specialized 
Conventions of the International Labour Organization, which generally have a low level of 
ratification,962 the treatment and conditions of entry of Pacific islanders and workers into 
Australia and New Zealand (as well as in other Pacific Island States less threatened by climate 
change impacts) largely depends on these State’s public statutory and case law.  
 
Complementary Role of Human Rights Treaty Law: Ensuring Basic Rights and Minimum 
Standards during and after Settlement in the Host State  
 
In spite of the limited applicability of international refugee law from a material perspective 
and of international migration law from a geographical perspective, as possible formal sources 
of rights of climate-related displaced Pacific islanders, human rights treaty law remains valid as 
a general and complementary relevant regime. First, there is the doctrinal movement in favour 
of reconceiving or reconsidering international refugee law as a specialized area within the 
realm of human rights.963 Such a move would imply a return of the focus on the State of origin, 
generally absent in the refugee regime, as already pointed out above. It involves the extension 
of protection obligations to States without a territorial link with the refugee, in particular with 
the State of origin, to end ‘persecution’, and to potential aid donors for providing support to 
                                                          
961
 As shown in Table 6, only Palau has signed the Migrant Workers Convention.  
962
 The only example of a relevant ILO convention could be the 1958 ILO Convention nº 110, Concerning 
Plantations, Article 88(1) of which establishes that, where housing is provided by the employer, the 
conditions under which plantation workers are entitled to occupancy shall be not less favorable than 
those established by national custom or national legislation. 
963
 See for instance J. HATHAWAY, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, 2005, (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press). 
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the host States.964 Secondly, irrespective of whether such a path is followed or not, the 
geographical applicability of the two human rights covenants in Australia and New Zealand – 
although still very poorly ratified by Pacific Island States – could serve as a source of general 
socio-economic rights and family rights for Pacific islanders and their families settled and/or 
working in these two regional powers, such as the right of the family unit. Regarding the State 
of origin – and although the obligation to stop persecution would not be applicable in this case 
– the docket of climate-displaced peoples’ rights could include the conventional right of free 
movement of its population – implying the right to travel and have access to appropriate travel 
documents965 – and, most importantly, the right to return, for citizens as well as stateless aliens 
with a long-term residence attachment to the State, which is generally being recognized as a 
customary international rule.  
 
4.2.2. Legal Framework for Prospective Total De-population Scenarios: From Homelessness to 
Statelessness?  
 
The scenario whereby the whole population of a State affected by climate change impacts 
relocates elsewhere is nowadays only a projection. Yet, since the speech delivered in 2008 by 
the former President of the Maldives, in which he announced the creation of a public fund 
from tourist revenues which would finance the purchase of lands in neighbouring countries, so 
as to resettle all its population abroad, it became a solid a paradigm of the real challenge that 
low-lying developing island States are facing in a relatively short time span. After its inception 
in the Indian Ocean, the idea that such a bad dream is slowly becoming a reality also reached 
the Pacific. Recently, the media spread the news that Kiribati’s President, Anote Tong, was 
conducting negotiations with Fijian private landowners for the purchase of land in Viti Levu 
(Fiji’s main island). Although anticipated, and to some extent imagined, it is essential to note 
how such a scenario would affect the legal protection scheme of transnational climate-related 
displacements set out above. 
The main consequence of the total de-population of a State is that it implies turning the 
focus of attention back to the State of origin. As previously indicated, the existence of the State 
of origin in international refugee law, international migration law and international human 
rights law is presumed. Thus, while the State of origin is not the focus of normative attention 
                                                          
964
 T. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra. 
965
 The right of free movement includes the right to travel and have access to appropriate travel 
documents and is bound by a non-discrimination rule, yet can be limited on grounds of national security, 
public order, public health or morals and protection of rights and freedoms of others.  
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under these three regimes, its presence is taken for granted and has an impact on some of the 
core obligations of the host State – such as the obligation of ‘non-refoulement’. However, the 
total de-population of a Pacific island State significantly threatens the continuation of its 
Statehood. The extinction of the State could indeed occur at two different moments. The first 
moment would be before total submergence of the territory, that is, when the whole 
population leaves the inhabitable territory falling under the jurisdiction or effective control of 
the State in question. In this case, while the two ‘material elements of the State’ still exist and 
are tangible, the physical link between the population of a State and its territory would be 
broken. As previously indicated in Chapter 4, the continuation of the State in this scenario 
would depend on the recognition that the total de-population of a State does not imply its 
disappearance, but that it constitutes a ‘population (and government) in exile’. The second 
moment would presumably arise at a later stage, after total submergence of the territory. The 
continuation of the State in this case would involve the recognition or creation of a legal 
construct (akin to the Holy See or the Order of Malta, ‘non-State sovereign entities). As these 
are facts that do not have real precedents in international law, the means by which the 
situation is resolved and the status of the endangered Pacific islands both fall outside the realm 
of law. Irrespective of the undeniable impact that the disappearance of a material element of a 
State would have on the continuation of its statehood, the fate of the State in both cases 
remains an outstanding issue that is, after all, resolved by political and informal – rather than 
legal and formal – elements of the international community. As will be seen in chapter 6, the 
capacity of the State at stake to defend its situation in international fora will possibly have an 
impact on how the international society resolves this issue. 
Although the issue remains outstanding, in the event that the statehood of the country of 
origin is considered extinct, the migrants in question would not be refugees or economic 
migrant workers, but potentially stateless people. Such an important change of status 
correlatively implies a set of obligations not only of the host State, but also of the international 
community as a whole and of certain international agencies. The Convention on the Status of 
Stateless Persons is therefore a potential avenue for prospective climate-related displaced 
people, which has been ratified by Kiribati and Australia (New Zealand ratified the Protocol on 
the Reduction of Statelessness). 
As the question of the continuation of statehood is raised, and its relation to the treatment 
and legal protection of its displaced population established, the shift from an individual (or 
family-community) towards a collective level of analysis seems necessary. Literature on 
peoples’ rights exploded in the 1970s and 1980s, as the right of peoples to self-determination 
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found a real framework of development.966 As the right to self-determination, understood 
collectively, was at the onset of the creation of what David Hume named ‘progressive 
nationalism’ of peoples fighting for freedom from colonization or administration by foreign 
powers, it becomes most relevant when the continuation of the same State is threatened. 
Arguably, a plea could be made in favour of considering that the collective right of survival of 
Pacific Island States that become totally de-populated is nothing but the ultimate – and 
perhaps capital – form of reaction against the post-modern forms of developed countries’ 
imperialism. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Closely connected with the looming de-territorialization described in Chapter 4, above, the 
primary manifestation of climate change impacts on the human dimension of Pacific Island 
States is the decrease of the habitability conditions of Pacific islanders. The paradigm reaction 
to the acute environmental stress suffered by the population of Pacific Island States is their 
displacement and consequent relocation to a different place where their basic survival needs 
may be met. Although such reaction seems, prima facie, the most common ultimate form of 
adaptation, with several previous examples in world history, the closer look at cases of 
accomplished relocation in the south-west Pacific taken in the present chapter has unveiled 
both the fundamental differences as well as the underlying complexities accompanying such a 
process in this specific region. First, actions conducted in the region seeking to preserve the 
habitability conditions of Pacific islanders, so as to prevent their resettlement, are rather 
similar and homogeneous among Pacific Island States, given that these governmental actions 
are organized, co-ordinated and even financed at a regional level and are closely linked to 
implementation measures stemming from the international regime on climate change and 
from international action on disaster risk-reduction. In contrast, when the display of such a 
range of preventive relocation actions cannot guarantee the maintenance of basic survival 
needs of the population, and Pacific islanders are forced to move, actions seeking to react to 
relocation scenarios differ widely from country to country and offer a highly heterogeneous 
landscape. These differences flourish as a result of socio-cultural, political and geographical 
factors encompassing, inter alia, the divergent levels of effective presence of the national 
government in their respective population’s daily life, the complexity of land-tenure systems, or 
the differences between relocations that remain within an agricultural setting from relocations 
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implying the move to an urban (and often already overpopulated) setting.  
As these root differences are unveiled, a critical approach to how climate-induced 
displacement has so far been dealt with in international legal scholarship becomes necessary. 
Although, in general, existing studies rightly diagnose the legal challenges – namely, the 
scarcity and inappropriateness of the existing legal instruments and institutions – the solutions 
proposed to overcome such challenges – creation of new legal instruments, development of 
existing instruments and institutions or inter-regime linkages – are either ill-suited or 
insufficient to address the inherent complexities of climate-induced displacement in the south-
west Pacific previously revealed. These are somehow top-down ‘universalist’ responses that do 
not respond to the existing real heterogeneity. Besides, and most importantly, the proposals 
made so far do not take into account the wider contextual variable in which relocations take 
place, and thus neglect or disregard the issue of the continuation of the State and how such an 
unresolved matter may greatly affect the responses to the problem of climate-induced 
displacements. 
As a result, this chapter has suggested a new framework for understanding and tackling the 
issue of climate-induced displacement, one that encompasses all stages of a relocation (both 
the prevention and reactive phases), distinguishes between relocation taking place at a 
national level from cross-border resettlements and, in doing so, relocates the issue within its 
wider context by associating it with the unresolved question of whether the continuation of the 
State in question may or may not be at stake. This question is in fact the real axis structuring 
the proposal to deal with climate-induced displacement through a multilayered legal 
protection scheme, and essentially highlights the fact that the fate of Pacific islanders and the 
eventual legal protection they may have cannot be detached from the fate of their State of 
origin. Then, when called upon to fill each stage of the multilayered legal protection scheme 
with concrete rights, some of the proposals most recurrently upheld in international legal 
scholarship also appear to be useless in this region. In cases of national displacements – which 
do not jeopardize the continuation of the State – the applicability of human rights treaty law is 
very limited, due to the low level of ratification of the ICESCR in this region. Yet, the 
development of a human rights approach may positively inform the implementation of 
international environmental legal instruments – in particular of the UNFCCC, which has been 
ratified by all Pacific Island States. National relocation in the reactive phase fundamentally 
alludes to the level of guarantee or protection of housing, land and property rights which – 
apart from being quite poorly recognized in international human rights treaty law – are mostly 
ruled by traditional customary systems that may generate significant obstacles for climate-
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induced displaced people to have access to new lands. On the one hand, in these cases, the 
housing, land and property rights of some minority groups (ethnic minorities, women and 
children) – may be covered by specialized human rights treaties which count with a higher level 
of ratification than the general instruments (ICESCR and the ICCPR). On the other hand, 
informal instruments, such as the Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Peoples, despite 
serving as an appropriate road map for future normative developments, are nevertheless not 
well suited to respond to displacements due to environmental – as opposed to conflict – 
causes. In cases of transnational relocations – which constitute the real looming threat to the 
continuation of Pacific island statehood – difficulties arise out of the multiplicity of relevant 
States involved (at least including the State of origin and the host State). Given that the 
moment in which the population of a State and its territory becomes formally discontinued is 
not settled, this chapter has differentiated between two main situations. In cases of partial de-
population, the applicability of refugee law to climate-induced displaced people has not been 
so far accepted by the national courts of the two potential host countries of the region – 
Australia and New Zealand; international migration treaty law, whose material scope of 
application is less specialized than that of the refugee regime, is yet not applicable in the 
region, given the lack of ratification. Finally, the prospects of having to deal with total de-
population scenarios of Pacific Island States (before the total de-territorialization actually takes 
place) has shown that, ultimately, the content of this multilayered legal protection scheme 
cannot, in these cases, be fixed or defined as long as the contextual issue – namely, whether 
and when the State becomes extinct – is resolved. The determination of the fate of the State 
challenged by high rates of, or total, de-population is a prerequisite of the determination of the 
eventual rights that climate-displaced people may have. Yet, the answer to this question lies 
outside the realm of law and forces us to come back to the blurred and slippery boundaries 
between international law and international life. 
Yet, despite the fact that this fundamental and structural question remains outstanding, 
one thing can be set clear. In all stages and scenarios covered by the multilayered legal 
protection scheme, the action and presence of the political dimension of the State is 
fundamental, for it is the government that organizes and finances preventive and, in some 
cases, reactive relocation actions; and it is also the government that is tasked with negotiating 
migration agreements with other countries, providing its citizens with travel documents, 
purchasing land in other countries and, ultimately, as detailed in Part I of this thesis, raising its 
voice and defending its cause before the international community. Hence, as the protection of 
the human dimension of the State is necessarily ensured by its political dimension, chapter 6 
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will finally be devoted to the effects of climate change impacts on the governmental capacity of 
Pacific Island States and the correlative power this dimension may have for the defence of the 
continuation of their statehood.  
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CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND PACIFIC ISLANDS’ GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY:  
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‘A remarkable feature of modern developments in the region of 
international law is an altogether novel tendency to regard nations as 
permanent and indestructible entities. As this does not usually 
correspond with facts, widespread friction and quarrels necessarily 
ensue. [T]he theoretical possibility of its [the State’s] depopulation or 
the total loss of its territory is hardly even of academic interest, but 
the loss of an effective government is altogether a different matter.’  
Tomas Baty, International Law in Twilight, 1933. 
 
‘Throughout its history, the development of international law has 
been influenced by the requirements of international life’ 
International Court of Justice, Reparations case, 1949. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Both the geographical and human dimensions of the State which have been made the 
object of study of the two preceding chapters may be seen as the paramount ‘material 
substratum’ of the State. As the metaphysical or immaterial State has not (yet) seen the light 
of day, territory and population clearly and prominently reveal how the State, as a political 
concept, nonetheless requires the existence of a physical basis through which such a concept 
can be materialized.967 The political dimension of the State, embodied in its government, is 
generally referred to as the third material criterion of statehood. It is also one with the 
potential to eclipse all other dimensions, as, for instance, Rosalyn Higgins (omitting any 
reference to the territory and population) considered that ‘if it is States who are leading 
actors, they find their physical manifestation in governments’.968 And indeed, there is a 
determinant quality of governments derived from the fact that States, as juridical persons, 
must act through organs.969 On the one hand, in the international sphere, governments are the 
agencies with exclusive and plenary competence to represent their respective States vis-à-vis 
other States or international organizations, irrespective of whether they are governments in 
situ or in exile.970 On the other hand, when it comes to a State’s ‘indoors’ action, governments 
                                                          
967
 This argument does not amount to an organic theory of the State (generally found in geopolitical 
studies), but simply seeks to point out the fact that the metaphysical State has not (yet) appeared as 
one of the possible expressions of statehood. 
968
 R. HIGGINS, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, 1994 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press), at 42.  
969
 German Settlers in Poland, (1923), Permanent Court of International Justice, Ser. B, nº 6, 1 at 22, 
cited in S. TALMON, Recognition of Governments in International Law (with Particular Reference to 
Governments in Exile), 1998, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), at 115.  
970
 Ibid. 
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are the engine and agency through which the State’s ruling power over its population and 
territory or its competences therein are displayed.  
Yet, the political dimension of the State does not simply refer to governments from the 
standpoint of the functional role they play; an additional element is encompassed in this 
dimension, which is what makes it distinct from the geographical and human dimensions of 
the State. Indeed, while serving as the material agency through which a State’s action operates 
indoors and outdoors, governments are also the depositories of the distinctive attribute of the 
State, namely, its sovereignty.971 Therefore, the political dimension of the State plays a 
particularly fundamental role vis-à-vis the other two dimensions; as the vehicle of sovereignty, 
the geographical and human dimensions are joined under a unifying umbrella so as to become 
part of the statist structure which, were it not for this distinctive attribute, would have simply 
constituted a decentralized territorial entity.972 From the fact that the political dimension of 
the State encompasses not only the organ through which the State acts, but also the quality 
enabling its differentiation from other forms of political organization, it follows that this 
dimension conflicts with, and necessarily leads to, incursions into the realm of power. Indeed, 
to begin with, sovereignty as a legal concept can be commonly defined as the ‘supreme power’ 
which, as Jean Salmon explains, is distinct from independence or political and economic power 
and applies equally to all States from the moment they acquire such a ‘statut étatique’, 
irrespective of the scope of their territory, the importance of their population, the form and 
nature of their government, or their autonomy or independence from third States.973 Norberto 
Bobbio further specifies that, although sovereignty does not exhaust power, it does capture 
the most significant and potentially dangerous form of concentration of power.974 Among the 
countless definitions of sovereignty that may be found in international legal scholarship, 
political theory and international relations, the one that best crystallizes this idea may be Carl 
Schmitt’s. In the words of this modern (also highly controversial) German philosopher, 
‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (understanding the exception as referring to a 
                                                          
971
 The expression ‘depositories’ is borrowed from S. TALMON, supra, at 16.  
972
 J. SALMON, ‘Quelle place pour l’État dans le Droit international d’aujourd’hui?’, (2010) Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit international de La Haye, vol. 347, at 21. 
973 Ibid., at 55 [my own translation]. The original version in French defines sovereignty as ‘un concept 
juridique distinct de l’indépendance ou du pouvoir politique et économique. C’est un concept juridique 
qui s’applique de manière égale à tous les États à partir du moment où ils accèdent au statut étatique, 
quelle que soit la superficie de leur territoire, l’importance de leur population, la forme et la nature de 
leur gouvernement, leur autonomie ou leur indépendance économique ou politique à l’égard d’États 
tiers.’ 
974
 N. BOBBIO, N. MATTEUCI y G. PASQUINO (dir.), Diccionario de Política, 2008, (Méjico DF: Siglo XXI), 
vol. 2, pp. 1215-1225, at 1218.  
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general concept belonging to the theory of State and not merely as a construct applied to 
states of emergency or siege).975 The exception, Schmitt continues, ‘is not codified in the 
existing legal order,’976 and can at best be characterized as a situation of ‘extreme peril, a 
danger to the existence of the State’,977 or the like. It is thus in the essence of sovereignty to be 
a borderline (as opposed to a vague) concept, although such a condition is precisely what 
‘makes relevant the whole question of sovereignty’.978  
Furthermore, by linking the definition of sovereignty with the extreme situations in 
which the continuation of the State is at stake, Carl Schmitt’s definition is also a reminder of 
how sovereignty operated as a fundamental conceptual basis of the modern State. Indeed, it is 
nowadays generally admitted that, since the birth of the modern European State, the concept 
of sovereignty cannot be dissociated from the concept of State (notwithstanding the special 
cases of the Holy See and the Order of Malta previously mentioned in Chapter 4, above).979 
Correlatively, the idea of sovereignty was nurtured by the internal sphere of the State, where it 
finds its conceptual roots and origin, while in its external dimension, it developed as a limit to 
the scope of the respective sovereign powers of other States.980 Both the internal and external 
aspects of sovereignty – inextricably bound to the State’s national and international political 
dimensions – are found in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, which establishes that, for 
a political entity to acquire statehood, it must have, inter alia, a ‘government’981 and ‘the 
capacity to enter into relations with other States’.982 
This final Chapter considers the effects of climate change impacts on the political 
dimension of Pacific Island States, a task which appears to be tricky and complex, for two main 
reasons. First of all, such a consideration entails a high risk of being trapped in a circular 
dynamic, given that, exploring the impacts of climate change on the capacity of Pacific island 
                                                          
975
 C. SCHMITT, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (translation by George 
SCHWAB), 1985, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), at 5.  
976
 Ibid., at 6. 
977
 Ibid. [Emphasis added]. 
978
Ibid., at 6. Then, he states that ‘a jurisprudence concerned with ordinary day-to-day questions has 
practically no interest in the concept of sovereignty’, at 12, and continues by quoting Soren Kierkegaard’s 
work Repetition, who wrote that ‘the exception explains the general and the self. And if one wants to 
study the general correctly, one only needs to look around for a true exception. It reveals everything 
more clearly than does the general,’ at 15.  
979
 See for instance J. SALMON (dir.), Dictionnaire de Droit international public, 2001, (Bruxelles: 
Bruylant): ‘la souveraineté expire la puissance suprême (suprema potestas) de gouverner, de commander 
et de decider et qui, liée à l’apparition de l’État moderne, est inseparable de celui-ci’, cited in SALMON, 
supra, at 21. [Emphasis added].   
980
 BOBBIO, supra, at 1221.  
981
 Montevideo Convention, supra, Article 1(c). 
982
 Ibid., Article 1(d).  
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governments to fulfil their role, implies tackling – at least indirectly – the question of how has 
Pacific Island States’ sovereignty been affected by climate change impacts, which in turn leads 
to questioning the scope of such effects on the continuation of Pacific Island States statehood 
(particularly when coupled with the range of disruptions present in the geographical and 
human dimensions of the State analysed in Chapters 4 and 5), despite the fact that, as S. 
Talmon recalls, ‘the government, as an organ of the State, by definition requires the existence 
of a State’.983 It is therefore difficult to evaluate whether and, eventually, when the adverse 
effects of climate change on the governmental capacity of Pacific Island States may endanger 
their statehood and whether or not they may reach such a qualitative and/or quantitative 
threshold. Secondly, associating the concept of sovereignty, understood as a supreme power, 
with the politically weak, economically vulnerable and environmentally threatened Pacific 
Island States may seem a bit far-fetched or disconnected from their reality in the international 
sphere.  
Taking into consideration these two difficulties, the question raised in this Chapter is 
two-fold: how may the adverse impacts of climate change challenge the governmental 
capacities of Pacific Island States? And how may the active participation of Pacific Island 
States in the international sphere operate as a determining variable of the question of their 
continuation as States? Part II of this Chapter begins with consideration of the challenge that 
climate change impacts may not affect the objective and material existence of Pacific islands’ 
governments, but the capacity of these governments to operate as ‘effective’ organs of the 
State, and considers whether they may be challenged by the ‘failed States’ doctrine or by the 
possibility of the States having their governments evacuated from their respective territories. 
Part III explores the role of Pacific Island States’ actions as players in the international 
community, with particular emphasis on their position regarding the threat to their survival as 
States, as encapsulated in the Climate Change and International Security Discourse, and argues 
that such a position is not irrelevant to the solution to their situation. Correlatively, this Part 
recalls the involvement that the international community has had in the acquisition and 
sustainability of Pacific islands’ statehood, and thus reveals that the question of whether or 
not the continuation of Pacific islands’ statehood cannot be resolved from a legal standpoint, 
but depends on the political decision of the international community to maintain recognition 
of Pacific Island States. To set this position on more substantial grounds than the merely 
practical, Part IV argues that the continuation of Pacific islands’ statehood even beyond its 
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‘material life’, through maintenance (at least temporarily) of international recognition, can be 
based on both ethical and legal grounds.  
 
2. THE INDOORS CHALLENGE: IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON PACIFIC ISLAND STATES’ 
GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY  
 
2.1. Limited Governmental Response Capacity to Scenarios of Partial De-territorialization 
and De-population: From ‘Vulnerable’ to ‘Failed’ States’? 
 
2.1.1. ‘Failing’, ‘Failed’ or ‘Collapsed’ States: Controversial Labels Challenging Formal Sovereign 
Equality 
 Just as sovereignty became the indispensable and distinctive attribute of the State 
since the birth of the modern European State, formal equality among States is regarded as 
integral to sovereignty, and the resulting principle of ‘sovereign equality’ being, in Lassa 
Oppenheim’s words, ‘the indispensable foundation of international society’.984 Although it 
constitutes, as Carlos Espósito puts it, a ‘constitutive fiction’,985 such a principle serves several 
important roles which help in the conduct of international relations by conveying the idea of 
an egalitarian international legal order in which all States are legally equal, while enabling 
State diversity (also referred to as pluralism in all its forms) to be tolerated.986 And yet, while 
the fundamental character of this principle in the construction of the modern international 
legal order remains uncontested, its relevance and operability in the context of contemporary 
international relations has been open to question. First, as a result of decolonization in the 
1960s–1970s, much political input sought to focus on the need to centre on substantive and 
not only formal sovereignty.987 Then, since globalization spread at the end of the Cold War and 
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 L. OPPENHEIM, ‘The Future of International Law’, (1921) Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Pamphlet nº 39, at 20. Literature on such a grounding principle of the international legal system, 
such as sovereign equality, is unsurprisingly very extensive. Some examples from different schools and 
legal systems include, P. KOOIJMANS, The Doctrine of Legal Equality of States: an Enquiry into the 
Foundations of International Law, 1964 (Leiden: Nijhoff). Christian Tomuschat went even further, 
qualifying sovereign equality as a ‘Grundnorm’, in C. TOMUSCHAT, ‘International Law: Ensuring the 
Survival of Mankind on the Eve of the New Century’, General Course on Public International Law, (1999) 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit international de La Haye, vol. 281, at 161.  
985
 C. ESPÓSITO, ‘Soberanía e igualdad en el Derecho internacional’, (2010) Estudios internacionales 
(Universidad de Chile), vol. 165, at 172.  
986
 G. SIMPSON, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, 
2004, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), at xii. 
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interdependence reached unprecedented peaks, legal scholars guessed that the end of the 
State could be closer than ever.988  
However, the real challenge that the principle of sovereign equality has recently been 
confronted with does not simply rely on the factual inequality of a State’s capacities (albeit 
connected to the historical phenomena of de-colonization and globalization). Such a challenge 
is related to the spread of new labels that seemingly sought to establish ‘categories’ of States, 
be it ‘outlaw’/‘rogue’ States, on the one hand, or ‘failed’/‘failing’ States, on the other. While 
the first category has been generally used to refer to ‘criminal States’ and seemingly 
introduces a Manichean view of international relations and has been particularly used after 
the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York, the second category of ‘failed’, ‘failing’ or ‘collapsed’ 
States has been particularly applied to post-colonial developing States, in view of their 
inherent political instability and economic underdevelopment that potentially lead to violent 
national and regional conflict.989 Both categories were born as highly controversial political 
constructs deployed after the end of the Cold War.990 They were thus made possible by the 
ideological homogenization that followed such a period and served to pierce the veil of formal 
sovereign equality and launch a move towards the grading of sovereignty, which arguably 
amounted to an updated re-introduction of the modernist ‘standard of civilization’ doctrine 
used before World War II to justify colonialism.991 As these concepts were essentially produced 
                                                          
988
 See for instance Jean Salmon, supra., who, after deploring and detailing the weakening of State 
powers and dimensions, concludes that, in the absence of a credible alternative and given the resistance 
of the State (both as a fact and as a legal concept), the State remains an irreplaceable structure. Contra, 
wordlist approaches, such as A. KHAN, The Extinction of Nation-States: a World without Borders, 1996 
(Michigan: Kluwer Law International). See also, C. SCHREUER, ‘The Waning of the Sovereign State: 
Toward a New Paradigm of International Law’, (1993) European Journal of International Law, vol. 4, 
issue 1, pp. 447-471.  
989
 For a critical explanation of how the social sciences developed representations of post-colonial States 
that arose as an adjunct to the hegemonic pretensions of the USA in the making of the ‘Third World’ 
during the Cold War and still ostensibly persist, see P. BILGIN and A. D. MORTON, ‘Historicizing 
Representations of “Failed States”: beyond Cold War Annexation of the Social Sciences?’ (2002) Third 
World Quarterly, vol. 23, issue 1, pp. 23-50.  
990
 Voices opposing the concept of failed States from the policy and legal standpoints thus include, inter 
alia: R. WILDE, ‘The Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the “Failed States” Concept’, (2003) ILSA Journal 
of International and Comparative Law, vol. 9, issue 2, pp. 425-429; H.-J. SPANGER, ‘Failed State or Failed 
Concept? Objections and Suggestions’, Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt, Paper presented at the 
Conference on Failed States III: Globalization and Failed States, held in Florence (Italy) on 7-10 April 
2000. For more recent works, see, for instance, A. AYERS, ‘The Illusion of an Epoch: Critiquing the 
Ideology of Failed States’, (2012) International Politics, vol.49, issue 5, pp. 568-590; N.AKPINARLI, The 
Fragility of the “Failed State” Paradigm: a Different International Law Perception of the Absence of 
Effective Government, 2010, (The Hague, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).  
991
 Early and clear accounts in favor of the ‘grading of sovereignty’ by American political scientists 
include: Robert H. JACKSON, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, 
1990, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), based on a previous work by the same author 
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by policy-makers of hegemonic countries, no formal institutional definitions by the UN or 
regional organizations can be found; rather, a diverse range of definitions and attempts to 
establish formal criteria or thresholds are mainly found in national security strategies of 
hegemonic powers and doctrinal analyses of international relations scholars and political 
scientists.992 One of the main sources of controversy arises from the fact that these newly 
invented categories have the potential to serve to justify – at least in political terms – foreign 
military intervention, in breach of the general prohibition of the use of force and of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other States laid down in Article 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN 
Charter, respectively.993  
The category of ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ States is left out of the present thesis, since it is not 
relevant to our study on the impact of climate change on the governmental capacities of 
Pacific Island States. The concepts of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ States rely on the idea that, as 
sovereignty empowers the State, correlative responsibilities attached to such power ensue. 
States are, in particular, expected to perform certain functions directed at the protection and 
wellbeing of their respective populations, on which the State’s political legitimacy is ultimately 
based. Thereby, political scientists have tended to define this category loosely as those States 
which have been unwilling to fulfil or incapable of fulfilling the core ‘weberian functions of the 
                                                                                                                                      
‘Quasi-States, Dual Regimes and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World’ 
(1987) International Organization, vol. 41, issue 4, pp.519-549; S. KRASNER, ‘Compromising Westphalia’, 
(1995) International Security, vol. 20, issue 3, pp. 115-151; J. E. THOMSON, ‘State Sovereignty and 
International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research’, (1995) International 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 39, pp. 213-233; and C. CLAPHAM, ‘Degrees of Statehood’, (1998) Review of 
International Studies, vol. 24, pp. 143-157. For a general explanation of the legal consequences of this 
movement, see P. MINNEROP, ‘The Classification of States and the Creation of Status within the 
International Community’, (2003) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 7, pp. 79-182. For a 
thorough analysis of how the civilizing mission served to justify colonial expansion and the adoption of 
unequal treaties, see M. KOSKENNIEMI, The Gentle Civilizer: the Rise and Fall of International Law: 1870-
1960, 2006, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). 
992
 See, for instance, S. HOFFMAN, Chaos and Violence: What Globalization, Failed States and Terrorism 
Mean for US Foreign Policy, 2006, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield); R. I. ROTBERG, ‘Failed States, 
Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators’, in R. I. ROTBERG (ed.) State Failure and State 
Weakness in a Time of Terror, 2003, (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution) and by the same author 
‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, (2002) The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, issue 3, pp. 85-96; 
R. H. DORFF, ‘State Failure and Responding to It’, paper presented at the 43
rd
 Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, held in New Orleans (USA), on 24-27 March 2002. 
993
 For a synthetic explanation of the legal implications of the spread of the concept of failed States for 
international security, see, for instance, Robin GEISS, ‘Failed States: Legal Aspects and Security 
Implications’, (2005) German Yearbook of International Law, vol.47, pp. 457-501; C-D. CLASSEN, ‘”Failed 
States” and the Prohibition to Use Force,’ in Les nouvelles menaces contre la paix et la sécurité 
internationales: Journée franco-allemande, Société Française pour le Droit international, 2004, (Paris: 
Pedone), pp. 129-140.  
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State’.994 Some authors, such as R. Rotberg, have sought to compose a detailed list of the 
functions of the State the fulfilment of which should be scrutinized when considering whether 
a State should be labelled as ‘failed’ or ‘failing’.995 These functions would include, first of all, 
the security of the population (measured by the absence of enduring political violence and by 
the ability to control State borders), coupled with political participation, economic 
development, infrastructures and social services.996 Two points are worth noting in this 
context. First of all, State weakness or fragility is generally differentiated from failure; while 
the former refers to a reduced or limited effectiveness of the State to fulfil one or more of the 
minimal functions laid down above, the latter implies that the specific function(s) at stake 
is(are) not fulfilled at all: it(they) is(are) absent. Secondly, this gradation goes on to 
differentiate between failed States and collapsed States, another category which tends to be 
even more loosely defined, but generally refers to the failure of the State to fulfil the set of 
specific minimal weberian functions to the extent that the conditions necessary for the State to 
‘sustain itself as a member of the international community’ are no longer met.997 W. Zartman, 
for instance, defined State collapse as occurring when a State ‘can no longer reproduce the 
conditions for its own existence’.998 
 
2.1.2. From ‘Failed States’ to Extinction of Statehood: The Big Gap 
 
Considering that the definition of failing, failed and collapsed States is not only 
controversial, but also variable, unsettled and multiform, one is faced with the question of 
how should concrete cases, such as those of certain Pacific Island States, be approached and, 
more importantly, how can it be possible to disentangle the concrete legal elements so that 
we can consider whether Pacific Island States will eventually become ‘failed’ or even 
‘collapsed’ States as a result of the adverse impacts of climate change. As slippery and as 
difficult such task may be, one thing can still be made clear: approaching the case of Pacific 
Island States from the angle of failed or collapsed States would require answering three 
consecutive questions. 
                                                          
994
 J. DI JOHN, ‘Conceptualizing the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: a Critical Review of the 
Literature’, January 2008, School of Oriental and African Studies, Crisis States Working Paper Series, vol. 
2, paper nº 25, at 4. 
995
 R. ROTBERG, ‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, (2002) Washington Quarterly, vol. XXV, issue 
3, pp. 85-96, who considered that the severity of State failure could be ranked according to the specific 
function that the State was not fulfilling.  
996
 Ibid.  
997
 G.HELMAN and R. RATNER, ‘Saving Failed States’, (1993) Foreign Policy, vol. 89, pp. 3-20. 
998
 See, W. ZARTMAN, Collapsed States, 1995, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner). 
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Given that State capacities are not uniform across functions and that, as J. Di John 
explained, ‘it is imperative for any definition of “failure” to be explicit in which dimension a 
State fails’,999 the first question that arises is whether, when and how may the ‘precise tipping 
points’, where State weakness transforms into failure or collapse, be identified.1000 To be sure, 
one may make a projection and estimate that the effects of climate change on the Pacific 
island’s territories and populations will gradually exert an increased pressure on the already 
limited capacities of Pacific islands’ governments. As already seen in Chapters 4 and 5, while 
sea-level rise and coastal erosion are already forcing these States to take active measures to 
stabilize and fix their maritime territorial entitlements and enhance regional co-operation to 
develop infrastructures that may increase their climate change resilience, population 
relocations have forced some Pacific Island States to produce relocation plans, negotiate with 
the relevant stakeholders and even seek international financing.1001 Yet, setting the criteria for 
establishing when the limited effectiveness of Pacific island governments to fulfil the ‘weberian 
functions’ of the State in the context of acute climate change impacts may so deteriorate as to 
amount to ‘failure’ [of the State] is unsettled and highly contested.  
Nonetheless, if State failure of Pacific Island States were to be acknowledged 
internationally – for instance, as a result of a resolution of a relevant United Nations body, or 
of self-acknowledgement by the States concerned – the second question that arises is whether 
State failure or collapse necessarily implies loss of statehood. Most literature on State failure 
or collapse generally uses such a term to refer to what in practice corresponds to government 
failure or collapse. This terminological equation is nevertheless understandable for, as already 
pointed out above, States are juridical persons which necessarily act through one organ, 
namely, the government. The fundamental importance of an effective government at the time 
when a political entity seeks to acquire statehood is indubitable; its existence is also generally 
considered and balanced along with other related considerations, such as the political 
legitimacy of such a government and its connection with the people’s right to self-
determination. And certainly, the subsequent loss of an effective government, as Tomas Baty’s 
words opening this chapter illustrate, is no little matter. However, irrespective of the legal 
consequences that the lack of an effective government may be, State practice indicates that 
the failure of the State to fulfil its functions does not imply that its statehood is challenged. As 
Rosalyn Higgins emphatically and clearly stated, ‘what is absolutely clear is that a loss of 
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 DI JOHN, supra, at 4.  
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 Ibid.  
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 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
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“stable and effective government” does not remove the attribute of statehood, once 
acknowledged’.1002  
Yet one point deserves attention in this context, which relates to the specificity of 
Pacific Island States. Although government failure as such is not, according to consistent State 
practice recently exemplified with the cases of Somalia or Afghanistan, a circumstance that 
may challenge the continuation of the affected State,1003 one may wonder whether such 
continuation could be at risk when the failure of the government is coupled with the partial 
loss of territory and the partial but significant de-population of the State itself. This question is 
challenging in so far as it directly touches on the already mentioned inherent bias of the 
international legal order to maintain the status quo for the sake of the stability of international 
relations, irrespective of whether such stability requires the maintenance of legal fictions. 
Therefore, when and why the extinction of statehood takes place is ultimately a matter that 
will probably be resolved by the weight of the facts; it will invite scrutiny of the future 
adaptation of State practice in this matter, while from a theoretical viewpoint it will also 
require returning to general theory of the State. 
 Finally, the third question that arises when considering whether Pacific Island States 
may become ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ States regards the obligations and responsibilities of other 
States in such a situation. Literature on State failure and collapse has sometimes developed 
the idea that the observed existence of failed States engages the responsibility of the Great 
Powers to act in the country and participate in the prevention of failure or in the 
reconstruction of the State at stake.1004 These accounts may be dangerous from a policy 
                                                          
1002
 R. HIGGINS, supra, at 40.  
1003
 In fact, as Paul Williams notes, the failure of the governance structures of a State are not even 
generally homogeneous in all the territory. Rather, different ‘degrees of success and failure can exist 
within a single State’, for the failed zones usually being made up of ‘numerous (often interconnected 
zones) where different sources of authority may dominate the local governance structures’. Focusing on 
the example of Somalia, the author for instance notes that the collapse of the Somali central 
government ‘did not automatically exclude the possibility that zones of alternative forms of governance 
and authority existed within Somalia’s officially recognized international borders. As Kenneth Menkhaus 
has observed, since 1991 ‘Somalia has repeatedly shown that in some places and at some times 
communities, towns, and regions can enjoy relatively high levels of peace, reconciliation, security and 
lawfulness despite the absence of central authority’, in P. WILLIAMS, ‘State Failure in Africa: Causes, 
Consequences and Responses’, in Africa South of the Sahara, 2010, (39
th
 ed.), Europa World Yearbook, 
pp.21-28. 
1004
 See for instance, Robert Jackson, who equates today’s Great Power responsibility in the face of State 
failure to the earlier trusteeship function performed by the ‘benevolent international society’ during the 
decolonization process. R. H. JACKSON, ‘Surrogate Sovereignty? Great Power’s Responsibility and “Failed 
States”’, (1998) Institute of International Relations of the University of British Colombia, Working Paper 
nº 25, 17 pp; see also D. CHANDLER, ‘Great Power Responsibility and Failed States: Strengthening 
Sovereingty?’, in J. RAUE and P. SUTTER, (eds.), Facets and Practices of State-Building, 2009, (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff). 
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perspective in so far as they potentially incentivize unilateral or multilateral, but potentially 
illegal, intervention in the domestic affairs of the State, in breach of Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter. While foreign intervention may be necessary and even justified on the basis of the 
recently developed concept of responsibility to protect,1005 the use of the channels of the 
collective security system laid down in the UN Charter is fundamental to prevent power-based 
abuses. Henceforth, focus may be turned onto the actions by the international community as a 
whole (acting through UN bodies and institutions or by delegation or authorization). First, to 
assist the State in preventing collapse from crystallizing, and then, if failure or collapse ensues, 
to revive the affected capacities of the State or to assist in the re-building process in cases of 
conflict or natural disaster.  
 
2.2. Scenarios of Total De-territorialization and De-population: Pacific Island Governments in 
Exile?  
 
2.2.1. Governments in Exile: An Uncontroverted Concept in International Law  
 
Contrary to the controversy that the approach to Pacific islands’ challenged indoors 
governmental capacity from the perspective of ‘failing’, ‘failed’ or eventually even ‘collapsed’ 
States arguably generates, addressing the consequences of the evacuation of Pacific island 
governments – particularly those of the most threatened low-lying island States of Tuvalu and 
Kiribati – beyond their respective national borders is a matter of interpreting how longstanding 
rules and State practice regarding governments-in-exile may be adapted to these situations. 
So far, this scenario is only a projection in time of what the acute consequences of climate 
change impacts may lead to and stems from the assumption that, if Pacific island de-
population reaches a high threshold – close to the realization of a ‘total’ de-population 
scenario – the respective governmental authorities of the island States concerned will 
correlatively be forced to leave. Both situations will then presumably be followed by the 
severe and eventually total de-territorialization of such States. At first glance, dealing with 
governments in exile may seem to raise issues related to the ‘outdoors’ governmental capacity 
of Pacific Island States to engage in international relations with other States and with 
international organizations, rather than a matter of challenging internal governance. In fact, 
                                                          
1005
 See the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
Responsibility to Protect, 2001, (Ottawa: International Development Research Center), which stipulates 
in Principle 1(B) that: ‘Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, 
the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’, at XI. [Emphasis 
added]. 
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the evacuation of governments beyond national borders affects both dimensions. To be sure, 
on the face of it, this situation leads to the issues pertaining to the recognition by other States 
of the authorities in exile as the government of the State concerned. Yet, as laid out in more 
detail below, this issue risks being much less of a concern in the case of eventual evacuations 
of Pacific islands’ governments, for no competing de facto or in situ authorities are likely to be 
present in these cases. In contrast, most of the difficulties traditionally encountered by 
governments in exile with regard to the internal affairs of the country are likely to be shared by 
all evacuated Pacific islands’ governments, while these will also present new additional 
challenges pertaining to the specific climate-related context in which the need to evacuate the 
country is generated. Ultimately, the possibility that the evacuation of Pacific islands’ 
governments may mark the moment at which Pacific Island States’ weakness and fragility bring 
failure or even collapse deserves consideration.  
Governments in exile are not, per se, a new concept in international law, nor a 
controversial one. In fact, as Stefan Talmon explains, the term ‘governments in exile’, as such, 
does not correspond to a specific legal status but simply indicates that the domicile of a 
government – that is, the authority through which the State displays and exercises its 
sovereign competences – is located outside the national territorial borders.1006 Talmon also 
criticizes how the hyphenated expression ‘governments-in-exile’ is misleading in this sense, for 
it gives the impression that they constitute an independent subject of international law with a 
legal status distinct from that of governments, a consideration which is inconsistent with State 
practice. S. Talmon’s criticism is based on consistent State practice, which, according him, 
shows that, in these situations, States have chosen either to recognize authorities abroad as 
the government of a State, or not to recognize them as such; what States have never done is 
to recognize an authority as a ‘government in exile’. The fact that the government is outside 
the national territorial borders is thus a matter of fact which, albeit carrying a set of legal 
consequences pertaining to the exercise of sovereign State competences, does not transform 
the legal nature of the government nor its legal status in international law.1007 Hence, Stefan 
Talmon recalls, there is no precedent of a State having denied a certain governmental 
competence to a government on the ground that its domicile was outside the national 
territorial borders of the State it represented.1008  
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Traditional circumstances in which governments have been led to evacuate themselves 
from the country are related to the outbreak of violent conflict, leading to belligerent 
occupation or civil war and/or stemming from either decolonization or even the defence of 
democratization.1009 These circumstances imply that, when authorities of a State are forced to 
leave, they raise one main political and legal issue, namely, the competition between two co-
existing authorities claiming governmental status in respect of the State in question. This is 
particularly clear when it comes to situations of belligerent occupation, in which a de facto 
authority controlling the territory and population competes with the de iure government 
forced into exile and seeks to obtain recognition from other States as the ‘new’ government of 
the occupied State. These cases imply that the de facto authority seeks to shift the recognition 
of other States from one authority to another, for only one government at a time can have the 
competence to bind its State.1010 This situation of double authorities claiming international 
recognition is, however, not likely to occur in the case of Pacific Island States. Rather, the 
situation they are most likely to find themselves in is one in which the same authorities that 
constituted the legitimate government, recognized as such by the international community, 
are forced to continue exercising their functions outside their national borders as a result of 
severe impacts of climate change on the habitability conditions of their territory and 
presumably to do so with most of its population (equally forced to leave the country). 
Therefore, as presumably no competition of authority will take place, it seems more 
appropriate to refer to Pacific islands’ governments abroad as ‘ex situ governments’, rather 
than as ‘governments in exile’.1011  
                                                          
1009
 Many prominent cases of governments in exile occurred during the World War II, as the German 
invasion gradually spread over Europe. For instance, in 1939, the Polish Government escaped under the 
orders of General Sikorski from Paris to London; the same year the Czech president Eduard Benes 
settled in London and was recognized as the head of the Czech government in exile for two years. This 
also applied to many European royal families. Queen Wilhelmina of The Netherlands, the Grand Duchess 
of Luxemburg, King Peter II of Yugoslavia, King Haakon VII of Norway and King George II of Greece all 
moved to London with their cabinets between 1939 and 1941. See H. L. SCANLON, European 
Governments in Exile, 1943, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). More 
recent post-World War II examples of governments in exile can be found in Y. SHAIN, Governments-in-
Exile in Contemporary World Politics, 1991 (London: Routledge). These include the aspirations of an 
exiled group known as the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma to overthrow its home 
country’s government; the case of the ‘Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne’, which 
resulted from the post-colonial political instability; and even the claims of the Tibetan Government in 
Exile for a political status independent from China. 
1010
 G. SCELLE, Manuel de Droit international public, 1948, (Paris: Domat Montchrestien), at 174-5. 
1011
 Indeed, according to the Oxford Dictionary, the term ‘exile’ is defined as: ‘the state of being barred 
from one’s native country, typically for political or punitive reasons’. The use of the term ‘ex situ’ 
government instead of the word ‘exile’ thus seeks to highlight the fact that the cause of the evacuation 
is not political.  
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Just as governments in exile do not constitute a category with a distinct legal status under 
international law, Pacific islands’ ex situ governments should not be different either. Issues 
pertaining to the recognition, by other States, of authorities abroad as the government of the 
Pacific island State concerned are presumably simplified by the absence of such competing 
claims. Nonetheless, international recognition of the fact that the government of a Pacific 
island State has become domiciled outside its national borders will arguably remain necessary, 
for a set of legal consequences stemming from such a situation will still be unavoidably 
present. The next section of the present chapter therefore scrutinizes the main legal 
consequences arising from prospective Pacific islands’ ex situ governments, applying them to 
the specific circumstances and challenges that they may encounter and ultimately locating the 
projected situation of Pacific islands’ ex situ governments in the overall context of the impacts 
of climate change on the continuation of Pacific islands’ statehood. 
 
2.2.2. The Real Threat to the Continuation of Pacific Island States: Conjunction of the 
Challenges to the Three Dimensions of Statehood 
 
 One of the fundamental characteristics of recognition of governments in exile is that it 
does not depend on the exercise of effective control of the territory by the authority claiming 
governmental status. Such a characteristic is likely to be highly important and useful for Pacific 
islands ex situ governments which, in spite of facing a situation in which their outer maritime 
borders may be under stress due to sea-level rise and to severe coastal erosion, may still take 
actions in the international arena seeking to protect such borders from becoming part of the 
high seas. However, if recognition of Pacific islands’ ex situ authorities as governments is 
important to ensure some level of protection of Pacific islanders and their interests abroad, 
described by S. Talmon as ‘one of the most noble tasks of States’, and is a corollary of the 
State’s personal sovereignty over its citizens.1012 The possibility to fulfil such a task is not 
affected by the government’s limited capacity or even complete incapacity to control its 
territory effectively. Also, such protection may be ensured by other States’ commitment – by 
means of an inter-State international agreement – to protect the nationals of the affected 
State. Such protection may take the form of consular representation, the furnishing of 
passports and identity cards to protect them from being considered abroad as stateless and, 
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 S. TALMON, supra, at 202. ‘A precondition however is that they are recognized as the governments of 
the States whose nationals require protection’. Therefore, nationality holds as the only prerequisite for 
the right to diplomatic protection (the effectiveness of the protection in any particular case being 
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most importantly, through the conclusion of migration arrangements with other States in 
which Pacific island populations may be relocated.  
 The need to conclude international arrangements, either with other States or with 
international organizations willing to help their population, leads to the question of the legal 
effects of the ex situ status of Pacific islands’ governments on the representation of their State 
before the international community. As only one government at a time is legally competent to 
bind the State, it follows that only if the ex situ authorities have been recognized as 
governments may they validly sign, ratify, or accede to international (bilateral or multilateral) 
agreements. Again, as no competition between de facto occupant authorities and de iure 
authorities in exile for recognition of governmental status is likely to take place in the case of 
Pacific Island States, the recurrent formal issues stemming from the uneven recognition by 
only some States parties to a multilateral agreement which the State concerned wishes to 
accede to is not an issue. The same may apply to the issue of whether ex situ authorities not 
recognized as governments may only enter into agreements in their own name or on behalf of 
the political movement they constitute, but not on behalf of the State they purport to 
represent.1013 In contrast, effects of recognition of ex situ authorities as governments on the 
substance of the treaties that such authorities are competent to conclude will be applicable in 
the case of Pacific Island States. To begin with, as the government of a State holds the 
exclusive and plenary capacity to bind the State it represents, only the ex situ authorities 
recognized as governments will be able to conclude treaties that involve the exercise of State 
sovereignty, such as treaties which dispose of the State’s territory.1014 Some scholars, such as 
Krystyna Marek, have nonetheless taken the view that the inherent limitations of an ex situ 
government make it incompetent to conclude treaties affecting the cession of a part of the 
State’s territory. S. Talmon, in contrast, holds that there is ‘no halfway’ situation; either an 
authority is recognized as a government, becoming entitled to conclude all kinds of treaties, or 
it is not recognized as a government and cannot therefore bind the State it purports to 
represent through any treaty. What the absence of the government from the State territory 
may imply, S. Talmon specifies, is that the capacity of the State to perform or comply with the 
obligations of a treaty may be limited.  
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 Therefore, being ex situ alone is not an impediment for Pacific islands’ governments 
evacuated abroad to continue concluding international agreements validly on behalf of their 
respective States. Rather, the main issue arising out of the specific circumstances of Pacific 
islands’ ex situ governments pertains to the fact that there will presumably be no temporal 
limitation on such exceptional situations. As the general assumption that the absence of ex situ 
governments from the State territory is only temporary cannot be applied to Pacific islands’ ex 
situ governments, the limitation of the States’ capacity to perform certain treaty obligations 
will presumably turn into a settled incapacity to implement treaties. Although this incapacity 
does not affect their competence to conclude them, it does limit the range of treaties that 
Pacific islands’ governments will be allowed to conclude, for they will not be able to conclude 
treaties they will only implement on their return to the national territory. Alternatively, they 
may choose to conclude treaties binding them only up to a certain number of years, while their 
transition to ‘partial’ de-territorialization and de-population takes place. This is actually 
common practice for traditional governments in exile, which have concluded treaties 
governing military, defence, economic, trade, loan, aid, extradition, administration, and even 
political agreements that are enforceable for only twenty years.  
 Furthermore, what is being highlighted for future treaties is seemingly applicable to 
treaties that had been concluded before the evacuation of the government. Existing treaties 
benefit from the general presumption of continuance, and thus absence from the State 
territory does not automatically suspend or terminate them. However, pursuant to Articles 
61(1) and 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the conditions that cause a 
government to establish itself abroad may lead to the termination or suspension of treaties 
because of the impossibility of performance or of a fundamental change of circumstances. 
Hence, while ex situ governments alone do not constitute an overriding impossibility or a 
fundamental change of circumstances sufficient to justify the termination or suspension of a 
treaty, they may be an exonerating cause of State liability for non-performance or non-
compliance with treaty obligations in the context of State responsibility.1015  
Closely connected to the importance of recognition of Pacific islands’ ex situ 
authorities as governments in the realm of treaty law – determinant in establishing whether 
such governments can exercise the rights of the State or perform State obligations and 
conclude new treaties, but also to suspend, terminate or denounce existing treaties they may 
not be able to perform anymore – is the issue of privileges and immunities of such ex situ 
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governments. Just as with existing treaties, the ex situ authorities recognized as governments 
benefit from the presumption that they possess certain competences, privileges and 
immunities, unless otherwise provided by the recognizing State.1016 Government recognition is 
fundamental only for authorities recognized as de iure governments to enjoy privileges and 
immunities. This element of legal protection has been very important in various traditional 
historical precedents, given that most traditional situations of governments in exile have been 
produced in contexts of internal or international conflict. Traditional types of aid that ex situ 
governments have requested from regional and international organizations have thus included 
the creation of new police forces or modernization of their existing armed forces, the freezing 
of the State foreign financial assets, the imposition, through the operation of the collective 
system of international peace and security, of economic sanctions and an arms embargo on 
the de facto, in situ authority or the sending of civilian or diplomatic missions to their States. 
Yet, in the case of Pacific Island States, the importance of getting international recognition of 
their evacuated authorities as governments stems from the fact that recognized ex situ 
governments may validly authorize other States to intervene within the territorial boundaries 
of the State and provide it with the necessary humanitarian assistance.1017  
Apart from authorization to receive humanitarian or other sorts of assistance from the 
international community, Pacific islands’ ex situ governments will probably be called upon to 
take interim measures that will require, inter alia, the development of national legislation. 
Therefore, the question of how the ex situ condition of a government may affect the State’s 
jurisdiction requires consideration. A State’s jurisdiction to prescribe exists by virtue of a 
governmental status in international law, irrespective of whether or not its government is 
absent from State territory. This has two main consequences. First, governments in exile, S. 
Talmon writes, ‘do not exercise jurisdiction derived from the host State, but exercise their own 
jurisdiction in the host State’ and therefore, secondly, ‘government recognition does not 
establish jurisdiction’.1018 Therefore, the State’s jurisdiction to prescribe is not limited by the 
location of its government abroad. In contrast, pursuant to the principle of territorial 
sovereignty, the State’s jurisdiction to enforce the laws it prescribes (whether new laws 
enacted ex situ or former laws still in force) is limited, and requires in any case the consent of 
the host State. Such consent may be given expressly or implicitly (for instance through the 
invitation of a group of exiles). Moreover, as S. Talmon reminds us, an ex situ government does 
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not possess more powers than it does at home, but may nonetheless be allowed by the host 
State to exercise more of the existing powers than usual, in the light of special circumstances 
and by way of comity. Finally, closely related to the limited jurisdiction of States with 
governments abroad to enforce is the jurisdiction to adjudicate. Traditional situations of 
governments in exile would not see their jurisdiction to adjudicate, as such, affected, since the 
judiciary may not have been evacuated with their governments all together. Therefore, the 
principle that applies in normal situations of governments in exile simply holds that host States 
may determine to what extent may the courts of the State exercise their jurisdiction – 
although they may not prescribe how such jurisdiction should be exercised. Moreover, the 
courts of the host State are under no obligation to recognize and enforce the laws of another 
State within its territory. These courts will simply do so when the conflict of law rules of the 
host State so prescribe, which will generally depend on two factors: whether the law is valid in 
its State of origin (and according the rules of such State); and whether they are contrary to the 
public order of the host State.1019  
Last but not least, the evacuation of Pacific islands’ governments may have 
consequences bearing on their access to State property, whether abroad or still in the State 
territory. As a corollary of a government’s exclusive and plenary right of representation of its 
own State in international relations, only authorities recognized as governments can validly 
make arrangements affecting the legal status of the property of their nationals abroad as well 
as of the State’s public assets (in the former case, this competence corresponds to the exercise 
by the State of personal sovereignty over its nationals, be it in State territory or abroad). As 
most governments abroad have been at least partly financed by their respective host States 
and/or other States, they seek to secure access to ownership of property abroad as quickly as 
possible, so as to organize an effective administration in exile, send diplomatic missions to 
other States or multilateral fora to plead their cause and gain allies, and maintain a certain 
independence from their host State – all measures directed at regaining control over their 
national territory. One of the first actions is usually to secure control of their State’s assets and 
sources of revenue abroad. As a matter of principle, a recognized government in exile is 
entitled to dispose of its State’s property abroad, allowing the sale of national property, 
drawing upon credits granted to their States, manage state-owned companies, occupy State 
property, like diplomatic and consular premises, and receive sums due to its respective 
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State.1020 Governments themselves are not the owners of their respective State’s property, but 
only hold it in trust and administer it. Recognition of an authority in exile as a government 
implies that the right to administer property automatically passes to the newly recognized 
government. In the case of Pacific island ex situ governments, this right and capacity will 
presumably be capital for them to effectively organize the necessary measures to ensure the 
safety of evacuation or transfer of the population, the negotiation of agreements with other 
States concerning the right of entry of their nationals into the territory of another State, the 
eventual purchase of land abroad to relocate their people, the payment of costs associated 
with the diplomatic missions to the regional and global international organizations (e.g. 
developing further the Climate Change and International Security Discourse) seeking to gain 
support for their cause and international humanitarian assistance, etc.  
All in all, what can be extracted from the study exposed in this thesis is that ex situ 
governments alone do not, in traditional cases, constitute a real challenge to the States 
concerned. While the exercise of some of the State’s powers – such as jurisdiction to enforce 
or the capacity to perform certain treaty obligations – is limited by the circumstances leading 
to the evacuation of State territory, a national authority abroad, as long as it is recognized as 
the government in exile, maintains the full and exclusive capacity to represent the State 
abroad, to exercise legislative jurisdiction over its national assets, and be endowed with all 
necessary privileges and immunities. It is thus still possible for the State to exercise its 
weberian functions in favour of its population, in spite of having its representative organ 
located outside its national territory. However, the prospective situation of Pacific Island 
States offers a slightly different picture, for they do not comply with the general assumption 
that the ex situ status is only temporary, nor does their situation stem from a competition 
between a de iure and a de facto authority from another occupying State. These distinctive 
characteristics stem from the fact that the evacuation of Pacific island governments will 
presumably take place at a time when the two other dimensions of the State will be severely 
affected by a double-sided de-territorialization and de-population scenario. The main 
characteristic of ex situ governments, namely their presumed temporality, would thus 
disappear. In fact, even if the lands lost to sea-level rise, coastal erosion or other natural 
causes were to re-emerge in the long term, as Esteban and Yamamoto mention,1021 the whole 
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population would have left anyway. And, therefore, the problem of Pacific islands’ ex situ 
governments, when put in the context of the general deterioration of the other two 
dimensions of the State due to climate change impacts, devolves into a problem of the 
continuation of Pacific Island States altogether (the two being at a time mutually exclusive).  
As J. Crawford points out, international lawyers have generally paid little more 
attention to problems of State continuation or extinction than to those of the definition and 
operation of the concept of statehood itself.1022 The question of State continuation or 
extinction is rather underdeveloped theoretically and has been traditionally approached as an 
issue to be necessarily resolved, for the law of State succession to come into operation. State 
continuation is, therefore, as defined by J. Crawford, assured when the same State can be said 
to continue to exist, despite changes of government, territory or population; whereas State 
succession implies that one State can be said to have replaced another – previously 
extinguished – State in the same territory.1023 The concept of continuation therefore implies 
that legal relations are preserved despite changes in the subject of the relations. Territorial 
changes – and the concomitant changes in population – such as loss of or acquisition of 
territory, do not per se affect the continuation of the State; the presumption of continuation 
being particularly strong when the constitutional system of the State existing prior to the 
territorial change remains in force. The same can be applied to changes in the municipal 
constitution of the State, which per se do not affect State continuation. Yet, problems arise 
where the constitutive elements or criteria of statehood undergo multiple and substantial 
changes. It is precisely in these marginal cases that what J. Crawford names the ‘distinct 
element of legal fiction’, inherently present in the concept of continuation, is unveiled. In such 
instances, the role of recognition and the claims to continuation made by the concerned States 
become determinant. And thus, given that Pacific islands’ governments will be called upon to 
evacuate in contexts of acute de-territorialization and de-population, recognition of Pacific 
islands’ ex situ governments in such instances could arguably amount to recognition of the 
continuation of Pacific islands’ statehood, or at least could have the potential to become 
recognition. Simply put, recognition of a government would thus potentially shift into 
recognition of State continuation. Although this certainly does not mean that problems of 
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continuation and statehood are resolved by application of a constitutive theory of recognition 
for, as Crawford puts it, ‘it can hardly be denied that it will constitute important evidence of 
that status, particularly in doubtful or marginal cases’.1024 Taking J. Crawford’s view that ‘the 
rules for determining identity and continuation are variants upon the basic criteria of 
statehood, with the addition of certain specific qualifying or particularizing rules’ that attribute 
to the recognition and the claims of the States concerned a decisive power, an incursion into 
the effects that climate change may exert on the Pacific island State’s capacity to maintain or 
engage in international relations becomes necessary.  
 
3. THE ‘OUTDOORS CHALLENGE’: IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON PACIFIC ISLANDS’ 
CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
3.1. Pacific Island States in the International Community 
 
3.1.1. Contrasting Faces: Limited National Governmental Capacity vs. Active Participation in 
International Life 
 
 In contrast to the limited governmental capacity of Pacific island States and their 
potentially increased struggle to fulfil the weberian ‘minimal functions of the States’ as climate 
change impacts become more severe, their participation in international life has proven to be 
steadily active, particularly for the last fifteen years. This may be surprising given that the 
governmental authorities that exercise the State’s sovereign power over its population and 
territory are also tasked with establishing and maintaining international relations with other 
States and international organizations. Hence, it could arguably be assumed that the weakness 
or fragility of the government in the execution of its internal duties could be transferred to the 
exercise of its external rights and duties. Nonetheless, the history of Pacific Island States’ 
conduct in the international arena is far from matching this picture. Indeed, ever since they 
came into being as autonomous and sovereign political entities, Pacific Island States have 
made a big effort to maintain international relations. In fact, it may be precisely because of 
their inherent physical, political and economic fragility, as well as their geographical isolation, 
that they have constantly sought the support of the international community. The first and 
most visible example of the high level of dependence of Pacific Island States on the good state 
of their international relations can be found, as already analysed in Chapter 4 above, in their 
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request for full membership as States in the UN.1025 This stage was all the more important at 
the time of their independence that, as William Harris explained, for most of them, acceptance 
of their request for UN membership was tantamount to international recognition of their 
acquisition of statehood.1026 Besides, other than maintaining constant international relations 
with other States through multilateral diplomatic fora in relevant UN bodies and agencies, 
Pacific Island States have nurtured bilateral relations with individual States with which they 
have concluded international trade, commercial and investment agreements that are capital 
for their respective economies. Sometimes, this dependency on foreign investments has been 
at the cost of controversial political decisions going against the general flow, such as the 
attempts by some Pacific Island States – Vanuatu, Kiribati, Nauru, the Solomon Islands and 
Tonga – to switch their allegiances between China and the recognition of Taiwan as a State 
depending on the course of the ‘dollar diplomacy’. 1027 As Yongjin Zhang remarks, ‘the Pacific 
has been one of the most fiercely fought battle-grounds in the struggle between China and 
Taiwan for international recognition since the 1970s’.1028 This example in turn raises the 
question of the role actually played by Pacific Island States in the international community. 
While the fact that access to statehood was opened to them as a result of the 
contextual framework of the time – and thus reflected the structural changes that the 
international community had undergone since the beginning of de-colonization – the role they 
played afterwards was still limited by their small leverage and high degree of dependence on 
external assistance to ensure their sustainability and development. While the acceptance of 
full UN membership did not provoke fundamental imbalances in the international order of the 
Cold War period, as some political leaders of the time had feared, it cannot be denied that 
Pacific Island States have been and still are being used by other States (mostly the Great 
Powers) as a useful source of votes necessary to ensure the success of an important voting 
procedure in the UN General Assembly. The statement of the Australian delegate to the 2006 
UN General Assembly session, when the resolution on ‘Climate Change and its Possible 
Security Implications’ was discussed, is a straightforward acknowledgment of this 
‘manipulation’.1029 One of the latest examples and most paradigmatic of this political 
manipulation can be found in the General Assembly session at which the question of whether 
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Palestine could be accepted as a UN Observer State was voted. Of the nine votes against the 
motion, other than those of Israel and the USA, four were of Pacific Island States: Nauru, along 
with the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, three island States 
formerly administered by the United States under the Pacific Access Category and which now 
have a compact of free association with the USA. Interestingly enough, when Emanuel Mori, 
President of the Federated States of Micronesia, was interviewed on the reason for his 
country’s vote, he replied, in a rather compassionate tone, that ‘Israel is a minority in the 
Middle East and struggling to survive. [W]e are also out there. We have no enemies, only 
natural ones. Typhoons come, and we survive. Being surrounded by not-friendly neighbours, we 
kind of pity them.’1030  
Other than bending themselves to the interests of other States, Pacific Island States 
have a tendency not to be part of international agreements they feel they cannot comply with. 
Their practice seems to indicate that they are highly self-conscious about the international 
obligations that statehood implies, and are therefore highly reluctant to enter into agreements 
they do not have the capacity to comply with. As already pointed out in Chapter 5 above, this 
is one of the reasons why the Pacific has been defined by the Office of the High Commissioner 
on Human Rights as the region with the lowest ratification of human rights instruments in the 
world.1031 However, this approach to international agreements had not precluded them from 
developing regional international co-operation nor from constructing, through their Pacific 
Islands Forum, an alternative and self-led platform on which, in spite of the numerous 
differences and cultural disparities among Pacific Island States, a common ground for their 
‘regional identity’ can be solidly built. Henceforth, the last fifteen years, in particular, have 
seen an exponential growth of the subject matter of successful regional co-operation, in such 
areas as security, exploitation of common marine resources, sustainable development, etc. It 
has also helped in building up a common voice for all, or at least most, Pacific Island States in 
international fora, for their common position is now increasingly being presented by the 
Secretary of the Pacific Islands Forum, instead of by each State individually, as their action in 
the integration of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse before universal 
international organizations shows.1032 
                                                          
1030
 The interview where the statement of Emanuel Mori is reproduced can be found at: 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/30/coalition-of-the-opposing-why-
these-9-countries-voted-against-palestine-at-the-u-n/> 
1031
 See Chapter 5, Section 4.2.  
1032
 See Chapter 3.  
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
385 
 
Furthermore, the reluctance of Pacific Island States to become part of international 
agreements they may not be able to comply with has not affected international environmental 
law. Indeed, all Pacific Island States are parties to the UNFCCC and some of them have also 
ratified other multilateral environmental agreements. For many, the UNFCCC is almost the 
only treaty they have ratified. Their participation as States parties to the international regime 
on climate change is, first of all, undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that the regime’s structure 
is based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. As all Pacific Island 
States are non-Annex-I countries, they have no obligation to reduce their share of greenhouse 
gas emissions, but remain among the beneficiaries of climate change adaptation funds and 
transfer of relevant technology – both serving as complementary and indirect means of 
obtaining international investments necessary to cope with their high level of vulnerability to 
climate change impacts. 
Yet, the role played by Pacific Island States should not be reduced to a double-edged 
dimension consisting of either being toys in the hands of the Great Powers or highly 
dependent passive players seeking means to obtain funding in every corner of the world. In 
fact, Pacific Island States – along with other highly active small island States, like the Maldives 
– can be said to be not only active ‘players’, but even ‘powers’ in the context of the climate 
change negotiations, to the extent that they embody the conscience and underlying normative 
grounds and principles on which the international regime on climate change was built, and 
thus recall the ultimate purpose of all the effort deployed to make international co-operation 
on climate change successful. Although this ‘power’ of leverage cannot, of course, be equated 
to the economic and political strength of the Great Powers – USA, the EU and the five big 
emerging countries – which hold the future of the regime, it is nonetheless significant. This 
power is all the more remarkable in that it is accompanied by a highly efficient institutional 
structure through which it can be displayed, namely the Alliance of Small Island States. 
Through this political coalition, Pacific Island States and other small island States from different 
oceans have demonstrated that they are not always simple instrumental votes in the hands of 
the Great Powers, nor even of their closest and most important regional partners, like 
Australia and New Zealand, which are both part of the same climate change political coalition 
as the USA, known as the UMBRELLA group. Ultimately, their voice contributes nowadays – 
particularly during controversial political moments – to establish whether the course of the 
climate change negotiations is succeeding or flawed, and they will certainly continue to do so. 
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3.1.2. Back to the Climate Change and International Security Discourse: A Prelude to Pacific 
Island States’ Claim to Their Own Continuation?  
 
 The generally active participation in international life that Pacific Island States have 
consistently demonstrated over the years since acquiring statehood is extendable to the 
challenge constituted by climate change impacts, for, as already seen in Part I of this thesis, 
they were the active promoters – along with the EU – of the introduction and further evolution 
of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse from 2007 onwards. As Part I of 
this thesis indicated, the development of the Discourse through three main successive phases, 
in 2007, 2009 and 2011, in which the Discourse was disseminated from the Security Council to 
the General Assembly and then back to the Security Council, eventually permitted 
understanding it as the source legitimizing consideration of the question of whether and how 
the continuation of Pacific islands’ statehood might be jeopardized by climate change impacts. 
Yet, in the end, following scrutiny of how the adverse impacts of climate change challenge the 
geographical, human and internal governance dimensions of the State, the relevance of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse acquired a new breadth. Indeed, the 
Discourse comes into play in a second role; not only does it help in pointing out the 
fundamental legal question underlying the Discourse – namely, the continuation of small island 
States threatened by climate change impacts – it can also become a component of the solution 
to this legal question.  
 To be sure, the successful dissemination of the Discourse among relevant global 
international organizations and the progressive acceptance by a majority of States of the 
existence of such a threat to the survival of small island States had, first and foremost, the 
political effect of introducing this matter into the international agenda and of mainstreaming 
some of the related issues in the mandates of the relevant UN bodies and agencies.1033 
Therefore, specific effects of the Discourse in the form of policy action can be expected to 
develop from now on in different areas, including, inter alia, those of human rights and 
refugee law and policy, or through further development of international scientific survey 
assistance enabling low-lying island States to conclude maritime delimitation agreements.1034  
However, beyond this concrete short-term effect, the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse will arguably be fundamental when the worst-case scenarios 
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of de-territorialization or de-population lead to the serious questioning of the future of Pacific 
islands’ statehood. Indeed, as J. Crawford recalls, previous cases of State succession have 
allowed the international community to acknowledge officially the disappearance of the legal 
personality of the former State and to recognize a new political entity as the successor of such 
State; the position of the former State concerning its own continuation or extinction is not 
irrelevant, however.1035 Henceforth, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
could arguably serve as an official proof, registered in UN verbatim records and known in 
advance by the international community, of Pacific Island States’ fight against the looming and 
jeopardizing effects of climate change on their continuation as States. A proof of their 
resistance to their eventual extinction, illustrating the extent to which the construction and 
dissemination of a Discourse in the appropriate international fora may not only prevent the 
concerned States from becoming voiceless under the weight of their situation and their 
inherently small leverage, but also contribute to their fight against the loss of statehood. 
Voicelessness and statelessness may thus be bound together. And yet, if the position of the 
States concerned is not irrelevant to their future as States, how the international community 
behaves and reacts to the present and future prospects of such a situation is equally important 
– from a political and from a legal perspective.  
 
3.2. The International Community and Pacific Island States 
 
3.2.1. Past Structural Transformations of the International Community: Their Reflection in the 
Creation of Pacific Island States  
 
As Rosalyn Higgins pointed out, ‘no State is totally without dependence on some other State. A 
degree of interdependence is in the nature of things’.1036 This acknowledgement is widespread 
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among international relations scholars, particularly since the launch of neo-liberal 
institutionalism, headed by authors such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,1037 and after 
which, interdependence and transnational governance came to be settled and defined as a 
new characteristic of contemporary life.1038 Yet, Rosalyn Higgins pursued this initial and rather 
straightforward acknowledgment by highlighting the importance for an entity making a claim 
to be a State for a ‘comprehensive purpose’, such as joining the UN, to have kept an ‘essential 
core of independence’ and not be a mere emanation of another State.1039 To be sure, from a 
formal point of view, Pacific Island States could be recognized as autonomous political entities 
differentiated from one another as well as from their formal colonial or administering States, 
especially given that their acquisition of statehood was in most cases preceded by the 
celebration of a referendum which secured the appropriate exercise of Pacific islanders’ right 
to self-determination. And yet, as pointed out on several occasions above, their constitution as 
truly autonomous, self-sustaining political entities was never pretended to be achieved. Such a 
high level of dependence on other countries – which led some of them, such as the Marshall 
Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, to choose a compact of free association 
instead of independence as their preferred form of government – almost prevented their 
acceptance as full Member States of the UN.  
However, as the core characteristic of international society had changed at the time, 
giving an unprecedented weight and importance to new normative developments, 
adjustments to the criteria for UN membership ensued. The entry of Pacific Island States into 
the UN as full Member States therefore mirrored the structural changes that the international 
community was undergoing and seemingly reflected the underlying forces that were changing 
the normative grounds of the international system, towards one in which the self-
determination of peoples would seemingly crystallize human liberation from colonial 
oppression, while a new sense of universality – one encompassing all new members recently 
set free – would arise. 
 
3.2.2. Present Looming Transformations of the International Community: A Reflection on the 
Treatment of the Pacific Island States’ Challenges to the Continuation of Pacific Islands’ 
Statehood?  
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 If the access of Pacific Island States to UN membership as a consequence of the 
attribution of statehood was a reflection of the structural changes that the international 
community was undergoing at the time, it can be argued that the international community’s 
treatment of the issue of the extinction of these same States may follow the same pattern. 
When dealing with the future of statehood in general terms, Marti Koskenniemi held that ‘the 
formality of statehood remains the last guarantee we have against the conquest of 
modernism’s liberal aspect by modernism’s authoritarian impulse.’1040 He then went on to 
consider the substratum of statehood as being evolutive, flowing and historically contingent, 
and thus explained that ‘the status of statehood can be associated with various sets of rights 
and duties. It carries no given, determinate, normative implications. [W]e cannot deduce the 
extent of a State’s freedom of action from the mere fact of its Statehood. [T]he construction of 
rights and duties – giving substance to statehood – remains a matters of political adjustment 
and of finding a contextual equilibrium in particular circumstances’.1041 As much as the 
contextual framework of international life was fundamental for the Pacific Island States to 
acquire statehood and be admitted as full Member States of the UN, the same contextual 
variable may arguably become just as fundamental for these States to maintain their 
sovereignty and statehood, irrespective of the actual level of deterioration of their 
geographical, human and political dimensions.  
 If, as James Crawford explained, a State may not be extinguished by ‘substantial 
changes in territory, population, or government, or even, in some cases, by a combination of all 
three’,1042 the mechanism through which the continuation of statehood is maintained mirrors 
that which operated in their coming into being as a State, namely, international recognition. 
Among the measures that the international community may be called upon to adopt to assist 
Pacific Island States – most of which will presumably take place through the UN – the non-
withdrawal of international recognition, be it through suspension of UN membership, owing to 
a total incapacity to fulfil the obligations of UN membership, or bilaterally, by unilateral 
declarations of States, will be the principal means by which Pacific island statehood will be 
preserved. As already pointed out in Section 2 of the present chapter, in the initial and mid-
term phases of de-territorialization and de-population, the preservation of the distinct legal 
personality of Pacific Island States may be justified on the grounds of practical necessity. As the 
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 M. KOSKENNIEMI, ‘The Future of Statehood’, supra, at 397. 
1041
 Ibid., at 409. [Emphasis added]. 
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 J. CRAWFORD, supra, at 417. 
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situation worsens, Pacific islands’ governments (whether in situ or ex situ) will require that the 
States they represent each maintain its legal personality, so as to be able to organize a scheme 
for the protection of their population (through the issue of passports, negotiation of migration 
arrangements with other countries or purchase of land abroad where to move the totality of 
the population), manage the State’s assets (legal mechanisms seeking to fix the outer 
boundaries of their maritime spaces, so that the population may still benefit from the direct or 
indirect revenues from the exploitation of their State’s maritime resources); and, ultimately, 
take the appropriate political decisions about the State’s future as a political entity, leading to 
either the assumption of their own extinction (which, according to the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse, does not seem to be their position so far) or through 
alternative mechanisms, such as the constitution of a federation or even merger with other 
bordering States.  
 As sustaining international recognition of Pacific Island States that have become highly 
deteriorated by the adverse impacts of climate change can be justified on utilitarian and 
pragmatic grounds, the temporality of such an argument seems still to be inevitable. Besides, 
as already pointed out above, the natural bias of the international legal system towards 
stability will naturally help in maintaining Pacific islands’ recognition of statehood and full UN 
membership for a while. Yet, one may still raise the question of whether it will still make sense 
to maintain a legal fiction, in situations where the level of deterioration of the material 
elements of the State may be close to completion, especially if the necessary adjustments to 
the future of the State and the protection of its population ever come to be made. If the time 
ever comes when such a point is reached, we shall be facing an unprecedentedly extreme-case 
scenario and embodying the realm of ‘the exception’ that, as Carl Schmitt explained, may 
provide more information on the nature of sovereignty and statehood and perhaps even 
delimit the presently vague boundaries of these two legal concepts than any other previous 
situation.1043 To be sure, questioning whether, even in such extreme circumstances, the 
continuation of statehood ought to be acknowledged, and considering that such situations 
would be tantamount to the disappearance of the material elements of the State that the 
possibility of conceiving a ‘metaphysical State’ is indirectly being suggested, implies an 
incursion into a utopia, understood, as defined by M. Koskenniemi, as a realm which directs us 
to the place ‘where developments in the international legal order would like to be seen’. If, as 
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the same author states, ‘statehood alone is an insufficient basis for international law’,1044 the 
next question that arises is whether the justification of the continuation of Pacific islands’ 
statehood (including in extreme circumstances) may be based on other arguments than the 
merely utilitarian and practical one. An incursion into the realms of both responsibility and 
possible future prescriptive avenues regarding this matter becomes thereafter necessary. 
 
4. A PLEA FOR THE CONTINUATION OF PACIFIC ISLANDS’ STATEHOOD: EXPLORING LEGAL 
AND ETHICAL GROUNDS  
 
4.1. Legally Based Avenues: State Responsibility and Liability for Climate Change Damage 
 
4.1.1. Duty to Prevent, and Compensation for, Transboundary Damage: A Principal Remedy for 
Climate Change Damage  
 
When dealing with cases in which State continuation is considered to be at stake, the 
assumption of the State as a ‘legal person’ may be as relevant as the analysis of how the basic 
criteria of statehood have been affected by the changing circumstances. Considering the State 
from this perspective essentially entails, as J. CRAWFORD indicates, that the State be defined 
‘as the sum of its rights and duties and, most notably, of its powers and immunities’.1045 This 
does not imply, however, that the State’s identity is exclusively defined by reference to the 
legal obligations and rights of the State in question, rather than by application of the criteria of 
statehood. Endorsing this view, which was formulated by K. Marek and rejected by J. Crawford 
on different grounds, would indeed be contradictory to the position taken in the present 
thesis, that statehood is determined by the conjunction of its three basic criteria (territory, 
population and government), and thus rejects the constitutive theory of recognition.1046 
Rather, the observation of the particular rights and duties of States whose continuation is 
considered to be at stake is based on the understanding that they are the consequence (rather 
                                                          
1044
 M. KOSKENNIEMI, supra, at 408-409. 
1045
 J. CRAWFORD, supra, at 401-402.  
1046
 Contra, J. CRAWFORD, supra, at 401, who explains: ‘Allowing greater attitude to recognition and the 
views of the actors concerned, one would have thought that reasonable solutions to problems of identity 
could have been found by reference to the basic criteria of statehood affecting the entities at the 
relevant times. A different approach has been adopted in Marek’s leading study: there, the identity is 
defined by reference to the legal obligations of the State in question, rather than by application of the 
criteria of statehood’. While making several objections to Marek’s position, Crawford nonetheless 
acknowledged that: ‘This is not to say that the State is some meta-legal thing, qua legal person it is, in a 
sense, merely the sum of its rights and duties and most notable of its powers and immunities’, at 401-
401. 
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than the criteria) of statehood.1047 In addition, it is crucial to recall that the nature of the 
factual circumstances threatening a State with extinction may have an impact on the way in 
which the question of the legal status of the State concerned is resolved. Indeed, as James 
Crawford recalls, ‘effective submersion or disappearance of separate State organs in those of 
another State, over any considerable period of time, will result in the extinction of the State so 
long at least as no substantial international illegality is involved’.1048 This rule, mostly 
developed for cases of illegal annexation, creates an obligation of non-recognition of the 
extinction of the annexed State, incumbent upon all States. 
An incursion into the field of State responsibility and liability for transboundary harm 
may thus unveil the existence of particular rights of Pacific Island States that could possibly 
help in protecting, ensuring or even defending their continuation as States (perhaps even in 
scenarios in which recognition of the continuation of the States concerned amounts to 
upholding a legal fiction).1049 To be sure, the difference between cases of illegal annexation 
and the threats due to climate change impacts on Pacific Island States is that, while the former 
refers to the breach of the peremptory norm – the general prohibition of the use of force – by 
classical means (military invasion by a foreign State in the context of debellatio), the attack on 
Pacific islands’ territorial integrity results from the adverse effects of acts that do not violate 
peremptory norms and may not even be prohibited by international law and which are not 
easily attributable to one State alone. Yet, the possibility of invoking States’ responsibility and 
liability for climate-change damage and to obtain compensation may be useful for Pacific 
Island States to finance all necessary adaptation and response measures, including, inter alia, 
the purchase of lands abroad, the development of population plans, the display of survey 
early-warning mechanisms to avoid catastrophic consequences of climate disasters and to 
monitor the scope and evolution of the de-territorialization in each State. And indeed, Pacific 
                                                          
1047
 J. CRAWFORD, supra, at 402, making a fundamental explanation: ‘Yet, particular rights, duties and 
powers in terms of the creation of States, are not criteria for, but rather the consequence of statehood. It 
therefore seems sensible to make continuity, identity and extinction depend on variants of these basic 
criteria; that is, primarily, territory, population and independent government, and subsidiary criteria (but 
criteria which may be particularly important in doubtful or marginal cases), permanence and 
recognition.’  
1048
 J. CRAWFORD, supra, at 416. [Emphasis added]. 
1049
 See for instance, P. CASHMAN and R. ABBS, ‘Liability in Tort for Damage Arising from Human-
Induced Climate Change’, in R. LYSTER (ed.), In the Wilds of Climate Law, 2010, (Brisbane: Australian 
Academic Press); one recent account of the difficulties of applying the law of State responsibility for 
unlawful acts to the context of ‘sinking islands’ can be found in J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced 
Displacement and International Law, supra, at 92-96. The author particularly highlights how establishing 
causation is likely to constitute the greatest obstacle, but considers nonetheless that ‘litigation can serve 
a political function, in addition to asserting legal rights’, at 95.  
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Island States themselves have shown unprecedented interest and engagement in the 
development of international law on State liability and compensation for transboundary harm. 
First, it is noteworthy that four Pacific Island States – Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea – made a declaration of interpretation upon their ratification of the UNFCCC stating 
that their understanding that ‘signature of the Convention shall, in no way, constitute a 
renunciation of any rights under international law concerning state responsibility for the 
adverse effects of climate change’.1050  Since September 2011, the President of the Republic of 
Palau, Johnson Toribiong, embarked on a new legal and political initiative calling for an ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on the obligations and responsibilities of States under international law.1051 
While the ultimate aim of this initiative seeks to bring greenhouse gas emissions under control, 
its launch has been undoubtedly triggered by the prior development of the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse, in which the connection between climate change impacts 
and the threat to the continuation of small island States, as particularly emphasized by Palau’s 
representative at the 2009 session of the UN General Assembly, was finally acknowledged in 
the 2011 Security Council Presidential Statement. Unsurprisingly, therefore, President 
Toribiong repeatedly referred to the successful incorporation of the Discourse into the agenda 
of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, and the related developments in each of 
these fora.1052 
So far, the possibility of obtaining remedies for climate change damage has mainly 
been dealt with in the context of State responsibility and liability for injurious acts not 
prohibited by international law (rather than within the context of State liability for unlawful 
acts).1053 Ever since the beginning of the 1980s, the International Law Commission (ILC) has 
worked on the codification and development of both the law on prevention of transboundary 
environmental damage (primary rule), and the law on compensation for such damage 
                                                          
1050
 All declarations of interpretation to the UNFCCC can be found at: 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/5410.php>.  
1051
 See Johnson TORIBIONG, President, Rep. Palau, Statement to the 66
th
 Regular Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (22 September 2011), available at the official website of Palau’s Permanent 
Mission to the United Nations, at: <http://gadebate.un.org/66/palau>. For a recent explanation and 
defence of the position of the Republic of Palau, see Aaron KORMAN and Giselle BARCIA, ‘Rethinking 
Climate Change: Towards an International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion’, (2012) Yale Journal of 
International Law Online, vol. 37, pp. 35-42.   
1052
 See Chapter 3, supra.  
1053
 For a general explanation of the international liability regime, see for instance K. ZEMAKEK, ‘Causes 
and Forms of International Liability’, in B. CHENG and E. DUNCAN BROWN (eds.): Contemporary 
Problems in International Law: Essays in Honour of Georg Schwartzenberger on His Eightieth Birthday, 
1988, (London: Stevens and Sons); and M. BEDJAOUI, ‘Responsibility of States: Fault and Strict Liability’, 
(1987) Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4, pp. 358-362. 
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(secondary rule).1054 As extensively developed by Roda Vereyen, the foundations of the law in 
this field can be found in the no-harm rule existing in customary international law.1055 The 
1941 Trail Smelter arbitration case had an important influence on the formulation and content 
of the no-harm rule and set the basis of the duty to prevent environmental damage and of the 
law on State responsibility for such damage, not only with regard to States in conflict, but also 
with regard to the territories of other States, common spaces of mankind and the environment 
as a whole.1056 Although the basic rationale of the Trail Smelter case would only become 
clearly significant in the 1990s, the UN Survey of International Law had already concluded as 
early as 1949 that, on the basis of the principle of territorial integrity, ‘there has been general 
recognition of the rule that a State must not permit the use of its territory for purposes 
injurious to the interest of other States in a manner contrary to international law’. With these 
‘founding’ momentums, the no-harm rule found a special place after being enshrined in 
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which recognized 
that States have both ‘the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.’1057 It was completed by Principle 22, calling upon States to 
develop international law on State liability for transboundary harm.1058 The next stage that 
finally reaffirmed the existence and content of the no-harm rule, and in which the significant 
impact of the Trail Smelter case became evident, was when, in 1996, the ICJ endorsed it in the 
Nuclear Weapons case, holding that ‘the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment’. All 
in all, as Vereyen explains, the essential content of the no-harm rule is that it obliges States to 
continually adapt their behaviour in the light of other States’ interests, and is thus an 
                                                          
1054
 See J. COMBACAU and D. ALLAN, ‘Primary and Secondary Rules in the Law of State Responsibility: 
Categorizing Legal Obligations’, (1985) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 16, pp. 81- 109. 
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 The no harm rule is also referred to as principle of good-neighbourliness or the rule of harmless use 
of territory. See P.M DUPUY, ‘International Liability for Transfrontier Pollution’, in M. BOTHE, Trends in 
International Environmental Policy and Law, 1980, (Gland, Switzerland: International Union for the 
Conservation of Natural Resources), pp. 369-379.  
1056
 R. VERHEYEN, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State 
Responsibility, 2005 (The Hague, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers). 
1057
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Development, adopted on 16 June 1972, in 
Stockholm (Sweden), principle 21. [Emphasis added].  
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expression of good faith. Yet this rule, in its customary form, has been limited, for it only 
entails a duty of prevention, which may only be triggered – according to State practice and 
scholarship – by significant and serious damage.  
The existence of the no-harm rule, as enshrined and expressly recognized in the 
Stockholm Declaration, was the starting point of the work of the International Law Commission 
on this matter. As J. Juste Ruiz recalls, the remote roots of the work of the ILC on responsibility 
and liability for transboundary harm can be traced back to the orientation of the work directed 
by Roberto Ago on the codification of State responsibility. Ever since R. Ago’s first report was 
released, in 1963, the ILC began recognizing the existence of situations in which State 
responsibility could be engaged for the injurious consequences of their acts, despite not being 
prohibited by international law. Following the celebration of the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
on the Human Environment, the General Assembly tasked the ILC with this matter, which was 
finally put on its agenda in 1978 under the heading ‘Responsibility for Injurious Consequences 
of Acts not Prohibited by International Law’. Robert Quentin-Baxter was appointed as the first 
Special Rapporteur, who delivered five reports between 1980 and 1984, including the 1982 
schematic outline which sought to address both the preventive and the reparative aspects of 
the theme, as well as the need to establish a fair balance between the freedom of action of 
States and their responsibility and obligation not to cause harm to other States; or, in M. 
Bedjaoui words, ‘the necessity of reconciling the greatest possible freedom of action for States 
with the justified fear that undisciplined use of technological and industrial power might spell 
the ruin of mankind’.1059 Then, the ILC appointed Julio Barboza as the second Special 
Rapporteur, who delivered twelve reports between 1985 and 1996. His proposition was to 
extend the scope of the proposed rules to harm caused in areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
and aimed at addressing not only the liability of States but also responsibility for harm by 
private individuals. As of 1992, the ILC decided that the work on this matter would be pursued 
gradually, so as to finish first the work on the primary rule on prevention of transboundary 
harm and continue afterwards with the secondary rule on liability and reparation; this 
distinction would become more accentuated after, in 1997, the ILC considered that there were 
two distinct – albeit interrelated – questions which would be dealt with separately from then 
onwards. As a result of this shift, the work of the Commission on the theme of Responsibility 
and Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law have been, 
until now, exclusively centred on the codification and development of the primary rule of 
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prevention. In 1997, the ILC appointed Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao as the third Special 
Rapporteur on this matter, who delivered a report a year later containing seventeen articles 
exclusively dedicated to the issue of prevention of transboundary harm. Finally, in 2000, the 
ICL adopted the final text of the project, consisting of nineteen articles on ‘Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm Resulting from Dangerous Activities’, which was endorsed in 2001 by the 
UN General Assembly, along with the recommendation of the ILC to elaborate a Convention 
based on the draft Articles adopted by the ILC. However, the Assembly limited itself to 
expressing its gratefulness for the great task undertaken by the Commission, inviting it to re-
launch its examination of the issues pertaining to State liability and reparation.  
 
4.1.2. The Maintenance of the Recognition of Pacific Islands’ Statehood: A Subsidiary Remedy 
for Climate Change Damage? 
 
 The underdevelopment of the law on State responsibility and liability for 
transboundary harm makes it difficult, so far, to ascertain whether Pacific Island States may 
receive economic compensation for the generally acute deterioration of the material elements 
composing them. The first problem is the lack of a conventional source establishing primary 
and secondary obligations in instances of transboundary harm. On the one hand, the work of 
the ICL on State responsibility for injurious acts not prohibited by international law has not 
been used by the UN General Assembly to promote the celebration of a convention on the 
duty of prevention in these cases, based on the articles presented and endorsed by it in 2001, 
while the question of State liability and compensation in such instances remains pending. On 
the other hand, the multilateral environmental agreements containing the no-harm rule in a 
conventional form are not applicable in cases of de-territorialization and de-population of 
Pacific Island States, since the material scope of application of such agreements does not 
match activities which have been recognized as contributing to climate change. Although, 
presumably, such lack could be compensated by the fact that the ratification of the UNFCCC by 
virtually all States – 194 States Parties and one regional economic integration organization – 
does recognize both the existence of a causal link between the emission of greenhouse gases 
and climate change – also referred to as the man-made cause of climate change- 1060  and the 
special responsibility of industrialized countries in the emission of greenhouse gases, as is 
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embodied in the structural principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The 
ratification of the UNFCCC could therefore have served as the conventional origin of the 
construction of State responsibility for climate change damage, had it not been for the fact 
that most States made declarative interpretations of their ratification of UNFCCC explicitly 
preventing such an application.1061 Therefore, all in all, the only ‘fall back’ source of State 
responsibility and liability for climate change damage would be the existing customary no-
harm rule. Yet, its applicability in these cases would also remain highly questionable, for the 
absence of fault in such cases is replaced by the need to prove the causal link between the 
damage and a specific action (non-prohibited by international law) attributable to a specific 
State. Yet, while the main victims of climate change damage can be quite easily identified – as 
those pertaining to the group of ‘most vulnerable countries’ – and the place of Pacific Island 
States in this group is unquestionable, the attribution to one or more specific States of the 
particular action that has caused such damage remains difficult, for one main reason. Although 
the evolution of international law since the end of World War II has come to recognize the 
existence of ‘global commons’ (a concept which began in the Law of the Sea with the idea that 
the high seas were a ‘common heritage of mankind’, and was applied afterwards to the global 
atmosphere in the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer), it still falls short 
of recognizing the existence of ‘global responsibilities’ for damage caused by all States but 
affecting, in a particularly acute way, a specific group of States.  
For all these reasons – and pending the finalization of the Advisory Opinion by the 
International Court of Justice on responsibility for climate change impacts put forward by the 
Republic of Palau – economic compensation of Pacific Island States from this source seems, 
unfortunately, unlikely to happen. This is regrettable, for the income obtained from such 
compensation could be valuable for developing plans in reaction to the progressive 
deterioration of the material elements of the State. Yet, one could suggest that, as an 
alternative (or eventually complementary) to the lack of an established right to economic 
compensation for climate change impacts, a duty to recognize the continuation of the States 
affected by severe climate change impacts may be upheld. This obligation of recognition – 
contrasting with the obligation of non-recognition of the extinction of a State following illegal 
annexation by another State – could be argued, at least during the time when the fate of 
Pacific Islanders is decided.  
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4.2. Ethically Based Avenues: Exploring and Contextualizing Streams of Environmental Justice  
 
4.2.1. The Threat to Pacific Islands’ Statehood: A Global, Southern and Post-Colonial Issue 
  
As the shortcomings of a legally based argument in favour of the continuation of 
Pacific Island States have been reviewed, the closing section of this thesis presents the basis 
for a short – and yet important – prescriptive note. To be sure, this is tantamount to entering 
what Marti Koskenniemi defined as ‘the realm of the utopia’,1062 in which the international 
lawyer, standing in the present, is called upon to think where and how international law 
should evolve. The first and foremost difficulty when embarking on such a path is being 
confronted with the task of making epistemological choices, in the midst of a complex system 
in which the traditionally accepted normative values that underline international legal 
discourse have been dramatically challenged by new historical circumstances as much as by 
intellectual arguments. This ‘time of perplexity’, as Thomas Frank called it, carries with it the 
heavy burden of constant uncertainty. And, in fact, it may not seem very coherent to close the 
thesis with a prescriptive note after having presented and developed it from the assumption 
that knowledge is culturally determined, so that ‘our notions of fairness, as also problems of 
freedom, are culturally determined and cannot be said to reflect anything but global values’.1063 
Yet, as this pressing topic will remain, in the years to come, a mutable field of enquiry, a 
reference to the ethical parameters in which it may be subject to further evolution seems 
necessary. While a full-fledged and comprehensive conceptualization of this issue in ethical or 
philosophical terms falls outside the scope of this thesis, this sub-section nonetheless attempts 
to pinpoint the main structural characteristics of the ethical parameters of this topic. In fact, 
this endeavour seems all the more required that the question of whether – and, in the 
affirmative, when – a Pacific Island State will cease to exist will presumably be resolved in the 
political realm before legal arguments are called into play and accommodate the political 
resolution of the issue at stake. A look at the ethical underpinnings of this situation may 
therefore serve to help us understand the different present and future political directions 
promoted.  
When sketching the philosophical issue in international environmental law, James 
Nickel and Daniel Magraw noted that ‘the philosophy of environmental law overlaps 
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considerably with philosophical work in environmental ethics’.1064 Similarly, the issue of State 
extinction due to or resulting from climate-change impacts overlaps and crosscuts more than 
one philosophical demand. One way to approach the ethical parameters of this topic is 
therefore to conceive it as a structure comprising three different layers. The first layer covers 
the global scale of analysis and allows regarding this issue as pertaining to the broader debate 
on inter-generational fairness; the second layer, in turn, is grounded in the North/South divide, 
colouring the global scale of analysis with additional considerations from the third-world 
approaches to international law on global environmental justice; finally, the third layer adds 
complexity by reminding us of how the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
pointed out the limits of the North/South divide in this case-scenario, for the developmental 
rationale of emerging countries clashed with the existential claims of Pacific Island States. 
The image of ‘drowning’ or ‘sinking’ States has certainly come to be equated with one 
of the most paradigmatic images of today’s post-modern global environmental crisis; an image 
which, Jane McAdam highlights, ‘has become the canary in the coalmine – the litmus test for 
the dramatic impacts of climate change on human society’.1065 Before considering the 
consequences of the loss of international legal personality from a geopolitical, State-centred 
perspective, it is worth noting that this issue represents the most stringent manifestation of 
the need to take the interests of future generations into account when world governments 
participate in decision-making. The principle of inter-generational justice, which traditionally 
arose in the context of decision-making involving resources or pollution,1066 is also referred to 
in the Preamble as well as in Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC.1067 To be sure, one of the main 
problems of this principle is that it requires world governments to adopt long-term 
perspectives about future peoples and future needs about which they lack factual knowledge. 
Although, as Nickel and Magraw state, we can nonetheless ‘be confident that they will need a 
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liveable earthly home,’1068 this inherent looseness – referred to by Robert Crisp as ‘the non-
identity problem’ – 1069 surely impinges on the capacity of the principle to effectively influence 
world governments and relevant actors during decision-making processes. Yet, in many 
respects, the case of Pacific Island States highly reduces the need to make uncertain 
projections; somehow, it makes ‘real’, and close to the present time, the needs of the future 
generations of Pacific islanders. Indeed, it is not surprising that most political statements of 
Pacific Island States’ representatives continuously make direct references to the next two 
generation of islanders (that is, to the grandsons and granddaughters of present politicians, 
some of whom may already be born), and the fear that, as early as within these next two 
generations, their descendents will be forcibly set apart from their traditional lands and loose 
a fundamental source of their cultural heritage. Therefore, the ‘sinking State’ paradigm is not 
only an issue which fits within the moral demands laid down by the principle of inter-
generational justice, now quite solidly settled in international environmental law; it also 
embodies such principle in a way that is closest to a present reality than any other mid- term 
or long-term scenario to which the principle has been applied.  
The principle of inter-generational justice goes hand in hand with the view –
particularly widespread among Northern countries – that the defining and ultimate purpose of 
international environmental law is to improve the state of the ‘global environment’. As much 
as the ‘sinking State’ paradigm can be been approached from this ethical ‘global standpoint’, it 
is necessary, as Adil Najam explains, to ‘accept that environmental concerns need to be 
contextualized within the broader politics of sustainable development, which is itself 
contextualized within the even broader context of North-South politics’.1070 Considering in 
addition that, in the formulation of environmental concerns, ‘the core of the issue is the 
environmental condition’,1071 one is called upon to treat today’s extreme vulnerability of 
Pacific Island States and the threat to the continuation of their statehood as part of a broader 
context that takes into account their Southern and postcolonial identity as inherent 
components of such environmental condition.1072  
                                                          
1068
 J. NICKEL and D. MAGRAW, supra, at 457. 
1069
 R. CRISP, ‘Ethics and International Environmental Law’, in S. BESSON and J. TASIOULAS (eds.), supra, 
pp. 473-490, at 477.  
1070
 A. NAJAM, ‘Why Environmental Politics Look Different from the South?’, in P. DAUVERGNE (ed.), 
Handbook of Global Environmental Politics, 2005, (Northampton: Edward Elgar Pub.), pp. 111-126, at 
123.  
1071
 Ibid. [Emphasis added].  
1072
 This is a means to effect what the objective highlighted by Mark Stallworthy, namely to find 
‘available environmental justice frameworks for addressing localized impacts’ despite the fact that the 
‘law/policy solutions must ultimately be found globally’, see M. STALLWORTHY, ‘Environmental Justice 
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For this reason, it is a matter which naturally lends itself to inspection in terms of Third 
World approaches to international law (TWAIL), a movement which, as Karin Mickelson 
explains, engages with the predominant discourse of international law and its failure to take 
into account the perspectives and concerns of the Third World by incorporating the post-
colonial critique earlier espoused by Young.1073 Indeed, the ‘sinking island’ paradigm is 
embodied by underdeveloped States that have acquired independent legal personality 
following decolonization,1074 and whose extreme vulnerability to the impacts of climate change 
results not only from their geographical characteristics, but is also bound to the colonial 
exploitation by their former colonial rulers. Indeed, as Ulrich Beck puts it, ‘the exposure to risk 
is replacing the class as the main inequality of modern society, for risk is defined in a reflexive 
way by the actors. The exposure to risk is basically a power game’. 1075 Therefore, in this sense, 
the statehood of Pacific Island States threatened by climate-change impacts cannot be 
understood as being disconnected from the earlier colonial encounter. Rather, their current 
situation should be seen as a continuation or even as the latest manifestation of such 
encounter. This approach implies embracing Antony Anghie’s view on colonialism; his 
unwillingness to relegate it to the past and conceive it, instead, as a phenomenon that still 
‘reproduces itself through its victims and continuously creates and represses new subjects’.1076  
In addition to the consequences of Pacific Island States’ post-colonial identity for the 
understanding of their present environmental condition – and largely connected to these – 
one should also bear in mind that, in many respects, the ‘sinking State’ paradigm must also be 
understood within the context of sustainable development and the North–South divide, 
generally pertaining to the debate on how global environmental justice should be materialized 
in an unequal world.1077 For indeed, the image of Pacific Island States, which has penetrated 
                                                                                                                                      
Imperatives for an Era of Climate Change’, (March 2009) Journal of Law and Society, vol. 36, issue 1, pp. 
55-74, at 73.  
1073
 See K. MICKELSON, ‘Critical Approaches’, in D. DOBANSKY, J. BRUNÉE and E. HEY, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law, 2007 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), pp. 262-290, 
at 273.  
1074
 For a reconstruction of the history of their creation as States, see Chapter 4, Section 2.2.  
1075
 U. BECK, ‘Vivir en la Sociedad del Riesgo Mundial’, (2007) Documentos CIBOB-Dinámicas 
Interculturales, vol. 8, pp. 5-32, at 11: ‘La exposición al riesgo está reemplazando a la clase como 
principal desigualdad de la sociedad moderna, por ser el riesgo definido reflexivamente por los actores. 
La definición del riesgo es básicamente un juego de poder.’ [My own translation from the Spanish]. 
1076
 See A. ANGUIE, ‘The “Heart of my Home”: Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the Nauru Case’, 
(1993) Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 34, issue 2, pp. 445-473, at 505, (cited in K. MICKELSON, 
‘Critical Approaches’ supra, at 273). 
1077
 Literature on this issue is of course very extensive and essentially deals with the distributional issues 
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change) policies. See, for instance, H. SHUE, Global Environment and International Inequality’, (1999) 
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today’s collective imagination as the paramount example of vulnerability, strikingly contrasts 
with their almost insignificant responsibility for the creation of climate change. As southern-
hemisphere countries, their image also accounts for the unjust and dark faces of an industrial 
revolution that largely took place within northern-hemisphere industrial countries. As already 
pointed out in Section 4.1.2, this point is relevant when considering the obligations – be they 
moral or political – of the international community of not withdrawing the recognition of 
statehood of Pacific Island States. 
And yet, as the reconstruction of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse before universal international organizations revealed, it was the big emerging BRICS 
countries, leaders of the southern world, who initially stood against the introduction of the 
Discourse before universal international organizations, so it can be inferred that the ‘sinking 
State’ paradigm partly cross-cuts and defies the traditional North–South divide.1078 This, 
however, is not a circumstance wiping away the fact that the case of Pacific Island States falls 
within this context. As Adil Najam explains, ‘it would be all-too-easy to find examples within 
specific developing country experiences in global environmental politics that defy the general 
characterisations above [the North-South tension]. As soon as one shifts one’s focus from the 
Southern collective to individual developing countries [...] one could reasonably argue that a 
fascination with a broad term such as “sustainable development” is inappropriate.’1079 
However, as the author responds to this reality of international politics, ‘equally, it is self-
evident that there are many important distinctions within the South’1080 and highlights the fact 
that developing countries still project a collective image.  
All in all, the ethical parameters in which the ‘sinking State’ paradigm should not be 
approached or located within one single ethical stream seems to require a sui generis ethical 
approximation in which elements of global ethical parameters, such as the principle of inter-
generational justice, must be contextualized within the North–South divide and post-colonial 
critique. Two main considerations can be extracted from this double-edged ethical ground to 
facilitate understanding of future policy and legal developments. On the one hand, the stream 
on inter-generational justice invites exploring the situation of Pacific Island States outside the 
Statist framework, and turning towards the peoples of the region. On the other hand, the 
relevance of some of the critiques laid down by the TWAIL movement implies that such a turn 
                                                                                                                                      
International Affairs, vol. 75, issue 3, pp. 531-545; and M. GRUBB, ‘Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the 
International Debate on Climate Change’, (1995) International Affairs, vol. 71, issue 3, pp. 463-496.  
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towards the peoples should be done by taking into account their southern and post-colonial 
conditions as elements of their identity. And thus, the sum of these two points leads us to 
explore, in the last sub-section of this thesis, the relevance of Pacific islanders’ right to self-
determination in the future resolution of the situation of Pacific Island States, threatened by 
extinction as a result of climate change impacts.  
 
4.2.2. The Turn to the Peoples: The Future of Pacific Islands’ Statehood in the Light of Pacific 
Islanders’ Right to Self-Determination? 
 
Irrespective of the legal, political and ethical grounds – all of which may seem, today, 
quite weak – in favour of the continuation of Pacific Island States’ statehood, three scenarios 
may ultimately crystallize. In the first scenario – the one best preserving the status quo – 
international recognition of Pacific Island States and independent political entities is simply 
maintained. For the interim period in which de-territorialization and de-population remain 
partial, this is the scenario that will presumably take place for all twelve Pacific Island States. 
However, once total (or at least en masse) de-population finally crystallizes, particularly in the 
three Pacific Island States exclusively consisting of low-lying coral atolls (Tuvalu, Kiribati and 
the Marshall Islands), States may, as Jane McAdam notes, ‘gradually withdraw their 
recognition of an entity as a State’1081 for, as already pointed out, granting or withdrawing 
recognition of an entity as a State is a political and discretionary act, which cannot be imposed 
on any State other than in exceptional cases where the creation of a State results from a 
previous unlawful use of force or breach of a ius cogens rule (in which cases – none of which is 
the case of Pacific Island States – States are bound not to recognize the new entity as a State).  
As already developed in Chapter 4, the Holy See and the Order of Malta exemplify how 
international law’s flexibility may allow for alternative forms of sovereignty to be recognized, 
even outside the statist framework. In addition, if the international legal personality of Pacific 
Island States were to become extinct and alternative forms of ‘non-State’ sovereign statehood 
were discarded, the future of Pacific peoples’ political organization could take various forms, 
including federation, merger or association with neighbouring countries.1082 Although the 
decision of whether – and, in the affirmative, which – alternative and exceptional path may be 
taken to accommodate these unprecedented cases will surely depend, to a great extent, on 
the reactions of the international community; the will of the actors concerned is equally 
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fundamental. This thesis has consistently taken this view, considering that the actors to be 
taken into account were the Pacific Island States themselves, whose view on their own 
situation can be, so far, primarily found in the reconstruction of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse. This principled approach is not surprising, for, as James 
Crawford recalls, the general rule still holds that the State, qua community of persons, has 
rights in international law which are moderated through a government that is ‘not necessarily 
representative, but legally the representative, of the people of the State’.1083 Governments 
represent in international relations not only the State itself, but also, in principle, the people of 
the State. Nonetheless, the position taken by the government could eventually diverge from 
the interests or the will of the people of the State that a government represents; also, as is the 
case of Pacific Island States, when the continuation of the State is put into question, the 
interests of the people of the State may emerge independently of the official position of the 
State as expressed through its government. An exploration of Pacific peoples’ rights in the 
context of the possible extinction of their States seems, therefore, both suitable and justified. 
Two consecutive sorts of rights of Pacific island peoples are likely to become relevant in this 
context: first, the right to self-determination; and, once self-determination is exercised, the 
right to physical and cultural existence as peoples (presumably in the territory of another 
State).  
By virtue of this right to self-determination, defined in Article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Pacific island peoples have already been called on once 
to ‘determine their political status’ following decolonization.1084 Now, in the midst of ever more 
pressing forces exerted over the material elements of the State – arguably constituting, as 
pointed out in the previous Section, the latest manifestation of the colonial encounter – such 
right may be revived. As Ian Browlie explains, the exercise of the right to self-determination 
‘does not necessarily involve a claim to statehood and secession’.1085 In Pacific island peoples, 
the idea of the State is not particularly stringent. Indeed, as Jane McAdam highlights ‘for many 
Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati, the issues of key importance to them as the retention of ‘home’ – land, 
community and identity – rather than preserving the political entity of the State itself’.1086 Two 
                                                          
1083
 J. CRAWFORD, ‘The Rights of Peoples: “Peoples” or “Governments”?’, in J. CRAWFORD (ed.), The 
Rights of Peoples, 1988, (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press), pp. 55-67, at 56.   
1084
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main divergent conclusions can be extracted from this fact. On the one hand, one should in 
principle expect that, if the preservation of the State itself is not of major importance for 
Pacific island peoples, the exercise of their right to self-determination will thus lean, without 
much controversy, towards choosing one of ‘various models of “self-government” or 
“autonomy” referred to by Brownlie, such as federalism or association with another State 
(such as Niue and the Cook Islands with New Zealand).1087 On the other hand, however, the 
fundamental importance of the land in Pacific island peoples’ cultural identity leads to the 
opposite conclusion, for, although the State as a political construct is not an inherent part of 
Pacific island peoples’ identity, the land in which they live – which corresponds to the territory 
of the State – is key. Following Jeremy Waldron’s dual conceptual approach to self-
determination, it seems that Pacific island peoples’ claim to self-determination is closer to the 
identity-based – rather than the territorially based – approach, for Pacific island peoples seem 
to regard themselves as culturally – and sometimes also ethnically – distinct.1088 Only in this 
scenario, the perils of the identity-based conception of self-determination – which ‘pulls 
towards outcomes that might only be achieved by unacceptable methods’ such as secession1089 
– are diluted by the same circumstances having raised the exercise of such right.  
Possibly forced to continue their existence as peoples as part of one or several other 
political communities, the maintenance of group identity – which, according to Brownlie, is the 
second form in which groups’ rights are guaranteed after self-determination1090 – will thus be 
essential for Pacific island peoples to avoid their final disappearance, not only as a State, but 
also as a people or ‘nation’. Ultimately, their challenge will thus be to survive what, in the 
context of the prohibition of genocide, has come to be referred to as ‘ethnocide’ – that is, the 
elimination of a group through cultural annihilation.1091  
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
As the third material element of the State, besides territory and population, the 
government embodies the State’s distinctive sovereign powers and provides it with the 
necessary organs to act and to display such powers, both in the national realm and with regard 
to other States in the international arena. Challenges to the governmental capacity of the State 
are therefore challenges to the State’s capacity to fulfil the range of duties expressing the 
legitimacy of its existence. The potentially adverse impacts that climate change may have on a 
State’s governmental capacity have therefore been explored from two standpoints. The first 
was an analysis of how climate change impacts affect the capacity of the State to fulfil the 
weberian functions of the State vis-à-vis its population, offering them security above all, as 
well as meeting other basic survival needs. While the controversial concept of failed States is 
not used in this thesis to define what Pacific Island States may become in the future, it is 
acknowledged that Pacific islands’ capacity to fulfil those functions will probably be 
undermined as the pressure on the other two pillars of the State continues to increase. Such a 
progressive decrease in Pacific islands’ governmental response capacities may in turn be 
particularly worsened as the impacts of climate change on the States’ territory and population 
become so acute that the government itself is forced to evacuate the State territory and settle 
abroad. Recognition of Pacific islands’ prospective ex situ authorities as governments is then 
fundamental for the affected States to be able to: conclude the international bilateral or 
multilateral treaties necessary to secure the protection of the population (for instance, 
through migration agreements); provide valid authorization allowing international assistance 
to enter their territory; enact legislation necessary to adapt to the new exceptional 
circumstances and needs; establish all sorts of disaster-response measures (including, for 
instance, the adoption of national and/or transnational relocation plans); control State assets 
in the territory and abroad, as an important source of revenues needed to finance States’ 
responses to acute levels of de-territorialization and de-population.  
Although, prima facie, the means by which recognition of Pacific islands’ ex situ 
authorities as government does not seem to raise any controversy when compared to 
traditional cases of governments in exile, the special circumstances in which Pacific islands’ 
governments will presumably be forced to evacuate State territory will in the long run 
generate unprecedented problems. This alludes to the instances in which the severe levels of 
de-territorialization (leading to possible complete submergence, in the case of the low-lying 
Pacific Island States of Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands) and de-population (likely to 
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affect most Pacific Island States as progressive de-territorialization leads to the inhabitability of 
the State territory) take place at a time when Pacific islands’ governments are ex situ. In such a 
possible – yet plausible – scenario, the general assumption of the temporality of ex situ 
governments may no longer apply to Pacific Island States. This would generate a myriad of 
specific legal consequences regarding, for instance, the suspension or termination of existing 
treaties for reasons of impossibility of compliance or of a fundamental change in 
circumstances. However, the paramount consequence is that, through the conjunction of the 
threat to the three dimensions of the State, the continuation or extinction of Pacific island 
statehood will be seriously at stake. In such instances, what may initially appear as an 
uncontroversial application of government recognition would turn into recognition of the 
continuation of Pacific Island States. Thus, both the response of the international community 
and the claims of the concerned States regarding their own situations become all the more 
determinant in defining the future of these States in such extreme and marginal situations. 
The present Chapter has shown how, in contrast to the limitations that the adverse impacts of 
climate change may generate in Pacific islands’ governmental capacity with regard to their 
national sphere, their participation in the international arena, always characterized as highly 
active and engaged, is likely to be pursued. Indeed, as the history of Pacific Island States 
shows, their creation as States was closely connected with the underlying normative 
evolutions that the international legal order underwent as a result of de-colonization and the 
correlative quest to secure the United Nations as an organization with a genuinely universal 
scope. For this reason, the admission of Pacific Island States to United Nations membership 
was virtually tantamount to their recognition as States. Ever since then, their engagement with 
the international community has remained extremely active, for it is precisely by such a bond 
to the international community that the inherent governmental limitations are 
counterbalanced. The development of a regional co-operation network through the 
establishment of the Pacific Islands Forum, their active participation in multilateral 
environmental agreements – in particular the UNFCCC, through the AOSIS – are only a few 
examples of how Pacific Island States remain far from being the mere puppets of the Great 
Powers. Now that it is their continuation or extinction as States which is at stake, it can be 
presumed that their active participation in international affairs would, if anything, be all the 
more increased. As already pointed out, the final elements that will prove to be determinant in 
the resolution of their status in the future are recognition by other States and their own claims 
to statehood. It is thus, at this point, that the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse acquires a new relevance. It was not only the source of the legitimization of the 
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question on whether and how do climate change impacts jeopardize the continuation of 
Pacific islands’ statehood; as the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is 
already a presentation of Pacific islands’ plea in favour of their survival as States, it may also 
constitute an important part of the response on the future of their legal status. And thus, the 
question of the continuation of Pacific Island States threatened by climate change impacts 
finds its roots in the political realm, crosscuts different fields of international law, and then is 
ultimately resolved in the political realm as well; as the central and defining institution of 
international law is stretched to its extremes, so are the outer boundaries and limits of 
international law themselves unveiled.  
Nonetheless, this closing Chapter has sought to discover whether recognition of the 
continuation of Pacific islands’ statehood could be based on other arguments than that of 
temporal practical utility or necessity (as a measure to protect their population from 
statelessness) and the fact that Pacific Island States themselves are seemingly reacting against 
their possible extinction as States. The first natural incursion is thus focused on the state of the 
law on State responsibility and liability for climate change damage. There, the present 
underdevelopment of such legal avenues seems to indicate that the possibility of Pacific Island 
States obtaining economic compensation for climate change impacts, as recently put forward 
by Palau’s attempt to gather a majority before the UN General Assembly to request from the 
International Court of Justice an Advisory Opinion on the matter, remains questionable. Yet, it 
has been suggested that, as an alternative remedy for climate change damage in the case of 
Pacific Island States, international recognition of their continuation as States – pending the 
final determination by Pacific islanders of their will – could be raised. Last but not least, as the 
present state of positive law on the matter remains limited, some ethically based arguments in 
favour of an evolution in this sense have been raised. By conceptualizing the future of Pacific 
islands’ statehood as a matter of both global environmental justice to be contextualized within 
the post-colonial North–South context, the path of future evolution in international law in this 
context is traced from a normative perspective. And thus, after coming to terms with the 
blurred and slippery borders between international law and international politics in the realm 
of State extinction, one is ultimately – and perhaps also paradoxically – called upon to pierce 
the veil of the State and consider that the voices which should decide on the future of Pacific 
Island States, particularly of the three most acutely at risk, may be, also, Pacific island peoples.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
‘The law of statehood encapsulates a process not readily 
classified within the assessment of a conglomeration of facts through 
manifold legal prisms, which can either be focused and narrow or 
broad and all-encompassing, such variations are dependent upon 
whether statehood is viewed – usually a priori – as acceptable or 
impermissible in any given situation’.  
Duncan French, Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling 
Tradition and Modernity in International Law, 2013.   
 
1. The Climate Change and International Security Discourse: The Political Representation of 
Pacific Islands’ Struggle for Survival as States 
 
Two years before the turn into the 21st century – at a time when the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse had not yet seen the light of day as a distinguishable self-
standing political representation of the Pacific islands’ struggle for survival – a groundbreaking 
book, originally entitled L’objet du siècle, came to fill the shelves of French bookstores. Written 
by art historian and Lacanian psychoanalyst, André Wajcman, this work constituted, at its core, 
a retrospective search to identify the most fundamental heritage that the bloodiest century 
was leaving to humanity. Starting from the field of fine arts and artistic representation to 
conduct his quest, Wacjman asked himself which artistic object better captured and defined 
the true essence of the 20th century. Ruins? No, something stronger, somewhere further. 
‘Absence’, he concludes, is the truthful object of the 20th century, the one that truly signifies 
such epoch.  
Wacjman’s endeavour to find in artistic representation the essence of that period of 
human history can to any great extent be reproduced in the realm of politics and law when 
approaching the object of study of this thesis. For indeed, the starting point of this study has 
been  the discovery – through reconstruction – of a narrative present in the international 
political sphere where three concepts converge, two of which are the defining concepts 
structuring international relations virtually since the end of the Middle Ages – the State and its 
security – and the third  – namely, climate change – which owes its recent identification to the 
scientific investigation of the effects of the greenhouse gas emissions of the late 20th century. 
If Wajcman’s search for artistic representation of the 20th century brought him to the concept 
of ‘absence’ in contemporary abstract art, the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse which was the subject of the first Part of this thesis and in which all three concepts 
converge, constitutes the political representation of the looming threat of disappearance – as 
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opposed to absence – of the State which, in the 21st century, is confronted with the adverse 
impacts of climate change. To be sure, fundamental differences distance Wajcman’s 
endeavour in the artistic field with our quest in the politico-legal arena, the most fundamental 
of which being that the contextual and psychological framework of Wacjman’s search and 
writing was closely bound to the grave crimes of the Second World War and the Final Solution. 
Being so much historically tainted, his look was also retrospective. The Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse is in contrast a narrative mainly providing a political 
representation of a prospective scenario. One that may ultimately – according to the Discourse 
itself – put at risk the State, this five-hundred-year-old form of political organization, in an 
unprecedented way. One is asked to reconsider the industrialization of developed States, 
under this prism, as the beginning of the end of the political independence of small island post-
colonial States. In this sense, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is a 
testimony of a new shared way of apprehending climate change as a phenomenon; one that 
reveals a new inherent complex concern, namely, the threat of extinction of small-island 
statehood as a result of climate change impacts. Forged in the political realm and embodied in 
the language, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse has thus constructed 
both new meanings and relationships.  
Before the Climate Change and International Security Discourse became recognizable 
and acquired self-standing, the earlier notion of ‘international environmental security’ 
emerged as a combination of two manifestations of the Soviet ‘New Thinking’ promoted by 
Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s – namely, a newly discovered Soviet national 
environmentalism and the reification of international law. Once coined, ‘international 
environmental security’ served as one of the conceptual vehicles of the fundamental change in 
strategy undertaken by the Soviet Union in the United Nations in the late 1980s. The notion 
was thus presented to UN bodies in the form of an ambivalent blueprint, as much as an engine 
of international environmental co-operation as of international disarmament co-operation. 
Unsurprisingly, the United States of America fiercely opposed the Soviet policy-based and 
conceptual innovation put before UN organs, albeit that such rejection was more a reaction 
against the wider Soviet attempt to launch a new debate on the system of international peace 
and security than against the notion of international environmental security as such. Then, the 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc produced a double-edged effect on the concept. On the one 
hand, the Soviet account of ‘international environmental security’ put before UN organs 
dissolved; only the positive dimension – which called for the development of international 
environmental co-operation – was followed up. On the other hand, the notion of 
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environmental security proved to be a useful compensation for the lack of an ‘enemy’ 
syndrome and was re-embraced by American governmental agencies. Important conceptual 
innovations in the notion of security and its relation to the environment mushroomed in the 
schools of international security studies, along with determinant reorientation of funding 
which gave rise to the first empirical attempts to link environmental degradation or stress and 
violent conflict.  
Nowadays, the latter theoretical and empirical accounts of the relation between the 
environmental and the security spheres developed outside the United Nations system remain 
(to some extent) active; they have come to coincide with the emergence of the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse. While this narrative can be chronologically 
considered as a ‘second wave’ of the move linking the environmental and security spheres, 
and has undoubtedly benefitted from the previous knowledge and experience that policy-
makers and research communities had acquired about the links between these two spheres, 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse was launched by a set of actors 
different from those engaged in the ‘international environmental security’ precedent, 
responding to different issues and interests taking place within a post-Cold-War setting, and 
counting with its own specific range of empirical research.  
Born in Germany, where the core contentions, innovative language (for instance, 
referring to climate change as a threat multiplier) and region-based methodology, were 
settled, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse began to acquire self-
standing when the European Union institutionalized it. It is from such a political cradle that the 
formation of an epistemic community on Climate Change and International Security was 
settled through the multiplication of EU contract reports, elaborated by the same community 
that had previously been tasked by the German Government with the early formulations of the 
links between climate change and security. Simultaneously, as individual EU Member States 
(UK, Denmark and The Netherlands) mainstreamed the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse in the realm of their national security strategies, more research institutions 
(such as the International Institute for Sustainable Development and the Royal United Services 
Institute) joined the pioneers (Ecologic Institute and, most importantly, Adelphi Consult). 
These reports, along with the underlying political will that promoted their elaboration, tailored 
the Climate Change and International Security Discourse as a widely embracing umbrella under 
which the manifestation of a range of adverse impacts of climate change (from food security to 
water stress, sea-level rise or the advance of desertification) were mapped in different regions 
of the world. However, the differential characteristic of the Climate Change and International 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
412 
 
Security Discourse, distinguishing it from other related discourses on climate-change 
adaptation and resilience, was its grounding purpose: anticipating how those changes might 
exacerbate local or regional conflict, and correlatively, measuring whether and to what extent 
these changes were likely to modify the geo-political standing of the regional organizations 
and the Member States promoting the Discourse.  
Once settled, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse was 
consolidated through its dissemination by the EU to the OSCE and NATO. Within these two 
regional security organizations, the Discourse became the object of a formal transatlantic 
dialogue between the EU and OSCE Member States and the United States of America. Then, it 
was circulated from these ‘hegemonic regions’ to areas extremely vulnerable to the adverse 
impacts of climate change. As a result, the originally strong geo-political footprint that the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse originally had decreased, and the 
Discourse thus acquired more legitimacy. The contrast between the incorporation of the 
Discourse into the agenda of the Pacific Islands Forum, as well as into the work of the African 
Union, on the one hand, and its restrained acceptance by Asian and Latin American regional 
organizations (ASEAN, Shanghai Co-operation Organization, Organization of American States, 
the Caribbean Community, MERCOSUR, UNASUR and ALBA) indicates that a set of conditions 
was required for a successful dissemination to take place. First of all, the political will of the 
promoter of the Discourse (the EU) to circulate it to a specific organization needed to become 
crystallized through the creation or revival of a political partnership, coupled with the 
association of such an inter-regional co-operation framework with a financial flow (for instance 
in the form of financial investment in adaptation or in renewable-energy projects). Secondly, 
the forum for the reception of the Discourse also involves some requisites. It seems important 
that the members of the regional organization at stake should have a rather homogeneous 
level of vulnerability to climate-change impacts and share a similar or even common position 
in climate change negotiations. Also, the existence of interests in common with the promoters 
of the Discourse or at least the absence of competing economic interest in key areas embraced 
by the Climate Change and International Security Discourse (such as food or energy security) is 
fundamental. 
 Mapping the construction and dissemination of the Climate Change and International 
Security Discourse at the regional level of analysis facilitated understanding of its widely 
embracing and complex underlying rationale. Yet, it is when the international community as a 
whole is confronted with the Discourse that its operation at a universal level of analysis can be 
truly grasped. The introduction of the Discourse into the work of the relevant universal 
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organizations had a double-barrelled and reciprocal impact. On the one hand, the purpose-
based incorporation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse into the work 
of universal organizations reveals the process by which an agenda-setting strategy turns into 
concrete political action, either by transforming previous patterns of international co-
operation or by generating innovative trends. On the other hand, when the Climate Change 
and International Security Discourse was presented to a genuinely unlimited multilateral 
setting, namely, the United Nations, it underwent a transformation as a result of political 
exchange, negotiation and compromise. The ‘shared understanding of the world’, finally 
embodied by the Discourse after going through the prism of universal organizations, evolved 
from its original regional conception and, thus, the concrete actions into which the Discourse 
may be transformed do not match the original purpose of its proponents either.  
The operation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse within 
universal organizations can be divided into three main stages. First, the Discourse was 
introduced to the Security Council as a result of an initiative of the United Kingdom, one of the 
main ‘drivers’ of the Discourse within the European Union. This first contact of the Discourse 
with the UN organ primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, took place at a time when the institutionalization of the EU was still at a very early 
stage. Its presentation to the Security Council, where it was seen by UN Member States that 
had not yet necessarily been reached by the inter-regional circulation of the Discourse, was 
closely attached to a geo-political view on how the consequences of the phenomenon could 
affect several key factors of international security – with special emphasis on its effects on the 
energy sector. The introduction of the Discourse at a time when the 2007 Bali Summit was in 
preparation, coupled with its original hegemonic-biased shape, conveyed the idea that it 
essentially served to exert influence and pressure on the mainstream climate change 
negotiations in an alternative (and arguably illegitimate) way. Despite the fact that States 
threatened by the most extreme impacts of climate change supported the hegemonic initiative 
for its capacity to raise awareness and increase the sense of urgency of dealing with climate 
change, this first attempt to ‘securitize’ climate change unsurprisingly encountered fierce 
opposition from States seeking to preserve the originally grounded developmental rationale of 
international climate change co-operation. However, the shift in the actors determining the 
introduction of the Discourse into the agendas of relevant UN organs and from the EU to 
Pacific Island States, which took it from the Security Council to the General Assembly, changed 
this austere landscape. Indeed, besides the negotiation leading to the endorsement, in 2009, 
of General Assembly Resolution 63/281 on Climate Change and its Possible Security 
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Implications, the existential plea of Pacific Island States tainted the core understanding of the 
Discourse and truly re-signified it. Also, the definition of the respective roles of the UN 
governing bodies and agencies with respect to the Discourse was also established. Thereafter, 
the security implications of climate change were particularly associated with the territorial loss 
and population migration produced by sea-level rise in small island States. This newly fixed 
understanding of the meaning of the Discourse, as well as the division of competence in this 
matter among the relevant bodies and organizations, was finally consolidated when climate 
change entered the agenda of the Security Council for the second time, in 2011. To be sure, 
the last stage of the operation of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
within the concerned universal organization only implied that climate change would, from now 
on, be considered by the Secretary-General in his description of the contextual information of 
Security Council operations but not give rise to concrete measures directed to UN Member 
States. 
Therefore, although so far the Discourse has not turned into actions that might 
significantly modify the behaviour of either the UN or individual Member States regarding 
climate change, a fundamental consequence arises in the realm of law. Indeed, the 
reconstruction of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse has shown how its 
evolution within universal international organizations led to the recognition that the 
continuation of small islands’ statehood is jeopardized by the looming adverse impacts of 
climate change. Political consensus exists which considers that this situation embodies, and 
stands out as, the core issue unveiled by the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse. It is an issue which, by its very subject-matter – the central concept of statehood – 
undeniably deserves and even requires consideration from an international law perspective. 
Indeed, as Emily Crawford and Rosemary Rayfuse noted, ‘while considerations of the effects of 
climate change may seem premature, the law’s quest for certainty requires at least the 
identification, if not a full consideration, of the possible legal consequences of disappearing 
States’.1092 The reconstruction of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse 
proves that undertaking such a task is not as premature as it may seem when compared with 
the indications of timing based on strict scientific criteria.  
To be sure, the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is not, strictly 
speaking, an environmentalist discourse – that is, a narrative that defines and interprets 
environmental affairs and whose ultimate purpose is to address such affairs. Rather, the focus 
                                                          
1092 E. CRAWFORD and R. RAYFUSE,, ‘Climate Change and Statehood’, supra, at 253 
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of the Climate Change and International Security Discourse is on the effects of an 
environmental issue with multiple manifestations on the central socio-political organization of 
the international community. However, the fact that it is the State – and not climate change – 
which constitutes the central element of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse, does not mean that acknowledgement of the existence of climate change and 
concern for such environmental problems is negated nor diminished. In other words, the fact 
that climate change is socially interpreted through the construction by State actors of the 
Climate Change and International Security Discourse does not imply that the phenomenon as 
such is unreal from an empirical and scientific perspective, nor that the existence of both 
perspectives (the Discourse/State and the empirical/scientific perspective) are incompatible or 
mutually exclusive. Embracing the opposite view – predominant among postmodern authors – 
which holds that there is no escape from subjective viewpoints, would be tantamount to 
considering the environment as merely a sub-category of culture. In this thesis, the Climate 
Change and International Security Discourse has not been considered as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ 
per se. Such a normative evaluation has been avoided because it is considered as irrelevant. 
No judgement of the Discourse itself has thus, purposely, been drawn. Rather, the interest in 
the reconstruction of the Discourse has focused on what the Discourse may generate in terms 
of political action in the international sphere which may ultimately lead to the development or 
launch of law-making processes. As a result, embarking on an analysis and comprehensive 
consideration of the impacts of climate change on the continuation of Pacific islands’ 
statehood may not only be based on ‘law’s quest of certainty’, as Emily Crawford and 
Rosemary Rayfuse held, but truly constitute a response to the socio-political claim driven by 
the States concerned and formulated through the construction of the Climate Change and 
International Security Discourse before international fora.  
And, thus, the reconstruction of the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse reached its natural and chronological end, which is the normative point of departure 
from which of the legal question it had revealed is addressed. 
 
2. Legal Consequences of Climate Change Impacts on Pacific Islands’ Statehood: 
Multidimensional Effects and Contextually Dependent Outcomes   
  
When dealing with the consequences of climate change for the continuation of Pacific 
islands’ statehood, the geographical or spatial dimension of the State is the first factor to be 
scrutinized. A genealogical study of the meaning of territory in international law first indicated 
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that, just as the nature of the State – a privileged habitat of the territory – goes beyond the 
realm of law, the place of territory in international law is equally unsettled and its nature 
doubtful from a legal perspective. A mosaic of legal accounts of the notion of territory can thus 
be found; they can be explained by approaching them from a historical perspective and then 
drawing from such context the differing functions that the territory has played in the 
international legal order. In the context of the modern European State, the territory was 
understood as a property of the State (property theory), an element or integral part of the 
State itself (constitutive theory), or the space wherein the competence of the State was 
displayed (competence theory). However, when it comes to determining the meaning of 
territory in post-colonial States, such as Pacific Island States, a fourth understanding of the 
territory emerges. In these cases, the territory was a vehicle for expressing or manifesting the 
right of Pacific island peoples to self-determination and political independence from former 
colonial domination. This particular meaning, that territory is a vehicle for expressing a right, 
explains why Pacific Island States were granted statehood in spite of their very limited land 
area (as opposed to very big maritime spaces), and shows how the existence of a solid 
normative ground may balance and even supersede the viability requirement. In addition, the 
smallness of Pacific islands’ terrestrial extent is largely compensated by vast maritime spaces 
made available to them under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and which are both 
their major spatial expression and their principal source of economic revenues. Paradoxically, 
for these so-called ‘Ocean States’, the sea is as much a fundamental element of their identity 
and the primary source of their livelihood as it is the source of the threat to their continuation 
as States.  
Henceforth, de-territorialization due to the adverse impacts of climate change on 
Pacific Island States constitutes, first and foremost, a challenge to these States’ maritime 
entitlements. As their shorelines progressively retreat as a result of sea-level rise and ocean 
acidification, baselines – generally considered as ‘ambulatory’ – retreat accordingly, and 
therefore so does the outer boundary of the State at stake. Devices seeking to halt this effect 
may include the ratification of maritime delimitation agreements among Pacific Island States 
and, arguably, the possibility to fix their baselines and to acquire archipelagic status by 
claiming archipelagic lines and then refraining from updating the official charts. Less useful and 
more aggressive physical devices, such as the construction of sea walls, have also been 
considered. And yet, as efforts to freeze, preserve or protect the spatial dimension of Pacific 
Island States against the adverse impacts of climate change flourish and develop in the region, 
the prospects of a total de-territorialization scenario cannot be ignored. Alternative responses 
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to this extreme expression of the impact of climate change include making incursions on re-
territorialization strategies, such as the purchase of land or the eventual merger with another 
State and, most prominently, the possibility to argue that completely submerged Pacific Island 
States may continue to be recognized as a post-modern or contemporary form of a non-State 
sovereign entity. The precedents of the Holy See and the Order of Malta, which currently have 
an atypical status, show that there is room and flexibility in international life allowing a 
typology of subjects of the international legal system, as long as strong historical and political 
reasons support this special treatment. It is also a reminder that, although sovereignty is the 
main and principal characteristic of a State, it can also exist outside a statal framework. 
Sovereignty and statehood may thus come together, or be set apart, if necessary, to 
acknowledge the existence of a special political entity that plays a positive role in the 
international community.  
The continuation of Pacific island sovereignty and/or statehood, even in extreme cases 
of total territorial loss, may be justified by the role played by the second dimension of the 
State, namely, the population, since a sovereign political entity with international legal 
personality may result first from its total or acute de-population, before total submergence 
ensues. Closely connected with the looming prospect of de-territorialization, the primary 
manifestation of climate change impacts on the human dimension of Pacific Island States is the 
degradation in the habitability conditions of Pacific islanders. The paradigm reaction to the 
acute environmental stress suffered by the populations of Pacific Island States is their 
displacement and consequent relocation to a different place where their basic survival needs 
may be met. Although such reaction seems, prima facie, the most common ultimate form of 
adaptation, with several previous examples in world history, a closer look at cases of 
accomplished relocation in the Pacific region have unveiled both their fundamentally different 
character, as well as the underlying complexities accompanying such a process in this specific 
region. First, actions conducted in the region seeking to preserve the habitability conditions of 
Pacific islanders, so as to prevent their resettlement, are rather similar and homogeneous 
across Pacific Island States, given that these governmental actions are organized, co-ordinated 
and even financed at a regional level and are closely linked to implementation measures 
stemming from the international regime on climate change, and to international action on 
disaster risk-reduction. In contrast, when such preventive relocation actions cannot guarantee 
the maintenance of the basic survival needs of the population, so that Pacific islanders are 
forced to move, actions seeking to react to relocation scenarios differ widely from one island 
State to another and offer a scattered and highly heterogeneous landscape. These differences 
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flourish as a result of socio-cultural, political, and geographical factors encompassing, inter alia, 
the divergent levels of effective presence of the national governments in their populations’ 
daily life, the complexity of land tenure systems, or the differences between relocations that 
remain within an agricultural setting and relocations implying the move to an urban (and often 
already overpopulated) setting.  
As these root differences are unveiled, a critical approach to how climate-induced 
displacement has so far been dealt with in international legal scholarship has been laid down. 
Although, in general, existing studies rightly diagnose the legal challenges at stake – namely, 
legal scarcity and inappropriateness of the existing instruments and institutions – the solutions 
proposed to overcome such challenges by, for example, the creation of new legal instruments, 
development of existing instruments and institutions or inter-regime linkages, are either ill-
fitted or insufficient to address the inherent complexities of climate-induced displacement in 
the Pacific previously revealed. These are somehow top-down responses that do not respond 
to the existing factual heterogeneity. Besides, and most importantly, none of the proposals 
made so far takes into account the wider and variable context in which relocations take place, 
and thus neglects or disregards the issue of the continuation of the State and how such an 
unresolved matter may greatly affect the responses to the problem of climate-induced 
displacements. As a result, this thesis has suggested an approach to the issue of the legal 
protection of Pacific islanders within a multilayered framework that encompasses both the 
prevention and reactive relocation stages, distinguishes between relocation taking place at a 
national level from cross-border relocations and, in doing so, replaces the issue within its wider 
context by associating it with the unresolved question of whether the continuation of the State 
in question may or may not be at stake. This question is in fact the real axis structuring the 
proposal to deal with climate-induced displacement through a multilayered legal-protection 
scheme, and essentially highlights the view that the fate of Pacific islanders and the eventual 
legal protection they may have cannot be detached from the fate of their State of origin. Then, 
when called upon to fill each of the stages laid down in the multilayered legal protection 
scheme with concrete rights, some of the proposals most recurrently upheld in international 
legal scholarship also appear to be useless in the Pacific. In cases of national displacements – 
which do not jeopardize the continuation of the State – the applicability of human rights treaty 
law is very limited, due to the low level of ratification in this region of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Yet, the development of a human rights 
approach may positively inform the implementation of international environmental law 
instruments – in particular of the UNFCCC, which has been ratified by all Pacific Island States. 
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National relocation in its reactive phase fundamentally alludes to the level of guarantee or 
protection of housing, land and property rights which – apart from being quite poorly 
recognized in international human rights treaty law – are mostly ruled by traditional customary 
systems that may generate significant obstacles for people displaced as a result of climate 
change to gain access to new lands. On the one hand, in these cases, the housing, land and 
property rights of some minority groups (ethnic minorities, women and children) – may be 
covered by specialized human rights treaties which count with a higher level of ratification than 
the general instruments (ICESCR and the ICCPR). On the other hand, informal instruments, such 
as the Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Peoples, despite serving as an appropriate 
road map for future normative developments, are yet not well suited to respond to 
displacements due to environmental conditions rather than conflictual situations. In cases of 
transnational relocations – which constitute the real looming threat to the continuation of 
Pacific islands’ statehood – difficulties arise out of the multiplicity of States involved (at least 
including the State of origin and the ‘host’ State). Given that the moment in which the 
population of a State and its territory becomes formally discontinued is not settled, this thesis 
has differentiated between two main situations. In cases of partial de-population, the 
applicability of refugee law to climate-induced people displacement has not so far been 
accepted by the national courts of the two potential host countries of the region – Australia 
and New Zealand; international migration treaty law, whose material scope of application is 
less specialized than that of the refugee regime, is yet not applicable in the region, owing to 
the lack of ratification. Finally, the prospect of having to deal with total de-population scenarios 
in Pacific Island States (before total de-territorialization actually takes place) has shown that, 
ultimately, the content of this multilayered legal protection scheme in these cases cannot be 
fixed or defined as long as the contextual issue – namely, whether and when the State becomes 
extinct – is resolved. The determination of the fate of the State challenged by a high rate of, or 
total, de-population is a prerequisite for the determination of the eventual rights that people 
displaced by climate change may have. Yet, the answer to this question is beyond the realm of 
law and forces us to come back to the blurred and slippery boundaries between international 
law and international life. 
Although this fundamental and structuring question – whether and when Pacific island 
statehood may become extinct – remains outstanding, one thing can be made clear. In all 
stages and scenarios covered by the multilayered legal protection scheme, the action and 
presence of the political dimension of the State is fundamental, for it is the government that 
organizes and finances preventive and, in some cases, reactive relocation actions, and which is 
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also the entity tasked with negotiating migration agreements with other countries, providing 
their citizens with travel documents, purchasing land in other countries and, ultimately, raising 
their voice and defending their cause before the international community. Hence, as the 
protection of the human dimension of the State is necessarily ensured by its political 
dimension, it becomes necessary to study the effects of climate change on the governmental 
capacity of Pacific Island States and the correlative power this dimension may have for the 
defence of the continuation of their statehood. 
The government both embodies State’s distinctive sovereign powers and provides the 
State with the organs necessary to act and to display such powers, both nationally and 
internationally. First, climate change impacts are likely to affect the capacity of the State to 
protect its population in terms of security and other basic survival needs. This capacity will 
probably be even more undermined as the impacts of climate change on the State’s territory 
and population become so acute that the governmental authorities themselves are forced to 
evacuate the State territory and settle abroad. Recognition of Pacific islands’ prospective ex 
situ authorities as governments is then fundamental for the affected States to be able to 
conclude the international bilateral or multilateral treaties necessary to secure the protection 
of the population (for instance, through migration agreements). Although, prima facie, the 
recognition of Pacific islands’ ex situ authorities does not seem to raise any controversy when 
compared to traditional cases of governments in exile, the special circumstances in which 
Pacific islands’ governments will presumably be forced to evacuate State territory will, in the 
long run, generate unprecedented issues. This alludes to the instances in which the severe 
levels of de-territorialization and de-population take place at precisely the time when Pacific 
island governments are forced to evacuate. It is in this still prospective – yet plausible –
scenario that one of the outer boundaries of international law is reached, as both the response 
of the international community and the claims of the concerned States regarding their own 
situations become all the more determinant in defining the future continuation or demise of 
these States.  
In contrast to the limitations that the adverse impacts of climate change may impose on 
Pacific island governmental capacity relative to their national sphere, the participation of 
Pacific Island States in the international arena, which is always characterized as highly active 
and engaged, is likely to be pursued and all the more increased as their continuation as States 
becomes increasingly probable. At this point, the Climate Change and International Security 
Discourse acquires a new relevance. Beginning in this thesis as the source from which raising 
the question of whether and how climate change impacts jeopardize the continuation of 
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Pacific islands’ statehood was legitimized, it reappears at the end of the thesis as a possible 
important element of response to the question of Pacific islands’ continuation as States. 
Considering the inherent flexibility and practical nature of international law, it can be argued 
that the solution to the question will ultimately depend on the practical needs arising out of 
these extreme-case scenarios once they become present realities. When such a moment 
arrives, it may well be the first time in which the international community will be confronted 
with, at least, the following three possibilities: (1) to recognize the continuation of Pacific 
island statehood, in spite of the acute deterioration of its material elements, at least for the 
time necessary to ensure the best protection of Pacific islanders against statelessness; (2) to 
resist the far-fetched legal fiction that an ‘immaterial’ or almost ‘metaphysical’ State may 
continue to exist legally, but to recognize their extinction as States; or (3) to recognize the 
continuation of their international legal personality in a sui generis form.  
At this point, Duncan’s French contention that the law of statehood, qua process, 
inherently resists ‘manifold legal prisms’ and is thus subject – and open – to variations, seems 
to be just as valid and accurate for State creation as it is for State extinction. In fact, despite 
the widespread tendency to view State creation and State extinction as ‘natural opposites’, 
one could argue that they are connected in a circular way. For the eventual extinction of the 
legal personality of a Pacific island State will necessarily ensue in a new form of political 
organization for Pacific island peoples. Other than pragmatic factors and feasibility arguments, 
the normative blueprint determining whether variations in the law of statehood in the case of 
Pacific Island States can be viewed as acceptable should not only remind us of the ethical 
compromise vis-à-vis future generations, but also not disregard the fact that today’s present 
vulnerable condition of Pacific Island States is bound to the history of their colonial occupation 
by certain industrialized countries. May these factors come up in the real political scenario, 
when a more pressing time crystallizes, and influence the contingencies of the moment, so as 
to at least give the chance for Pacific Islanders to exercise collectively their right to self-
determination. While the exercise of such right at the birth of the State may be of little help to 
‘save it’ – the State’s political independence – it may at least contribute to the conservation of 
Pacific islanders’ cultural heritage and group identity.  
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CONCLUSIONES 
 
 ‘El Derecho de la estatalidad encapsula un proceso no 
fácilmente clasificable en la evaluación de un conglomerado de hechos a 
través de primas jurídicos variados, que pueden estar enfocados estrecha o 
ampliamente. Estas variaciones dependen de si la estatalidad es vista – 
generalmente a priori-  como aceptable o no permisible en cada caso’. 
1093
  
Duncan French, Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling 
Tradition and Modernity in International Law, 2013.   
 
1. El Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional: Representación 
Política de la Lucha de las Islas del Pacífico por su Supervivencia como Estados 
Apenas dos años antes del comienzo del nuevo milenio – cuando el Discurso del Cambio 
Climático y la Seguridad Internacional todavía no salido  a la luz como la representación 
política, autónoma y distinguible, de la lucha de las islas del Pacífico por su supervivencia como 
Estado – una obra revolucionaria titulada originalmente ‘L’objet du siècle’, llenó las estanterías 
de las librerías francesas.  Escrito por el historiador del arte y psicoanalista André Wajcman, 
este trabajo constituye, en esencia, una búsqueda retrospectiva dirigida a identificar la 
herencia más fundamental que el más sangriento de los siglos dejaba a la humanidad. 
Situándose en el ámbito de la historia del arte para realizar su búsqueda, Wacjman se 
preguntó entonces qué objeto de arte podía capturar y definir mejor la auténtica esencia del 
siglo XX. Ruinas? No, algo más lejano, y más fuerte. ‘La Ausencia’, concluye, es el verdadero 
objeto del siglo XX, el único realmente capaz de encapsular el significado de esta época.  
El propósito de Wacjman de encontrar en una representación artística la esencia de ese 
periodo de la historia de la humanidad pueda ser en cierta medida reproducido en el ámbito 
de la política y el Derecho cuando nos adentramos en el objeto de estudio de esta tesis. En 
efecto, el punto de partida de este trabajo ha sido el descubrimiento, a través de un trabajo de 
reconstrucción, de una narrativa presente en la esfera política internacional donde tres 
conceptos convergen, dos de los cuales son conceptos definitorios y estructurales de las 
                                                          
1093
 Traducción propia. La cita original indica: ‘The law of statehood encapsulates a process not readily 
classified within the assessment of a conglomeration of facts through manifold legal prisms, which can 
either be focused and narrow or broad and all-encompassing, such variations are dependent upon 
whether statehood is viewed – usually a priori – as acceptable or impermissible in any given situation’.  
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relaciones internacionales prácticamente desde el final de la Edad Media – el Estado y su 
seguridad-, siendo el tercero el cambio climático, que debe su reciente identificación al 
descubrimiento científico del efecto de las emisiones de gases a efecto invernadero iniciados 
en la era industrial de finales del siglo XIX.  
Si la búsqueda del objeto de representación artística del siglo XX llevó a Wacjman al 
concepto de ‘ausencia’ en arte contemporáneo abstracto, el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la 
Seguridad International, que constituye el objeto de estudio de la primera parte de esta tesis y 
en el que los tres conceptos convergen, constituye la representación política de la amenaza de 
desaparición – que no de ausencia- del Estado; institución que, ya adentrados en el siglo XXI, 
se ve enfrentado a los impactos negativos del cambio climático. Por supuesto, diferencias 
fundamentales distinguen el trabajo de Wajcman en el ámbito artístico de nuestra búsqueda 
en el terreno político-jurídico, como es el hecho de que el estudio de Wacjman se sitúa en el 
marco contextual y psicológico íntimamente vinculado a los graves crímenes de la Segunda 
Guerra Mundial así como a la ‘Solución Final’. Fue un trabajo marcado por un periodo concreto 
de la historia, y por tanto de corte retrospectivo. Por su parte, el Discurso del Cambio Climático 
y la Seguridad Internacional es, al contrario, una narrativa que provee una representación 
política de un escenario prospectivo. Un escenario que puede en última instancia – y de 
acuerdo con el propio Discurso- poner en riesgo el Estado, forma de organización política de 
más de cinco siglos, de manera sin precedentes. Bajo este prisma, conviene también 
reconsiderar la industrialización de los países desarrollados como  el comienzo del fin de la 
independencia política de los pequeños estados insulares post-coloniales. En este sentido, el 
Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional es un testimonio de una nueva 
manera común de aprehender el fenómeno del cambio climático, revelando en esta ocasión 
una preocupación compleja e inherente al fenómeno, a saber, la amenaza de extinción como 
Estado de las pequeñas islas como resultado de los impactos del cambio climático.  
Forjado en el ámbito político y encarnado en el lenguaje, el Discurso del Cambio Climático 
y la Seguridad Internacional ha construido tanto nuevos significados como nueva relaciones 
conceptuales. Antes de que el Discurso fuera reconocible y adquiriera autonomía, el concepto 
previamente acuñado de ‘seguridad ecológica internacional’, o seguridad ambiental, emergió 
como resultado de la combinación de dos manifestaciones de la Perestroika o  ‘Nuevo 
Pensamiento Soviético’ promovido por Mikhail Gorbachev a mediados de los años 80. Estas 
dos manifestaciones son, por un lado, el surgimiento de un nuevo movimiento ambientalista 
nacional soviético; y, por otro lado, la reificación del Derecho internacional y la consiguiente 
reconsideración del papel de la ideología en la gestión de las relaciones internacionales. Tras 
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ser acuñado, el término ‘seguridad ambiental internacional’ sirvió como vehículo conceptual 
del fundamental cambio de estrategia llevada a cabo por la Unión Soviética en el seno de 
Naciones Unidas a finales de los años 80. La noción fue por tanto presentada ante distintos 
órganos de Naciones Unidas bajo un formato y significados ambivalentes, constituyéndose 
como motor tanto de la cooperación internacional medioambiental, como también de la 
cooperación internacional en materia de desarme. No es de extrañar de los Estados Unidos de 
América se opusieran radicalmente a la política e innovación conceptual soviética propuesta 
ante los órganos de Naciones Unidas, si bien el rechazo fue más una reacción al intento más 
ambicioso de la Unión Soviética de abrir un nuevo  debate sobre el sistema de mantenimiento 
de la paz y seguridad internacionales que contra la noción de seguridad internacional 
ambiental como tal. Más adelante, la desintegración del bloque soviético produjo un doble 
efecto en el concepto. Por un lado, la propuesta soviética de incorporar la noción de 
‘seguridad ambiental internacional’ presentada ante los órganos de Naciones Unidas se 
disolvió. Únicamente la vertiente positiva – que llamaba al desarrollo de la cooperación 
internacional- continuó su curso. Por otro lado, la noción de seguridad ambiental resultó 
operar como una útil compensación a al llamado el ‘síndrome del enemigo’, y fue recuperado 
por agencias gubernamentales americanas. Importante innovaciones conceptuales de la 
noción de seguridad y su relación con el medio ambiente emergieron en las escuelas de 
estudios sobre seguridad internacional, acompañadas de una determinante reorientación de 
recursos financieros que ayudaron a la publicación los primeros estudios empíricos dirigidos a 
vincular la degradación o el estrés ambiental con el surgimiento del conflicto armado.  
Hoy en día, estos últimos estudios teóricos y empíricos sobre la relación entre las esferas 
del medioambiente y la seguridad, desarrolladas fuera del sistema de Naciones Unidas, 
permanecen, en cierta medida, activas; llegando a coincidir con el surgimiento del Discurso del 
Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional. Si bien este Discurso puede ser 
cronológicamente considerado como la ‘segunda ola’ del movimiento que busca vincular 
ambas esferas, habiéndose sin duda beneficiado del conocimiento y experiencias previas 
adquiridas por los negociadores y comunidades investigadoras, el Discurso del Cambio 
Climático y la Seguridad Internacional fue gestado por un grupo de actores distintos que 
aquellos involucrados en el precedente de la ‘seguridad ambiental internacional’; 
respondiendo a distintos problemas e intereses enmarcados en un contexto post-guerra fría; y 
contando con su abanico de investigación empírica específico y distinguible. 
Surgido en Alemania, donde los fundamentos, el leguaje innovador (que por ejemplo, 
calificaba el cambio climático como ‘multiplicador de amenazas’) y una metodología basada en 
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la unidad regional, fueron establecidas, el Discurso  del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad 
Internacional comenzó a adquirir autonomía al ser institucionalizado por la Unión Europea. Es 
además en el seno de esta cuna política donde se fue formando la comunidad epistémica 
sobre Cambio Climático y Seguridad Internacional, a través de la multiplicación de informes 
sobre este tema contratados por la UE y elaborados por la misma comunidad que previamente 
había sido contratada por el gobierno alemán y que había producido las primeras 
formulaciones de los vínculos entre el cambio climático y seguridad. Simultáneamente, en su 
calidad de miembros individuales de la Unión Europea, el Reino Unido, Dinamarca y los Países 
Bajos incorporaron el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional en el ámbito 
de sus respectivas estrategias de seguridad nacional, mientras otras instituciones de 
investigación (tales como el International Institute for Sustainable Development y la Royal 
United Services Institute) se sumaron a las instituciones pioneras (Ecologic Institute y, sobre 
todo, Adelphi Consult). Estos informes, junto con la voluntad política subyacente que promovió 
su elaboración, diseñaron el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional como 
un paraguas de amplio espectro en el que la manifestación de una serie de impactos negativos 
del cambio climático fueron cartografiados en distintas regiones del mundo (desde seguridad 
alimentaria, estrés por escasez de agua, aumento del nivel del mar o avance de la 
desertificación). No obstante, la característica diferencial del Discurso del Cambio Climático y 
la Seguridad Internacional - que permite distinguirlo de otros discursos relacionados sobre 
adaptación y resistencia al cambio climático - es su objetivo fundacional: anticipar cómo estas 
transformaciones pueden exacerbar los conflictos locales o regionales y, correlativamente, 
establecer en qué medida estos cambios son susceptibles de modificar la posición geo-política 
de las organizaciones regionales y Estados miembros promotores del Discurso.  
Una vez establecido, el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional se 
consolidó a través de su diseminación por la Unión Europea a la Organización de Seguridad y 
Cooperación Europea (OSCE) y la Organización del Tratado Atlántico (OTAN). En estas dos 
organizaciones regionales de seguridad, el Discurso se convirtió en objeto de un dialogo 
transatlántico formal entre la UE y Estados miembros de la OSCE con los Estados Unidos de 
América. Después, el Discurso circuló de estas ‘regiones hegémonicas’ hacia áreas de extrema 
vulnerabilidad a los impactos del cambio climático. Como resultado de esta circulación, el 
fuerte sesgo geo-político inherente al Discurso en sus orígenes quedo amainado, permitiendo 
que el Discurso adquiriese mayor legitimidad. El contraste entre la incorporación del Discurso 
en la agenda del Foro de las Islas del Pacífico, así como en el trabajo de la Unión Africana, por 
un lado, y su limitada aceptación por organizaciones regionales asiáticas y latinoamericanas 
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(ASEAN, Organización de Cooperación de Shanghái, Organización de Estados Americanos, 
CARICOM, MERCOSUR, UNASUR y el grupo ALBA), indica que el éxito de la diseminación del 
Discurso depende de la presencia de una serie de condiciones. En primer lugar, la voluntad 
política del promotor del Discurso (la UE) de circularlo hacia otra organización regional 
específica requiere, para su cristalización, de la reactivación de un partenariado, alianza o 
marco de cooperación  política, uniendo dicho marco de cooperación inter-regional con una 
transferencia financiera (por ejemplo, como inversión en proyectos de adaptación o de 
desarrollo de energías renovables). En segundo lugar, el foro de recepción del Discurso 
también está sujeto a determinados requisitos. Parece importante que los miembros de la 
organización regional en cuestión tengan un nivel de vulnerabilidad a los impactos del cambio 
climático bastante homogéneo, y que compartan posiciones o visiones comunes en el seno de 
las negociaciones del clima. Asimismo, la existencia de intereses en común con los promotores 
del Discurso - o al menos, la ausencia de intereses económicos encontrados en áreas clave 
cubiertas por el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional (tales como 
seguridad alimentaria o energética) es fundamental.  
Identificar y cartografiar la construcción y diseminación del Discurso al nivel de análisis 
regional facilita la comprensión de su razón de ser, que es tan amplia como compleja. Sin 
embargo, no es sino cuando la comunidad internacional en su globalidad se ve enfrentada al 
Discurso que la operatividad de éste a nivel de análisis universal  o global puede ser 
verdaderamente aprehendido. La introducción del Discurso en la agenda de las organizaciones 
universales relevantes tuvo así un efecto doble y recíproco. Por un lado, la incorporación del 
Discurso en la agenda de las organizaciones internacionales universales revela el proceso por 
el que una estrategia de definición de la agenda de trabajo acaba convirtiéndose en acción 
política concreta, ya sea por transformación de antiguos esquemas de cooperación 
internacional o mediante la generación de innovadoras tendencias. Por otro lado, cuando el 
Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional fue presentado en un foro genuina 
e ilimitadamente multilateral – a saber, los órganos de Naciones Unidas-, el Discurso fue 
transformado como resultado del intercambio político, la negociación y los compromisos 
resultantes de esta.  
La operatividad del Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional en el 
seno de las organizaciones internacionales universales puede ser dividida en tres etapas 
principales. En primer lugar, el Discurso fue introducido en el Consejo de Seguridad como 
resultado de una iniciativa del Reino Unido, uno de los principales promotores del Discurso 
dentro de la Unión Europea. Este primer contacto del Discurso con el órgano de la ONU 
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responsable del mantenimiento de la paz y seguridad internacionales, tuvo lugar cuando la 
institucionalización del Discurso en la UE se encontraba todavía en una etapa inicial. Su 
presentación al Consejo de Seguridad, donde fue recibido por Estados Miembro de la ONU no 
necesariamente integrados en la circulación inter-regional del Discurso, estaba impregnada de  
la visión geo-política inicial sobre cómo las consecuencias del fenómeno podían afectar a 
factores clave de la seguridad internacional – con especial énfasis los efectos del cambio 
climático en el sector energético. La introducción del Discurso durante la preparación en 2007 
de la Cumbre de Cambio Climático, sumado a su formato original de sesgo hegemónico, 
transmitió la imagen de que, en esencia, el Discurso servía para influenciar y ejercer presión en 
las negociaciones del clima, perfilándose como una alternativa ‘ilegítima’ a éstas. A pesar de 
que los Estados amenazados por los impactos más extremos del cambio climático apoyaron la 
iniciativa hegemónica por su capacidad de generar e incrementar la idea de que reaccionar 
frente al fenómeno es una necesidad urgente, no es de extrañar que el primer intento de 
abarcar el cambio climático desde la perspectiva de la seguridad encontrara fuerte oposición 
por parte de Estados preocupados por preservar la razón de ser original de la cooperación 
internacional en materia de cambio climático.   No obstante, una vez que la introducción del 
Discurso en la agenda de los órganos relevantes de Naciones Unidas pasó de la Unión Europea 
a ser encabezado los Estados Insulares del Pacífico, y trasladado del Consejo de Seguridad a la 
Asamblea General, el nivel de recepción y aceptación del Discurso transformó el panorama 
austero inicial. En efecto, además de la negociación que culminó con la adopción en 2009 de la 
Resolución de la Asamblea General 63/281 sobre Cambio Climático y sus Posibles 
Implicaciones para la Seguridad, la súplica existencial de los Estados Insulares del Pacífico tiñó 
el sentido fundamental del Discurso, produciendo una auténtica re-definición o re-significación 
de éste. Asimismo, los roles respectivos de los órganos y agencias de Naciones Unidas con 
relación al Discurso fueron igualmente perfilados. A partir de entonces, las implicaciones en 
materia de seguridad del cambio climático fueron en concreto asociadas a la pérdida de 
territorio y movimientos migratorios de la población de los pequeños Estados insulares 
afectados por el aumento del nivel del mar. El nuevo sentido del Discurso, así como la división 
de competencias de esta problemática  entre los órganos y organizaciones relevantes, quedó 
finalmente consolidada cuando el cambio climático fue incorporado en la agenda del Consejo 
de Seguridad por segunda vez, en 2011. Cierto es que la última etapa de la operatividad del 
Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional en el Consejo de Seguridad no dio 
lugar a la adopción de medidas concretas dirigidas a los Estados miembro de Naciones Unidas. 
No obstante, sí implicó que el cambio climático sea en adelante tomado en cuenta por el 
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Secretario General de Naciones Unidas en la descripción de la ‘información contextual’ relativa 
a las operaciones militares del Consejo de Seguridad.  
 A pesar de que hasta el momento el Discurso no se ha cristalizado en acciones reales 
susceptibles de modificar el comportamiento de la ONU ni de los Estados miembros 
individuales con relación al cambio climático, una consecuencia fundamental surge en el 
ámbito jurídico. En efecto, la reconstrucción del Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad 
Internacional has demostrado cómo la evolución de éste en el seno de las organizaciones 
internacionales universales dio lugar al reconocimiento de que la continuación como Estado de 
las pequeñas islas está seriamente amenazada por los impactos adversos del cambio climático. 
Hoy por hoy, hay  consenso político en cuanto a la consideración del Discurso del Cambio 
Climático  y la Seguridad Internacional encarna y desvela esta cuestión fundamental. Siendo la 
estatalidad el concepto central de esta problemática, merece consideración y estudio desde la 
desde la perspectiva del Derecho internacional ya que,  tal y como apuntan Emily Crawford y 
Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘a pesar de que las consideraciones sobre los efectos del cambio climático 
parecen prematuras, la búsqueda del Derecho por la certidumbre requiere, al  menos, la 
identificación – si no la total consideración- de las posibles consecuencias jurídicas de la 
desaparición de los Estados’. 1094  La reconstrucción del Discurso del Cambio Climático y la 
Seguridad prueba que realizar esta tarea no es un propósito tan prematuro como puede 
parecer desde una perspectiva basada en criterios de probabilidad y predicción científica. 
 Ciertamente, el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional no es, en 
sentido estricto, un discurso medioambientalista – es decir, una narrativa que define e 
interpreta las cuestiones medioambientales y cuyo último propósito es abordar tales 
cuestiones. Más bien, el foco del Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad está en los 
efectos de un problema medioambiental con múltiples manifestaciones en la organización 
socio-política de la comunidad internacional. No obstante, el hecho de que sea el Estado – y no 
el cambio climático- el concepto central del Discurso sobre Cambio Climático y Seguridad 
Internacional, no significa que la existencia del cambio climático  y la preocupación por 
problemas medioambientales sean negadas o infravaloradas. En otras palabras, el hecho de 
que el cambio climático sea socialmente interpretado a través de la construcción por parte de 
actores estatales del Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad no implica que el fenómeno 
como tal sea irreal desde una perspectiva empírico-científica, ni tampoco que la existencia de 
                                                          
1094 E. CRAWFORD and R. RAYFUSE,, ‘Climate Change and Statehood’, supra, at 253 
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ambas perspectivas (el Discurso/Estado y la empírico/científica) sean incompatibles o 
mutualmente excluyentes.   
Adoptar la visión opuesta – predominante entre los autores postmodernos- que 
considera que no hay escapatoria o salida a la subjetividad de los puntos de vista, sería como 
considerar que el medioambiente no constituye sino una sub-categoría de la cultura. En esta 
tesis, el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad Internacional no ha sido considerado 
como ‘positivo’ o ‘negativo’ como tal. Una evaluación normativa en este sentido ha sido 
voluntariamente evitada por ser considerada irrelevante. Más bien, el interés de la 
reconstrucción del Discurso se ha centrado en la acción política que puede potencialmente 
generar en la esfera internacional, pudiendo llevar en última instancia al desarrollo o 
lanzamiento innovadores procesos de creación normativa. Como resultado, embarcarse en un 
análisis y en la consideración exhaustiva de los impactos del cambio climático en la 
continuación de los Estados insulares del Pacífico puede no basarse meramente en la 
‘búsqueda del Derecho por la certidumbre’ – ‘the ‘law’s quest of certainty’-, abogada por Emily 
Crawford y Rosemary Rayfuse, sino constituir una respuesta real a la reivindicación socio-
política dirigida por los Estados afectados y formulada a través de la construcción del Discurso 
sobre Cambio Climático y Seguridad Internacional en organizaciones internacionales.  
Y así, el final natural cronológico de la reconstrucción del Discurso del Cambio 
Climático y la Seguridad Internacional constituye a su vez el punto de partida normativo de la 
pregunta jurídica revelada por dicho Discurso. 
 
2.  Consecuencias Jurídicas de los Impactos del Cambio Climático en la Estatalidad de 
las Islas del Pacifico: Efectos Multidimensionales y Resultados Coyunturales 
 
Al abordar las consecuencias del cambio climático en la continuación de los Estados 
insulares del Pacífico, la dimensión geográfica o espacial del Estado es el primer factor 
merecedor de escrutinio. Un estudio genealógico del significado del territorio en Derecho 
internacional indica, en primer lugar, que así como la naturaleza del Estado (hábitat 
conceptual privilegiado del territorio) es una cuestión que supera el  ámbito del Derecho, el 
espacio del territorio en Derecho internacional es una cuestión igualmente irresoluta y su 
naturaleza jurídica cuestionable. Es posible dibujar un mosaico de explicaciones jurídicas sobre 
la noción de territorio, desde una aproximación histórica, y tras la cual se establezca en cada 
contexto las diferentes funciones operadas por el territorio en el orden jurídico internacional. 
En el contexto del Estado moderno europeo, el concepto de territorio ha sido aprehendido 
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como propiedad del  Estado (teoría de la propiedad), como elemento o parte integral del 
Estado en sí (teoría constitutiva), o como el espacio en el que se extiende que la competencia 
del Estado (teoría de la competencia). No obstante, cuando se trata de determinar el 
significado del territorio en los Estados post-coloniales, tales como los Estados insulares del 
Pacífico, emerge u cuarto sentido del concepto de territorio. En estos casos, el territorio debe 
ser entendido como vehículo para la expresión o manifestación del derecho de los pueblos 
insulares del Pacífico a la auto-determinación e independencia política de la dominación 
colonial. Este sentido particular y específico, consistente en considera el territorio como un 
vehículo para expresar un derecho, explica porqué los  Estados insulares del Pacífico fueron 
reconocidos como Estado a pesar de su más que limitado espacio terrestre, y muestra cómo la 
existencia de una base normativa sólida puede equilibrar e incluso suplantar el criterio de la 
viabilidad. Por ende, la reducida extensión terrestre de los Estados insulares del Pacífico se ve 
está ampliamente compensada por los vastos espacios marinos que les fueron otorgados por 
la Convención del Mar, y que constituyen tanto su  fuente prominente de expresión espacial 
como su principal fuente de recursos económicos. Paradójicamente, para estos países, a 
menudo denominados ‘Estados oceánicos’, el mar constituye tanto un elemento fundamental 
de su identidad y fuente primaria de su sustento, como el origen de la amenaza latente a su 
continuación como Estados.  
Así, la des-territorialización debida a los impactos  del cambio climático en los Estados 
insulares del Pacífico constituye, en primer lugar, un desafío a los derechos sobre los espacios 
marinos de estos Estados. A medida que sus costas retroceden progresivamente como 
resultado del aumento del nivel del mar y de la acidificación de los océanos, las líneas de base 
– generalmente consideradas como ‘ambulatorias’- retroceden correlativamente, y por tanto 
igualmente retroceden las fronteras marítimas del Estado afectado. Entre los mecanismos 
jurídicos destinados a frenar estos efectos, cabe destacar la ratificación de acuerdos de 
delimitación marítima entre los Estados insulares del Pacífico, así como la posibilidad de fijar 
las líneas de base, adquirir la condición de Estado archipelágico al establecer el trazados de las 
líneas, y después abstenerse de poner al día las cartas náuticas oficiales. Otros mecanismos 
menos útiles y más agresivos - de naturaleza física y no jurídica - como la construcción de 
rompeolas o diques en el mar, también han sido considerados por algunos de los Estados 
afectados. No obstante, mientras los esfuerzos por congelar, preservar o proteger la 
dimensión espacial de los Estados insulares del Pacífico contra los impactos adversos del 
cambio climático florecen y se desarrollan en la región, el escenario prospectivo de una des-
territorialización total no puede ser ignorado. Entre las respuestas alternativas a esta 
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expresión extrema de los efectos nocivos del cambio climático, se incluyen las estrategias 
jurídicas de re-territorialización, tales como la compra de terrenos en países extranjeros; la 
eventual unión con otro Estado; o bien, como ejemplo más prominente y audaz, la posibilidad 
de considerar a los Estados insulares del Pacífico completamente sumergidos como una forma 
post-moderna o contemporánea de entidad soberana no  estatal. Los precedentes de la Santa 
Sede y la Orden de Malta, que todavía hoy mantienen un estatus atípico, muestran que hay 
espacio y flexibilidad en la vida internacional como para aceptar y permitir  la existencia 
política de una tipología variada de sujetos del sistema jurídico internacional - siempre y 
cuando fuertes razones de índole histórico-política justifiquen o expliquen este trato especial. 
Dichos precedentes son igualmente un recordatorio  de que, a pesar de que la soberanía es la 
principal característica del Estado, ésta puede operar  también fuera  del marco estatal. 
Soberanía y estatalidad pueden por tanto venir de la mano, o existir separadamente, en caso 
de que la necesidad urja a reconocer la existencia (o sub-sistencia) de una entidad política 
especial que juega un papel positivo en la comunidad internacional.  
La continuación de la soberanía y/o estatalidad de los Estados insulares del Pacífico, 
incluso en casos extremos de pérdida territorial total, puede estar justificada por el papel  
operado por la segunda dimensión del Estado, es decir, su población, dado que la desaparición 
de una entidad soberana estatal con personalidad jurídica internacional sería en principio 
resultado de la total o grave despoblación del Estado, acaecida antes de que la sumersión total 
del territorio tenga lugar.  
Estrechamente conectado con la acechante perspectiva de des-territorialización, la 
primera manifestación de los impactos del cambio climático en la dimensión humana de los 
Estados insulares del Pacífico es la degradación de las condiciones de habitabilidad de sus 
habitantes. La reacción paradigmática al estrés medioambiental agudo sufrido por las 
poblaciones de los Estados  insulares del Pacífico es su desplazamiento y consiguiente 
relocalización a un nuevo emplazamiento donde sus necesidades de supervivencia básicas 
puedan quedar cubiertas. Aunque esta reacción parece, prima facie, la  forma más común de 
adaptación, como ha quedado registrado en numerosos ejemplos de la historia universal, una 
mirada más cercana a los casos de relocalización llevados  a cabo en la región del Pacífico  sur 
desenmascara tanto el carácter fundamentalmente diferencial de estos casos, como las 
complejidades subyacentes del proceso de relocalización es esta región específica.  
En primer lugar, las acciones operadas en la región para preservar las condiciones de 
habitabilidad de los habitantes de los Estados insulares del Pacífico, tales como prevenir su 
reasentamiento, son similares de Estado a Estado, dibujando por tanto un escenario 
  A.TORRES CAMPRUBI 
  Phd Thesis_ Tesis doctoral_ Feb 2014 
 
433 
 
homogéneo en esta región. Esto se debe  a que las acciones gubernamentales son organizadas, 
coordinadas e incluso financiadas a nivel regional y están estrechamente vinculadas a las 
medidas de implementación de proyectos provenientes del régimen internacional contra el 
cambio climático, así como a la acción internacional en materia de reducción del riesgo de 
desastres.  
En contraste, cuando tales acciones preventivas de relocalización no pueden garantizar 
el mantenimiento de las necesidades de supervivencia básicas, resultando en el 
desplazamiento forzado de los habitantes isleños de la región, las acciones concebidas para 
reaccionar frente a los escenarios de relocalización varían en gran medida de Estado a Estado, 
ofreciendo por tanto un escenario disperso y altamente heterogéneo. Estas diferencias 
florecen como resultado de factores socio-culturales, políticos y geográficos que incluyen, inter 
alia, los distintos niveles de presencia efectiva de los gobiernos nacionales en la vida diaria de 
la población; la complejidad de los sistemas de propiedad y tenencia de la tierra– 
generalmente basadas en reglas consuetudinarias ancestrales – ; o las diferencias entre 
relocalizaciones que tienen lugar dentro de un escenario agrícola y aquéllas que conllevan el 
traslado de una parte de la población a un espacio urbano (generalmente ya sobrepoblado). 
Tras revelar estas diferencias fundamentales, cabe realizar aproximación crítica a cómo el 
desplazamiento inducido por el cambio climático ha sido hasta ahora abordado por la doctrina 
internacionalista. A pesar de que, en general, los estudios existentes diagnostican 
correctamente los  desafíos jurídicos en juego – a saber, la escasez normativa y el carácter 
inapropiado de los instrumentos e instituciones existentes- las soluciones propuestas para 
superar dichos desafíos – por ejemplo, con la creación de nuevos instrumentos jurídicos, 
desarrollo de instrumentos e instituciones existentes, o promoción de los vínculos inter-
regímenes – son, o bien inapropiados, o bien insuficientes para abordar las complejidades 
inherentes al fenómeno del desplazamiento inducido por el cambio climático en la región de 
Pacífico sur mencionadas previamente. Estos estudios proponen respuestas deductivas o ‘top-
down’ que no responden a la heterogeneidad fáctica existente. Además, cabe en particular 
resaltar que ninguna de las propuestas hasta ahora formuladas tiene en cuenta la variable 
contextual que enmarca dichas relocalizaciones, desatendiendo o ignorando  el problema de la 
continuación del Estado y cómo esta cuestión pendiente condiciona las respuestas propuestas 
al problema de los desplazamientos. Como resultado de esta visión crítica de la literatura 
existente, esta tesis ha propuesto una aproximación a la cuestión de la protección jurídica de 
los habitantes de las islas de Pacifico a través de un marco multi-nivel que integre tanto las 
etapas de relocalización preventiva y reactiva; distinga entre relocalizaciones a nivel nacional y 
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relocalizaciones trasfronterizas; y, por consiguiente, reubique el problema en su contexto más 
amplio al asociarlo con a la cuestión irresoluta, de si la continuación del Estado en cuestión 
puede o no estar amenazada. Esta cuestión es en realidad el autentico eje estructural de la 
propuesta de tratar el desplazamiento inducido por el cambio climático a través de un 
esquema de protección jurídica multi-nivel, y esencialmente recalca la idea de que el destino 
de los habitantes de las islas del Pacifico y su eventual sistema protección jurídica no puede 
quedar disociada del destino de su Estado de origen. A continuación, cuando se trata de llenar 
cada unos de los estratos que componen el marco jurídico multi-nivel de referencia con 
derechos concretos, algunas de las propuestas más recurrentes en la doctrina internacionalista 
resultan igualmente inútiles en la región del Pacifico sur. En casos de desplazamientos 
nacionales – que no ponen en peligro la continuación del Estado – la aplicabilidad de los 
tratados de derechos humanos es muy limitada, debido al bajo nivel de ratificación en la región 
del Pacto internacional de Derecho Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. No obstante, el 
desarrollo de una aproximación desde la perspectiva de los derechos humanos podría tener un 
impacto positivo en la implementación de instrumentos de derecho internacional del medio 
ambiente – en particular del Convenio Marco de Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático, que 
ha sido ratificado por todos los Estados del Pacifico. La relocalización nacional en su fase 
reactiva alude fundamentalmente a los niveles de garantía o protección de derechos de 
alojamiento, tenencia de la tierra y de propiedad que, además de estar poco reconocidos en 
tratados de derechos humanos, se encuentran sobre todo regulados por sistemas tradicionales 
consuetudinarios que pueden generar obstáculos significativos a que los desplazados por el 
cambio climático puedan acceder a nuevas tierras. Por un lado, en estos casos, los derechos de 
alojamiento, tenencia de la tierra y de propiedad de algunos grupos minoritarios (minorías 
étnicas, mujeres y niños)- pueden quedar cubiertos por tratados de derechos humanos 
especializados que cuentan con un mayor nivel de ratificación que los instrumentos generales. 
Por otro lado, instrumentos informales, como los Principios Rectores sobre Desplazados 
Internos, a pesar de poder servir de guía a futuros desarrollos normativos, no son adecuados 
para responder a los desplazamientos inducidos por factores medioambientales. En casos de 
desplazamientos transnacionales – que constituyen la auténtica amenaza a la continuación 
como de las islas del Pacifico como Estados – surgen dificultades relacionadas con la 
multiplicidad de Estados involucrados – ya que incluyen al menos al Estado de origen y al 
Estado de acogida. Dado que el momento en el que la relación entre la población de un Estado 
y su territorio se vuelve formalmente discontinua no está fijado, esta tesis ha distinguido dos 
tipos de situaciones. En casos de despoblación parcial, la aplicabilidad del derecho de los 
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refugiados a los desplazados inducidos por el cambio climático no ha sido hasta el momento 
aceptada por los tribunales nacionales de los dos países con potencial de acogida de la región – 
Australia y Nueva Zelandia. Por otro lado, el derecho internacional migratorio de fuente 
convencional, cuyo ámbito  de aplicación material es menos especializado que el del régimen 
de los refugiados, no es sin embargo, todavía aplicable en la región, debido al bajo nivel de 
ratificación. Finalmente, la perspectiva de tener que lidiar con escenarios de despoblación total 
en los Estados insulares del Pacifico (antes de que la des-territorialización total llegue a 
cristalizarse), ha demostrado que a fin de cuentas el contenido del marco jurídico multi-nivel 
para estos casos no puede fijarse ni definirse hasta que la cuestión contextual  - es decir, si el 
Estado se extingue y, en su caso, en momento en que la extinción puede ser reconocida 
objetivamente- quede resuelta.  
La determinación del destino del Estado desafiado por un alto nivel o total des-
población es un prerrequisito para la determinación de los derechos de los que las personas 
desplazadas por el cambio climático podrán, eventualmente, prevalecerse. No obstante, la 
respuesta a esta pregunta supera las fronteras formales del Derecho y nos fuerza a regresar a 
los límites difusos y resbaladizos entre el Derecho internacional y las relaciones internacionales.  
Aunque esta pregunta estructural y fundamental – si la  personalidad jurídica internacional 
de los Estados insulares del Pacifico puede llegar extinguirse – permanece sin resolver, un 
punto puede al menos quedar establecido con claridad: en todas las etapas y escenarios 
cubiertos por el marco de protección jurídica multi-nivel, la acción y la presencia de la 
dimensión política del Estado es fundamental, ya que es el gobierno quien organiza y financia 
las acciones preventiva de relocalización (en algunos casos, también las acciones reactivas), 
siendo asimismo la entidad encargada de negociar los acuerdos migratorios con otros países; 
de entregar a sus ciudadanos documentos de identidad y pasaportes para viajar; de comprar 
tierras en otros países; y, en última instancia, de levantar la voz y defender la causa del Estado 
que representan ante la comunidad internacional. Por tanto, dado que la protección de la 
dimensión humana del Estados está necesariamente vinculada e incluso asegurada por 
dimensión política, es necesario estudiar los efectos del cambio climático en la capacidad 
gubernativa de los Estados insulares del Pacifico y el poder correlativo que esta dimensión 
tiene en la defensa de la continuación de su estatalidad.  
El gobierno encarna los poderes soberanos distintivos del  Estado y otorga al Estado los 
órganos necesarios para actuar y ejercitar estos poderes, tanto a nivel nacional como 
internacional. En primer lugar, los impactos del cambio climático probablemente afecten a la 
capacidad del Estado de proteger su población en términos de seguridad y demás necesidades 
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básicas de supervivencia. Esta capacidad quedará probablemente socavada a medida que los 
impactos del cambio climático en el territorio del Estado y de su población se vuelvan tan 
acuciantes que las propias autoridades se vean forzadas a evacuar el territorio del Estado e 
instalarse en el extranjero. El reconocimiento de las futuras ‘autoridades ex situ’ de los Estados 
insulares del Pacifico como gobiernos adquiere entonces una relevancia fundamental para los 
Estados afectados, en particular de cara a poder concluir tratados y acuerdos bilaterales o 
multilaterales necesarios para asegurar la protección de la población (por ejemplo, a través de 
acuerdos migratorios). A pesar de que, prima facie, el reconocimiento de las autoridades ex 
situ de las islas del Pacifico no genera ningún tipo de controversia cuando se compara su 
situación con los casos tradicionales de gobiernos en el exilio, las circunstancias especiales en 
las que los gobiernos de las islas del Pacifico se verán forzados a evacuar el territorio 
generarán,  a largo plazo, una serie de problemáticas sin precedentes. Esto alude en particular 
a las instancias en que el Estado es testigo y víctima de niveles severos de des-territorialización 
y despoblación al tiempo que los gobiernos de las islas del Pacifico se ven forzados a evacuar el 
territorio nacional. Este escenario prospectivo – y sin embargo plausible- nos acerca a unas de 
las fronteras del Derecho internacional, ya que tanto la respuesta de la comunidad 
internacional como las reivindicaciones de los Estados afectados se constituyen como factores 
determinantes en la definición de la futura continuación o desaparición de estos Estados.  
En contraste con las limitaciones que los impactos adversos del cambio climático puede 
imponer en la capacidad gubernativa de las islas del Pacifico con relación a su esfera nacional, 
la participación de los Estados insulares del Pacifico en la esfera internacional – que se 
caracteriza siempre por su alto nivel de actividad y compromiso- probablemente proseguirá su 
curso, e incluso se acrecentara a medida que su continuación como Estados se torne cada vez 
más improbable. Llegado este momento, el Discurso del Cambio Climático y la Seguridad 
Internacional adquiere una nueva relevancia. Si bien al comienzo de esta tesis se configuraba 
como la fuente de legitimación de la pregunta jurídica – en qué medida los impactos del 
cambio climático amenazan la continuación como Estado de las pequeñas islas  del Pacifico - el 
Discurso reaparece al final de esta tesis como un probable importante elemento de respuesta 
a dicha pregunta. Considerando la inherente flexibilidad y naturaleza práctica del Derecho 
internacional, es posible argumentar que la solución a la cuestión dependerá, en última 
instancia, de las necesidades prácticas que surjan de estos escenarios extremos, una vez se 
configuren como realidades presentes. Llegado este momento, es posible que por primera vez 
la comunidad internacional se vea frente, al menos, tres posibilidades: 1) reconocer la 
continuación como Estado de las islas del Pacifico, a pesar del agudo deterioro de sus  
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elementos materiales, al menos por el tiempo necesario para asegurar el mayor nivel de 
protección de los habitantes de las islas del Pacifico frente a la apatria; 2) resistir la ficción 
jurídica de que un Estado ‘inmaterial’ o incluso ‘metafísico’ puede continuar a existir 
jurídicamente, y reconocer su extinción como Estado; o bien 3) reconocer que la continuación 
de su personalidad jurídica internacional bajo  una forma sui generis hasta ahora desconocida.  
Frente a este abanico de posibilidades, la consideración de Duncan French de que el 
Derecho relativo a la condición de Estado (‘the law of statehood’)  está sujeto – y abierto- a 
variaciones, parece ser tan válido y pertinente para la creación de los Estados como para la 
extinción de estos. De hecho, a pesar de la tendencia ampliamente extendida que considera la 
creación del Estado y su extinción como ‘opuestos naturales’, es posible concebir ambos 
procesos como conectados de manera circular -  siendo en realidad, parte de un único 
proceso-,  dado que la eventual extinción de la personalidad jurídica de un Estado  insular del 
Pacifico dará lugar, necesariamente, a una nueva forma de organización política de sus 
habitantes. Dejando de lado los factores prácticos y argumentos de viabilidad, el plan de 
acción normativo que determinará si las variaciones en el Derecho de la estatalidad, necesarias 
en el caso de los Estados insulares del Pacifico, son o no aceptables, debiera tomar en cuenta 
no sólo el compromiso ético suscrito por la comunidad internacional de cara frente a las 
futuras generaciones; sino también reconocer que la condición de vulnerabilidad actual de los 
Estados insulares del Pacifico está íntimamente vinculada a la historia de su ocupación y 
explotación colonial por ciertos Estados industrializados. Que muchos de esos factores 
emerjan en los escenarios políticos reales, cuando tiempos de mayor  presión sobre estos 
Estados se cristalice, e influencien las contingencias  del momento, para que al menos los 
habitantes isleños del Pacifico  tengan la  oportunidad de ejercer colectivamente su derecho a 
la auto-determinación. Quizás el ejercicio de este derecho con el nacimiento de la nueva forma 
de organización política pueda al menos contribuir a la conservación de la herencia  cultural e 
identidad grupal de los pueblos del Pacifico.  
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